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Summary: 
This thesis asks whether foundational principles exist, from which meaningful and just 
cross-cultural dialogue can take place to establish international principles of conduct, 
interactions and law. It claims that this will offer a possible and viable response to the 
concerns surrounding the homogenising nature of universalism, and the often imperialist 
justifications underlying it in cases of international principle formation and application. This 
is achieved by postulating Kantian notions of internal self-law giving and external willkür as 
potential foundational principles. It then seeks to question the validity of these claims 
through an examination of African political theory. The purpose of this is to look at African 
political theory for ideas equal to, or similar in foundation to, notions of internal and 
external self-law giving.  
The aim is to establish an analytical framework through which the principles of internal and 
external self-law giving can be operationalised for usage in the textual analysis; defining the 
analytical framework as including the concepts of freedom of choice versus domination, 
equality of individuals and self-mastery as representing the overarching principles of 
internal and external self-law giving. Following on from this Chapter 2 locates the thesis 
within the wider literature through a discussion of culture, universalism and relativism in 
both the Western liberal and African traditions. It establishes the role of this thesis in 
arguing that these foundations can form the basis for open and just cross-cultural dialogue. 
Finally the main body of the work focuses on a selection of schools of African political 
thought, or collection of thinkers, which have been grouped together based on similarities 
in their views or the individual’s claimed membership to a particular ideology or system of 
thought. Within the work of each group of thinkers the thesis seeks to locate the principles 
of internal and external self-law giving.  
This thesis contributes to the ever growing literature surrounding the topic of comparative 
political theory. It supports a model of weak universalism premised on the understanding 
of foundational principles that can be approached and responded to in culturally specific 
ways: whilst also respecting individual autonomy and personhood. In concluding it is 
suggested that an argument can be made for the necessity for open, honest and fair cross-
cultural dialogue that is justified by, and respectful of, these principles as existing at the 
centre of political discourse in both the Kantian model and the selection of African political 
theory examined by this project. It can therefore be argued that this thesis establishes an 
evidence base for the potential a priori nature of the principles of internal self-law giving 
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and external willkür: understood as freedom of choice, self-mastery and equality of 
individuals. This thesis thus makes the recommendation that these principles should be 
recognised and respected as foundations of, and central to, just and fair cross-cultural 
dialogue.   
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Introduction: 
.1- Introduction and Overview: 
The purpose of this thesis is to ask whether foundational principles exist, shared by us all, 
from which meaningful and just cross-cultural dialogue can take place to establish 
international principles of conduct, interactions and law. The hope being that this will offer 
a possible and viable response to the concerns surrounding the homogenising nature of 
universalism, and the often imperialist justifications underlying it, in cases of international 
principle formation and application. Cross-cultural studies are often criticised for paying 
either too great or too little heed to issues of cultural difference; the intention of this piece 
of work is to suggest a shared foundational position from which these discussions can take 
place in a way that is respectful of difference whilst also recognising a shared humanity. 
The term foundation will be understood within this thesis as “some class of statements or 
propositions, which are favoured absolutely over others. To be foundational, this class of 
statements is regarded as ‘fundamental’- ‘fundamental’ implying that its possessors cannot 
avoid deferring or referring back to it” (Vincent, 2007, p.3). The aim of this study is to find 
what that common factor might be from which we are able to see ourselves in one another. 
In line with Fred Dallmayr I see that the “point of comparative political theory (or cross-
cultural studies)… is precisely to move in the direction of a more genuine universalism” 
(Dallmayr, 2010, p.15). Rather than imposing universal principles from above this study 
asks what shared traits exist prior to politics and society: a priori. It recognises that “shared 
meanings and practices - to the extent that this is possible - can only arise from the lateral 
interaction, negotiation, and contestation among different, historically grown cultural 
frameworks” (Dallmayr, 2010, p.7) and aims to provide foundational principles, or shared 
traits, on which this dialogue can be premised. 
This is achieved by postulating Kantian notions of internal self-law giving and external 
willkür as potential foundational principles and then seeking to question the validity of 
these claims through an examination of African political theory. The purpose of this is to 
look within a range of African political theory for ideas equal to, or similar in foundation to, 
notions of internal and external self-law giving. This thesis will then either support or 
dispute the claim that these ideas act largely as universally shared foundational principles, 
which are equally valued by political theorists of different cultural backgrounds. This thesis 
does not imply that the two principles will be similarly substantiated within the different 
literatures, but rather that they are metaphysical points around which debates exist both 
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within different cultural groups and between cultures. To clarify using the example of 
individual choice (one understanding of external self-law giving): this thesis accepts that 
the concept of individual choice may be responded to in numerous ways by different 
groups, cultures or individuals. It also accepts that it is unlikely that in all examples the aim 
of achieving individual choice will be realised. However, it is the focus of this thesis to 
question whether, these factors being taken into account, the idea can be located at the 
centre of discourse within different cultural groups and thus can be viewed as existing a 
priori. 
The division of the concept of self-law giving into its internal and external applications is 
dealt with in-depth in Chapter 1, in which the Kantian framework is fully explained. 
However, the central question of this thesis focuses on two factors. Firstly, whether there is 
an a priori assumption in the work of African political theorists that persons have an innate 
ability to be self-law giving on an individual level. Secondly, whether there is a drive in the 
writings of African political theorists and politicians towards establishing political structures 
that can provide the conditions for people to realise their innate ability to be self-law giving 
in the political realm. To summarise, the overall aim of this project is to use a Kantian 
approach to explore the degree to which universals might be found in certain African 
political discourses.  
The following discussion details how the notions of internal and external self-law giving are 
being translated and operationalised for use in this project in relation to the analysis of 
African political theory carried out in Chapters 3-5. Furthermore, it briefly explains the 
methodology being adopted for the purpose of this research, whilst in Section .2 the choice 
to study African political theory is justified and explained in greater depth. These enquiries 
aim to justify a number of claims: firstly, and most obviously, that more research is 
required which looks at the published ideas of different cultures from all over the world in 
order to be able to claim true universality of these ideas as foundational principles of 
humanity. The scope of this project is limited to whether foundational principles exist in 
the range of African political theory selected for this study. Secondly, that even with the 
limited sources covered by this study, the presence of a foundational principle of this type 
has the potential to raise questions and problems regarding our current system of 
international principle formation. The argument follows that if the methods currently used 
when establishing international principles and laws do not abide by the requirements of 
self-law giving individuals then this would be problematic because it would disregard the 
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fundamental foundations of personhood owed to all individuals. Finally, that the existence 
of a shared a priori belief in the value to, and right of, persons to be self-law giving, and the 
corresponding duty not to interfere with others’ rights as self-mastering individuals has the 
potential to provide a basis for open, just, and fair cross-cultural dialogue.  To summarise, 
the aim of this thesis is to question whether an argument can be made for the existence of 
Kantian concepts of internal self-law giving and willkür as foundational principles of 
humanity across different cultural perspectives; in particular, whether they exist in the 
selected works of African political philosophy. To elucidate, it is asked whether or not an a 
priori assumption exists in African political theory that individuals have the capacity to be 
self-law giving (as an internal, individual trait). It is then questioned whether in their 
writings theorists advocate for a system that translates this moral assumption of self-law 
giving (internal) into the necessary public model to enable individuals to be purposive 
moral law giver’s in community with others (willkür, external). This is achieved through a 
comparative study of African political theory which asks whether these ideas can be 
located in the work of various authors. This thesis concludes that an argument can be made 
for open, honest and fair cross-cultural dialogue that is justified by, and respectful of, these 
principles as existing at the centre of political discourse in both the Kantian model and the 
selection of African political theory examined by this project.   
The methodology used in this thesis is borrowed from comparative political theory (as the 
analysis broadly falls into this field) and is a part of an ever growing field, the growth of 
which initially occurred “in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s” (Freeden & Vincent, 2013, p.7). 
It uses textual analysis of speeches, essays, philosophical articles and monographs to look 
for similarities that may exist between a Kantian theory of internal self-law giving and 
external willkür as rights and duties of all mankind, and what African political theory 
suggests are the rights and duties of all mankind. A priori and inductive approaches are 
combined to establish the concepts being looked at, followed by analysis of a selection of 
African political theory to suggest potential similarities. In referring to a priori and inductive 
approaches, it is being suggested that the concepts of external willkür and internal self-law 
giving exist a priori. Following on from this assumption, an inductive approach has been 
utilised to establish sub-themes that are used to represent these ideas in the works of 
either Kant himself or contemporary Kantians. A more detailed methodology for 
establishing the themes to be studied follows in the next paragraph. The approach being 
adopted borrows from a discussion of theme identification in Gery Ryan and Russell 
Bernard’s 2003 article that describes themes as: “Abstract (and often fuzzy) constructs that 
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link not only expressions found in text but also expressions found in images, sounds and 
objects” (Ryan & Bernard, 2003, p.87). Whilst this particular piece of work focuses 
predominantly on published texts and speeches, it does provide a suitable framework for 
extending the study to other, less formal, oral traditions. 
The first stage to Ryan and Bernard’s method is to establish an overarching, higher order 
category or metaphysics. This is often a more abstract idea but it can be broken down into 
themes and sub-themes that are clearer and easier to find represented in the chosen 
material: in this case African political theory. If themes can be found across the texts being 
studied then it is possible to suggest that a similarity exists, and that the concepts have 
relevance in both the areas selected for comparison.  
In brief, the process of locating foundational principles will consist of two stages. The first 
involves introducing the higher order categories which it is being suggested could exist 
universally. These have been established as a priori concepts that, borrowing from Kant, 
this thesis suggests may be universally recognisable as not only a right of humans to be 
autonomous agents but also a duty to achieve this in common with all others. The 
justification for their a priori existence will be examined further in Chapter 1 as a part of 
the discussion of the wider Kantian framework of this project. The meta-themes or 
categories that lie at the centre of this project are the Kantian concepts of internal self-law 
giving and willkür (the external formation of the concept of choice in pursuing one’s ends 
within a community of others). Justification for these categories can also be found in 
Chapter 1. The second stage is to operationalise these categories in a way that makes them 
useful as part of an analytical framework. At this stage the categories are broken down into 
a set of three themes, each of which has been adapted from a combination of both 
contemporary Kantian thought and the writing of Kant himself. The inclusion of each theme 
is explained and justified in detail. The themes are: freedom of choice versus domination, 
equality of individuals and self-mastery. The debates from which these themes derive, as 
well as the particular authors who make use of the terms, are listed and explained in 
Chapter 1. 
Following the establishment of the concepts to be considered as existing a priori, and the 
terms that can be viewed as representing these in Chapter 1; and a literature review 
examining the role of culture on understandings of universal concepts, as well as the 
potential space for utilising an understanding of foundational principles in establishing fair 
and just cross-cultural interactions; the rest of this thesis is dedicated to testing the 
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hypothesis that these ideas can be located in African political theory. This is achieved in 
two stages. Firstly, the theorists selected for study are grouped together based on 
similarities in their ideas, their time of writing, or the body of literature with which they 
associate. The purpose of this is to facilitate more detailed comparison and to enable the 
drawing of stronger parallels between them. The method for grouping theorists together in 
this way is explained in greater detail in Section .2. Secondly, a detailed textual analysis is 
carried out which aims to locate ideas representative of the themes of willkür and self-law 
giving in the monographs, speeches, poems, essays and other academic works of the 
selected theorists. This analysis leads to the conclusion that it is possible to interpret the 
selected texts of African political theory as entering into debate around similar shared 
foundational principles to those presented by the Kantian model.  
The usage of a methodology focusing on textual analysis is not uncontroversial. The 
question of whether we should even interpret historical and political texts, as well as 
concerns regarding how this should be achieved, are discussed widely in the literature: 
particularly amongst literary theorists in the 1960’s and 1970’s. It is to this debate that the 
discussion now turns. The methodology for this project is, as previously suggested, adapted 
from Ryan and Bernard’s approach. However, the justification for carrying out this research 
borrows from Quentin Skinner’s 1972 article “Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of 
Texts”. Skinner’s article focuses on the ability of critics to interpret meaning from literary 
texts. However, this thesis adapts these views to relate to political theory. The premise 
being that Skinner’s approach offers validation for the choice to analyse and interpret the 
views of political thinkers based on a reading of their publications, as well as establishing 
the meanings that can be interpreted from their outputs. In the introductory passages of 
his article he makes a number of claims regarding the necessity of recognising that within 
the process of interpretation we cannot “ever hope to arrive at ‘the correct reading’ of a 
text, such that any rival readings can then be ruled out” (Skinner, 1972, p.393). This 
understanding is at the centre of this thesis’s ethos; the aim being to provide one 
interpretation of the texts but not to claim that this reading is either an exact exegetical 
account of the theorists’ aims, nor the only possible interpretation. In fact this thesis 
accepts that, whilst precautions have been taken to limit bias by attempting to achieve 
“critical distance from (my) own positions and preferences” (Freeden & Vincent, 2013, 
p.10), there are elements of reader bias inherent in the process of interpretation itself. 
Skinner focuses on the limits entrenched in interpretive work in the early stages of his 
article. He then changes focus, intending to establish greater clarity around what meaning 
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it is possible to derive from interpretive readings of source material, and whether there is a 
value in doing so: the outcomes of his project are of particular importance to the 
methodology of this thesis. He concludes that the role of interpretation is in establishing 
the intentions of the author, or to phrase it differently, what the author meant to achieve 
when they elected to produce their text: “for example, to attack or defend a particular line 
of argument to criticise or contribute to a particular tradition or discourse, and so on” 
(Skinner, 1972, p.404). The aims of this thesis are to achieve very similar ends. Therefore, 
Skinner’s approach has been influential when considering the parameters and purpose of 
analysis; to gain understanding of the meaning, aims and foundations of the discourse 
produced by a selection of African political theorists. To clarify, whether the selected 
African political theorists focused their arguments around the central themes of willkϋr and 
self-law giving, understood as choice versus domination, self-mastery, and equality. Having 
explained the justification for textual interpretation, and the purpose behind it, discussion 
now reverts to the categories and themes that are being used as a framework for carrying 
out the interpretive work.  
The relationship between categories and themes can be seen in greater clarity in the 
following diagram: 
The relationship between categories and themes  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Willkür and Internal self-law 
giving (category) 
Equality of individuals 
Self-mastery 
Freedom of choice 
versus domination 
Category 
Theme 
Theme 
Theme 
Adapted from Strauss and Corbin 1990, cited in Ryan and 
Bernard 2003. 
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Before moving on to discuss and explain the selection of African political theory/philosophy 
chosen as the source material for this thesis, it is necessary to further delineate the 
underpinning methodology. The following section (Section .2), examines the methods used 
for choosing and narrowing down the selection of source material. However, it is the 
purpose of this current discussion to scrutinise how the Kantian framework (briefly 
discussed in this section but to be fully developed in Chapter 1) is used in carrying out the 
rest of this project.  
The overall purpose of this thesis (to adopt a Kantian approach to explore the degree to 
which certain universals may be found in a selection of African political discourses) relies 
on being able to establish Kantian ideas as a lens through which it is possible to study non-
Western sources. The argument below explains how that is possible and overcomes a 
number of the concerns associated with adopting a Western approach for the purpose of 
studying non-Western sources. 
The first stage considers how Kantian ideas are being adapted and the extent to which this 
thesis remains faithful to an exegetical reading of Kant. In his discussion of Kantian 
cosmopolitanism, Garrett Brown makes reference to two different approaches often 
employed by theorists studying Kant’s views on the topic. He suggests that theorists often 
employ one, or a combination of both, methods in their analysis:  
“The first approach is to employ strict exegesis in an attempt to understand 
Kant’s cosmopolitanism by directly analysing his use of words, logical 
structure and relationship between various aspects of philosophy…The 
other approach is to reconstruct aspects of Kant’s cosmopolitanism in 
order to establish a coherent and defensible argument for Kantian 
cosmopolitanism” (Brown, 2009, pp.20-21). 
When discussing these ideas, Brown talks specifically about methods that are employed for 
defending Kantian cosmopolitanism. However, this thesis argues that both approaches 
have wider scope; they can be applied when making use of Kantian ideas more generally, 
and also be used as the basis for further study. The first method Brown mentions, in which 
researchers conform to a strict exegetical approach, enables a project to better clarify 
Kant’s work and to highlight, and often overcome, some of the inconsistencies. Doing this 
can provide the conditions for better defending the contemporary relevance of these ideas. 
This approach is relevant to the first stage of this thesis in which the concepts of willkür and 
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internal self-law giving are presented as initial starting points to form a lens through which 
the question of shared foundational principles can be considered. This method will be 
employed in Chapter 1, in which a strict exegetical study of Kant’s work is carried out. A 
number of points will be considered in this analysis: the roots of these ideas, how they link 
together and the implications they have according to Kant. This thesis asks whether these 
ideas are present in the work of a selection of discourses taken from African political theory; 
to achieve this it is necessary to unpick the terms and clearly understand their roots as they 
were presented by Kant. Consideration of whether these ideas exist in the African political 
theory source material requires a further stage: to operationalise the terms into a relevant 
framework for analysis. The second approach referred to by Brown is employed at this 
stage.   
Usage of the second approach (adaptation of Kant’s work to contemporary projects whilst 
still recognising the importance of rooting developments in his original texts) is based on 
the assumption that “there is heuristic value in allowing for the redevelopment of Kant’s 
(views) when it is properly substantiated in relation to strong exegetical evidence” (Brown, 
2009, p.21). The purpose, in relation to this project, is to build on the original Kantian texts, 
and to reinterpret and restructure the ideas in order to present a coherent framework in 
which the suggested foundational principles can be operationalised to enable a detailed 
textual analysis. It is important to make clear which of the two approaches is being utilised 
at each stage of the project, as simply blending the two can lead to ideas being attributed 
to either Kant or a Kantian approach without the necessary textual evidence; an approach 
which can lead to unnecessary bias. It is for this reason that Chapter 1 has been dedicated 
to comprehensively situating each of the concepts in the literature and highlighting ideas 
that are adopted either for the purpose of this project or from secondary sources such as 
the work of Mary Gregor, Thomas Pogge and Arthur Ripstein. To make clear, the role of 
Chapter 1 is to present a detailed exegetical discussion of Kant’s work on willkür and self-
law giving, to then explain how these ideas have been developed and restructured, and 
finally to clearly present the analytical framework that will be used as a method to discuss 
the potential existence of shared foundational principles within both the established 
Kantian framework and the writings of a selection of African political theorists. 
Departing from a strict exegetical approach creates the opportunity to reformulate Kantian 
ideas in order to increase their relevance to contemporary issues and overcome some of 
the historical concerns associated with Kant. For example, Kant’s work is often criticised for 
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maintaining an inbuilt assumption of inequality between those individuals he sees as 
citizens and those he views merely as wards of the state; based on his construction of who 
he considers to be reasoned agents. Supporting exclusion along these lines has been used, 
both in the past and present, to justify political actions that are often abhorrent. For 
example, it was often argued by academics and politicians supporting the colonial 
movement, that their role was to civilise people, and that when this process was complete 
they may eventually be worthy of citizenship. Therefore, whilst the role of reason is 
maintained as a central facet of this project, it is assumed from the outset that when 
discussing reasoned, autonomous agents striving to have choice in the direction of their 
lives, discussion in fact refers to all human beings. This adaptation responds not only to the 
concern of inequality often directed at Kant, but also ensures the framework established in 
the thesis has greater contemporary relevance.  
Discussion of the issues that arise when adapting the work of Kant leads to the second 
methodological concern referred to earlier in this section: how is it possible to overcome 
the criticism that this project is ethnocentric when taking a theory from within the 
metaphysical position of Western political thought and then using it to indicate the 
potential existence of shared universal ideas? In response, it must first be admitted that 
methodologies such as this one can be adopted as a method of imposing certain Western-
specific views on external cultures. However, this is not the aim of this thesis; the purpose 
is not to advocate for the spreading of a belief in the importance of willkür and self-law 
giving, but instead to ask whether these views can be seen as already existing in the work 
of African political theorists. The Kantian framework is being used purely as a lens through 
which to examine the empirical material through detailed textual analysis; the role of this 
project is to question the existence of these views, not to advocate for their uptake. 
Concerns regarding ethnocentric practice, as well as methodologies for overcoming it, are 
discussed further in Chapter 2. 
Having given a condensed overview of this thesis, the following section (Section .2) explains 
and justifies the choice of African political theory as the body of theory chosen for analysis. 
This section also sets the parameters of what has been selected for inclusion when 
reference is made to what could be seen as an infinite category of work. This is followed by 
Section .3 which explains how the research question translates into a contribution to the 
greater body of comparative political theory literature. Finally, Section .4 offers a 
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breakdown of the chapters of this thesis, explaining the focus of each one and the role it 
plays in developing the overall body of work. 
.2- African Political Theory: 
Following the establishment of the theoretical framework for this project in Chapter 1, and 
the literature review investigating the effect culture plays on the understanding of shared 
foundational principles in Chapter 2, the remainder of this thesis engages with questions of 
the existence of potentially foundational principles in the canon of literature selected for 
study. Before clarifying the process by which the African texts were selected, it is necessary 
to elucidate further the method of analysis used. Having established a framework in which 
the concepts of willkür and internal self-law giving can be represented by other terms 
(namely freedom of choice versus domination, equality of individuals, and self-mastery) an 
exegetical analysis of the selected texts is carried out in which the aim is to “elucidate their 
meanings and debate their significance” (Couldry, 2000, p.67). To achieve this thorough 
analysis of each of the texts is carried out in which two approaches are utilised. Both direct 
references to these terms are looked for, as well as discussions that demonstrate a similar 
underlying idea. In each case there is an honest analytical dialogue asking whether ideas 
are directly represented or being assumed from within the broader discourse, as well as 
use of detailed textual references to support the assumption being made. It is important to 
avoid the criticism that in analysing the source material the views being referred to are 
taken to mean more than they in fact do. For this reason, it is necessary to be clear that the 
views found in the source material represent the views of the authors themselves, no 
assumption is being made that they also represent the views of the wider community from 
which the author emanates. Having established how this work is carried out, the remainder 
of this section (Section .2) presents the method used for selecting the African sources. 
Questioning whether Western conceptions of autonomy or rights exist in the writings of 
non-Western cultures is not rare. There have been a number of studies (Chan 1999, Chan 
2002, Maududi 1976) that consider different variants of what it means to have autonomy 
or individual rights, and ask whether they exist externally to the West; this includes looking 
for both Kantian and non-Kantian ideas in non-Western cultures. For example, a number of 
studies have considered whether similar notions of what it means to have autonomy exist 
in the work of both Islamic and Confucian scholars. They have done this by examining 
either a historical sample: in the case of the analysis of Confucian thought, studies start 
with Confucius and progress through other theorists that write under the banner of 
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Confucianism. Or, a study of the religious materials associated with the religion in question: 
in the case of Islam, the Quran. Many of these studies share a common goal: to find 
commonalities between Western and non-Western theory that either suggest the 
contemporary relevance of these non-Western traditions, and/or allow the author to 
advocate for the existence of shared foundational principles. For example, Panikkar and 
Panikkar (1982) consider an “Indian reflection” (Panikkar and Panikkar, 1982, p.95) on 
shared cross-cultural principles.  
The studies in question often also share a common model: they define what it is that they 
are referring to when they discuss autonomy and then break the category down into a 
number of elements before carrying out a textual analysis of the existence of said elements 
in their source material. For example, Chan’s 2002 article lists four elements that he sees as 
representing autonomy in the Western system, and argues for the existence of two of 
these in the work of Confucian authors.  As discussed in Section .1, this study follows a 
similar model. What separates this thesis from the rest of these studies is the choice to 
consider African political theory as the selection of texts being studied. As a result, it is the 
selection of African political theory as the topic for study that provides the original 
contribution of this thesis to the broader literature. This is due to the fact that African 
political theory is often understudied and there have been few attempts to link key 
elements of the Kantian tradition to African literature on freedom of choice versus 
domination, equality of individuals and self-mastery, and to question whether these ideas 
form a central tenant of the debate between African authors. 
Unlike the aforementioned areas of Confucianism and Islam, African political thought is not 
a neatly bounded ideology or set of political ideas. There is great divergence in cultural 
heritage, political persuasion, moral thought and philosophical positions. What constitutes 
African political thought or African philosophy is also a widely debated topic. Theorists such 
as John Mbiti have suggested that use of homogenising terminology such as “African 
philosophy” risks overlooking individual differences between cultural groups such as Akan, 
Yoruba and Ewe. However, emphasis on the folk philosophies of certain cultural or 
linguistic collectives (such as these) as being representational of the whole group is also 
problematic as it has, in the past, been viewed as a less academically rigorous form of 
investigation; a discussion which will be looked at in more detail in Chapter 5. The 
secondary point raised by theorists such as Mbiti is the importance of not allowing the 
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homogenising term of “African philosophy” to trivialise or silence the valuable 
contributions of individual philosophers as presenting their views.  
In contrast, many of the statesmen, philosophers and activists writing in the early to mid-
1900s, both on the continent and in the diaspora, believed that unification under one 
umbrella was in fact a positive step: Kwame Nkrumah, Julius K. Nyerere and Léopold Sédar 
Senghor to name a few prominent examples. Therefore, a major part of this project has 
been establishing what is being referenced by the terms “African political theory” and 
“African philosophy”, as well as grouping theorists together and setting the boundaries of 
the sources to be studied. That being said, it is fundamental to the success of this project to 
be explicit about selection choices and criteria, this is dealt with in detail in the following 
paragraphs; but firstly a brief response to the issues surrounding the grouping of work as 
being African is necessary.  
In discussing this, reference will be made to the Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Gyekye who 
argues that the term African should be used in the same way that Western is. When we 
suggest a philosophy emanates from the West we are not diminishing its association with 
an individual, for example Kant; or a country, like Germany; or a tradition, such as the 
Enlightenment. Instead, we are simply categorising the ideas as being written by theorists 
of Western origin concerning themselves with issues relevant to their individual or cultural 
experience. In a similar vein Gyekye defines what it means to classify philosophy as African: 
“It only needs to be the results of the reflective exertions of an African thinker, aimed at 
giving analytical attention to the intellectual foundations of African culture and experience” 
(Gyekye, 1987, p.211). These foundations are not required to be unique to Africa. In fact, as 
is suggested by the overall question of this thesis; it is being argued that certain 
foundational principles are common to many different philosophies, cultures and theorists. 
All that is required, according to Gyekye, is that they have relevance in an African context. 
This can include traditional philosophies, contemporary theorists discussing traditional 
ideas as well as contemporary theorists more generally. This approach to categorising 
philosophers works also overcomes a key concern presented by Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o of 
tribalising individuals, thus failing to recognise that their differences in opinion are those of 
an individual rather than caused by their biology, as has been a mistaken assumption in the 
past. He argues that, “no man or woman can choose their biological nationality. The 
conflicts between peoples cannot be explained in terms of that which is fixed (the 
invariables)” (Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, 1986, p.1) and as a result we shouldn’t assume that 
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individuals’ opinions are based on their place of origin. Rather, we should respect their 
views as being theirs and theirs alone. That being said, and in respect of both Gyekye and 
Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o’s approaches, reference to African political theory and philosophy is 
meant in the sense of individual philosophers, statesmen and activists (potentially but not 
necessarily) of African origin “reflecting on and giving analytical attention to” philosophical 
and foundational questions as individuals and presenting their individual views. To clarify, 
reference to African political theory and philosophy is discussed in terms of individual 
thinkers, potentially but not necessarily of African origin, giving analytical attention to the 
intellectual foundations of African culture and experience. By setting the boundaries in 
these terms it is possible to justify the inclusion of thinkers Frantz Fanon and Aimé Césaire, 
who, whilst not being born in Africa, discussed ideas that were relevant to African 
experience. In particular, when Fanon discussed the “Wretched of the Earth” (1965), it is 
African’s that he is referencing. That being said, it would be impossible to consider issues of 
colonialism, oppression and autonomy without including these views. The selection of texts 
and theorists chosen for study in this particular project is narrowed down in the following 
discussion, but for now it is important to understand that all theorists included for study in 
Chapters 3-5 of this thesis can be broadly understood as being African under this definition. 
It is because the range of ideas and positions is so varied, that African political theory has 
been chosen for this study. However, it is necessary to be specific in explaining what it is 
that is being considered when this thesis is claiming to study “African political theory” and 
also what is not included. Because of this, this chapter now examines the question of why 
this makes it an ideal subject for study. It does this before then narrowing down the 
boundaries of the material to be analysed. 
The vast array of political theory and philosophy emanating from Africa represents a 
microcosm of difference: different ideologies, philosophies, politics, traditions and histories. 
If, therefore, it can be concluded that a Kantian conception of autonomy (understood as a 
belief in an a priori right to be one’s own master) can be interpreted in any number of the 
theorists studied, then it is possible to conclude in favour of the principle as holding value 
across a number of different cultural backgrounds. This is not to suggest that autonomy will 
look the same in each of these examples, but rather that it is a concern at the centre of 
debate and discourse for theorists from a wide range of backgrounds. Unlike a study of 
Confucianism or Islam, this project has scope to consider a broader range of ideas 
associated with African diversity, and thus argue for wider applicability of the findings as 
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holding relevance across ideological, philosophical, political, traditional and historical 
contexts.  
However, whilst the broad range of philosophies, cultures and political ideas makes for an 
interesting comparative study, they also cultivate a number of problems. For example, 
whilst the authors that can be defined as Confucian are widely accepted and can thus be 
viewed, at least for the purpose of study, collectively as part of the same tradition, what it 
means to be an African political theorist or philosopher is contested. As has previously 
been examined, what counts as philosophy in an African context is somewhat controversial. 
The selection of sources is of fundamental importance to the viability of this project. In 
order to provide a more exact rationale, the time period being considered briefly touches 
on work from the 1900s through to the present day, although the majority of sources range 
in date from the late 1950s through to present publications (the anti-colonial struggle and 
the post-independence era’s). The texts being considered are published in either English or 
(in rare cases) French. The importance of this period emanates from the historic influence 
of colonialism. Other than the states of Liberia and Ethiopia, which remained independent 
throughout the period, all of Africa suffered colonial rule: the pinnacle of which was the 
division of the continent amongst the colonial powers at the Berlin conference in 1885. For 
this reason, it is impossible to study concepts of autonomy and domination without taking 
into account the influence of such all-encompassing colonial policies, and it was on this 
basis that the time period was selected.  
The period being studied includes discussions from the height of colonial influence, during 
the period of independence, and the post-colonial period; thus, it presents an interesting 
range of perspectives surrounding notions of autonomy, domination and self-mastery, with 
a central focus on the colonial movement and responses to it. Inclusion of pre-colonial 
texts was also considered for this project so as to enable analysis considering whether the 
routes of these ideas existed prior to Western influence. However, many of these texts are 
published in local languages or are verbal philosophies translated, and potentially altered, 
by Western missionaries. For these reasons, and with a hope of avoiding using translations 
that may, through the translation process, have been infused with Western ideas that may 
not have existed in the original texts, these sources will not be included for analysis in this 
project, but they would make interesting source material for future work in the area. Also 
considered for inclusion were texts from the diaspora, in particular the texts of authors that 
viewed themselves as members of the Harlem Renaissance project and Black Pride 
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movements in America. However, whilst these authors would make fascinating research 
material for future work it was decided that their focus, whilst looking at issues of 
oppression and mistreatment, were not directly focused on the colonial struggle and thus 
lay outside the boundaries of this particular research project due to the focus on 
colonialism when selecting the texts.  
The choice to consider texts predominantly published in Western languages has a 
narrowing effect on the source material available for analysis. The majority of sources are 
divided into two; which is represented by the division of this thesis into two parts. This 
divide will be explained in Section .4. Texts analysed in the first part of the thesis (Part 1, 
including Chapters 3 and 4) are written by political figureheads, either activists or members 
of the political establishment, of an educated background. The contemporary texts 
included in Chapter 5 are written by professional philosophers working in academia, again 
from educated backgrounds. Therefore, the claim of this thesis is not that these views are 
representational of the whole of Africa, or even the people living in the countries in which 
these people live and work, but rather it asks whether a diverse range of individuals enter 
into debates regarding similar foundational principles or rights. It is questioned whether 
they argue, in one formation or another, that these principles may be owed to all of 
humanity; and as an extension to this, whether they recommend establishing political 
systems which enable individuals to realise these rights. That being said, the thesis is 
treating the influence of a Western education on included thinkers as distinct from 
discussions of inaccurate translations of traditional philosophies by Western 
anthropologists. It is suggested in Chapter 2 that cultures should not be viewed as closed 
off or static concepts, but rather fluid, ever changing, identities with multiple influences. 
Thus a Western education, may very well influence the identity of the included scholars but 
this is only one facet of their identities, whereas an incorrect translation would be an 
inaccurate portrayal of views and identity.  
It is worth noting that the views of the theorists expressed in their monologues, speeches 
and articles have not always translated into realised political models and this thesis does 
recognise this concern which is also common in Western political thought. Similarly to 
approaches studying the theoretical ideas of Western scholars such as Marcus Aurelius and 
Benjamin Franklin their ideas and their political states will be treated separately, 
justification for which is given in more detail in Chapter 4. The question being raised is 
whether the language they use, and the ideas they espouse, indicate a belief in, or support 
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for, the a priori right and duty of individuals to be self-law giving, autonomous agents and 
whether the political discourse they engage in focuses around finding solutions relevant to 
these metaphysical points. In other words, it is not to defend them as political figureheads. 
As already mentioned, other than the limits placed by language and timescale, the 
selection of texts is quite broad. This thesis is divided into two parts and the theorists then 
roughly divided into individual chapters: with similar thinkers grouped together accordingly. 
The chapters, as will be described in greater detail in Section .4, consist of: in Part 1, The 
Négritude movement and the African socialism movement; and in Part 2, Post-colonial 
discourse. The theorists covered in Part 1 (in the two chapters concentrating on Négritude 
and African socialism) are predominantly philosopher statesmen, activists and political 
figureheads. Whereas, the sources analysed in Part 2 (Chapter 5) are mainly the work of 
professional philosophers.  
To ensure transparency it is important to be specific not only regarding which thinkers 
were included for analysis, but also regarding those which were specifically excluded. In the 
introduction to each of the chapters in Part 1 and Part 2 a more detailed introduction to 
the scholars is given, but the aim here is to detail the rationale behind the selection of 
schools of thought and thinkers. Négritude was expressly both a cultural and political 
movement that directly criticised and responded to the treatment of colonised peoples by 
colonial actors. It was a movement consisting of African scholars Léopold Sédar Senghor, 
Léon Damas, and Aliounne Diop; as well as Carribean scholars Aimé Césaire and Frantz 
Fanon. It was felt that inclusion of both halves of the movement was important to 
understanding its foundations, as both were discussing topics of oppression, “giving 
analytical attention” to the problems resulting from colonialism that faced Africa. Chapter 4, 
with its focus on African socialism, posed a greater challenge when it came to selecting or 
excluding thinkers for study due to the volume of work in the area. Discussion of the choice 
to focus on socialist rather than capitalist values takes place in the chapter itself, but it is 
predominantly based on the more detailed philosophical account of original models 
promoted by these scholars. The scholars included are Julius K. Nyerere, a nationally and 
internationally dominant and influential post-colonial leader writing on issues of individual 
and national sovereignty; Kwame Nkrumah, whose influence in the pan-African movement, 
as well as his internal struggles with his changing views, make him a particularly interesting 
figure to discussions of foundational principles; and Samora Machel whose brand of 
socialism has been referred to as “the model for African Socialism” (O’Meara, 1991, p.82) 
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due to his influence as a key revolutionary figure in Southern African struggles. The 
selection of these thinkers did, however, lead to the exclusion of some other key scholars 
in the area, and it is necessary to discuss here why these selections were made. Amongst 
others, Milton Oboté, Kenneth Kaunda and Thomas Sankara were each excluded from this 
chapter as it was felt that, whilst their writings and speeches are important to 
understanding the historical period, and revolutionary fervour, in question, the 
philosophies of the three included scholars are better defined as original models of thought 
than the workings of these other scholars. Additionally, it was felt that a number of the 
scholars would have played a similar role in the chapter than those already included. For 
example, as a revolutionary, analysis of Sankara’s views would have given very similar 
insights to analysis of Machel’s.  This is not to suggest that Kaunda, Oboté and Sankara will 
not be included in future work, but rather that at this stage they have been left aside. 
Selection of thinkers for Chapter 5 is based on the prevalence of these scholars to 
contemporary discourse focussing on post-colonial debates. Kwame Gyekye, in particular, 
plays a fundamental role in understanding both the contemporary landscape and the 
narratives expressed by traditional philosophies. For reasons explained earlier, the main 
focus at this stage is on his personal views, but it is important to note for future work the 
utility of his other areas of expertise. Kwame Anthony Appiah’s Cosmopolitanism played a 
fundamental role in guiding the questioning of this project and thus his views are discussed 
in detail in Chapter 5, particularly in relation to their underpinning foundations. The views 
of these thinkers, as well as Kwasi Wiredu, Paulin Hountondji, Dismas Masolo, Immanuel 
Chukwudi Eze, Valentin-Yves Mudimbe, Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o and Noah Dzobo are not being 
presented as an exhaustive list of contemporary African scholars. Rather, they are 
presented as being thinkers fundamental to debates surrounding autonomy in the post-
colonial period: consideration of their views is thus vital to questioning the potentially 
universal existence of the foundational principles of self-law giving and willkϋr. Having 
discussed the selection of source material for study, the chapter now turns to discussions 
of the works contribution to the literature.  
.3- Core Contributions: 
As mentioned in Section .2, the core contribution this work makes to the comparative 
political theory literature emanates from the choice of source material, as well as the very 
specific Kantian claim that willkür and internal self-law giving represent potential 
foundational principles around which discourse exists both between cultures, as large 
social groups, and between the divergent range of groups that exist within a culture. There 
26 
 
have been numerous academics that have made claims regarding universal principles, not 
least in the language of human rights and justice: Jack Donnelly, John Rawls, and Jϋrgen 
Habermas to name just three. Nevertheless, the aim of this thesis is to suggest that the 
Kantian argument that our right to be masters of our own lives (expressed as autonomy) 
exists a priori and is thus shared by humanity in general and not affected by culture: 
although the response to these issues may be culturally specific. These principles are an 
overarching framework that is being suggested are both owed to human kind, and can be 
helpful in facilitating dialogue and understanding between cultures. The role of culture and 
the debates that exist around cultural relativism and universalism are dealt with in detail in 
Chapter 2. At this stage it is mentioned so as to highlight that this thesis is making the claim 
that foundational principles exist across cultures, and specifically in the cultures of the 
African political theorists studied in this project. This is achieved by utilising a comparative 
approach and analysing a selection of African political theory, a selection that has been 
chosen and defined by this author and is not specific to one tradition. Choosing to study 
African theory, and discussing the work in the climate of the controversies surrounding 
what the words African, or even political theory or philosophy, mean outside of Western 
academic circles, provides the original contribution of this work. Additionally, in carrying 
out this work, potential exists to demonstrate through detailed analysis not only that 
Kantian-based universal principles exist, but also that there is a drive to implement a 
political system in which they can be realised in common with others. As a result, this thesis 
claims that open and honest cross-cultural dialogue could be grounded on these 
foundations. It is in these potential outcomes, as well as the original choice of source 
material, that this thesis offers its contribution to the literature of comparative political 
theory. 
.4- Chapters: 
The chapters within the main body of this thesis are divided into groups based on the 
theoretical approach adapted to the drive for self-determination in Africa. Each of the 
theorists being considered in this project writes in their work about the importance of 
African theorists establishing, or re-establishing, what it means to exist for an African 
individual. The overall question of this thesis, as previously examined, is to ask whether 
these ideas are similar to those ideas proposed by Kantian theorists. As referenced in 
Section .2, collating the selection of philosophy for study and organising it into schools of 
thought has been a major part of this project due to the lack of established groups of 
research in this area. 
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As the project has developed, it has become clear that African approaches to self-
determination can be divided along a number of different lines. The first distinction that is 
often referred to is the difference between modern and traditional philosophical ideas. 
Traditional African thought is often associated with regional groups such as the Akan, Ewe 
or Essan people, and consists mainly of proverbs, myths and folk tales. Modern African 
philosophy, in contrast, is often associated with individuals and is the “philosophy that is 
being produced by contemporary African philosophers, but which reflects, or has a basis in 
African experience, thought categories, and cultural values” (Gyekye, 1987, p.32). The 
second distinction, and the one used to divide the theorists considered in this project into 
groups, is between the work of statesmen and activists (discussed in part 1 of this thesis) 
and professional philosophers (discussed in Part 2).  
Having introduced the overall structure of this project and the justifications for this, the 
introduction concludes with a brief overview of the contents of each chapter and what this 
offers to the overall goals of this research.  
The chapters are sequenced as follows: 
Introduction 
Theoretical chapters: 
 Kantian Framework 
 Literature review- The Elephant in the Room: Culture 
Part 1- Statesmen and activists: 
 Négritude 
 The African socialism movement 
Part 2- Contemporary discourse: 
 Post-colonial philosophers 
Concluding Remarks 
The role of Chapter 1 is to enhance and develop the overview of the Kantian belief in 
internal and external self-law giving that has been briefly referenced within the confines of 
this Introduction. In Chapter 1 elements of Kantian ethics and politics are broken down to 
demonstrate not only how each link together, but also how Kantian ethical and political 
thought can be viewed as separate theories. This is followed by a discussion of debates that 
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exist within the secondary literature. Chapter 1 concludes by offering further detail on the 
choice to divide the analytical framework into 3 themes, as described in Section .1 of this 
Introduction: self-mastery, equality of individuals, and freedom of choice versus 
domination.  
Chapter 2 is a literature review, the role of which is to discuss, question, and develop the 
explanatory role and (sometimes) glorified status often given to culture in discussions of 
Africa. In any discussion of universalism it is impossible to ignore the counter position in 
which cultural difference is viewed as fundamental. There is a strong Western tradition of 
viewing practices emanating from non-Western backgrounds as being cultural, but when 
turning the lens back on Western traditions viewing culture as playing a lesser role. Culture, 
in this sense, is very much the domain of The Other. At the same time, the work of many of 
the African authors studied in this project makes strong reference to the fundamental 
importance of culture to the achievement of self-mastery. Whilst notions of self-law giving 
are examined in this thesis, it is particularly interesting to see how often these more 
universal ideas come wrapped in culturally specific terms. Not only are there examples of 
culturally specific adaptations of universal ideas, observations can also be made in the work 
of certain theorists such as  Leopold Sédar Senghor, of a belief in the necessity of culture in 
being able to realise one’s self-law giving abilities: autonomy through culture. Therefore, it 
is a necessary element of this project to consider where the boundaries of culture lie. This 
enables the thesis to better answer the question of whether universal foundational 
principles exist and whether or not this can help provide the space for open, equal, and just 
cross-cultural dialogue.  
Chapters 3 to 5 take three different segments of African political theory or philosophy as 
their focus and then question whether it is possible to locate in the theorist’s work an a 
priori belief in the value of internal self-law giving and external willkϋr. The chapters then 
question whether the theorists use their writing to promote the uptake of structures, both 
political and social, that would provide the citizenry with a system which publicly embodies 
their rights to be self-law giving. Finally, Chapters 3 and 4 also question whether 
inconsistencies exist between the philosophical ideas presented by the theorists and the 
political systems they implement. The expectation is not to find language or concepts that 
are identical to a Kantian model, but rather, to locate patterns of similarity indicating a 
potential value to the notion of being a law unto oneself as not simply being a construct of 
Western, Kantian philosophy. To clarify, the aim is to locate potentially universal 
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foundational principles, respect for which could provide a space for just, equal and fair 
cross-cultural discourse. As previously mentioned, these three chapters are grouped into 
two parts of the thesis. Part 1 contains Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Part 2 contains Chapter 5. 
The final chapter (Concluding Remarks) collates the outcomes of the theoretical analysis in 
the previous three chapters, investigating any patterns that have been found. Finally, it 
concludes that evidence exists to imply cross-cultural support for the principles of internal 
self-law giving and willkür as universally shared foundations on which open, honest and just 
cross-cultural dialogue could be founded. 
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Chapter 1- Kantian Framework: 
“The human interest in autonomy and responsibility is not mere fancy, for it can be 
apprehended a priori” (Habermas, 1968, p.314). 
The aim of this chapter is to explain the Kantian framework that is central to the work of 
this thesis whilst also clarifying the choice to select a Kantian model for the purposes of this 
research. At this stage the Kantian framework is analysed in depth. It is necessary to work 
through each stage logically so that a greater understanding can be achieved as to where 
the assumptions for this project originate. This is important as it aids the process of 
improving translucency and thus reducing bias. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to 
justify the choice to use a Kantian model; to outline the Kantian framework being put 
forward; and to better articulate the claims being made, to consider their routes, and to 
operationalise them in a way that allows for a detailed textual analysis of the selection of 
African political theory chosen for study. The aim being to further research into the 
question of whether these ideas exist in work that is culturally diverse outside of Western 
political thought; whether the themes detailed in this chapter exist in the selection of 
African political theory studied in the rest of this thesis. This chapter also plays a 
fundamental role in responding to the critique sometimes directed at work supporting the 
existence of shared foundational principles: the implication that such work is either 
ethnocentric or imperialist. 
A further role of this chapter is to clearly present the concepts of willkür and internal self-
law giving, and to define the methods used for operationalising them: establishing a 
framework with which to carry out the analysis detailed in Chapters 3-5. By logically 
examining each stage of the theoretical position being adapted for the study, the aim is to 
be as transparent as possible regarding how the initial concepts were established and how 
they were then operationalised. To clarify, the aim is to establish why the concepts of 
willkür and self-law giving are being presented as existing a priori and to follow this with a 
detailed explanation of how the existence of these concepts will be examined in African 
political theory. The purpose of including this chapter is thus to offer as translucent a 
framework as is possible and, whilst recognising that researcher bias will always exist in 
comparative political theory, to work to reduce it, with the aim of overcoming the concern 
that work which claims the existence of universal principles is imperialist. Having clarified 
these aims, the chapter turns now to a discussion of how Kantian ideas will be adapted for 
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the purpose of this project: to explore the degree to which these foundational principles 
can be located in certain African discourses at least to the extent that they are at the centre 
of the discourse and debate.  
This chapter is divided into four sections. Initially there is a discussion of the broader 
Kantian framework which this work adopts; this is followed by a breakdown of the more 
specific adaptations of the ideas that are considered in carrying out the study of certain 
African political theories. Following a brief explanation of why the Western tradition of 
Kantian political theory was selected for this study, the initial task of this chapter is to 
provide an overview of what the terms willkür and self-law giving are generally taken to 
mean and why they are being treated as separate. Included in this is a more detailed 
explanation of the two main elements of this project: asking whether there is a belief in an 
a priori right and duty of the individual to be self-law giving, and how these rights and 
duties translate to living in community with others whilst still maintaining a sense of self-
mastery when existing within a political condition. Having established the two concepts, 
greater detail is offered as to the connection between the two and the difference between 
internal and external freedoms. This includes the role of the categorical imperative and 
public right and why it is that public right is not simply a derivation or extension of the 
categorical imperative: providing evidence for which is a further contribution of this thesis. 
This is followed by a discussion that seeks to answer the question of why Kant treats the 
concepts of internal self-law giving and willkür as existing a priori. The third section 
considers the controversial debate surrounding the relationship between morality and 
politics within the Kantian model. With reference to Thomas Pogge and Arthur Ripstein’s 
work on this topic, this thesis argues that there is a link between morality and politics 
according to Kant, but that it exists only in one direction; his morality dictates his 
republican form of government, but his republican form of government does not require 
his version of morality to justify it. In the final section of this chapter the framework is 
applied to the analytical element of this thesis;  an explanation is given as to which 
concepts, ideas and terms are interpreted as indicating the existence of the foundational 
principles (willkür and self-law giving) when carrying out the analysis. This section adds 
greater detail to the discussion of the concepts and themes touched on briefly in Section .1. 
There is also discussion of the authors that refer to these ideas as representing broader 
categories; and the relationship of each theme to the broader Kantian framework. It is the 
aim of this project to look not only for a suggestion that these ideas are a priori rights of 
individuals that should be adhered to, but also to look for examples in the African literature 
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that support a political structure in which the a priori right to be self-law giving individuals 
can be realised; suggesting both that the principles exists universally and that they could 
form the basis for peaceful coexistence and interactions. The question is raised whether, 
similarly to Kant’s work, these ideals are recognised by the African theorists as political 
goals to be strived for. This does not necessarily rely on them being successful in achieving 
these goals. To summarise, it is the normative reference to them, as much as the actual 
realisation of them, that the thesis considers as indicating support for these concepts as 
being a priori.  
Before examining the terms self-law giving and willkϋr in greater depth it is necessary to 
discuss both the selection of a Kantian approach as a suitable framework for analysing texts 
from other cultures, and as representing a potentially universal metaphysics around which 
discourse can be established. Whilst this thesis accepts that Kantian political theory, as a 
whole doctrine, is only one theory amongst many (in both the liberal tradition and Western 
political thought more generally) the argument is being made that the underlying 
philosophical foundations of the theory may not be specific to Kantian approaches but may 
in fact underpin arguments from across ideological, ontological and cultural perspectives 
and, in fact, Kantian thought is just one example amongst many that debates the themes 
representative of internal and external self-law giving. This is not to suggest that a 
complete Kantian doctrine is universally relevant, but rather that the underlying 
foundations represent a universal understanding of what humanity in general shares. It is 
the aim of this research to demonstrate this argument in relation to the selection of African 
political theory. It is worth noting at this stage that the claim of this thesis is not that all 
theorists rely on a foundational approach. Rather, the burden of the argument is on 
demonstrating sufficient grounds to show that these foundations are assumed in the 
practice of African political theorists. The purpose of testing this theory results from the 
practical consequences such a discovery would have on contemporary political concerns 
such as human rights which are founded on a notion of universality. However, it can be 
questioned whether imposing such doctrines on vastly different cultures respects the 
autonomy of all individuals to maintain control over their purpose and choices in both the 
public and private spheres. Thus, if it is possible to show that the desire to maintain that 
level of purposiveness is universally held then there would be consequences for the role of 
individuals in understanding and developing international principles. To clarify, whilst the 
basic assumption is that these principles exist a priori, there is heuristic value in carrying 
out empirical research to question this assumption. It may reveal that the assumption of 
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the relevance of these principles is in fact correct, but without an evidence base it is 
difficult to recommend reform to international systems of principle formation. To clarify 
further, a priori does not mean fact in the Kantian case. Rather, it means it in the 
transcendental case (which is discussed in greater detail in Section 1.2), which is neither 
provable nor unprovable. Yet, what it is, a priori, is deeply embedded in the language and 
actions we insist upon in our everyday life. In this way, it cannot be proved as a matter of 
fact, but rather as a matter of logic. As Kant says, to suggest that someone should do 
something, we are also suggesting that they can do something (Kant, 2009); or rather that 
they have the capacity to do it. The capacity to do something is understood both as an a 
priori internal condition that would be required for A to do B, but also an external condition 
for A to carry out B. We cannot prove the first (autonomy / free will), it's just assumed in 
our practice, but we can measure the second (external freedom) by demonstrating the 
capacity of the individual to carry out their act. It is this element that the thesis is exploring. 
Whether the African scholars recommend a model of society that relies on an assumption 
of the value of self-law giving and willkür, but considering this relies, as a matter of logic on 
the assumption that the concepts themselves do indeed exist a priori. By demonstrating 
through a detailed textual analysis of African political theory that these principles have 
relevance across cultural boundaries it is possible to make a more convincing argument 
that to be just, cross cultural dialogue should be premised on respect for foundational 
principles. 
The choice to utilise a Kantian approach as the lens through which to carry out this analysis 
is based on two factors: firstly, the unique strength of such an approach to considering 
both internal values and external conditions for realising these values: the distinction 
between self-law giving and willkϋr that will become apparent in the following section. In 
this sense the approach lends itself to the two-sided analysis being carried out by this 
project, asking firstly whether these ideas are fundamental underpinnings relating to 
individual concerns; and secondly whether African political theorists recognise the 
importance of creating public conditions for the protection of these principles. Secondly, 
the focus in Kant’s work on establishing a metaphysics that exists separate to experience: 
“Do we not think it a matter of the utmost necessity to work out for once a pure moral 
philosophy completely cleansed of everything that can only be empirical and appropriate to 
anthropology” (Kant, 2009, p. 57). The Kantian focus on the existence of a foundational 
philosophy prior to experience, and thus prior to culture, implies, as will become apparent 
in Section 1.3, that it is possible to consider the foundations of the theory as separate to 
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the influence of culture and experience. As previously suggested, this allows the thesis to 
treat the principles of willkϋr and self-law giving as separate from a full Kantian doctrine.  
Having grounded the choice to draw on a Kantian approach throughout this study this 
chapter now alters focus to establish the concepts of self-law giving and willkϋr. 
1.1- Self-Law Giving and Willkür: 
i. Self-Law Giving 
The condition referred to as self-law giving or being a law unto oneself is grounded most 
specifically in Kant’s moral philosophy found in “Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten” 
(Kant, 1785) (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals). As becomes clear throughout this 
discussion, what it means to be moral or right and what it means to be free are one and the 
same thing for Kant. This is represented in his formulation of both concepts. Morality and 
freedom are both derived from reason: “the idea of moral perfection (is that) which reason 
traces a priori and conjoins inseparably with the concept of free will” (Kant, 2009, p. 76). 
This also requires us to overcome our sensual desires (for food, pleasure etc), as adherence 
to these is, according to Kant, a form of slavery indicating a state in which we are no better 
than animals: “In actual fact we find that the more a cultivated reason concerns itself with 
the aim of engaging life and happiness, the farther does man get away from true 
contentment” (Kant, 2009, p.63). True autonomy is realised only by overcoming these 
desires and living a life directed by individual reason. Kant explicitly refers to the 
importance of overcoming our sensual drives in his essay “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist 
Aufklärung?” (1784) (An Answer to the Question: what is Enlightenment?). He claimed in 
his introduction to this essay that “enlightenment is the human being’s emancipation from 
its self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to make use of one’s intellect 
without direction of another” (Kant, 2006, p.17).  Being enlightened, and by definition 
being free, therefore, requires us to realise our individual reason and to live our lives 
guided by our own purposiveness. Kant argued that each individual has this ability a priori, 
however he did not believe that all individuals had yet realised it. To further establish this 
point, reason is a specifically human trait of which, according to Kant, all agents have the 
potential to live by. Doing so, enables individuals to overcome their animalistic desires and 
to achieve true autonomy as they are unhindered by their desires and guided by reason 
alone. This was the purpose of his essay: to suggest that we are not yet all enlightened (in 
the sense of being self-legislators), but that this was an end point for which to strive. He 
argued that by striving for it (enlightenment) we could eventually realise an autonomous 
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state in which we would possess the duty and right to live by the laws we willed for 
ourselves (Kant, 2006). It is this belief in humanity as having the potential to be self-law 
giving, grounded in the human property of reason, which is the first overarching concept 
that this thesis posits as potentially existing a priori. As was discussed in the Introduction, 
the property of reason is assumed to be possessed by all humans and is not limited by the 
same factors given by Kant. Therefore, as discussed in Section .1 this is not an exegetical 
account of Kant’s approach, but rather an adaptation. The justification for Kant’s reliance 
on the concept of reason is discussed in Section 1.2 in relation to his usage of 
transcendental arguments. 
The relationship between autonomy and morality is also important in discussions of 
external self-law giving (willkϋr) and this is examined in greater detail in the following sub-
section. The connection between morality and freedom refers in no small part to the 
categorical imperative, a thought experiment that allows for the creation and testing of 
maxims that secure our freedom and could be willed into universal law. Kant presents 
three related formulations of the categorical imperative, the third of which is considered in 
this project. The first requirement of the categorical imperative (“The Formula of Universal 
law”) is that we act only on maxims that it would be logically consistent for all others to act 
on simultaneously, or more specifically, that we can will to be universal law (Kant, 2009). 
The second (“The Formula of the End in Itself”) is that rational beings should be respected 
as having “absolute value as ends in themselves” (Becker, 1993, p.76). That “every rational 
being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that 
will: he must in all his actions, whether they are directed to himself or to other rational 
beings, always be viewed at the same time as an end” (Kant, 2009, p. 95). The third 
formulation, and the one being utilised in this thesis, is often referred to as “The Formula of 
Autonomy” and is founded on the value of self-legislation: “According to this principle one 
is only subject to the moral law that one has legislated for oneself” (Becker, 1993, p.77). 
This is “the idea of the will of every rational being as a will which makes universal law” 
(Kant, 2009, p.98). The role of the categorical imperative is limited to the personal sphere 
and deals not only with the actions themselves, but also with the justifications for the 
actions in question. To be more precise, it deals with whether an action is morally right or 
wrong, which, as has already been suggested, is dependent on whether the action respects 
an individual as being self-legislating and an end in themselves, whilst also being 
universalisable to the whole of humanity.  
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According to Kant, unlike many of his contemporaries, the establishment of an action as 
being either right or wrong is not based on its consequences, but rather on whether the 
maxim respects the individual “as an end in himself” (Kant, 2009, p.95). By “an end in 
himself” Kant requires that all individuals are treated by both themselves and others not 
merely as a means to achieving a further end but rather as an absolute end. It is immoral to 
use an individual in a way that fails to respect them as having ends of their own derived by 
their own reason, since doing so curtails their freedom as self-legislators. To clarify, Kant 
does not suggest that we cannot, in all circumstances, use people as a means to an end but 
simply that we must recognise that they, too, have ends towards which they are directing 
their own lives and we should not prevent their purposiveness in achieving those ends by 
utilising them for our own means: we must respect in all our actions that “rational beings, 
always be viewed at the same time as an end” (Kant, 2009, p.9). For example, if two 
individuals embark on a course of action in which both are acting based on their own 
choices, but simultaneously using the other as a means to realise their end, if this action 
respects the choices of both individuals it is not necessarily wrong; if, for example, their 
ends are alligned. This is because, as Arthur Ripstein explains, “you remain independent if 
nobody else gets to tell you what purposes to pursue with your means” (Ripstein, 2009, 
p.34) and in this example you are choosing your own purposes, it is merely that they 
coincide with the purposes of another, equally autonomous, individual. In establishing this 
point it is possible to interpret Kant as being less strict with the boundaries of “right” 
treatment than is often claimed by his critics.  
Kant’s work allows for some restrictions of freedom but also demands a deontological sub-
floor that cannot be violated. It is the notion of a sub-floor that is central to the work of this 
project. When referencing a deontological sub-floor the following is implied: we cannot 
treat individuals in a way that fails to recognise that they, like us, have individual ends 
which they must be able to choose to direct their life towards: our actions must respect 
that they too have purposiveness, as they too are rational beings. Kant provides the 
following argument to justify this claim: 
“If then there is to be a supreme practical principle and- so far as the 
human will is concerned- a categorical imperative, it must be such that 
from the idea of something which is necessarily an end for everyone 
because it is an end in itself it forms an objective principle of the will and 
consequently can serve as a practical law. The ground of this principle is: 
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Rational nature exists as an end in itself. This is the way in which a man 
necessarily conceives his own existence: it is therefore so far a subjective 
principle of human actions. But it is also the way in which every other 
rational being conceives his existence on the same rational ground which is 
valid for me, hence it is at the same time an objective principle, from which 
as a supreme ground, it must be possible to derive all laws for the will” 
(Kant, 2009, p.96).  
It is the notion of an underlying deontological sub-floor, founded on our rational nature, 
which prevents us from violating certain individual freedoms. It is also this idea that leads 
to the conclusion that, from a Kantian perspective, there are certain foundational principles, 
shared by all of humanity, that place restrictions on how we can treat autonomous agents: 
both ourselves and others. On an individual level, it would be immoral to seek sensual 
pleasures simply to maximise one’s own happiness, for example. Doing this uses the self as 
a means to derive pleasure and is thus using the self as a means rather than an end. It is 
immoral because the individual is driven by sensual whims rather than reason.  
According to Kant the justifications behind an action are as important as the action itself. 
When proposing a maxim as being either right or wrong, moral or immoral, this does not 
imply that the outcomes are either good or bad, rather the claim is being made that the 
maxim which led to the action was moral (right) and done for the correct (right) reasons. As 
Don Becker explains: 
“Kant argues that acts do not have moral worth merely because they 
accord with duty, but only if they are done from (the motive of) duty. For 
example, if a shopkeeper gives a young child the correct change because 
they know that it is good for business, or even if someone helps another in 
need because they like to be helpful, although the acts accord with duty, 
they have no true moral worth” (Becker, 1993, p.78).  
Hence, an action may have positive outcomes; it may even have the same outcomes as it 
would have had if it were carried out for the correct reasons. However, unless a maxim is 
carried out in accordance with duty, it is immoral:  
“An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose to be 
attained by it, but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided 
upon; it depends therefore, not on the realization of the object of the 
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action, but solely on the principle of volition in accordance with which, 
irrespective of all objects of the faculty of desire, the action has been 
performed” (Kant, 2009, pp. 67-68).  
Therefore, if a person is abiding by moral laws that they did not will for themselves then 
they are being moved to act by an external influence and “obedience to the moral law 
would then be conditional on rational beings responding in certain ways to external 
influences” (Becker, 1993, p.78). In this case they would be abiding by moral laws not out 
of duty but out of some separate reason, utility maximisation maybe, and this, for Kant, 
means that neither the action is moral nor the individual free.  This debate is fundamental 
to understanding the relationship between morality and politics, and is referred to in 
greater detail in Section 1.3. True moral freedom on the individual level, for Kant, comes 
from abiding by laws one sets for oneself in accordance with the restrictions set by the 
categorical imperative. The question is thus raised as to how this can translate into living in 
a community with others. How can individuals be self-legislators whilst also not infringing 
on the freedom of others to achieve the same? This external formulation of the concept 
constitutes the second category. Why this theme has been selected, as well as the method 
for operationalising it for the purpose of this study, is dealt with in Section 1.3. However, at 
this stage it is worth noting that there is a divide between ethics and law. The chapter turns 
now to a more detailed account of Kant’s approach to guaranteeing moral freedom in the 
public realm: the condition of public right. The state’s role in guaranteeing moral freedom 
is important to this thesis as a whole as it defines the second stage of questions being 
asked by the project: are there examples in the African political theory literature of 
individuals advocating for the implementation of political structures that provide the space 
for individuals to be self-law giving whilst also existing within a community? As previously 
mentioned, one of the justifications for relying on a Kantian lens for carrying out the 
analysis of this thesis was, in fact, the divide in his theory between internal and external 
conditions.  
ii. Willkür and the Condition of “Right” 
The following discussion is concerned with the external strand of self-law giving; how we 
are able to be self-legislators whilst living in common within a political society. The majority 
of Kant’s thoughts on this matter can be found in a handful of his works. Most prominently, 
“Die Metaphysik der Sitten” (1797) (The Metaphysics of Morals) but also the essays “Uber 
den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht fur die Praxis” 
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(1793) (On the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Hold in 
Practice) and “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” (1784), as well as “Zum 
ewigen Frieden” (1795) (Towards Perpetual Peace). This discussion deals with the political 
circumstances established by Kant which provides the conditions for individuals to maintain 
their individual freedom whilst living in common with others: referred to as the condition 
of public right. His work was heavily influenced by the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
who believed that humanity has a right to live freely under a positive conception of 
freedom. This positive conception dictated a necessity for public structures to be put in 
place to guarantee individual autonomy within a community.   
To open this discussion it is worth highlighting a single point in relation to Rousseau’s 
interpretation of freedom. It relates to the previous discussion of right and wrong and good 
and bad. According to Charles Taylor’s reading of Rousseau, “virtue and vice themselves are 
given a new interpretation in terms of freedom. For the key to vice is other-dependence, a 
failure to be determined by one’s own internal purpose; and virtue is nothing more than 
the recovery of this self-determination” (Taylor, 1985, p.319). As a brief aside, it is 
important to recognise that the terms “virtue and vice” are understood in a myriad of ways 
in political philosophy. Some of these understandings are grounded on concepts of good 
and bad, the community or human welfare to name a few. However, the focus of this 
section is on understanding their meaning according to a Kantian model and the 
consequences this has for this thesis; to then be able to delineate the differences from 
those of other approaches, such as those focusing on good and bad and human welfare. 
Returning to the analysis of the above quote from Taylor, this once again highlights the 
distinction made by these theorists between right and wrong and good or bad that was first 
mentioned in Section 1.1i. The morally correct condition in which to find oneself is the one 
in which you are living by the laws you will for yourself, in common with others. At the 
same time it is wrong to live in a condition in which your freedom, understood as an ability 
to define the laws by which you live, is hindered by others. To clarify, the concepts of virtue 
and vice, as understood by their predecessors as good and bad or increasing or decreasing 
welfare and happiness have been completely redefined by firstly Rousseau and secondly 
Kant. Under this re-definition the rightful condition is dictated by an individual’s autonomy 
in directing his or her own life. Kant claimed that: 
“If the doctrine of morals was merely the doctrine of happiness it would be 
absurd to seek a priori principles for it… Only experience can teach what 
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brings us joy…But it is different with the teachings of morality. They 
command for everyone without taking account of inclinations, merely 
because and insofar as he is free and has practical reason…reason 
commands how men are to act even though no example of this could be 
found, and it takes no account of the advantages we can thereby gain, 
which only experience could teach us. For although reason allows us to 
seek our advantage in every way possible to us and can even promise us, 
on the testimony of experience, that it will probably be more to our 
advantage on the whole to obey its commands than to transgress them, 
especially if obedience is accompanied with prudence, still the authority of 
its precepts as commands is not based on these considerations” (Kant, 
1996, pp.9-10).  
This point is clarified in Section 1.3, in which there is a discussion of the importance Kant 
places on the state not imposing a view of the good life on individuals. However, at this 
stage, the purpose is simply to highlight the distinction being made between right and good 
and to act as an introduction to what exactly a rightful condition is. As will become clear 
throughout this section, for a Kantian, entering a rightful condition is not simply a choice, it 
is a requirement of duty that will enable us to realise our freedom in a political condition; it 
is in fact the only condition under which this can be realised when individuals exist in 
communities. In the introduction to “The Metaphysics of Morals” Kant clarifies this point, 
explaining why it is he believes a metaphysics is necessary: 
“If, therefore, a system of a priori cognition from concepts alone is called 
metaphysics, a practical philosophy, which has not nature but freedom of 
choice for its object, will presuppose and require a metaphysics of morals, 
that is, it is itself a duty to have such a metaphysics, and every human 
being also has it within himself, though in general only in an obscure way; 
for without a priori principles how could he believe that he has a giving of 
universal law within himself?” (Kant, 1996, p.10) 
As will become clear, a metaphysics is in this sense a public condition in which individuals 
are able to realise their private freedom as self-law givers. A right, as already discussed, 
that Kant argues, must exist a priori because, if it were to not then how would individuals 
discover their individual abilities to will universal law. The metaphysics is thus, both a duty 
of society, but also an internal a priori principle that directs rational individuals towards a 
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condition of moral right. His transcendental assumption that every human being “also 
(have) it within himself” is a subject of discussion in the following section where 
transcendental arguments are discussed in greater detail. However, it relies on the premise 
that for a concept to exist (in this case an internal understanding of what it is to be self-law 
giving), the conditions of that concept must also exist. The role of this section is to establish 
how Kant achieves this, which is important to this thesis as it grounds and justifies the 
intention to locate these ideas in African texts. 
The rightful condition according to Kant “is therefore the sum of conditions under which 
the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal 
law of freedom” (Kant, 1996, p.24). Or, “a system of laws for a people, that is, a multitude 
of human beings, or for a multitude of peoples, which, because they affect one another, 
need a rightful condition under a will uniting them…so they may enjoy what is laid down as 
right” (Kant, 1996, p.89). To clarify, a rightful condition is one that accepts that people have 
to live in common with one another and creates the condition for individual freedom not to 
be hindered, whilst also taking the necessity of community into account. What it is to have 
freedom when living in community with others then, is “independence from being 
constrained by another’s choice” (Kant, 1996, p.30). In the next few paragraphs the 
importance of choice to the rightful condition is dealt with in greater detail, as is the 
political structure Kant recommends to guarantee said freedom. However, firstly, it is 
important to clarify why Kant believed the construction of a political condition is important 
at all. As David Stern asks, “how is political obligation reconcilable with the autonomy of 
the individual?” (Stern, 1991, p.127); surely the existence of a state will curtail freedom. As 
was mentioned in the section dealing with self-law giving (Sub-Section 1.1i), Kant argues 
that “there is only one innate right” (Kant, cited in Ripstein, 2009, p.29) and that is the right 
to freedom: understood as each autonomous, reasoned agents right to self-mastery (to 
exist directed by their own purpose and not via the purposes of others). Therefore, the 
political condition “is (only) legitimate and enforceable because freedom requires it” 
(Ripstein, 2009, p.29). As previously mentioned, this is the only condition, according to Kant, 
under which the rights of individuals to express their own choice can be guaranteed in 
common with all others. 
The innate right to freedom, established by Kant in the “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals” entails within it a duty to enter into a political condition in which this right can be 
guaranteed. Kant believed that guaranteeing the right of all individuals to freedom is the 
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only justification for the existence of a state. As already suggested, a state (similarly to a 
maxim on the individual level), according to Kant, cannot be justified as improving the 
welfare of the citizenry, nor as making them happier; the only true justification of a state is 
as a vehicle for guaranteeing the freedom of each equally up to the point in which it 
infringes on the freedom of others: “therefore only the concurring and united will of all, 
insofar as each decides the same thing for all and all for each, and so only the general 
untied will of the people can be legislative” (Kant, 1996, p.91). The state is required to 
secure the ability of individuals to guide their individual lives in common with others, and 
to ensure the conditions in which reasoned individuals can all coexist. For “every action 
which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual’s will to coexist with 
the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right” (Kant, 1991, p. 
133). Therefore the role of the state is to ensure that these conditions occur and that the 
space exists for individuals to live under these laws unhindered by others who may not be 
fully reasonable. Freedom from the interference of others in this sense is often referred to 
by Kantians as external freedom. “A person’s external freedom is secure, then, in so far as 
others’ actions that would obstruct her own are themselves obstructed. The security of a 
person’s external freedom thus requires that the external freedom of others (to obstruct 
her external freedom) be constrained” (Pogge, 2012, p.77). This condition in which the 
state protects the freedom of its citizenry is referred to by Kant as the universal principle of 
right, an ideal system which he believes is the only condition in which humanity’s freedom 
can be guaranteed. He does not suggest that all states abide by these norms, but rather 
that is it “the state in idea, as it ought to be in accordance with pure principles of right. This 
idea serves as a norm for every actual union into a commonwealth” (Kant, 1996, p.90).  
The role and composition of the state is now considered in greater detail. The purpose of 
including this discussion in this chapter is to provide the grounding for understanding the 
role of public right in securing individual willkϋr and the conditions to be looked for in the 
political practice of the African theorists analysed in Chapters 3-5: in particular the 
arguments on which they justify certain political conditions. As has previously been 
mentioned, Kant was of the opinion that not all individuals achieve reason, and similarly 
not all states are ideal. However, it is the ideal role of the state to step in to guarantee the 
freedom of those individuals that have achieved reason by hindering those who hinder 
them. An action that would not, in fact, reduce freedom, but rather increase it as the 
individual hindering the freedom of another and acting irrationally was by definition not 
free, as rationality precludes freedom. Ripstein refers to Kant’s “Principle of Publicity”: 
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“Coercion is objectionable where it is a hindrance to a person’s right to freedom, but 
legitimate when it takes the form of hindering a hindrance to freedom…force that restores 
freedom is just the restoration of the original right” (Ripstein, 2009, p.44). This is because 
“resistance that counteracts the hindering of an effect promotes this effect and is 
consistent with it” (Kant, 1996, p.25).  
The rightful condition is, according to Kant, an ideal for which to strive. He recognised, 
similarly, that not all individuals are rational; that all states do not realise the rightful 
condition. He did not however believe that this is reason to believe the rightful condition is 
wrong, but rather, to view it as an ideal humanity should strive towards. To summarise, for 
Kant, “right” is “the whole of the conditions under which the external freedom of any 
person can coexist with that of all others according to universal law of freedom” (Pogge, 
2012, p.78); it is equality in the sense of having one’s freedom guaranteed. As has been 
previously mentioned, it is the intention of this project to question whether it is possible to 
locate these ideas in African texts and whether theorists actively advocate a political 
condition in which individual autonomy (understood as self-mastery) is a central focus. This 
takes place in Chapters 3-5 of this thesis. Having established the political condition under 
which freedom would be guaranteed this sub-section now turns to the definition of 
external freedom itself and the role of choice within this. 
The concept of willkür is central to the aims of this thesis; it refers to the external notion of 
self-law giving within the confines of a rightful condition. It includes not only what an 
individual’s rights are when living in community with others, but also a person’s rational 
duties to establish and maintain a condition of right. Kant argues that this is necessary 
because “individual human beings, peoples, and states can never be secure against 
violence from one another, since each has its own right to do what seems right and good to 
it and not be dependent upon another’s opinion about this”. He thus suggests the following 
solution: 
So, unless it wants to renounce any concepts of right, the first thing it has 
to resolve upon is the principle that it must leave the state of nature, in 
which each follows its own judgement, unite itself with all others (with 
which it cannot avoid interacting), subject itself to a public lawful external 
coercion, and so enter into a condition in which what is to be recognised as 
belonging to it is determined by law…that is, it ought above all else to enter 
a civil condition” (Kant, 1996, p.90).  
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The internal notion of self-law giving and the conditions under which freedom can be 
delivered have been explained above. There now follows a more in-depth discussion of 
what that external freedom actually entails. 
Willkür is translated by the majority of contemporary Kantians as having choice in the 
pursuit of one’s own ends. Don Becker, Mary Gregor, Thomas Pogge and Arthur Ripstein, 
along with many other scholars, have concentrated on this definition in their discussion of 
what external freedom meant for Kant. The definitions provided by these scholars are 
referred to at this stage and will be relied upon for the work of this thesis. In his 2012 
article, Pogge takes Gregor’s definition and adds further clarification. He states that, “first 
‘choice’ must be understood not in the sense of a decision (as in she came to regret her 
choice) but in the sense of the domain of control as in this is her choice; for her to decide, 
not locally, as what is up to her on some occasion, but globally, as what is up to her over a 
lifetime” (Pogge, 2012, pp.77-78). This definition of choice makes reference to the ability of 
individuals to rationally set and pursue their own purposes and ends without this being 
prevented either by themselves or others. Ripstein makes a similar claim, suggesting that 
“the ability to choose in this sense doesn’t depend on the ability to stand outside the causal 
world, or even to abstract from your own purpose in making choices. Instead, it rests on 
the familiar observation that if you choose to do something, you must set about doing it” 
(Ripstein, 2009, p.40).  This highlights the fact that, for Kantians, when they make reference 
to the concept of choice, they are not simply referring to choice in a casual sense. Choice is 
not whether you drink skimmed or full-fat milk in your tea, but rather the direction you 
intend to take for your life according to your own reason. A rightful condition, as already 
described in this section, is one in which this freedom is guaranteed for each individual, in 
common with all others; a condition under which, “the choice of one can be united with 
the choice of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom” (Kant, 1996, p.24).  
To clarify this point further reference is made to Becker’s definition of Kant’s views: 
“people necessarily view themselves as having a certain role to fulfil in the world, and that 
they can only perform this role successfully if their freedom to formulate and pursue their 
own ends is secured in the state” (Becker, 1993, p.83). The state, therefore, is the vehicle 
for guaranteeing an individual’s choice in the direction their lives take and the ends they 
choose to pursue.  
If the condition described above is one in which individuals are seen as being treated justly 
then it is worth considering the reverse situation in which freedom is unjustly curtailed, in 
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order to better understand what is counted as limiting the choice of others. According to 
Ripstein, the opposite of having one’s willkür guaranteed is to be the subject of domination: 
“Wrongdoing takes the form of domination. It is not that somebody does something that 
causes something bad to happen to you; it is that somebody does something to you” 
(Ripstein, 2009, p.42). Not only does this help to explain what is being referred to when 
defining willkür as choice, it also refers back to the discussion in Section 1.1i regarding the 
definition of actions as good or right, bad or wrong. For example, Ripstein refers to the 
example of someone sleeping and another person touching them. The person who is asleep 
may never find out that this happened to them and there may be no harm caused. A 
consequentialist would thus struggle to see this as problematic. However, for Kant, it is not 
wrong because something bad has been done to someone’s person, but it is wrong 
because something has been done at all. It is the fact that the sleeping person has been 
used purely to advance the purposes of the other, without the necessary respect being 
paid to them as an individual with purposes of their own. As Ripstein explains, “I draw you 
into my purposes and wrong you, even if, as it turns out, you never learn of my action” 
(Ripstein, 2009, p.22). To clarify, according to recent scholars, when discussing the 
appropriateness of maxims Kant was not concerned with empirical factors such as the 
levels of happiness of individuals but with the respect for their freedom only. Ripstein 
clearly sets out this definition as being based in the realisation of one’s freedom. He 
suggests that “an action is wrong if it hinders an action or ‘condition’ that is itself rightful, 
that is, one that can coexist with everyone’s freedom” (Ripstein, 2009, p.30). In summary, 
considering the factors that are relevant in deciding whether an action is morally right or 
wrong, it is not whether a factor leads to a good or bad life, or increases or decreases the 
happiness or well-being of the individual or the community, but only that the individual’s 
right to freedom, the only “innate right” (Kant, 1996), has not been infringed and nor has 
the freedom of others. Finally, that an individual’s purposiveness is maintained. Willkϋr is 
thus the condition of being able to realise rationally made choices for ones-self. 
External freedom, then, is the opportunity to direct one’s actions towards one’s own ends 
in common with all others having the same opportunity. The rightful condition is one in 
which this is guaranteed by a state. The only justification for said state is to guarantee all 
reasoned individuals an innate, a priori right to freedom, and to enable them to fulfil their 
duty to realise this freedom. 
47 
 
1.2- The A Priori Right to Freedom and the Duty to Obtain it: 
The aim of this section is to briefly reiterate some of the points that have already been 
mentioned regarding peoples’ a priori right to be self-law giving individuals and the duty to 
obtain that. Kant argued throughout his philosophical writings, in part as a response to 
David Hume, that for principles to have value as universal laws they cannot be based solely 
on empirics, but rather must be found external to experience. In fact, he suggested that it 
was a matter of the “utmost necessity to work out for once a pure moral philosophy 
completely cleansed of everything that can only be empirical” (Kant, 2009, p.57). He made 
this point most explicitly in the introduction to the “The Metaphysics of Morals” where, by 
way of establishing the possibility of a priori principles he draws comparisons with the 
natural sciences. To achieve this, he states that “one must have a priori principles and that 
it is possible, indeed necessary, to prefix a system of these principles, called a metaphysical 
science of nature…Such principles must be derived from a priori grounds if they are to hold 
as universal in the strict sense” (Kant, 1996, p.9), but they can be justified by experience. 
Whereas in the case or moral laws, “they hold as laws only insofar as they can be seen to 
have an a priori basis and to be necessary. Indeed, concepts and judgements about 
ourselves and our deeds and omissions signify nothing moral if what they obtain can be 
learned merely from experience” (Kant, 1996, p.9). Thus, for Kant, for something to be 
moral law it is a necessary condition that it exists a priori because if morality were to be 
subject to experience then morals would be subjective generalities and not universal laws. 
He claims that it would be the “grossest and most pernicious error” (Kant, 1996, p.9) to 
treat morality in such a way. He viewed the right of reasoned agents to be self-law giving 
free agents in the same sense; as being an a priori universal principle. The question though, 
is why he argued that the right of individuals to be self-law giving was a foundational 
principle of moral law? 
There are two elements to these principles according to Kant (an internal and an external 
element). He argues that: 
“A practical philosophy, which has not nature but freedom of choice for its 
object, will presuppose and require a metaphysics of morals, that is, it is 
itself a duty to have such a metaphysics, and every human being also has it 
within himself…for without a priori principles how could he believe that he 
has a giving of universal law within himself” (Kant, 1996, p.10).  
48 
 
Thus, these principles exist both as a priori internal concepts guiding humans in 
their understanding of moral duties, but also impose a duty upon us to establish an 
external metaphysical framework which can enable a community to live together 
whilst also respecting individuals as self-law giving moral agents. By way of 
establishing this Becker suggests that: 
“(There are) two forms of a priori study that Kant employs…the analysis of 
concepts and transcendental arguments. According to the former, insofar 
as some concept applies, whatever is entailed in this concept is true. 
According to the latter, insofar as some concept applies, whatever is a 
necessary condition of its application is true” (Becker, 1993, pp.68-69).  
Put simply, if morality applies then the factors implied in it must also be true, as must the 
factors that are necessary conditions of its existence. For example, on this argument, if the 
concepts exist in the writings of African political theorists, even by way of being debated 
rather than agreed with, then it logically follows that these principles themselves must exist, 
because otherwise discussion of them would be logically inconsistent. According to Kant, if 
we are free to have a rational discussion regarding what it means to be free reasoned 
beings, then by definition both free and reasoned beings must exist, and, we are both free 
and reasoned, simply by the fact that the discussion is taking place. He believed that the 
existence of these concepts in common language was enough to allow us to claim that they 
are in fact, transcendentally, a priori. As previously discussed, a priori does not refer to fact 
in the Kantian case, but rather he refers to it in the transcendental sense, which is neither 
provable nor unprovable. Yet what it is, a priori, is deeply embedded in the actions and 
language we insist upon in our everyday life. In this way, what is required is not that we can 
prove the existence of these principles as a matter of fact, but rather we can demonstrate 
their coherency as a matter of logic. If we are able to have reasoned discussions then 
reason must exist a priori; by suggesting that someone should do something (act from a 
position of reason), it is also being suggested that that it is in fact possible (that they have 
the capacity to reason). Reason is a facet of autonomy according to Kant, and thus, 
freedom to be self-law giving, reasoned beings must exist a priori because the existence of 
a concept also predisposes the existence of the necessary conditions of that concept. This 
is what it means to rely on a transcendental argument. This is not to suggest that it is 
enough for these concepts to simply exist in common language for it to be possible to claim 
their transcendental a priori existence. Rather, what sets these principles apart is that 
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individual’s act in a way that logically requires their existence. This sets them apart from 
words such as unicorns that do also exist in common language but are not subject to the 
same logical relationship with human behaviour. In contrast, discussion of the a priori 
nature of reason logically relies on individuals having the capacity to reason based on their 
actions (entering into a reasoned discussion about the a priori nature of reason). Thus 
whilst the existence of reason cannot be proven, it can be shown to exist transcendentally 
in that Kant argued that suggesting we act from a position of reason logically relies on this 
being possible to achieve.  
To clarify this argument, and to consider a second facet of it, attention is now turned to an 
explanation from Ripstein who considers the role of proof, or lack thereof, in defining a 
priori arguments:  
“If no proof is available, then a postulate is required to introduce the 
norms governing the concept of an embodied rational being, that is, one 
that both occupies space and falls under laws of freedom. Embodied 
persons have both duties and entitlements because they are rational 
beings; the form of duties and entitlements reflects the distinctive 
incompatibility relations between beings that occupy space. The synthetic 
a priori truth that two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same 
time is incorporated into the law of freedom that no person may invade 
the space occupied by another; if the postulate requires us to individuate 
persons spatially, then any potential incompatibility between the 
occupation of space by different persons becomes a moral incompatibility” 
(Ripstein, 2009, pp.370-371). 
The claim being made by Ripstein is that it is impossible for two beings to exist in the same 
space without infringing on the personal space of one another. If to be free we are required 
to exist as individuals, then a moral law is required to ensure this because if we establish 
something as moral law we suggest that this is a way that individuals should behave. For 
Kantians, to make this claim also relies, as discussed in the previous paragraph, on 
individuals having the capacity to act on this behaviour; it is only when individuals have the 
capacity to act in a certain way that a law can be established that they should act in that 
way. Ripstein concludes this point: 
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“If moral persons are individuated spatially then the only way to have 
freedom under universal law is for each embodied rational being to have, 
in virtue of its humanity, a right to its own person- that is, to its own body. 
Such a right must be innate, because nothing could count as an affirmative 
act establishing it- the right applies to any rational being that occupies 
space, because its right is nothing more than the right it has to the space 
that it happens to occupy” (Ripstein, 2009, p.372). 
Thus, to be able to exist in a community logically requires an a priori right to freedom for it 
to be possible. Hence, if we accept that Kant is correct concerning our a priori right to be 
internal self-law giving agents (the logic of which has been demonstrated through 
discussion of transcendental arguments), then it places a duty on us as individuals to realise 
this in the conditions in which we find ourselves: living in common with others. Therefore, 
it follows logically that we have a duty to enter into a state that can guarantee this right. As 
has previously been mentioned, this is what Kant believed offered the justification for the 
state: in fact, the only justification because, “a multitude of human beings…because they 
affect one another, need a rightful condition under a will uniting them, a constitution, so 
they may enjoy what is laid down as right” (Kant, 1996, p.89). Thus we can demonstrate 
logically the existence of an a priori right to be self-law giving, reasoned beings, and 
originating from this point, an a priori duty to enter into a political condition in which we 
can realise this in common with others. These are the overarching categories which provide 
the basis for the analytical element of this project which takes place in Chapters 3-5 where 
discussion takes place regarding whether the logical progressions demonstrated in Kantian 
thought also follow in the work of African scholars. How these categories are being 
adapted into a framework for study is made clear in Section 1.4 of this chapter.  
1.3- The Debate Surrounding the Divide between Morality and Politics: 
Having discussed the ideals of internal and external self-law giving as a priori rights and 
duties, and the condition in which Kant believed this could be realised, attention now turns 
to consideration of the contemporary debate that exists regarding the connection between 
Kant’s ethics and his politics. In Sections 1.1i and 1.1ii it was implied that the Kantian 
political condition is the best, if not the only, condition for the realisation of Kantian ethics 
and morality. There is, however, a recent debate regarding the relationship between the 
ethical theory of the “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals” and the legal and political 
theory Kant developed in “The Metaphysics of Morals”. This section is concerned with 
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discussing the two elements of the debate but will conclude, in line with Thomas Pogge and 
Arthur Ripstein, that Kant’s belief in an innate right to freedom, as living by the laws one 
wills for oneself, is best realised within the Kantian condition of public right. However, also 
in line with Pogge, it is suggested that the embodiment of willkür in a rightful condition can 
be justified both as a political system for realising the innate right and duty to freedom as 
described by Kant, and as a sensible political system for individuals who do not share Kant’s 
view on ethics. This is an important debate for the overall aims of this thesis as it highlights 
the distinction between political legislation and moral or ethical justifications given for 
political choices; implying that regardless of the existence of individual or cultural 
difference, certain ideas maintain universal relevance around which political debate can 
(and does) focus. It is worth noting that Pogge and Ripstein’s position is debated in the 
literature, and this debate existing between these thinkers and Wolfgang Kersting is briefly 
touched upon in this section. That being said, the section concludes in favour of Pogge and 
Ripstein’s position and the thesis relies upon this interpretation when carrying out the 
research; justification for which is discussed in this section.  
To begin this discussion it is worth recapping the distinction between the “right life” and 
the “good life”, as this holds greater importance in discussion of the potential divide that 
may exist between Kantian ethics and politics. A maxim is right or wrong based on its 
relationship with freedom, and takes into account the maxim itself rather than the ends 
that the maxim causes: Universal moral laws cannot, as such, be based on individual 
interests “for a will which is dependant in this way would itself require yet a further law in 
order to restrict the interest of self-love to the condition that this interest should itself be 
valid as universal law” (Kant, 2009, p.99). Kant justifies this position based on the 
subjectivity of individual interests. “Good and bad” unlike “right and wrong” are particular 
to individual interests and thus irrelevant to discussions of universal moral laws. To clarify, 
the notion of good and bad considers the consequences of a maxim and looks at ends 
beyond the individuals themselves, such as happiness, which is particular to individual 
experience and cannot be applied universally. This division takes on particular importance 
if consideration is given to the debate that exists when Kantians discuss the notion of living 
by one’s own choices, or living in a state of public right, as one that can be embedded in 
any number of ethical schematics. In fact Kant himself has been interpreted as having 
viewed his legal system to have value beyond his own construction of the state and 
morality. On this interpretation his doctrine of public right is a stand-alone theory that can 
be viewed not only in collaboration with his ethical philosophy, but also on its own 
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individual merits. This is a controversial element to contemporary Kantian debate, with 
recent publications from Arthur Ripstein (2009) and Thomas Pogge (2012) suggesting that 
evidence exists for this position from a re-interpretation of Kant’s work outside of an 
exegetical reading. 
Pogge argues that Kant’s description (in “Towards Perpetual Peace”) of his system as being 
suitable for a society not only of angels but also of devils (Kant, 2006, p.90) makes it clear 
that “Kant wants his argument for Recht, and for a Republican instantiation thereof, to be 
independent from his morality” (Pogge, 2012, p.89). He sees the value of his own argument 
not only in delivering the morality that accompanies it but also in the logical consistency of 
choosing to live under a doctrine of public right. Whether individuals are angels or devils 
they can agree that a life in which they are constrained in their freedom only to the level in 
which all individuals can be guaranteed the same freedom, assures them a freer and more 
secure existence than the daily perils of a state of nature:  
“Hence reason can use the mechanism of nature, in the form of selfish 
inclinations, which by their nature oppose one another even externally, as 
a means to make room for reasons own end, legal regulation, and to 
thereby promote and secure, insofar as it is within the power of the state 
to do so, both internal and external peace” (Kant, 2006, p.91). 
To borrow once again from Pogge in clarifying this point, Kant did not base his theory on a 
conception of the good “rather, he bases the establishment and maintenance of Recht 
(right) exclusively on persons’ fundamental a priori interest in external freedom” (Pogge, 
2012, p.88). By doing so he is able to overcome claims of subjectivity and show 
transcendentally (as discussed in the previous section) the logical justification for arguing 
for the a priori existence of the concept of freedom. How Kant establishes this a priori right 
was discussed in Section 1.2. The “right” life for Kant would be one in which an individual’s 
moral freedom is guaranteed by a state in common with all others; or, on a larger scale, the 
freedom of states is guaranteed in the international arena. This condition would allow each 
individual to act only out of duty and to abide by the categorical imperative. However, he 
also recognises, Pogge suggests, that his political system could also be abided by, by people 
who are not acting out of duty but rather for the enhancement of their own self-interests. 
For example, I may keep my promise to help my neighbour because it is the right thing to 
do; but, I could also make the instrumental choice to keep my promise based on a hope for 
financial reward. Whilst one of these actions is morally correct, according to Kant, and one 
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is not, the outcome is the same: I keep my promise to help my neighbour. In the same way, 
I could choose to follow the laws of the state out of duty or because I have selfish reasons 
for wanting my freedom guaranteed. It is this that Kant referred to when he suggested that 
his political system was suitable for both angels and devils because it can inspire individuals 
to be “if not exactly a morally good person (they can) nonetheless be forced to be a good 
citizen” (Kant, 2006. P.90). It was also the reason that recent scholars have suggested that 
it is relevant to a broader community than simply those who follow Kantian ethics, as the 
principles of right and autonomy can be viewed as important to both, individuals who act 
from the perspective of duty and individuals who act to further their own selfish interests. 
To discuss this point further it is necessary to reiterate once again the value Kant placed on 
ensuring that his state did not impose a view of what a good life would look like on people. 
It is the role of the state, according to Kant, to “command for everyone without taking 
account of his inclinations, merely because and insofar as he is free and has practical 
reason” (Kant, 1996, p.10). It is possible to interpret this as justifying a neutral notion of 
universal law and politics that does not succumb to a relativist dilemma of having relevance 
to only some of the people some of the time if they hold the same view of what it means to 
live a morally “good” life. According to Michael Sandel, Kantian liberals: 
“Draw a distinction between the ‘right’ and the ‘good’- between a 
framework of basic rights and liberties and the conceptions of the good 
that people may choose to pursue within the framework. It is one thing for 
the state to support a fair framework, they argue, something else to affirm 
some particular ends” (Sandel, 1998, p.110).  
There are obvious connections here with Pogge’s analysis. Both theorists suggest that Kant, 
or in Sandel’s case contemporary Kantians, have the ability to support a system of ethics 
and promote a political system in which to realise these said ethics, whilst also suggesting 
that the political system has relevance outside of the ethical schematic. This has value as it 
allows the promotion of a Kantian state that is able to protect an individual’s freedom even 
in areas where the Kantian view of what it is to be moral may not be accepted. According 
to this view, the state has a duty to create a framework in which individuals can exist freely. 
Within this framework individuals can sculpt their view of the good life by willing the laws 
by which they live for themselves. The state does not have the right to dictate what this 
good life looks like, only to create the space for free individuals to find it for themselves. 
This is particularly important for the comparative analysis of this project; the expectation or 
54 
 
aim is not to find exact replicas of a particular model, but rather, support for the existence 
of the same fundamental foundational principles, or debate around the topic of how to 
guarantee them: to advocate for the existence of a global framework of principles, 
adherence to which will enable a plurality of cultures to interact justly. Similarly, the aim of 
this thesis is not to suggest that all thinkers support a particular normative framework of 
moral reasoning. Rather, it is to question whether underpinning debates regarding morality, 
utility and interests is a discussion of autonomy, the relevance of which cannot be proven 
or disproven, but which can be shown as being logically implied in further discussions that 
take place regarding right or good. Thus, the argument can be put forward that 
transcendental evidence exists to support an understanding of these principles as existing a 
priori as they act as foundations underpinning further discussions. 
To return to the example utilised in the Introduction: the concept of what free choice 
entails, or how it can be realised, may differ between cultures and this thesis recognises 
and accepts this point. However, the argument that is being presented claims that the 
concept of choice itself is, nonetheless, a topic of debate in each of these examples and 
thus it can be claimed, through reliance on transcendental arguments, to exist a priori. If 
this is the case, the potential may then occur to claim this as a universally shared, 
foundationally grounded, principle. This does not, however, require all political and moral 
models respecting this principle to look the same, only for them to respect, or aim to 
further, this principle within the debates they undertake. In carrying out this project it is 
accepted that it is not possible to prove the existence of autonomy. What is possible, 
however, is to show that its existence is being assumed in the practice of the studied 
authors, and to then explore their views of how it should/ can be expressed within societies. 
This is why the division between ethics and politics, as expressed by Pogge, is valuable to 
this project. On this interpretation of Kant it is possible to accept that recognition of the 
value of self-law giving does not necessarily rely on individuals expressing this recognition 
from the Kantian position of duty. Rather it allows for a situation in which individuals from 
different perspectives can recognise the value of guaranteeing individual freedom based on 
their own experience.   
Pogge makes a further claim regarding this reading of Kant. He suggests that when 
interpreting Kantian moral law as prescribing universal laws to all reasoned individuals, 
philosophers have often exaggerated what this claim actually means. Instead, Pogge makes 
the following statement: 
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“To ensure mutual consistency, such a law must apply to all persons, must 
specify precisely for each what she may, must, and must not do. But it 
need not treat all equally by making ultimately the same demands on each. 
I propose then to read the universal here in the weak sense of ‘applying to 
all’; not in the stronger sense that also entails equality of persons under 
law” (Pogge, 2012, p.78).  
This implies the potential for a situation in which Kantian law can be accepted by all, but 
achieved in different ways dependent on the situations in which each individual resides. 
For example, each individual has external freedom up to the point in which it affects the 
external freedom of others and it is only at this point that it is curtailed. Before that point is 
reached, individuals can make use of their freedom in whichever way they rationally 
choose, and in that sense the law itself is universal but the way it affects individuals is 
relative. To clarify, I can live under the guideline that I am a free self-law giving agent in 
common with all others and still have a different approach to happiness than all other 
members of the state. This would not be wrong in this interpretation as I am still being 
treated equally in relation to the demands of universal law, but what this means for me is 
different to what it means for someone else.  The notion of weak universalism is discussed 
in greater detail in relation to the concept of culture in Chapter 2, with specific reference 
being made to the work of Bhiku Parekh in this area. The concept of freedom here relies on 
willing the laws by which we live whilst respecting the limiting factor that we cannot 
impose on others’ equal freedom; not on this requiring us all to adhere to these laws in the 
same way. It is this sense of “weak universalism”, discussed by both Parekh and Pogge, 
which the thesis relies upon to establish the framework for questioning the potential 
existence of these principles in the African source material. Evidence can be found for this 
reading of Kant’s ideas by considering his own words in the Introduction to “The 
Metaphysics of Morals”: 
“But just as there must be principles in a metaphysics of nature for 
applying those highest universal principles of a nature in general to objects 
of experience, a metaphysics of morals cannot dispense with principles of 
application, and we shall often have to take as our object the particular 
nature of human beings, which is cognised only by experience, in order to 
show in it what can be inferred from universal moral principles. But this will 
in no way detract from the purity of these principles or cast doubt on their 
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a priori source. – This is to say, in effect, that a metaphysics of morals 
cannot be based upon anthropology but can still be applied to it” (Kant, 
1996, p.10). 
On this reading of Kant’s work it is argued that the subjective element of his theory 
provided the space for people to better comprehend the principles of moral law and thus 
ensure its uptake. He claimed that the anthropological element he makes reference to, that 
is based on experience, must not be relied upon to define laws, the remit of reason alone, 
but rather to “deal with the development, spreading, and strengthening of moral principles” 
(Kant, 1996, p.10). Such an argument is convincing as it not only recognises the effect of 
experience on subjective claims, such as interest, and discusses why this makes them less 
relevant in defining universal laws. It also recognises the role of subjective experience in 
shaping the lives of individuals, and does not presume it is possible to ignore this. Many 
previous readings of Kant have failed to recognise the value of subjectivity in understanding 
approaches to foundational principles and this is a further justification for why this project 
is relying on this interpretation.   
Nevertheless it is important to acknowledge the existence of a second interpretation of 
Kant’s work which centres around the common argument that according to Kant the 
universal principle of right is derived from the categorical imperative and is thus contingent 
on it. This debate exists between Pogge, Ripstein, and Julius Ebbinghaus on the one side 
who believe that the two elements can be viewed separately, and Wolfgang Kersting and 
John Rawls on the other whom argue that, in fact, they are two parts of a complete 
doctrine and that “right” is contingent on the categorical imperative. Pogge sets out his 
argument as follows:  
“I believe, that Kant wants his argument for Recht, and for a republican 
instantiation thereof, to be independent from his morality. This morality 
may well give its adherents moral reasons for supporting Recht and a 
republican constitution in particular. But it does not therefore have a 
special status with respect to Recht, because it is… just as true that 
selfishness gives its immoral adherents selfish reasons for supporting Recht 
and a republican constitution in particular” (Pogge, 2012, p.89).  
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This refers once again to Kant’s claim that his politics has relevance for both angels and 
devils (Kant, 2006, p.90), which is where Pogge finds evidence for this claim. Similarly 
Ripstein states that: 
“Under the criteria set out in the Groundwork…as a rational being you 
could not will a universal law under which you could never set a purpose 
for yourself, or one under which you could only do so with leave of another. 
So once spatial forms of incompatibility are introduced, only the formal 
principle of outer freedom- the Universal Principle of Right- could govern 
the exercise of free but spatially individuated persons. Such an argument is 
not a derivation of the Universal Principle of Right from the Categorical 
Imperative; it only shows the former to be the logical extension of the 
latter” (Ripstein, 2009, pp.371-371).  
This links back to the discussion in Section 1.2 regarding the a priori nature of the right to 
freedom and the duties this creates (in which Ripstein’s argument for individuated persons 
being unable to exist in the same physical space was discussed). The fact of individuated 
individual’s being unable to share space and thus relying on a framework to protect their 
freedom is true, according to a Kantian moral theory. However, it also maintains value 
separate to Kantian ideals. As Ripstein suggests, Kant’s political system follows on from his 
morality but, as discussed, it does not necessarily rely on his morality to justify it as a 
sensible political system. It is, in fact a system suitable for both angels (those who act 
according to duty) and devils (those who act according to self-interest) (Kant, 2006, p.90). 
This is an important distinction for this thesis as it supports a system in which respect for 
freedom of individuals can be achieved by different cultural groups, for culturally specific 
reasons, but grounded on shared foundational principles. To clarify, this thesis questions 
whether the principles are accepted in the narratives of the African thinkers, but it does not 
expect the justification for acceptance to necessarily be grounded in Kantian morality. 
To counter these arguments for the separation between ethics and law in Kant’s work, 
theorists from similar perspectives to that of Kersting often make reference to the 
Introduction of “The Metaphysics of Morals” in which Kant states that “the supreme 
principle of the doctrine of morals is, therefore, act on a maxim which can also hold as 
universal law. Any maxim that does not so qualify is contrary to morals” (Kant, 1996, p.18). 
They argue that statements such as these imply an intrinsic link between Kantian morality 
and the theories of public right and universal law; a link that, they argue, cannot be broken 
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because the universal principle of right is in fact derived from the categorical imperative: 
“As far as its structure and potential value as a criterion are concerned, the principle of 
right cannot be distinguished from the categorical imperative” (Kersting, 1992, p.344). They 
argue that the evidence for this reading exists in the similar construction of the two 
positions and the similar ways in which Kant words his descriptions of them. This, they 
suggest, indicates a logical progression from the categorical imperative to the universal 
principle of right. Failure to respond to this critique would be problematic to the overall 
aims of this thesis as it implies that the Kantian model of political thought is only relevant 
within the Western liberal tradition. In contrast, this thesis contends that a priori 
foundational principles, referred to by Kant, exist, separate to his theory, across political 
and philosophical boundaries but are responded to differently dependent on experience. 
As previously suggested, it is possible to contend that there is, in fact, a response to this 
argument; a response that admits that a relationship exists but that this implies a bond in 
only one direction. As Pogge puts it, Kant “aims to show that those who accept his moral 
philosophy must also accept his Rechtslehre (Doctrine of Right). But it does not follow from 
this that he also aims to show that anyone who accepts his Rechtslehre must also accept 
his moral philosophy” (Pogge, 2012, p.90).  
Like Botterell in the following quote, this argument supports the fact that to guarantee 
internal individual freedom, according to Kant, his system of government is required:  
“For Kant, genuine freedom consists in being independent of the choices of 
others. But such independence is possible only if there is in place a legal 
and political order that can determine and police the boundaries of such 
interactions. Absent such an order, my ability to set my own ends will 
always be subject to the purposes and choices of others, which is to say 
that I will not be sui juris, that is, I will not be my own master. 
Consequently, in Kant’s view genuine freedom is only possible against the 
backdrop of an effective legal order” (Botterell, 2011, p.457). 
 
What is being disputed, however, is that his system of government can be justified only 
within a Kantian system of ethics. This, I agree with Pogge and Ripstein, is an over 
stretching of the argument and not necessarily required to support a Kantian system as 
being logically consistent; all that is required is to claim that a Kantian system of 
government, in which individuals have rights to hold autonomous control over their 
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personal sphere, can be viewed as a favourable condition both for Kantian ethicists and 
individuals from other ethical/non-ethical backgrounds. This is an important distinction for 
the purposes of this thesis as it implies a potential applicability of the model to none 
Kantian systems of thought as the notion of holding autonomy over the personal sphere 
can be supported by a range of different ethical/ non-ethical systems; this thesis questions 
whether this is the case in the work of a range of African scholars. Following on from this, 
there is an implied value to researching the existence of the said ideas amongst traditions 
external to the Kantian model and questioning whether individuals refer to the importance 
of creating a political condition that respects the rights of individuals to maintain 
autonomous control over the personal sphere. That being said, and as previously 
referenced, the thesis references Pogge and Ripstein’s definition of Kantian morality and 
politics when carrying out the research of this project.  
The main purpose of this chapter so far has been to establish the Kantian belief that 
reasoned individuals have an a priori right to autonomy: understood as the ability to live by 
the laws that one wills for oneself. The secondary purpose has been to examine and explain 
the nature of this right when experienced in common with others: willkür. It has then been 
considered how this was to be understood as an equal right of all to choice in the purposes 
one sets for oneself. Following on from this the purpose has been to examine the political 
condition in which Kant believed that this right to autonomy could be realised. It was 
suggested that, according to Kant, all reasoned individuals have a duty to enter this 
condition in order to realise their a priori right to freedom.  It was noted that this condition 
is an ideal for which to strive, rather than an empirical consideration of reality. This section 
has dealt with the contemporary debate between the traditional stance that suggests that 
Kantian morality and politics are intrinsically linked, and the position supported by Ripstein 
and Pogge which suggests that this link exists in only one direction. The final element of 
this section was dedicated to clearly presenting the Kantian position in order to create the 
space to make certain claims regarding its universality, and to operationalise it in a way 
that enables research into whether these ideas exist in the work of African political theory; 
which is, as previously claimed, the aim of this thesis. The final section of this chapter 
presents how this will be done, applying the framework to the African case. 
1.4- Applying the Framework to the African Case: 
The original contribution that this thesis makes is to raise, and attempt to answer, the 
question of whether the Kantian ideals of a right to be an internal self-law giving individual 
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and the ability to exercise one’s willkür when living in common with others are ideas that 
are valued universally, or more specifically for the remit of this thesis, within certain works 
of African political theory as laid out in the Introduction. As previously mentioned, the 
purpose of this chapter as a whole has been to establish why and how Kant justified these 
principles as being a priori and the political condition he believed was necessary for 
realising them. This, the final section, establishes the ways in which this framework is 
broken down into themes that are then sought in the African political theory literature as a 
method of asking whether these ideas are viewed to be of key philosophical importance by 
the chosen theorists. The analysis of the theorists work is twofold: firstly, it is asked 
whether their views, policies or philosophical suggestions can be viewed as implying an 
innate a priori value in treating individuals as autonomous individuals, understood as 
referring to self-law giving as reasoned individuals. Following this it is asked whether the 
political policies they advocate can be interpreted as intending to provide the space for 
individuals to be self-law giving and autonomous in common with all others. On 
interpreting the outcomes of the analysis it is suggested that a belief that human beings 
have a right to be free, self-law giving individuals exists. It is also suggested that there exists 
a corresponding belief in a right to have this guaranteed within a political structure, at least 
in the form of discursive debate across cultural distinctions. In particular this is the case in 
both the Western Enlightenment tradition and in the case of the African political theorists 
chosen for study by this thesis.  
The categories of internal self-law giving and external willkϋr, as presented in the 
Introduction, are broken down into themes to better enable the enquiry into their 
existence in African political theory. As mentioned in the Introduction, these themes are as 
follows; equality of individuals, self-mastery and freedom of choice versus domination. 
Each of these is unpicked and developed in the following three sub-sections. 
i. Equality of Individuals 
The requirement of equality raises many questions in political theory: what does it mean to 
be equal? Is it the role of the state to artificially create equality of outcome or opportunity? 
Does support for universal laws require us to treat everyone exactly the same under those 
laws, or is there space for relativism and particularity? In the analysis of the selected 
African texts the concept of equality being looked for is specific to Kant. Equality is 
understood in this project as a moral position that posits acts of treating people as 
autonomous individuals who are equally deserving of the right to freedom under a 
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condition of mutually consistent public right. Policies that support the creation of an 
environment in which all individuals have equal opportunity to be self-law giving and 
pursue their own ends in common with all others will be considered as representing this 
idea. This form of equality is understood by Kantians to be “Juridical Equality”: “each 
person has the right to independence from each of the others. None is born either a master 
or a servant. Each enjoys this right to juridical equality innately, prior to any affirmative act 
to establish it” (Ripstein, 2009, p.17). Additionally, the notion of weak universalism 
advocated for by Pogge, and discussed in Section 1.3, will be interpreted as supporting a 
Kantian belief in the value of self-law giving as being owed to all equally, but that this does 
not necessarily look the same for all individuals. The concept of equality is interpreted as 
representing categories of both internal and external freedom as an a priori right. We are 
all, for example, equal in our right to be self-law giving individuals; but we also need to be 
equally restricted from infringing on the freedom of others to have the same choice in 
pursuing their own ends. The location of any of these interpretations within the African 
literature are taken as evidence for the potentially universal notion of these ideas; or at 
least the argument is made for the possibility of interpreting the presence of these views in 
African political theory as having strong correlations with the Kantian tradition as outlined 
above. 
ii. Self-Mastery 
The inclusion of self-mastery as a theme depicting internal self-law giving originates in the 
theory discussed in Kant’s “An Answer to the Question: what is Enlightenment?” This essay 
questions an individual’s ability to live guided by reason and to overcome sensual or base 
drives or passions. This is an internal notion of freedom based on the ability of individuals 
to reason maxims to guide their lives that could be willed into universal law. During analysis 
of the texts from a selection of African political theory it is asked whether an a priori 
assumption exists that individuals have this ability. This does not require theorists to 
believe that all individuals have achieved this, or that perfection of reason is possible, but 
rather that individuals are capable of moral improvement and greater approximations of 
self-mastery. An assumption that individuals may be capable of self-mastery, according to 
Kant, does not require us to believe that all have achieved this, or to build politics on that 
assumption. Rather it requires us to respect an individual’s right to have this level of 
freedom and to guide those that are yet to achieve it. This is one of the elements 
considered when carrying out the textual analysis. If examples of this idea can be found in 
the work of African political theorists then this lends credit to the postulation that this may 
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be a universal foundational principle which may exist across cultural boundaries, which 
may subsequently present the conditions for open and honest cross-cultural dialogue. 
iii. Freedom of Choice versus Domination 
The third theme that is looked for is divided into two contrasting sub-themes. These are 
the concepts of freedom of choice and the contradictory stance of domination. These are 
both external concepts and refer to freedom in a political condition, in common with 
others. As previously discussed, choice, from a Kantian perspective, is a translation of the 
external notion of freedom as understood by the conception of willkür. It is having the 
space as an individual to set and pursue one’s own ends, unhindered by others, and to thus 
direct one’s own life guided by one’s own reason in common with all others.  It dictates the 
need for a political system that either enhances the ability of individuals to be reasoned or 
provides them with the space to allow their reason to guide them. Each of these ideas is 
sought in the selection of African political theory chosen for this study.  
The second half of this theme is domination, and it originates in Arthur Ripstein’s 
interpretation of willkür, previously discussed in Section 1.3. It suggests that preventing 
individuals from pursuing their own ends within the limits of the same freedom being 
awarded to others is an act of domination. When looking for this theme in the selected 
African political theory the aim is to find critiques of domination that are similar to those 
espoused by Kantians. The inclusion of the negative side of freedom of choice is an 
important element to the study due to the time period being studied. Many of the theorists 
being considered are responding to and critiquing the atrocities that occurred under 
colonialism. For this reason, it is important to ask the question of whether the critiques are 
based in the denial of the victims’ right to choose their own ends or pursue a life guided by 
the laws that they devise for themselves. If this is the case, this too will be interpreted as 
suggesting support for the value of willkür within a political system and the importance of 
guaranteeing the space for individuals to live freely guided by their own reason, viewing it 
as an a priori right.  
1.5- Conclusion: 
To conclude, the purpose of this chapter has been to describe and discuss the Kantian 
belief in an a priori right of all humanity to be autonomous, understood as being self-law 
giving, and the duty to enter into a condition in which this can be achieved in common with 
the rest of humanity. It is claimed that this a priori right may in fact be a foundational 
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principle of all of humanity, being of value to individuals regardless of cultural background. 
The aim of this chapter was to establish the foundation of this claim and to then 
breakdown the overarching category into a number of themes that can be looked for in a 
detailed textual analysis of the selection of African political theory chosen for study in the 
remainder of this thesis. The model being used for this is adapted from Strauss and Corbin 
and was presented in greater detail in the Introduction. In summary, the supposition of this 
thesis is that all individuals have a right to be treated as autonomous agents, (understood 
as the right to choose the direction and purposiveness of their own lives in relation to 
others) and that this should be taken into account in political and legal systems, agreeing 
with the model discussed in this chapter. The aim of the remainder of this thesis is to ask 
whether there is an indication that this principle may be a universally shared fundamental 
principle that exists regardless of cultural background, or whether it is specific to the 
Kantian tradition. The role and influence of culture is deliberated in the following chapter in 
which the concept of weak universalism, as presented in Section 1.3, is further discussed, 
along with a range of additional influences on the issues of universality. Following on from 
this, the results of the textual analysis are discussed in Chapters 3-5. 
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Chapter 2- The Elephant in the Room: Culture: 
“Culture: The cry of men in face of their destiny” (Camus, 1978, p.36). 
The term culture is described in the literature as having a myriad of meanings. It is referred 
to in relation to the outputs of musicians, artists and authors; to explain elements of dress 
or style that are at odds with those we understand personally; as fundamental to religious 
or minority groups; as defining who we are as people, nations or continents; and as 
representing the views, or obscuring the individuality, of autonomous agents. As the 
opening quote from Camus suggests, culture provides the space in which humanity can 
express and define itself, be that through membership of a group or nation, through artistic 
output, or through a claim to the value of a ritual, clothing style or language. Each of these 
ideas, standing alone, covers a plethora of concepts or behaviours, but when defined as a 
property, process, or outcome of culture the response can (in certain circumstances) be 
polarised: either, referring to culture stagnates any further questioning of a practice’s 
authenticity and it is simply accepted as being cultural (a relativist position); or, in contrast, 
mention of culture leads to automatic hostility towards said practice. Whilst clearly, these 
responses are polarised examples they do highlight an important academic concern. Often, 
when something is described as being a part of another individual’s culture the question 
regarding the authenticity of the behaviour draws to a halt and, outside of the school of 
anthropology, is rarely replaced with the fundamental query: what does that mean? In 
cases where the question is answered the responses are, as with all subjective topics, 
broadly ranging. 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the body of writing on culture, cultural relativism 
and universalism, to provide the grounding for understanding what is meant when a 
practice is described as cultural, and to provide a basis for understanding the relationship 
between universalism and relativism and the effects of each position on this thesis. The 
reviewed literature emanates from, predominantly, the field of political theory but is also 
supplemented with work from cultural studies. Theorists discussed consider the problem of 
culture from a range of different ideological stand points, and are based both in Western 
and African locations. Due to the overall purposes of this thesis it was felt to be 
fundamental to this project to not only include Western scholars but also the thoughts and 
ideas of contemporary African scholars working on the definition and effects of culture. The 
theories of African thinkers are discussed again in greater depth in Chapter 5 in relation to 
their thoughts and opinions on the themes of this thesis; support for basic principles of 
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internal self-law giving and external willkϋr. Their inclusion here is intended purely to 
advance understanding of the discourse surrounding the role of culture in the debate 
between universalism and relativism, and the potential existence of universally shared 
principles.  
As previously referenced, the central aim of this thesis is to question the existence of such 
shared foundational principles. Thus, understanding the role of culture in advocating for 
these principles or diminishing their relevance is fundamental. As Fred Dallmayr suggests, 
comprehending “shared meanings and practises- to the extent that this is possible- can 
only arise from the lateral interaction, negotiation, and contestation among different, 
historically grown cultural frameworks” (Dallmayr, 2010, p.7), thus comprehension of the 
role of culture is essential to diligently carrying out this study. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
this research centres on the question of whether the two metaphysical claims (internal and 
external self-law giving) exist a priori. These claims have been translated into themes which 
are being utilised for the purposes of the textual analysis: self-mastery, freedom of choice 
versus domination and equality of individuals. When considering these concepts within 
different cultural and individual contexts it becomes clear that the rights of self-mastery 
and freedom of choice may not have been fully or even partially realised, or that the 
method of realisation differs greatly both within a culture (for example some groups 
preference the rights of males over the rights of females), and between cultures (Islamic 
and Christian groups, for example, approach style of dress differently). Thus, culture is at 
the centre of the debate. It plays a fundamental role in the understanding of what these 
principles mean to individuals, as well as to the realisation of them. That being said, the 
argument of this thesis is as follows: the principles of internal and external self-law giving, 
as well as the concepts of choice, self-mastery and equality act as the foundations of 
debate, both within a culture and across cultures. This is not to suggest that the outcomes 
of the debate will be recognisable between examples, nor that each individual has been 
able to realise their self-law giving abilities. Rather, that these principles are fixed 
metaphysical points around which debates about human well-being focus. Thus, it is 
fundamental to understanding the universality of this argument to investigate the role 
culture plays in both increasing and diminishing self-law giving abilities of individuals; as 
well as the role cultural practices, such as dress or language, play in developing individual 
self-definition. 
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Whilst this thesis initially looked for notions of self-law giving as a foundational principle 
being universally similar in approach, it became apparent throughout the analysis that the 
principles may indeed exist universally but the approach to achieving them was, in some 
cases, culturally specific. For example, Leopold Sedar Senghor (whose views are analysed in 
Chapter 3), indicated in his writing, a belief that autonomy is best realised through both a 
recognition of the value of community and the value of culture. This position is notably 
different from the Kantian approach set out in Chapter 1. However, as becomes clear in 
Chapter 3, similarities still exist in the underlying philosophical belief; in the value of 
autonomy to individuals. This substantiates the assumption that these principles exist as 
universal focal points for debate, but at the same time responses to these debates do 
indeed differ. It is for these reasons that clarifying the concepts of culture, relativism and 
universalism is fundamental to provide a basis for the research carried out in Chapters 3-5.  
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first (Section 2.1) considers definitions of 
culture presented by a cross-section of theorists from different regional and ideological 
backgrounds. The second section (Section 2.2) looks at the relationship between minority 
and majority cultures living within the same geographical space and the problems that arise 
balancing the rights and priorities of each. The third section (Section 2.3) is an extension of 
the second. This section analyses the Incommensurability Thesis and the role of relativism 
more generally; the aim being to overcome a number of concerns associated with this 
position that are problematic to a universalistic understanding of individuals, such as the 
one that is central to this thesis. This section also asks whether there are certain behaviours 
that should or should not be defended because they have cultural significance; an idea that 
Brian Barry deals with in a number of his articles on the topic. The fourth section (Section 
2.4) looks at the role of common practices and language in defining a bounded group and 
the possible existence of a universally recognised human identity that supersedes the 
concept of culturally specific identity. Language plays a fundamental role in individual and 
cultural development and this section utilises the work of Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, amongst 
others, to further understand this central role. The fifth, and final, section (Section 2.5) 
considers why comparative analysis is an important approach for understanding universal 
and cultural identities, and concludes with a summary of the chapter and a more detailed 
explanation of its role within the rest of this thesis. In particular, this section builds on the 
justifications given in Chapter 1 for the uptake of a comparative approach to political 
theory. 
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2.1- Definitions of Culture: 
Having explained the overall structure of this chapter, I now proceed with a discussion of 
how culture is defined by theorists from across regions, ideologies and philosophies. It is 
important to state at this stage that the chapter does not deal with ideas of popular culture 
or cultural output (such as music, film and television). Whilst reference will be made by 
some of the theorists covered to the effects of clothing, literature, dance and music on 
binding people together, a detailed analysis remains outside the scope of this thesis. It is 
however, important to highlight the value of reflecting on these elements to comparative 
studies and there is a vast literature that exists within the field covering these topics. For a 
summary see Nick Couldry’s 2000 text, “Inside Culture”.  
As previously stated, culture is presented in academic and political circles, as well as 
common parlance, as having a multitude of meanings. In fact as Willie E. Abraham observes 
in his monograph “The Mind of Africa”, “the word culture has a variety of uses. At its most 
inclusive, it is used to cover every possible aspect, public and private, of the life of a people” 
(Abraham, 1962, p.12). This definition, like many others attempting to uncover what 
exactly is meant by culture, is vague in its formulation, and thus raises more questions than 
it answers. In particular, what is meant when Abraham refers to “a people”? A people, a 
community, a cultural group, a nation: each of these terms are commonly used to 
reference a collective of individuals who, it is suggested, have something in common, often 
referred to as their culture. Jeremy Waldron, for example, suggests that “a culture is a 
human community larger than a few families that is associated with ongoing ways of seeing, 
doing, and thinking about things” (Waldron, cited in, Gutmann, 1993, p.171). What is 
implied by both of these theorists, each considering the question from different academic 
perspectives, is that what is important about culture is that it is shared by a collective of 
individuals, each of which hold a common view on the correct ways to act in certain 
situations. On this understanding, culture can cover any group of people who exist within 
an imagined community based on shared understandings of how they should exist. For 
example, the methods they use to prepare food, educate their children, dress, practice 
religion, converse with other members of the community, establish a political system or 
interact with others who are alien to their group. For Abraham, culture is that part of 
communal life that exists “on the basis of common reactions, common actions, common 
interests, common attitudes, common values. It creates the basis of the formulation of a 
common destiny and cooperation in pursuing it” (Abraham, 1962, p.27). The main focus in 
each of the definitions covered so far is on commonality, be that in belief or actions. 
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However, whilst Abraham and Waldron focus on commonality, there is a further selection 
of authors, such as Charles Taylor (1994), Bhiku Parekh (2002) and Iris Marian Young (2011), 
who emphasise the internal differences within cultural groups such as age, gender, status 
and sexuality. They view shared practices as only one aspect of a cultural identity. The 
direct contrast in focus between the two sets of authors emphasises the subjective nature 
of the concept. Before discussing further definitions this section considers in greater detail 
those arguments that focus on difference.  
Whilst Abraham focuses on culture as being a “source of solidarity, of the complex 
mechanisms, symbols, and ideologies of social integration and common belongingness” 
(Abraham, 1962, p.39) it has been suggested by some liberals that such an approach leads 
to dangerous attempts at homogenisation. Will Kymlicka argues that liberals responding to 
claims of cultural value are met with what he describes as the liberal dilemma; this 
dilemma divides liberal responses to cultural practices. He describes the liberal dilemma as: 
“the debate among liberals is about whether autonomy or tolerance is the fundamental 
value within liberal theory” (Kymlicka, 1995, p.154). Support for tolerance represents the 
idea that cultural difference is valuable and thus, should be respected whether or not 
individuals external to the group understand or agree with it (the cultural relativist 
position). In contrast, support for a position favouring autonomy places the individual at 
the centre of all discussion of fair and just treatment and suggests that the right way to 
treat an autonomous agent is universal; thus superseding respect for cultural difference 
(the universalist position). This broadly marks the lines of debate between universalism and 
relativism and is understood by Kymlicka to be the dilemma of contemporary liberals 
working in this area:  
“Simply put, universalism holds that there is an underlying human unity 
which entitles all individuals, regardless of their cultural or regional 
antecedents, to certain basic rights… Cultural relativism is a theory which 
asserts that there is no meaningful way to judge different cultures because 
all judgements are ethnocentric” (Zechenter, 1997, pp. 320-323). 
Debate between these two positions is at the centre of most contemporary discussion of 
culture and the need to either respect certain practices or to protect individuals from them. 
Within the recent literature there has been a move away from either extreme universalism 
or extreme relativism, but arguments for each will be considered throughout this chapter. 
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In considering the dichotomy between these two positions, Barry, in his 1998 article “The 
Limits of Cultural Practice” discussed the claim that theorists holding these positions, in fact, 
over emphasise the value or role of culture. He argued, to the contrary, that, “appeal to 
culture is less than conclusive. All too often, the appeal to culture is an attempt to 
legitimate either the oppression of one group by another, or the oppression of some 
members of a group by others within the group in the name of an internally inegalitarian 
and illiberal culture” (Barry, 1998, p.313). Barry’s concern is with the position of extreme 
relativism. By suggesting that certain behaviours are fundamental to the maintenance of a 
culture’s heritage, or to the ability of members of the group to recognise one another, 
relativists argue that a group should be able to protect these behaviours on the grounds of 
cultural value, regardless of the effects on the individuals involved. For example, 
discussions of cultural relativism frequently debate the issue of female genital mutilation 
(FGM): claiming either that it is universally abhorrent and should be banned, or that it is 
relevant to certain cultures, and that individuals external to those cultures cannot 
understand it and should not comment on it. Therefore, according to epistemological 
relativists (the term given to extreme relativist positions) such as Clifford Geertz (1997) and 
Ernest Gellner (1985), there is no ethical way to make judgements between cultures 
without being accused of ethnocentrism. In contrast, Barry critiques the claim that cultural 
practices should be protected regardless of their effects on individuals through reference 
to a number of prevalent examples. This response will be considered in depth in Section 2.3; 
however, it is raised at this stage to illustrate the contrasting positions of relativism and 
universalism.  
Having briefly touched upon the debate between relativism and universalism, the chapter 
now returns to further discussion of definitions of the term culture and issues that arise 
around those definitions. A controversy that is referenced throughout the discourse on 
culture and universalism is the question of whether culture represents different groups’ 
attempts to respond to the same human questions or, whether instead, certain differences 
cannot be overcome: a dilemma which is a central tenant of this thesis. This dilemma not 
only relates to differences between cultural practices within a state (examples of which are 
considered in Sections 2.2 and 2.3), but also, cultural differences between sovereign states 
and differences that exist between two cultural groups that are not attached to a state. 
Difference, in this sense, refers to only sharing commonalities with other members of your 
cultural group rather than humanity in general. For example, being of the view that the 
commonalities between yourself, and an individual from outside of your cultural group, are 
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as insignificant as those that exist between a goldfish and a stone. The opposing 
(universalist) position suggests that whilst you may have more things in common with 
those within your group, you still, although potentially to a lesser extent, share 
understandings and experiences with the rest of humanity more generally. These positions 
rely on a static view of culture as being closed off and isolated. I take a more cosmopolitan 
perspective that recognises fluidity and the multitude of influences that can affect 
individual identity. That being said, the intervention I make to the debate between 
relativism and universalism is to suggest a groundwork on which interactions between 
cultures can take place justly. Of course, the consequences of the debates between 
relativists and universalists are of great importance to this thesis. They raise questions 
regarding the relevance and appropriateness of comparison between cultures. Proponents 
of the Incommensurability Thesis (discussed in Section 2.3) would argue that such 
comparison is neither relevant, nor productive, I respond to this concern throughout the 
thesis.  
To achieve this, consideration of the literature turns now to a number of philosophers who 
approach culture from a position of basic understanding relying on a conception of 
humanity rooted in universalism. Thus, for these theorists, culture is defined as secondary 
to humanity; a way of coping with human concerns, which takes into account the local 
conditions in which groups find themselves. In the Western tradition, a seminal text dealing 
with objective humanity is Thomas Nagel’s somewhat controversial “The View from 
Nowhere” (1986) in which he claims, amongst other things, that there must be a common 
humanity between cultural groups to allow individuals to recognise one another as human. 
He suggests, our ability to reach agreement on certain ethical dilemmas indicates the 
existence of an objective human position from which we can approach these concerns. To 
clarify, he asserts that, “the fact people can to some extent reach agreement on answers 
which they regard as objective suggests that when they step outside of their particular 
individual perspectives, they call into action a common, evaluative faculty” (Nagel, 1986, 
p.148). This position he referred to as “The View from Nowhere”; a view that is not 
affected by regional, or cultural, existence but instead can, although this is not always the 
case, be the domain of all thinking humans. Nagel’s argument for how an individual can 
achieve a view point that is not affected by cultural experience is controversial, and a 
number of critiques, as well as alternatives or adaptations, have been offered. One 
example is Marilyn Friedman’s work on deliberative and discursive approaches to 
democracy. She claims that, rather than trying to overcome issues of culture the intention 
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should, instead, be to understand the influence they have on individuals. She defines 
objectivity as follows: “Genuine objectivity requires ideal inter-subjective dialogue, 
dialogue which meets ideal conditions such as the absence of those power imbalances 
which privilege the voices of some participants over others” (Friedman, 1990, p.507). This 
thesis intends to offer one intervention regarding on what grounds this dialogue can be 
achieved. Not only does Friedman recognise the importance of difference, she also argues 
that it should be considered through a system of fair, and just, cross-cultural interactions, 
premised on ideal inter-subjective dialogue. This is particularly important when considering 
the purpose of this thesis. Firstly, the points Friedman raises regarding issues of power are 
ones that it is important to be aware of when carrying out textual analysis of source 
material from other cultures. In particular this relates to the necessity to achieve “critical 
distance” (Freeden & Vincent, 2013, p.10) when analysing the views of both one’s own 
culture and the culture of others. Furthermore, it highlights the necessity to view the works 
of authors as their views alone, and not as being representational of a larger group; 
regardless of the claims they may make to be the educated voice of the people. Secondly, 
her work also begins to set parameters for the requirements of fair, and just, cross-cultural 
dialogue; in particular, establishing a system which avoids privileging the voices of the 
powerful.  
Alternatively to Friedman’s view, Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Gyekye presents the role of 
culture as enabling individuals to respond to “human” questions. He too recognises the 
existence of cultural difference, but he believes that this relates only to the situations 
individuals find themselves in, and it does not represent a central facet of human existence. 
Like a number of other discussants of culture, such as Abraham and Waldron, he defines it 
in somewhat vague terms:  
“An enactment of a community of people, created and fashioned in 
response to the whole gamut of problems or questions that arise in the 
context of a people’s particular situation. The problems or questions 
themselves are universal, even though the approaches to dealing with 
them may be particular or specific, and may differ from society to society” 
(Gyekye, 2004, p.28). 
In Section 2.3, his views on both culturally specific and, what he describes as objective facts, 
are considered in greater detail. However, at this stage, reference to Gyekye is intended to 
highlight his support for a philosophical position that recognises culturally specific 
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approaches to questions he views as being relevant to all individuals regardless of cultural 
affiliation. On this argument, comparison between cultures is appropriate as it is of 
academic value to discover the ways in which different experiences and life situations 
enable an individual or group to respond to, what Gyekye describes as, “universal” 
problems. Additionally, according to this interpretation, culture is presented as enabling us 
to cope better with our experience of individual existence. Thus, as Abraham suggests, one 
“use of culture is to make events intelligible and significant” (Abraham, 1962, p.28), to 
enable us to understand them as they take place in our lives and to respond appropriately 
to them in common with those experiencing them from within the same geographical, 
political, national or religious situation. 
George Crowder makes a further argument for why certain “values and concepts are 
universal. This must be true (he claims)… if we are to account for our capacity to 
understand and empathise with the goals and values of other cultures” (Crowder, 2006, 
p.407). There are notable similarities between Crowder’s position and Nagel’s (already 
discussed) in that both base their arguments on the concept of recognition between 
cultural groups of all being members of the same human race. In discussing the views of 
Abraham, Gyekye, Nagel and Crowder, each of whom emanates from a different academic 
background, a pattern emerges. Similar to Kant’s transcendental approach discussed in 
Chapter 1, it is possible to interpret each of these theorists as making a claim that 
individuals’ ability to enter into discourse regarding the definition or role of culture in their 
lives suggests that there is at least a basic shared understanding of what it means to be 
human. It is the argument of this thesis that this shared understanding emanates from the 
philosophical underpinnings of internal and external self-law giving and those cross-cultural, 
or inter-cultural, interactions, whilst they may differ, maintain a focus on responding to 
issues of self-mastery. As way of clarification, it is not controversial to claim that a 
multitude of responses exist to culture; the brief overview given in this chapter indicates 
that this is the case. However, the fact that academics from across a wide range of 
disciplines, locations and backgrounds each contribute to this debate suggests that there is, 
at the very least, a shared understanding of what culture involves or means and the role it 
plays in guiding the lives of human agents.  
In summary, definitions of culture are often poorly defined: it is a topic that both 
engenders subjectivity and inspires debate. There are a number of areas in particular that 
highlight the vast differences that exist amongst discussants of culture. Firstly, the number 
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of people a group is required to contain to be considered a culture is often controversial. As 
discussed previously, Waldron claims that a culture is a “community larger than a few 
families”. However, culture has also been associated with national, religious or political 
identities of far larger groups as well as the extremist positions of very small groups. The 
requirements placed on individuals to be members of certain cultures, as well as what 
being cultural looks like are also controversial. For example, it is clear in the following 
section (Section 2.2) that theorists such as Will Kymlicka argue cultures are in no way neatly 
bounded groups and in fact, there can be much crossover between the different cultures to 
which an individual feels they have a claim to membership: be that a religion, a linguistic 
group or a nation. As is discussed in the following section, Kymlicka argues that it is possible 
to claim membership of a multitude of different cultures and that an individual can be a 
part of each of these cultures in different ways. To clarify, what it means for one individual 
to be a member of the French culture may be different to what it means for a second 
individual. As a specific example, Kwame Anthony Appiah refers to the concept of the 
nation as embodying an idea of culture: “A nation…is an imagined community of culture: or 
ancestry running beyond the scale of the face-to face and seeking political expression for 
itself” (Appiah, 1997, p.623). This is not to suggest that the nation is the only embodiment 
of culture, but rather that it is one unit of understanding among many. Similarly to Appiah’s 
mention of ancestry, Bhikhu Parekh refers to the influence of the past on an individual’s 
identity:  
 “Although the term identity is sometimes inflated to cover almost 
everything that characterises an individual or a group, most advocates of 
these movements use it to refer to those chosen or inherited 
characteristics that define them as certain kinds of persons or groups and 
form an integral part of their self-understanding” (Parekh, 2006, p.1). 
Parekh claims that the influence of historical factors is thus an important part of culture. A 
focus on history leads to a further concern which is highlighted by discussion of Barry’s 
views in Section 2.2. He surmises that if a practice is deeply rooted in a group’s past, but 
viewed negatively by contemporary standards, this does not justify its protection as a 
practice adaptable to temporal and situational change. This concern will be discussed in the 
following section, but at this stage it is being raised to highlight further the range of 
definitions and responses that are invoked by the term “culture”.  
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However, having highlighted the divergent approaches to discussing, studying and 
understanding culture it is important to conclude this section by highlighting some of the 
similarities that have been referenced in each of the definitions included in this review of a 
range of perspectives from within political theory and cultural studies. The first is the idea 
that one’s chosen culture in some way enhances human experience; be that through 
providing greater local understanding of human concerns or through enabling the building 
of communities. The second is that for a practice to be cultural it must be experienced by a 
plurality of individuals. Whilst the number is debated it is widely accepted that a culture is a 
group greater than a few. Thirdly, as an extension to the second point, culture is rooted in 
shared ideals and approaches to human experience. Finally, that cultures have “myths and 
tales” (Gyekye, 2004, p.29) on which they are built and shared, that have meaning and 
value to their members. This is not to imply that cultures are homogenous groups that 
treat all members fairly or equally, but rather that there are shared stories and guidelines 
that each member may not favour or agree with but they will still recognise. 
Simultaneously, it is important to recognise that certain cultural practices negatively affect 
the human well-being of certain individuals within the group. The argument of this thesis is 
not intended to deny the negative aspects of culture, or to suggest that all cultures treat 
individuals in a way that respects their ability to be self-mastering individuals able to live 
guided by their own purposiveness. Rather, it is to suggest that in situations in which 
cultures do treat individuals negatively these principles (of self-law giving, purposiveness 
and choice) will be the foundations on which this discourse is built, around which debate 
centres, and on which the cultural group in question is criticised. Similarly, in situations in 
which cultures are praised for their treatment of individuals, the said praise will be built on 
the foundation that individuals’ rights to live guided by their own purposiveness have been 
realised or that the culture is one expression of this. In each of these cases, it is suggested 
that these principles represent the philosophical underpinnings of debate and discourse 
around which a plurality of cultures can be assessed. This review of literatures, from both 
cultural studies and political theory, has been included to demonstrate the relevance of 
these arguments to current debate, and to ground the study within the current literature. It 
is through the analysis carried out in Chapters 3-5 that this thesis is able to provide 
evidence for these arguments. Demonstrating that across a range of different cultural, 
political and ideological models the concerns of self-law giving, purposiveness and choice 
remain prominent human principles. They are at the centre of debates regarding the 
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appropriateness of certain cultures to individual development, and form the foundation of 
discussions of personhood and autonomy.  
Having considered a number of definitions of culture within this section, and the 
foundations of the debate between relativism and universalism, the following section 
develops this discussion further focusing on the situation in which a multitude of cultural 
groups exist in the same geographical space. 
2.2- The Relationship between Majority and Minority Cultures: 
This section and the following section (Section 2.3), in which the Incommensurability Thesis 
is discussed, are intrinsically linked. The primary focus of this section is to consider the 
various solutions theorists offer to situations in which cultural groups come into contact 
with one another in a situation in which one has the numerical majority; thus allowing it 
the opportunity to potentially oppress the smaller group. The analysis will focus on 
Kymlicka’s work on group rights, as well as Parekh’s studies on religious clothing, and 
discuss their responses to issues of inequality. This section is included within the thesis as 
the authors discussed focus, in their research, on methods of understanding and 
overcoming clashing views that exist within a larger cultural or national group. In the two 
examples considered here this refers to religious groups within a nation. However, the 
issues that arise are also relevant to other minority groups, such as gay rights groups or 
political activists existing within different, potentially hostile, majority cultures. Within each 
of these examples the debate focuses around issues of self-determination and self-mastery, 
understood as the rights of individuals to express their cultural preferences. This can be 
interpreted as a desire to protect a personal culture, or alternatively to protect an 
individual from the homogenising force of a dominant culture. However, in each of these 
contradictory examples the debate remains focused around self-determination. This will 
become clear throughout the following discussion. This debate, existing within the liberal 
tradition rather than the African sample selected for study in this thesis, is included here to 
demonstrate the broad range of existing views, from a range of different ideological and 
cultural perspectives, that premise their arguments on the value of self-determination and 
personhood. By including these liberal theorists, the intention is to show that they, too, 
rely on similar foundational arguments to those that I am suggesting underpin the views of 
the African scholars. In so doing the intention is to provide further evidence for the 
potentially a priori nature of these arguments, and to argue for the need for further 
research in this area. To clarify, if it is possible to locate foundational principles within 
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liberal traditions it raises the question as to whether these are particular to that one 
tradition or whether they are potentially universal: the intention of this thesis is to begin 
the process of answering this concern through the analysis of a further sample of 
discourses. This section (Section 2.2) provides the grounding of this discussion by firstly 
locating these principles within the liberal tradition. The argument being that the two 
thinkers included in this section (Parekh and Kymlicka) approach the concern for minority 
cultures from different perspectives, offering different solutions to the debate, but 
nonetheless, each of their arguments centres around a concern for the rights of individuals 
to be (in some sense) self-law giving. Establishing the existence of these principles in both 
liberal and African traditions has a further value: it is the argument of this thesis that these 
foundations can form the basis for open and just cross-cultural dialogue, thus it is 
fundamental to the premise of the project to locate them in both the dominant liberal 
tradition and the perspectives of the African sample selected for study. This is to enable 
arguments to be made regarding their value in establishing the conditions for just discourse. 
It is the role of this section (and this chapter more broadly) to achieve the first of these two 
aims (locating these principles within the views of liberal thinkers) and the role of Chapters 
3 to 5 to locate them in the work of the African scholars selected for study.  
When considering the plight of minority groups Parekh refers to the Canadian example in 
which Sikhs serving in the police force have been criticised for advocating for the right to 
wear a turban whilst patrolling, rather than the traditional headwear associated with the 
force. They have argued that it is their religious right to represent themselves in such a way; 
whilst critics have suggested that individuals choosing to join the police force should be 
willing to wear the uniform representing their position. Both groups emphasise the value of 
being recognisable as members of the two groups: either the police force or the Sikh 
religion. Parekh also discusses a second example: the French case which was popularised 
by the media in the early 2000’s. A question was raised about the legitimacy of young girls 
wishing to wear religiously specific clothing, in particular the Hijab, to attend school in a 
system that prides itself on being secular (Parekh, 2002). Each of these examples asks 
whether a minority group should have the right to protect itself against homogenisation 
within larger groups. However, a second question is also raised: should individuals have the 
right to membership of a multiplicity of different cultural groups? It is a truism to assume 
that individual identity has many facets, the question raised by these examples, however, is 
how contradictory practices can peacefully coexist. At their core, each of these questions 
focuses on the individual’s right to purposiveness. 
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To summarise, each of these examples leads to the question: What does it mean to be a 
member of a cultural group associated with a nation, whilst simultaneously expressing 
individual choice to maintain further, in some examples contradictory, identities. Kymlicka’s 
solution is based on the ability of individuals to have multiple cultural allegiances. He is 
widely credited as one of the most famous voices amongst nationalist and multiculturalist 
circles and his arguments supporting multicultural forms of nationalism are well cited.  He 
refers to the example of Muslims living in France as a demonstration of how cultures are 
not tightly bounded, finite groups that exist on separate planes. Individuals, he argues, can 
possess a multitude of cultural identities that exist in symbiosis, each identity being as 
important to them as the last. He focuses on a French Muslim asserting their right to wear 
a head scarf as not being a Muslim concern, but rather a French concern:  
“When asserting their right to wear a headscarf, they are not saying they 
have this right as ‘Europeans’, or as ‘Parisians’, but precisely as French 
citizens. They argue that being Muslim is one way of being French…and of 
course they make these arguments in French to their French co-nationals” 
(Kymlicka, 2006, p.141). 
For Kymlicka, being a member of a religious cultural group does not lessen your 
membership of the national cultural group, it is just another, equally valid, form of 
membership. Thus for him, wearing a turban as a Sikh member of the Canadian police force, 
or a Hijab to attend a French school, would not be problematic. They would simply be 
examples of Canadian and French individuals being Canadian or French in ways that are 
different, but equally valid, to other members of their national cultural group. Thus 
supporting a similar approach to the one discussed in Chapter 1, in which it was argued 
that it is possible to use different means to achieve a similar end. For Kymlicka, what it 
means to be French can differ for different individuals or groups. 
He does, however, recognise that this entails the risk that the dominant culture will 
eventually homogenise the minority group. The solution, as he sees it, emanates from the 
state, whose role it is to prevent majority domination through the creation and policing of 
minority rights. This originates, in Kymlicka’s view, from the assumption that culture is 
fundamental to human experience and thus should be protected by state power. As Parekh 
observes a, “stable and historically continuous cultural community, is essential to human 
freedom and autonomy and hence is a primary good” (Parekh, 1997, p.56): it is therefore, 
the duty of the state to protect this.  In his 1995 study of “Multicultural Citizenship”, 
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Kymlicka, unlike many theorists who favour the protection of minority groups and the 
maintenance of culturally relative values, does not advocate against the existence of 
universal human rights. Instead, he claims that having only a universal system of rights is 
not enough. In addition to a set of human rights that offer a certain level of protection to 
all individuals, he believes that we should also have minority rights that allow small groups 
to protect themselves from the ever growing strength of assimilation politics. He argues 
that it is: 
“legitimate, and indeed unavoidable, to supplement traditional human 
rights with minority rights. A comprehensive theory of justice in a 
multicultural state will include both universal rights, assigned to individuals 
regardless of group membership, and certain group-differentiated rights or 
‘special status’ for minority cultures… A liberal theory of rights, therefore, 
must explain how minority rights coexist with human rights, and how 
minority rights are limited by principles of individual liberty, democracy, 
and social justice” (Kymlicka, 1995, p.6).  
Thus, according to this argument we can be a part of a nation, a continent, a village and a 
culture simultaneously, and each of these identities is valid. The ability to develop these 
identities should be enshrined in both national and international law through the uptake of 
a system of minority rights.    
Parekh is critical of Kymlicka, suggesting that his support for culture through the uptake of 
a minority rights based approach is grounded in a belief in, and adherence to, a Western 
liberal approach, as well as in his understanding that: 
“Human beings are ‘cultural creatures’…cultures are the necessary bases 
of their development as human beings...culture defines and structures 
their world, offers them spectacles through which to see themselves and 
others, helps them make intelligent judgements about what is valuable, 
suggests worthwhile roles, provides them with the meaningful options, 
guides their decisions concerning how to lead their lives, provides a secure 
background necessary for developing the capacity for choice, and is in 
general the inescapable context of their autonomy and choices…For him 
choice and autonomy are some of the central liberal values, and culture is 
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important primarily as a context of choice and a cradle of autonomy” 
(Parekh, 1997, pp. 56-57). 
As implied above, Parekh disagrees with Kymlicka that every society has a national culture 
which is of fundamental importance to them. Instead, he argues for a multicultural model 
rooted less in liberalism, which is able to recognise that not all societies are, or want to be, 
liberal. He argues that Kymlicka, “takes no account of this, and universalises and imposes 
the liberal understanding of culture on non-liberal cultures and defends them only after 
suitably liberalising them” (Parekh, 1997, p.59). 
Parekh also questions how we can deliver both equal rights to citizens and at the same 
time recognise the value and importance of cultural difference. He suggests that “when we 
take legitimate cultural differences into account, as we should, equal treatment is likely to 
involve different or differential treatment, raising the question as to how we can ensure 
that the latter does not amount to discrimination or privilege” (Parekh, 2002, p.261). 
Before considering the outcomes of such a response, it is necessary to raise the issue of 
Parekh’s use of the term “legitimate”. By making use of such terms, the implication is that 
he is making certain value judgements regarding what he does and doesn’t view as being 
valid cultural differences. According to his view, legitimate cultural positions are those that 
remain within the boundaries of respect for International Human Rights; outside of these 
boundaries he would not necessarily mount a defence for differentiated rights. Whereas 
within them, he suggests that all individuals should be guaranteed an equal set of rights 
regardless of which cultural groups they associate with. The assumption of legitimacy 
would be one that many relativists would take hubris with as they would argue that no 
individual from outside of the culture in question is in a position to make a judgement 
regarding the legitimacy of the cultures practices. However, for Parekh, to enable respect 
of cultural difference a model that is able to adhere to universal rights in culturally specific 
and different ways is required. He uses the example of the right to religious freedom to 
illustrate this point:  
“As a general rule it would seem that different treatments of individuals or 
groups are equal if they represent different ways of realising the same right, 
opportunity or in whatever other respect they are intended to be treated 
equally, and if as a result none of the parties is better-off or worse-off. The 
Sikh who is allowed to carry a Kirpan and a Christian who is not are treated 
differently but equally because they are both exercising the same right (the 
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right to religious freedom)in different ways and because the former does 
not secure an advantage over or at the expense of the latter” (Parekh, 
2002, p.261). 
As this quote suggests, Parekh, like Kymlicka, strongly advocates for a model of relative 
universalism that is able to guarantee the protection of cultural difference and the 
avoidance of homogenisation of minority groups by those in the majority, whilst also 
maintaining a system of universal protections for all individuals, independent of their 
cultural allegiances. However, his method for achieving this same outcome differs. Rather 
than creating a system of minority rights he prefers to have one set of universal protections, 
such as the UNDHR that can be realised differently. In relation to the example used at the 
start of this section: a Sikh would be able to wear a turban whilst serving in the Canadian 
police force, whilst a Christian would be required to wear the standard uniform but would 
be within their right to adorn it with a cross. The alterations they make to their uniforms 
may look different but their treatment remains equal in respect of the right to religious 
freedom. Parekh’s approach is of particular interest to the overall aims of this thesis in that 
it concludes in favour of respecting individuals’ rights to be self-law giving in common with 
others. However, this treatment, whilst equal will, like Parekh’s argument, look different 
across examples.  On analysing Parekh’s work it is possible to draw similarities with the 
concept of “weak universalism” presented in Chapter 1 as being associated with the 
theoretical approach of Thomas Pogge. This thesis, in line with both theorists (Pogge and 
Parekh), argues for the value of a theory that is able to respect shared universal principles 
of humanity (a deontological subfloor), whilst also respecting and supporting a system 
which recognises different ways of being treated equally. For example, Parekh’s argument 
in which the same right to religious freedom is expressed differently by contrasting groups 
in varying circumstances. The existence of the expression of the same fundamental 
principle in different cultural situations will become clear throughout the analysis in Parts 1 
and 2 of this thesis (Chapters 3-5). This concept will be further summarised in the final 
chapter: Concluding Remarks. Parekh’s (as well as Pogge’s) work has been a guiding 
influence in establishing the approach of this thesis.  
Having considered the issues that exist around protecting minority cultures from 
assimilation under universal practices, and demonstrated that the foundations of these 
arguments are similar to those premised by this thesis (self-mastery, equality and choice or 
purposiveness), the chapter now progresses to a discussion of a counter position which 
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places the individual at the centre. This section raises the question: at what stage, if any, 
should we universally protect individuals from cultural practice rather than cultural practice 
from individuals? This will be considered in the following section (Section 2.3) which 
assesses the political theory literature surrounding the Incommensurability Thesis. 
2.3- The Incommensurability Thesis: 
The Incommensurability Thesis is a theory that is not specific to discussions of culture; 
however it has been adapted from its original format to enhance such discussion. The 
original Incommensurability Thesis claims that:  
“Two theories are incommensurable…if they contain a basic common term 
whose meaning or use in one theory is incommensurable with its meaning 
or use in another, i.e., if at least one basic term used in both theories has a 
totally different meaning in each. Incommensurability renders it impossible 
to compare or contrast, relate or otherwise devise the content of the two 
theories” (Wisdom, 1973, p. 299).  
In terms of culture the argument is presented as follows: there is no common standard or 
quality in virtue of which we can measure different cultures against one another. Cultures 
and moral values, according to this theory, are so vastly different that there is no common 
measure by which all could fairly be evaluated. According to this argument, the only option 
is to recognise the existence of substantial differences and to respect those differences, 
and not to criticise them. This argument, in line with relativism more generally, argues that 
there is no common standard of human well-being against which practices can be 
measured. That being said, the relativist argument is particularly problematic to the aims of 
this thesis and therefore one of the central tenants of this section is both to develop the 
thesis’s response to these concerns, but also to discuss, and draw on, the work of other 
theorists in this area. The concept of strong relativism or incommensurability is problematic 
for a number of reasons. This thesis is not premised on the idea that all cultures should, nor 
do, approach certain concerns in the same way, or that one culture is superior to another. 
Rather, that the potential exists to locate a priori universals that are prior to culture and 
relevant to all individuals regardless of their membership to, or affiliation with, a cultural 
group. That being said, it is necessary to tease out and overcome relativist arguments 
suggesting that the existence of universal principles is a falsehood, to enable this thesis to 
better establish the counter argument supporting a weak universalism. This is the purpose 
of the following discussion.  
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Appiah adapts the Incommensurability Thesis to relate to the individual. He argues that 
“part of what the equal dignity of all persons means for the liberal is that we respect 
people’s autonomous decisions for themselves, even when they are decisions we judge 
mistaken- or simply choices we would not make for ourselves” (Appiah, 1997, p. 621). This 
position is particularly important to this thesis, as similarly to Appiah’s cosmopolitan stance, 
this project agrees that individuals should maintain their right to direct their own lives. 
However, the limit placed on this right, both by this thesis and Appiah, is that it should not 
infringe on the same equal rights of all other autonomous agents. Thus, supporting this 
right does not place the same requirements on us as the Incommensurability Thesis. Rather, 
it supports a deontological sub-floor shared by all humans, regardless of their cultural 
group, that cannot be overwritten by cultural difference. It is by using this basis as a 
foundation that this thesis is able to overcome the concerns of relativism. This argument is 
developed in greater depth in the following paragraphs, initially considering the arguments 
of other academics, and then developing a response grounded on Arthur Ripstein’s theory 
of individuated persons first discussed in Section 1.2 of the previous chapter, as a response 
to the issues raised by relativism. 
Before developing an argument based on the concept of spatially individuated individuals, 
this section considers three further responses: the first is associated with Ghanaian 
philosophers Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye and suggests that individuals must respect, 
and cannot criticise, those culturally specific practices that are not fundamental to human 
existence, but only to maintaining the existence of the culture itself. However, it is the duty 
of individuals external to a culture to criticise those practices that are damaging to human 
well-being. The second argument comes from Brian Barry and is an extension of ideas 
discussed in Section 2.1. He argues that certain practices are so abhorrent that their 
extinction will have no negative effect on the maintenance of the cultural group’s identity. 
The final approach analysed in this section is Amy Gutman’s deliberative response to 
cultural difference. 
Gyekye focuses his argument around the central assumption that culture is, in fact, a 
human construct. Thus, as mentioned in discussion of his views in Section 2.1, our shared 
humanity takes precedence over our cultural differences. He makes the claim that: 
“Culture, and we must always bear in mind this banal truth, is created by 
human beings to serve the purposes and interests of human beings. For 
this reason, the basic or ultimate criterion for evaluating cultures is human 
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well-being, the extent to which a particular culture is set to fulfil the 
conditions that make for human well-being” (Gyekye, 2004, p.38).  
Additionally, according to Gyekye, cultural practices that have no influence on the overall 
well-being of the individual human should remain outside of the realms of cross-cultural 
debate. The question of who sets the parameters of what is and isn’t relevant for debate is 
somewhat unclear in his argument; however, he refers to elements such as style of dress or 
music as being harmless (Gyekye, 2004). Gyekye understands these practices to be 
harmless to the overall development of humanity; although, especially in relation to 
examples of dress, this position is somewhat controversial, in reference to examples such 
as foot binding. However, according to his argument they are deemed harmless. In contrast, 
in the case of practices that he deems as damaging to human well-being, he believes, 
humanity has a shared duty to condemn. According to his view the central purpose of 
culture is the advancement of human well-being. Thus, if a certain practice violates this 
purpose, it is a human duty to denounce it: “There are beliefs, practices, values, and 
institutions of a culture that clearly are obnoxious and destructive of human interests or 
welfare; these cannot be morally accommodated… A metaphysic that breeds a practice 
detrimental to human well-being ought to be repudiated” (Gyekye, 2004, p.38) in the sense 
of moral condemnation; in this form Gyekye’s argument is not an argument for 
criminalisation. Gyekye goes on to claim, in distinct contradistinction to the position of 
extreme relativism, that no two positions are incommensurable. He suggests that all 
positions “can be considered from the perspective of the common standard of human well-
being or interest. In other words, the common ground or measure of human well-being 
makes the two different beliefs or practices commensurable” (Gyekye, 2004, p.39). In this 
sense, according to Gyekye, no culture is so distinct from the rest of humanity that an 
argument can be successfully established to justify ignoring practices that are damaging to 
the well-being of individuals. The way in which Gyekye distinguishes between what does, 
and does not count as harmless lacks analytical clarity and it is unclear from his description 
on what grounds judgement can be based regarding effects of human well-being. However, 
his argument for commensurability could be adapted to relate to a model such as the one 
proposed by this thesis; on which the argument would be made that debate should exist 
around practices that were in some way damaging to individuals rights and duties to be 
self-law giving in common with others. 
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American philosopher Thomas Scanlon makes a similar point based on the idea of 
individuals’ choosing or desiring greater protections for themselves against a majority 
culture: 
“What matters, in deciding whether a principle can reasonably be rejected 
for application to a particular society, is whether, in that society, people in 
the positions that the principle describes have good reason to want a 
certain form of protection. The emphasis on the reasons people have 
differentiated the view I am defending from objectionable forms of 
relativism, which claim that it is permissible for people in other societies to 
be treated in ways that we would not accept because they do not value 
privacy, or individual liberty, or even life, in the way that we do. Claims 
about what ‘they’ actually think…are usually questionable” (Scanlon, 2000, 
p.340). 
Scanlon recognises that external groups have a duty to get involved in the practices of 
cultures only when members of those cultures have a good reason to want them too. For 
example, in situations when their human well-being is put at risk he, like Gyekye, would 
support external interference. Scanlon’s argument focuses on the self-determination of 
individuals to dictate the level of interest they have in being protected, and not on the 
outsiders duty to judge cultures they have no experience of. Such a position combines both 
universalist and relativist assumptions; suggesting (from a universalist perspective) that 
intervention should be based on the people within a society and their individual right to 
determine their lives in relation to cultural practices, thus assuming that all individuals have 
that ability; and from a relativist perspective, that certain traditions or views of the world 
require inside knowledge, and as a result external judgements are problematic. Therefore, 
debate inspired by Scanlon’s position, similarly to the model advocated for in Section 2.1, 
focuses on the rights of individuals to live guided by their own purposiveness, and to make 
choices about cultural interactions as a result of this. 
In contrast to Scanlon’s middle ground position, Wiredu focuses on commonly held facts of 
humanity as a response to the question of culture. He, like Gyekye, suggests that there are 
“two broad aspects of human culture” (Oladipo, 1995, p.30), those that are fundamental 
objective facts that are true for all of humanity, and those that are not essential to the 
overall well-being of humanity, and thus can be the domain of cultural difference without 
endangering the agents practicing them: 
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“Any culture has procedures, customs and usages that have no essential 
bearing on questions of either human well-being or truth or falsehood. 
Style of apparel or of address, for example, is frequently (though not 
invariably) of this nature. Adopting one style rather than another often 
makes no objective difference to human well-being or to one’s beliefs 
about the world. Specifically because of this there cannot be any 
compelling reason to change such elements of a culture in favour of foreign 
ones… Since it is not rational to give up such components in preference to 
foreign substitutes, to do so is a sure sign of the loss or diminution of 
cultural self-identity” (Wiredu, 1992, pp. 65-66). 
Thus, similarly to Gyekye’s position, Wiredu argues that cultural difference should be 
respected and maintained in areas he views as being contingent to overall human existence. 
He argues that these factors are those that become necessary for the maintenance of a 
cultures independent identity. Thus, they are the elements that a culture has a right to fight 
to protect, as they tend to be those elements that allow the members of a group to 
recognise one another. For example, referring back to Parekh’s example in the previous 
section (Section 2.2), a Sikh individual would have the right to defend his choice to carry a 
Kirpan or wear a turban as these elements are necessary to enable the maintenance of the 
cultural group but have no fundamental effect on overall human well-being. Thus, their 
legitimacy should not be debated by those individuals external to the cultural group. 
However, similarly to the concerns raised in relation to Gyekye’s argument he does not, 
within his prose, consider in any historical detail, examples in which items of apparel have 
led to concerns related to well-being and oppression, and this is a weakness with his 
position in relation to contingent factors. The second element to his argument asserts that 
there is also a second side to human culture, including: 
“Such components of culture as philosophy and religion (which) on the 
other hand, are anchored to truth value. Philosophy necessarily involves 
claims about what things are or should be and about what relations hold 
between various objects of thought… religion and philosophy (as also other 
domain of thought in which truth is sought, such as science) are areas of 
human experience in which the effects of cultural difference could 
conceivably be eliminated through the peaceful give-and-take of dialogue 
among cultures… Any interaction among cultures, however, has to be on 
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the basis of equality; otherwise some cultures are compromised” (Wiredu, 
1992, pp.65-66). 
This side to human existence, Wiredu suggests, is not specific to individual cultures, but 
rather is relevant to humanity in general. He argues, for example, that if a scientist was able 
to prove unequivocally and unquestionably the existence of God, then this fact would be of 
relevance to all people regardless of their cultural or religious background. Once these 
findings were shared, then each culture would have to change their beliefs to recognise the 
newly discovered objective fact. This piece of information would not only be relevant to 
certain groups but to the human community in general. Whilst this example is far-fetched, 
he makes use of the point to highlight his belief in the distinction between factors of 
human existence that are relevant universally and thus require cross-cultural interaction, 
dialogue, and debate; and factors that are only relevant to certain groups and thus are, 
according to his position, outside of the jurisdiction of cross-cultural deliberation.  
As previously mentioned in Section 2.1, similarly to Wiredu and Gyekye, Brian Barry 
balances a respect for cultural difference with a strong belief in the necessity for limiting 
certain harmful practices. He asserts that, “culture is no excuse. If there are sound reasons 
against doing something, these cannot be trumped by saying- even if it is true- that doing it 
is a part of your culture” (Barry, 2001, p.258). Referring back to the example of FGM 
established in Section 2.1: the primary justification given for this practice, in areas where it 
is supported, is that it is a fundamental element of female development for certain cultural 
groups. Arguments are always made along cultural grounds. In contrast, arguments 
presented by condemners of the practice tend to be based on concern for human well-
being. For that reason, according to Barry, criticism and debate on the topic from those 
outside of the cultures should be welcomed. He further extends his opposition to practices 
that can be viewed as harmful to human well-being as follows: he suggests that those 
practices he judges to be abhorrent should be banned; a judgement that in and of itself has 
been criticised by proponents of relativism. According to his theory, the central tenant of 
the debate surrounds the question of what factors are integral to a group establishing and 
maintaining their identity. Thus on this argument, we must question what practises should 
be protected to allow cultural groups to be able to recognise one another as a distinct 
group with shared commonalities. The question is one that has been widely debated and a 
plethora of answers offered that either suggest the fundamental importance of 
maintaining certain, sometimes degrading and dangerous, practises in the name of identity, 
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or the converse position of excluding these practises from the mainstream for the 
protection of individuals that may have been coerced to take part in them.  
Barry’s response, with which this thesis agrees, is as follows. He argues that we should not 
be using the notion of culture, and the need to protect it, as an excuse to carry out certain 
practises that may put the lives of others, be they human or animal, at risk.  He claims that:  
“Appeal to culture establishes nothing. Some cultures are admirable, 
others are vile. Reasons for doing things that can be advanced within the 
former will tend to be good, and reasons that can be advanced within the 
latter will tend to be bad. But in neither case is something being part of the 
culture itself a reason for doing anything” (Barry, 2001, p.258).  
He uses the example of whaling to focus his point. He suggests that preventing a certain 
group from carrying out a practise that is both cruel, and endangers the existence of a 
species, does not damage the integrity of their culture. He claims that culture is far more 
than one single practise and any group that claim their culture is put at risk by the banning 
of one element of their social interactions fails to respect all the elements that make up a 
cultural group. He argues this, not only because he sees it as an absurd tautology, but also 
because he sees it as patronising to the cultures in question. By suggesting that a certain 
cultures identity is so fragile that it could disintegrate due to the loss of a singular practise, 
is, for Barry, offensive to the rationality of those individuals who engage and view 
themselves as members of said culture:  
“The idea that aboriginal cultures are extraordinarily fragile is profoundly 
patronising. Charles Taylor insists…that we must recognise in all human 
beings an equal capacity for culture. I endorse that proposition and simply 
wish to add that we should also attribute to all human beings an equal 
capacity for cultural adaptation” (Barry, 2001, p.256). 
Barry recognises the fundamental importance of communal practises but he also 
emphasises the necessity for adaptation and change to enable existence in the modern 
world. The development and alteration of a culture to realise contemporary moral 
standards does not, according to Barry, diminish its worth; rather it makes the practise 
more relevant to modern life. The length of time a practise has been established cannot 
justify its continuation if it is putting the lives of modern day humans or animals at risk. If it 
avoids these concerns, the practises ability to exist in the modern world and the important 
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role it may play in the self-definition of individuals do make it a worthwhile candidate for 
protection. Again, both sides of this debate can be viewed as centring around the question 
of an individual’s right to be self-law giving; whether that be their choice to maintain a 
cultural practice others view as abhorrent, or alternatively, their right to be protected from 
a cultural practice they deem to be detrimental to them. 
Choosing to criticise bad practices that are external to our own personal cultural 
experience is regularly demonised, often fairly so, as being an act of ethnocentrism. Gyekye, 
agreeing with the points raised by Barry in the previous paragraph, explains his opinion on 
the distinction between an act of critique being fair and just cross-cultural debate and it 
being an act of ethnocentrism:  
“Ethnocentrism is a cultural mind-set mentality that regards one’s own 
culture, just because it is one’s own culture, as superior to other cultures 
and, consequently, as a model for all cultures. The ethnocentric person 
regards the values, beliefs, practices, and institutions of one’s own culture 
as the most worthwhile, and is neither prepared to wean oneself from the 
imagined beauty and goodness of those values, nor able to look over the 
walls of one’s culture. One thus fails to see one’s culture as one- and only 
one- form of life among others” (Gyekye, 2004, p.62). 
To clarify, cross-cultural debate and dialogue is not, according to Gyekye, problematic. In 
fact, it should be supported as enhancing human development. However, on entering into 
said dialogue it is important that all parties recognise not only the value of their own views 
but of those of others as well. As Michael Freeden and Andrew Vincent argue in their 
discussion of comparative political theory, “difficult as it may be, we need to seek critical 
distance from our own positions and preferences, not only from those of others” (Freeden 
& Vincent, 2013, p.10). By cultivating awareness of this concern it is possible to reduce the 
ethnocentric assumptions that can occur when considering the perspectives of cultures 
other than the researchers own. This is an important factor when considering the aims of 
this thesis; to support and create the foundations for honest and just cross-cultural 
dialogue. An approach which is able to respect all individuals rights to be self-law giving 
agents, able to choose the path their lives follow, would, by definition, also support a 
system that is required, following detailed analysis, not to recognise the equal value of 
every culture, but is required to approach each culture equally from the outset. Thus 
enabling members of the culture to explain and defend their position in dialogue that is not 
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limited by unjust conditions and pre-emptive conclusions regarding inferiority. It is the 
argument of this thesis that equal respect for a shared human condition would create the 
building blocks on which to base just and equal cross-cultural dialogue. 
Charles Taylor justifies comparison of cultural groups by suggesting that the fundamental 
justification for comparing cultures is not only to increase our understanding of the 
identities of others, but also of ourselves. Gutman describes his position as follows, 
“human identity is created, as Taylor puts it, dialogically, in response to our relations, 
including our actual dialogues, with others” (Gutman, 1992, p.7). Hence, for Taylor, cross-
cultural dialogue is not only justified by our need to better understand others, but also 
ourselves. It enables us to establish our own identities through interactions with others 
which guide our understanding of how we act in certain situations. In committing to this 
idea individuals are better equipped to improve their own well-being as well as the well-
being of others who undergo the same process, realising the same benefits. It is possible to 
draw parallels here with Gyekye’s claim (discussed in Section 2.3) that the purpose of 
culture is to develop individuals.  For Taylor, “recognition forges identity” (Taylor, 1992, 
p.66) but this requires agents to approach each culture as having something to offer that is 
equal to their own. Like Gyekye, he feels strongly that a necessary condition of interaction 
is the initial assumption of equal worth and the avoidance of ethnocentrism: “It makes 
sense to demand as a matter of right that we approach the study of certain cultures with a 
presumption of their value… But it can’t make sense to demand as a matter of right that we 
come up with a final concluding judgement that their value is great, or equal to others” 
(Taylor 1992, pp. 66-69). His argument is not to suggest that all practices are equally 
valuable to human well-being, as he agrees with Barry that some are in fact problematic, 
but rather that when approaching cultural studies the basic assumption should not be that 
our personal culture is superior to that of others being studied, and that regardless of 
background, all individuals should be willing to enter into just discourse to develop greater 
cross-cultural understanding.  
Amy Gutman agrees with Barry, Gyekye, Wiredu, and Appiah that cultures can and should 
be compared and debated, and that bad practices cannot be respected simply on the basis 
of culture. She argues that “some differences- racism and anti-Semitism are obvious 
examples- ought not to be respected, even if expressions of racist and anti-Semitic views 
must be tolerated” (Gutman, 1992, p.21). Her solution to the debate between universalism 
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and relativism is (similarly to the project of this thesis) to support the conditions for just 
cross-cultural dialogue. The approach she supports is a system of deliberative universalism: 
“Deliberative universalism explicitly recognises that some conflicts over 
social justice cannot now (or perhaps ever) be resolved by a 
comprehensive, universally justifiable set of substantive standards. These 
conflicts are best addressed and provisionally resolved by actual 
deliberation, the give and take of argument that is respectful of reasonable 
differences” (Gutman, 1993, p.197). 
Her argument is based on the assumption that a universal moral doctrine, supported by all 
cultures, enabling coexistence under conditions of peace, may never exist. However, she 
suggests that this is not necessarily problematic. The approach she supports is not one that 
leads to assimilation and homogenisation of difference, nor is it one that ignores practices 
simply because they are the domain of a different culture (as we saw at the start of this 
section, this would be the requirement of the Incommensurability Thesis) but rather, one 
that enables groups to recognise reasonable differences whilst also deliberating and 
overcoming issues that are harmful to human well-being, simultaneously learning from one 
another through commitment to just interactions.  
To summarise, each of the theorists discussed in this section (emanating from different 
geographical, political, ideological and academic backgrounds) questions and denies the 
validity of ideas summarised by either the Incommensurability Thesis or relativism. Instead, 
they support a system that is able to criticise and condemn certain practices, not because 
they are strange or foreign to them, but because they are detrimental to human well-being. 
They agree that criticism should not be based on the engendered assumption that one’s 
own culture is superior, but rather, on support for equal human opportunities, and they do 
each of these things utilising a methodology that is specific to their ideology. As discussed 
in the opening to this section, this thesis recognises each of these aims and objectives 
whilst simultaneously building on Ripstein’s spatially individuated individuals model (first 
discussed in Chapter 1) as a response to relativism. To recap Ripstein’s argument:  
“If moral persons are individuated spatially then the only way to have 
freedom under universal law is for each embodied rational being to have, 
in virtue of its humanity, a right to its own person- that is, to its own body. 
Such a right must be innate, because nothing could count as an affirmative 
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act establishing it- the right applies to any rational being that occupies 
space, because its right is nothing more than the right it has to the space 
that it happens to occupy” (Ripstein, 2009, p.372). 
In adapting this argument to respond to cultural relativism, the following is relevant: if each 
individual has, on account of being spatially individuated, a right to their own person, then 
each individual has a right to make choices (in line with Scanlon’s argument) as to whether 
they wish to be involved in certain cultural practices; or alternatively, whether they require 
protection from them. This argument, also similarly to Scanlon’s, is a model of relative 
universalism based on the assumption that cross-cultural discourse and debate centres 
around fixed universal a priori metaphysical principles of internal and external self-law 
giving, which may lead to different outcomes in different examples. It is on this basis, whilst 
also being influenced by the authors considered in this section, that this thesis responds to 
the concerns of the Incommensurability Thesis specifically, and relativism more generally.  
Having discussed a range of theorist’s responses to practices that fail to further human 
well-being and the right to criticise them, the following section (Section 2.4) turns to a 
discussion of the value of common practices and language and the important role they play 
in the maintenance of cultural groups.  
2.4- Common Language and Practice:  
A plethora of studies exist that consider the role and value of shared language. 
Simultaneously, anthropologists learn and study languages that are only associated with 
small cultural groups to enable them to extend their studies and interact directly in local 
languages, gaining greater understanding of less well known practices: enabling them to 
translate certain ideas and metaphors into more widely spoken languages. A number of 
questions are raised by each of these academic pursuits. The first is the role of language in 
producing and developing cultures, and subsequently the use of language in silencing or 
dominating certain cultures. To elucidate, in the colonial period the colonial powers 
condemned the use of local languages as a part of their methodology for destroying local 
cultural heritage. The second is the relativist argument of whether common understanding 
across vastly different languages is in fact possible? Or, whether certain ideas can only be 
explained within their own linguistic framework? Both of these examples are of relevance 
to this thesis. The first (the role of language in identity formation) is of particular 
importance as the prevention of this within the colonial period can be understood to be a 
form of domination (in the Kantian sense), and it is questioned whether critiques are made 
92 
 
on this premise. The second refers once again to the debate between relativism and 
universalism and, as suggested in the previous section, it is important for the aims of this 
thesis to be able to overcome relativist arguments to be able to support a weak 
universalism grounded on the existence of shared foundational principles.  
The first question is based on the assumption that the act of sharing a language has value 
beyond that of communication. In his final text written in the English language 
(“Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of African Literature” (1986)), Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o 
explains his decision to publish in only his mother tongue in his future literary and 
academic pursuits. He justifies this choice based on the value he places on language and 
the relationship it has with culture, community and individual self-definition. He argues, 
not only that “the choice of language and the use to which language is put is central to a 
people’s definition of themselves in relation to their natural and social environment” 
(Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, 1986, p.4), but also that, “in my view language was the most 
important vehicle through which that power fascinated and held the soul prisoner. The 
bullet was the means of physical subjugation. Language was the means of spiritual 
subjugation” (Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, 1986, p.9). Thus for Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, language can not 
only be both a tool of self-definition but also one of oppression; it plays a fundamental role 
in self-definition and cultural expression and can (and was in the colonial example to which 
he refers) be a dangerous instrument in the hands of oppressors. Culture and language, are 
for him, synonymous with one another: 
“Language as communication and as culture are then products of each 
other. Communication creates culture: culture is a means of 
communication. Language carries culture, and culture carries, particularly 
through orature and literature, the entire body of values by which we 
come to perceive ourselves and our place in the world. How people 
perceive themselves affects how they look at their culture, at their politics 
and at social production of wealth, at their entire relationship to nature 
and to other beings. Language is thus inseparable from ourselves as a 
community of human beings with a specific form and character, a specific 
history, a specific relationship to the world” (Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, 1986, pp. 
15-16). 
His argument suggests that in the cases of both language and culture the concepts 
themselves are universal, but differences exist between each that enables individuals living 
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within these groups to set the parameters of their own existence. This argument is 
important to the overall project of this thesis, not only because it suggests the value of 
language and culture in guiding and defining individuals’ self-definition and purposiveness, 
but also as a methodological tool. Throughout his book Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o suggests that 
the choice of authors to engage with their audience through different languages or forms 
of expression, enables the reader to infer certain information regarding their cultural and 
individual values, an area of analysis which is built into the methodological approach 
utilised in Chapters 3-5. 
To extend the discussion of the value of language beyond its role in communication and as 
a way of turning the attention of the remainder of this section to the second question, I 
now turn to Appiah’s argument:  
“To share a language is to participate in a complex set of mutual 
expectations and understandings, but in such a society it is not only 
linguistic behaviour that is coordinated through universally known 
expectations and understandings. People will share an understanding of 
many practices- marriages, funerals, other rites of passage- and will largely 
share their views about the general workings not only of the social but also 
of the natural world” (Appiah, 1997, p.626). 
For Appiah, the role of culture is to enhance community through shared understanding of 
the fundamental elements that guide individuals through life. It is possible to draw parallels 
here with Gyekye’s views discussed in Section 2.3. Each of the rites of passage mentioned 
by Appiah in the above quote is understood across cultural boundaries: the terms 
“marriage” or “funeral” are not, in and of themselves, culturally specific. To put this 
differently: “social conventions overlap and often have complex family resemblance” 
(Vincent, 2007, p. 142). The approach taken to these ceremonies often differs, but 
nonetheless, the underlying social conventions do indeed overlap; even among the 
numerous denominations of the Christian Church the attitude to each ceremony alters. 
When discussing the value of shared cultural understanding and language it is these ideas 
that are being referenced. A group understanding allows communities to come together 
and celebrate human rites of passage in a way that is relevant to their local experience, and 
it is in that way that common language and practice can be viewed as being of value to 
individuals within a community. In relation to the overall purpose of this thesis, this 
approach presents a valuable lesson: the importance of recognising both universal ideas as 
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well as their local translations. To be more specific, as this thesis demonstrates the 
existence of ideas of internal self-law giving and external willkϋr in different cultural and 
ideological stand points, it also recognises that these ideas are presented in culturally 
specific guises that relate to the local experiences of each author referenced. The general 
idea may indeed be universally relevant but the approach to recognising and supporting 
these ideas differs from location to location, culture to culture, or ideology to ideology.  
Parekh further emphasises this point. He stresses throughout his work the existence of a 
distinction between “cultural” and “human” identifiers:  
“Human beings are at once both natural and cultural beings, sharing a 
common human identity but in a culturally mediated manner. They are 
similar and different, their similarities and differences do not passively 
coexist but interpenetrate, and neither is ontologically prior or morally 
more important. We cannot ground equality in human uniformity because 
the latter is inseparable from and ontologically no more important than 
human difference” (Parekh, 2002, p.243).   
Thus, for Parekh, it is equally important for us to recognise both universal and culturally 
relative practices of identity formation. In relation to this thesis: it is equally important to 
consider not only whether theorists value the potentially human desire to be self-law giving, 
but also how they achieve this within culturally specific environments. Parekh’s discussion 
of the relationship between both human and cultural identities responds to this concern; it 
is suggested that it is possible to accept the existence of a number of shared universals 
whilst also recognising differences in approach to these for different cultural groups. As 
discussed in Section 2.2 Parekh refers to culturally specific ways of realising the universal 
right to religious freedom.  
On debating questions of shared identity, critics often claim that anthropological 
observations have found that individuals existing within a cultural group do not always 
support and undergo the same rites of passage as the culture dictates. To take an example 
from British culture: legally Britain is a Christian state, and Christianity commands 
recognition of the value of marriage. It also implies a sense of value of individuals 
undergoing the ceremony of marriage before cohabiting. However, an ever increasing 
number of British people cohabit prior to marriage, even denouncing the necessity of 
marriage more generally; thus implying that they are not being influenced in this way by 
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the Christian culture. This situation inspires two responses: the first, that culture is fluid 
and adaptable, and as discussion of Barry’s views suggested in Section 2.3, capable of 
change, to be more relevant to the modern world. The second response is adapted from 
Appiah: 
“It may well be that some people, even some groups, do not share the 
values that are enunciated in public and taught to children. But, once more, 
the standard values are universally known, and even those who do not 
share them know what it would be to act in conformity with them and 
probably do so much of the time” (Appiah, 1997, p.626).  
He argues that, the fact that all members of a cultural group may not share the values and 
aims of that group, does not suggest that those values are not widely understood. In the 
majority of cases even those individuals who do not involve themselves in the practices, 
will at the very least know of their existence and may passively be a part of them from time 
to time. For example, a British person who does not see the value of a Christian wedding 
will still have been taught about it at school and may attend a wedding as a guest at some 
point in their lives. To summarise, according to both Appiah and Parekh, and in support of 
the views of Gyekye already discussed in the previous section (Section 2.3), culture can be 
viewed as a locally specific lens for understanding the complexities of individual human 
existence. It provides the tools required to respond to issues that are universally relevant. 
Culture is not however, simply a way of being human; both local and universal experiences 
have value in and of themselves and dictate the ways in which individuals live their lives. 
Thus, according to these arguments, shared language and identity are important factors in 
understanding the makeup of individual experience; they are not simply parts of human 
existence that can be annexed without just cause.  
In the preceding sections discussion has dealt with definitions of culture; fears surrounding 
certain practices that are detrimental to overall human well-being; and the value of shared 
identities to overall human experience. The final section of this literature review asks the 
direct question: Why do we compare cultures? It also questions the existence of universal 
foundational principles. Its purpose is to summarise the body of literature considered in the 
preceding four sections and to provide the justification for the overall project of this thesis: 
asking whether the notions of internal self-law giving and external willkϋr are foundational 
principles of personhood shared by human communities from different cultural, ideological, 
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and geographical backgrounds. To summarise: whether they are universal principles rather 
than culturally specific values. 
2.5- Conclusion: A Comparative Approach to Culture:   
This section will go into greater detail regarding the thesis’s approach to comparative work 
before explaining the placement of this chapter in the remainder of the thesis, and the 
work this chapter does in the thesis. It also further reiterates the potential original 
contribution the thesis can offer to the body of literature covered by cultural studies and 
political theory, as previously referred to in the Introduction.  
To progress this discussion further, attention now turns to the academic study of culture. 
Geert Hofstede argues that the study of culture is often divided along the lines of searching 
for either similarities or differences between groups. To clarify, when engaging in 
comparative analysis academics approach the study from a base assumption that they are 
looking for either similarities or differences between cultures:  
“The comparison of cultures presupposes that there is something to be 
compared- that each culture is not so unique that any parallel with another 
culture is meaningless. Throughout the history of the study of culture there 
has been a dispute between those stressing the unique aspects and those 
stressing the comparable aspects” (Hofstede, 2001, p.24). 
He suggests that the two positions, a “difference based approach” and a “similarities based 
approach” cover the majority of comparative studies of culture. As the names imply, the 
first approach is based on the assumption that when undertaking a comparative study of 
two or more cultures, the point of academic interest is elements in which the groups differ. 
The latter approach, however, suggests that interest lies in discovering and understanding 
similarities that may exist between the cultural groups. This thesis falls into the second 
category; whilst recognising that differences between cultures are both normatively and 
empirically interesting, the question of the project is to ask whether the concepts of 
internal self-law giving and external willkϋr are valued across cultural boundaries as shared 
foundational principles of humanity, and thus what is being looked for between cultures 
can be categorised as similarities.  
Cultural engagement is, as has become clear throughout this chapter, a widely debated 
topic. Arguments have been considered both for and against comparison of ideas from 
different cultures; justifications for both criticising and ignoring practices external to our 
97 
 
cultural understanding, and concerns regarding the ethnocentrism of those embarking on 
cross-cultural studies, have been discussed. The review of the literature has covered a wide 
variety of discussion of approaches to the study and understanding of culture, as well as 
the question of whether diverse cultural groups should and can speak to one another. 
However, very little research exists in the political theory and cultural studies canons in 
which the conditions are established or debated for these cultures to interact through fair 
and just cross-cultural dialogue. Although Taylor, Friedman and Gyekye do discuss certain 
factors they see as necessary; assuming the culture in question has something to offer, and 
not approaching studies of other cultures from a position already tainted by ethnocentrism. 
They do not discuss what it is about humanity that enables individuals to recognise 
themselves in one another and thus makes them want to engage in cross-cultural dialogue. 
It is the aim of this thesis to offer a potential solution to this dilemma. Similarly to Barry, 
Gyekye, Wiredu, Parekh, Taylor and Gutman, this thesis disagrees with the logic of the 
Incommensurability Thesis and extreme relativism. Instead, it argues that cross-cultural 
dialogue is both desirable, and necessary for a number of reasons. This project offers one 
suggestion as to why different cultures can, as Nagel suggested, recognise one another as 
sharing and possessing common values as members of the same species; there is an a priori 
philosophical underpinning in which a common trait of personhood is a desire to be 
masters of one’s own destiny, a principle that is not specific to one cultural group, but 
rather, a metaphysical point around which debates take place between different cultural 
groups (both large groups such as states or nations, or smaller minorities at risk of being 
homogenised by a dominant culture) claiming this right in response to oppression, or 
simply as a form of self-determination. Each of these groups may respond differently to the 
question of internal and external self-law giving, and view the effects of human well-being 
through different ideological lenses, but, nonetheless, these two metaphysical points act as 
foundations around which these debates take place, as being universally important factors 
of individual personhood for spatially individuated persons.  
To conclude, this thesis, like many of the theorists discussed in this chapter, accepts culture 
to be man-made: created by humanity as a method of responding to the universal 
questions facing individuals, based on the environmental and temporal conditions in which 
humans find themselves. Therefore, the overarching purpose of culture can be defined as 
advancing human well-being. It is a commonly held belief that human well-being is the 
central purpose of cultures, some of which are more, or less, equipped to deliver on this. 
We can therefore enter into discussion and critique of cultures based on whether they 
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increase or decrease overall human well-being. It is the argument of this thesis that human 
well-being is entrenched in the understanding of a human right of reasoned persons to 
define the laws by which they exist in common with all others. To enable recognition of this 
right, individuals require conditions for just and fair cross-cultural dialogue in which 
cultures can interact equally without facing assumptions regarding their value as being 
lesser or greater than others: the foundations for which can be grounded on the 
understanding that respect for self-mastery, as a right, is central to the uptake of cross-
cultural dialogue.  
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Chapter 3- Négritude: 
“I should like to show that this poetry- which seems racial at first- is actually a hymn by 
everyone for everyone” (Sartre, 1964, p.16). 
As was discussed in Chapter 1, according to Kant the only way for autonomous agents to 
realise their individual personhood is through the free expression of their individual reason, 
within a system that respects them as being self-law giving agents that should be able to 
live directed by their own purposiveness. Freedom is not something that can be given but 
only something that individuals can realise for themselves through a process of 
“enlightenment” (Kant, 1784). For contemporary Kantians, all individuals have the capacity 
to be reasoned self-law givers, and a right to be treated as such. Simultaneously, it is the 
duty of each individual to overcome their natural passions and to be guided by reason, to 
enable them to truly realise their freedom as autonomous agents; whilst also recognising 
the importance of respecting the same freedom in others, and avoiding dominating or 
interfering with them. It is the role of the state to ensure a condition of public right, in 
which individuals can realise their freedom and express their personal choice in the 
direction their lives take, without the fear of domination by either the state or other 
individuals. The State should, according to Kantians, guarantee this level of freedom equally 
for all citizens. This is the sole purpose and justification for the state. 
What follows in the ensuing three chapters is a discussion of the views of African theorists 
divided into two sections. The first part (Part 1) including two chapters, the second part 
(Part 2) consisting of one chapter. The postulate at the centre of each of these chapters is 
to ask whether these Kantian ideas (summarised in the previous paragraph) are replicated 
or implied in the writings of the individuals studied, or whether the debates they enter into 
within their writings, responding to issues of oppression, focus around these metaphysical 
points. The aim being to answer the research question of this thesis: can these ideas 
(internal self-law giving and external willkϋr) be found in the work of this selection of 
African theorists, thus enabling the claim to be made that they may be foundational 
principles of humanity on which we could premise a framework for just and fair cross-
cultural dialogue? 
Throughout, it is assumed that the views of the discussed authors are those of themselves 
alone. Regardless of the claims they make to speak for Africans as a collective, this thesis 
recognises the views as being theirs alone, and not the opinion of Africans more generally. 
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In fact, this criticism will be dealt with throughout the following chapters as successive 
theorists make claims to speak for Africa in general. This is a particular concern with the 
work of Léopold Sédar Senghor, analysed in this chapter. 
When carrying out this research, no presumptions were made regarding the methods that 
would be advocated for, or the language in which these would be expressed. In particular, 
it was not assumed that the language used would replicate that of Kantian theorists. As was 
suggested in Chapters 1 and 2, this thesis recognises that advocating for a position 
suggesting a human commitment to be self-law giving does not require that in each cultural 
situation principles are represented in the same way. In contrast, this thesis argues that the 
methods for recognising this right are specific to different cultural and ideological 
situations, but, that they share an a priori assumption in the value of being self-law giving 
and self-mastering on the individual level. Therefore, the following chapters use the 
framework presented in Chapter 1 as a lens through which to look for similar ideas to self-
law giving: not assuming that these will be identically expressed, in the work of three 
groups of theorists. It is argued, that each group may recognise, through different forms of 
expression, a right of all autonomous agents to be self-law giving, and a corresponding duty 
of states to create a public sphere in which this right can be realised equally by all 
autonomous agents. It is the argument of this thesis that this claim strongly resonates with 
Kantian ideas and that there exists between these theorists, and the Kantian framework 
established in Chapter 1, a basic philosophical connection sharing a key foundational belief 
which it is possible to postulate, exists a priori. 
Chapters 3 and 4 analyse the articles, monographs, speeches and in some cases novels and 
poems of activists and statesmen philosophers writing in the period towards the end, and 
directly following, colonialism (late 1940’s- 1970’s). Each chapter also considers the 
secondary literature surrounding these theorists’ ideas. What ties these two chapters 
together is their focus on the views of activists and philosopher statesmen in that 
aforementioned time period. This sets them apart from Chapter 5, which focuses instead, 
on the views and arguments of contemporary philosophers and scholars. 
Besides the primary focus on the views of statesmen and activists, there is a second theme 
that is common to the first two chapters, and is the basis for their coupling. Theorists that 
advocated for both the philosophical concept of Négritude (Chapter 3), and an African form 
of socialism (Chapter 4), were to a lesser or greater extent also associated with the Pan-
Africanism movement, a movement that still exists today. The movement originated in the 
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late 1890’s, early 1900’s, in the diaspora. However, it became particularly popular in the 
1920’s when it was associated with the academic writings of W.E.B DuBois, and the 
activism of Edward Blyden and Marcus Garvey. The movement was grounded in feelings of 
oppression, alienation and loss of dignity. Thus, to “regain dignity is the mainspring of all 
their actions…the intellectual superstructure of Pan-Africanism has meaning only if one 
constantly reminds oneself that at its roots lie these deep feelings of dispossession, 
oppression, persecution and rejection” (Legum, 1965, p.15). The second strand of the pan-
African movement consisted of African political figures; it will be these that this thesis will 
focus on as the interesting debates and movements taking place in the diaspora are outside 
the remit of this project. 
The second strand of the Pan-African movement was, like the first, rooted in three key 
themes: alienation, the necessity to reassert dignity and a shared sense of unity between 
all African people.  For the political class however, this constituted more than a 
philosophical goal. It also established the conditions to progress towards the federalisation 
of the African continent. In the late 1950’s, as a greater number of African states began to 
gain their independence, there was a political move from figures such as Léopold Sédar 
Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah, Ahmed Sekou Toure, Jomo Kenyatta and Julius Nyerere, to 
name a few, to federate (to a greater or lesser extent) to create a collective movement that 
was not pro-West, pro-communism, pro-nationalism, but was instead “pro-African” (Legum, 
1965, p.13). Leaders from across the political and ideological spectrum, supporting national 
states grounded in democracy, one-party politics, socialism and capitalism, were willing to 
set aside differences in the name of a Pan-African state. However, the underlying 
differences in leadership put a strain on this relationship. Whilst there was a shared belief 
in the unity of all Africans, the movement was riddled with issues of political contestation 
between the various leaders of the newly independent states. As just one example of the 
problems that existed at the heart of the movement: the open borders policy between 
socialist Tanzania and capitalist Kenya were founded on fundamental differences, and short 
lived: “Between 1975 and 1985 the East African Community folded, the border between 
Tanzania and Kenya was closed and Tanzania went to war with Uganda” (Smyth and Seftel, 
1998, p.246) to remove Idi Amin from power and reinstate Milton Obote. 
Not only were there these issues arising between the states, regarding their abilities to 
work collectively, there was also a question of what exactly each state wanted the 
outcomes of a unified Africa to be. Was it a political ideal? Or was the goal of collaboration 
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only for the purposes of economic security? Why should the leaders that had fought so 
hard in the anti-colonial struggles, give up the sovereignty they had just won? Who would 
lead a federalised continent? For these reasons the various charters detailing the plans for 
a unified continent (Casablanca, Sanniquellie, and Monrovia) fell through, and the Pan-
African dream was never realised. However, the underlying philosophical grounding of all 
Pan-African movements (a response to alienation and the necessity to reassert a human 
right to dignity) make them particularly interesting to this thesis’s research. Unfortunately, 
it is outside the remit of this thesis to cover all movements and theorists espousing Pan-
African views. Instead, the two movements selected (Négritude and African socialism) are 
associated with the anti-colonial struggle and, in the case of the Négritude movement, 
support a narrative of “return” approach to the study and application of political progress 
in Africa. 
A “return” approach emphasises the valuable lessons that can be learnt from an often 
excessively glorified past, and recommends a political model for the future focusing on a 
return to traditional values and approaches. In her discussion of this approach, Susan 
Ireland refers to a “variety of forms, including nostalgic evocations of childhood memories, 
undesired departures, and the symbolic return to cultural traditions associated with the 
past” (Ireland, 2004, p.24). The focus of this discussion will be on the third of those 
definitions; symbolic returns to past cultural traditions. This concept is of particular interest 
to this thesis due to its focus on the past, and the re-establishment of traditional ideas. 
Thus, inclusion in this thesis not only allows for the analysis of the theorists views of how a 
future Africa should look, but also their approach to understanding the historic (pre-
colonial) approaches to understanding personhood. This is not to suggest that their 
interpretation is a factually accurate account of the past, but rather that their 
interpretation itself is interesting for the purposes of analysis as it enables the thesis to 
question what values they felt should be constant. 
With the exception of Frantz Fanon (who is somewhat of an anomaly in his approach, and is 
discussed in the final section of this chapter), each of the individuals included in this 
chapter have been associated, at one point or another, with the concept of a narrative of 
“return”; in which they recommend a return to the, often imagined, glorious African past. 
As previously stated, a narrative of “return” is a philosophical practice which looks to 
“history as a moral force from which societies drink deep in order to reconstruct their 
consciousness and their identity, a moral reincarnation that precedes their regaining 
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control of their future” (Jewsiewicki, 1992, p.96). In doing this, not only did they 
recommend a return to a glorious past, but also one which is shared by all individuals of 
African heritage. They, “claim that people of African descent, wherever they live, have and 
should rediscover common socio-cultural traditions derived from their shared origins” 
(Howe, 1999, p.25). Abiola Irele referred to the approach, as an “instinctive falling back on 
tradition in the face of political domination…especially among educated Africans” (Irele, 
1965, p.324), such as those considered in this chapter: Léopold Sédar Senghor, Alioune 
Diop, Aimé Césaire and Léon Damas. Ireland makes reference to, “a discourse of desire, a 
desire to recuperate, repair, and return” (Ireland, 2004, p.24). She suggests that these ideas 
do not only relate to a notion of looking backwards, but rather use this approach to rebuild 
and repair for the future. In the cases of the authors considered in this chapter, the notion 
of repairing and rebuilding for the future through a backward looking lens is very much 
central to their approach, and will be discussed in detail as the chapter progresses: 
especially in relation to Senghor. As will become clear throughout the chapter, a number of 
these “return” narratives justify their approach on the grounds of their value in delivering 
self-determination to the African people. The groundings of this debate will be analysed 
within the body of the chapter to assess the similarities with the Kantian approach posed 
by this thesis. 
In contrast to the concepts of Pan-Africanism and “return” narratives, the theorists 
analysed in Chapter 5 are professional philosophers examining contemporary issues that 
affect African societies. The focus of this chapter is to ask whether the debates they enter 
into have a similar foundational focus to those discussed by this thesis. The selection of 
theorists approaching the topics from different standpoints (philosopher statesmen and 
activists in Part 1, and professional scholars in Part 2) creates the conditions for comparison 
between the two halves of this thesis. As suggested in the Introduction, by demonstrating 
the existence of an underlying philosophical grounding in works associated with different 
backgrounds and purposes, greater evidence can be proffered for the existence of these 
principles as existing a priori. The individuals whose work is analysed in Chapter 5 are 
philosophers and political theorists, emanating from an academic tradition, writing in the 
period between 1980 and the current day. Again, these ideas will be supplemented with 
secondary literature, often coming from their contemporaries, and debates surrounding 
their interpretations. The theorists studied will include, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Paulin J. 
Hountondji, Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye, to mention a few. The purpose of each of 
these chapters is to question whether it is possible to interpret notions of internal self-law 
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giving and external willkür in these African thinkers, and in the way they deal with the 
colonial and post-colonial periods. In each case, the conclusion has been drawn that it is 
possible to interpret the existence of the Kantian themes, presented in Chapter 1, as 
existing in the work of the theorists analysed in the following three chapters. In each 
example studied, these ideas are presented differently, based on their individual and 
cultural differences, but similarities still exist with the foundational principles of internal 
self-law giving and external willkϋr. To clarify, this thesis locates the presence of these 
ideas in theories that are external to the Western Enlightenment tradition, and argues that 
their existence within these schools of thought provides the evidence to imply their 
potentially universal relevance. 
Having introduced the structure of the following three chapters, focus now turns to the 
topic of this current chapter: Négritude. The focus of this chapter is on analysing the 
speeches, poems, and political monographs of the politicians, philosophers and poets of 
the Négritude movement. The Négritude movement originated amongst the educated elite 
emanating from the African and Caribbean colonies and studying in Paris in the late 1930’s- 
1940’s. It was a poetic, literary, philosophical, cultural and political response to the colonial 
situation. The focus of this chapter is on analysing the works of predominantly members of 
the African movement with the notable exception of Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon. The 
primary source materials for this chapter are the writings (scholarly, fictional and poetic) 
and speeches of Léopold Sédar Senghor, Aimé Césaire, Léon Damas, Alioune Diop and 
Frantz Fanon. 
A comprehensive introduction to each of these theorists, as well as the overall movement, 
is detailed in Section 3.1. This chapter is presented in the following six sections: Section 3.1 
is an introduction to Négritude, including a discussion of why this movement was selected 
for analysis, more detailed information regarding its origins and key publications and an 
historical account of the key authors. Section 3.2 considers the artistic and cultural turn, 
and the role of poetry in establishing a response to oppression, as well as the value and 
role of culture in directing the purpose of politics and shaping political goals. Section 3.3 
reflects on the concept of Otherness as it is presented by these theorists and the role and 
affects it had on their experience of independence and freedom. The penultimate section 
(Section 3.4) analyses the concept of the Universal Civilisation as it is presented by Senghor, 
Diop, and to a lesser extent Césaire, as well as the role and influence of key publication 
“Présence Africaine”. The final substantive section (Section 3.5) discusses criticisms of the 
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movement, considering critiques both from contemporary authors, as well as issues raised 
by Frantz Fanon. Section 3.6 summarises and concludes the chapter, reiterating the 
parallels that have been drawn with the Kantian framework across the previous five 
sections. As previously suggested, the primary focus of this chapter is to respond to the 
question of whether the theorists studied demonstrate a belief in the equal value and right 
of all individuals to be self-law giving, and able to live in a political condition under which 
they are able to express their purposiveness, as expressed in Chapter 1. A secondary 
question is also raised querying whether the theorists demonstrate a belief, or active 
political attempt, to create a political system in which these conditions can be guaranteed. 
3.1- Introduction: What is Négritude: 
This section first answers the question of why Négritude was selected as a relevant school 
of thought for analysis in this thesis, followed by a brief factual account of the lives of each 
of the theorists selected as representing the movement. The purpose of which is to 
examine the historical and individual contexts under which they were writing which may 
have influenced their views. Included within this discussion is an introductory account of 
the works of Frantz Fanon and an explanation of his inclusion in this chapter. The 
introduction to the theorists precedes a detailed account of the movement itself and the 
role it played in the lives of the people involved.   
i. Why Négritude 
It is necessary to first establish why this movement was selected as a relevant topic for 
analysis within this thesis. As suggested in the Introduction, the selection of texts for study 
was a major element of this piece of work, and a particular focus was placed on selecting 
philosophers and political figures from a diverse range of cultural and ideological 
perspectives. However, it was also deemed fundamental to analyse reactionary and 
revolutionary philosophies as one of the key elements of this thesis, both as a result of the 
time period being studied (colonial and post-colonial eras), and the comparative focus of 
this thesis on issues of autonomy, personhood, and self-mastery. Négritude, whilst its 
interpretation differs between theorists, can be understood to be, at some level, either a 
reactionary or a revolutionary theory. Therefore, if within an approach that places such an 
emphasis on reacting and responding to issues of oppression and domination it is 
impossible to discover underlying principles similar to those advanced by a Kantian model, 
it would then be problematic to declare the existence of these principles as potentially a 
priori universals. Additionally, the movement, as will become clear throughout this chapter, 
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was explicitly both a cultural and political project, that aimed to build on both elements as 
a way of inspiring and entering into discourse with their audience. The combination of both 
elements adds a further level of interest for this thesis, as it provides the material for 
analysis of questions of the relationship between political norms and culture, and the 
interactions between them. It is for these reasons that the Négritude movement was 
selected as being of interest to the overall hypothesis of this thesis. 
Whilst carrying out the research for this project, it became clear that the authors of the 
Négritude movement did emphasise in their poems, speeches and academic works the 
importance for individuals to be self-mastering, equal, and autonomous. It is the role of this 
chapter to share this analysis and to indicate the difference in approaches recommended 
for realising these principles because, as stated in Chapter 1, their expression is not always 
found to be in Kantian terms. It is only in carrying out detailed interpretive textual analysis 
that it is possible to locate the existence of culturally relative examples of similar ideas.  
Selection of the authors to be included as primary source material was based on research 
into which thinkers are commonly understood to be representational of the movement. 
What it means for them to be representational relates to a number of factors. Firstly 
included are those associated with founding the movement; secondly, those authors 
associated with predominant publications focusing on Négritude; and finally, those 
involved in key debates regarding the value of Négritude as a movement. A brief 
introduction to each of these authors (Léopold Sédar Senghor, Aimé Césaire, Léon Damas, 
Alioune Diop, and Frantz Fanon), is included in the following paragraphs, as way of 
introduction to the historical situations in which they lived, and were influenced by. 
ii. Key Figures and Texts 
Léopold Sédar Senghor was the first president of independent Senegal, from the year of 
independence in 1960 until his retirement in 1980. Before taking the presidency he had 
favoured a system of federalisation of the ex-French colonies, and the formation of a 
French commonwealth. However, due to the unpopularity of this model amongst his 
contemporaries, he attempted to form the Mali Federation with Modibo Keita; a system of 
cooperation between Senegal and the French Sudan (present day Mali), of which he was 
president until its failure in 1960 and his accession to President of Senegal. Throughout his 
presidency, Senegal remained a socialist state with strong ties to France. However, 
following his resignation in 1980 the state moved towards a mixed party system as his 
adamant support for a socialist model was no longer present. From an academic 
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perspective, Senghor was the first African scholar to be admitted to the French Academy. 
He published the majority of his work in French, and remained until his death (in 2001) a 
strong advocate of the Francophone. Much of his early work, founding the Négritude 
movement and authoring texts discussing its value, took place in Paris, where he gained his 
formal education and met the other members of the early movement, including Aimé 
Césaire. 
Aimé Césaire was born on the Caribbean island of Martinique in 1913 and (like Senghor) 
was educated in Paris where he started the paper “L’Étudiant Noir” (The Black Student), 
with Senghor and Damas. He published a vast collection of poetry, plays, non-fiction 
articles and books through the paper, as well as independently, and with the support of the 
journal “Présence Africaine”. He returned to Martinique in 1937, taking a teaching role 
where he met and taught Frantz Fanon. As an adamant socialist he remained committed 
throughout his writings to left wing ideals and in 1945 he successfully ran for Mayor of 
Fort-de-France on the communist ticket. However, based on a disagreement with the 
French Communist Party’s treatment of former colonies he, in line with his political beliefs 
in the value of individuals, publicly resigned from the party, denouncing their treatment of 
colonised peoples, in 1956.  
Léon Damas, born in French Guiana, is viewed by many as the third of the three father 
figures of Négritude (alongside Senghor and Césaire). His most famous publication, and the 
one included for analysis in this chapter, is the poetry anthology “Pigments” (1937). He had 
a brief foray into politics in 1948 when he was elected to the French National Assembly; 
however he retired this role in 1951, and moved into a career in teaching until his death in 
1978. He was selected for study in this thesis due to his role in founding the cultural side of 
the movement, as well as the evocative imagery and strong political stance grounding his 
poetry. It is through his work that the relationship between the cultural and the political 
becomes particularly clear, as he makes use of artistic and cultural forms of expression to 
respond to explicitly political debates surrounding oppression and autonomy. Analysis of 
this takes place in Section 3.2. 
Aliounne Diop was born in Senegal in 1910, a writer and poet and the founder of the 
journal “Présence Africaine”. The journal was one of the key publications of the movement, 
with many of the texts published either in the magazine itself or through the associated 
publishing house. He also went on to run a publishing house of the same name. His main 
role in the movement was in promoting the values and strengths of Black culture, and in 
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doing so he formed the Society of African Culture in 1956. He also worked with other 
members of the movement to organise the first celebratory conference of Black culture in 
Paris in 1956. The conference and his work more generally, played an influential role in 
bringing together thinkers, poets, authors and artists and on raising awareness of the 
cultural side of the movement.  
The final theorist considered in this chapter is Frantz Fanon. Born in Martinique in 1925 and 
educated there under Césaire he became a famous revolutionary, and an active member of 
the Algerian revolution. The year 2011 marked the 50th anniversary of both Fanon’s death 
and the publication of his final text “Les Damnés de la Terre” (1961) (The Wretched of the 
Earth). His revolutionary work has been divisive, gaining both adamant supporters and firm 
critics. His placement in an academic movement has also been somewhat problematic. His 
work crosses the boundaries of psychiatry, political theory and revolutionary propaganda, 
and is both highly critical of movements such as Négritude, whilst at the same time being 
associated with them. He, as an author, has been counted amongst the movement’s 
members within much of the secondary literature. Thus, locating Fanon’s work amongst his 
contemporaries is incredibly challenging, and it is for this reason he is being dealt with 
somewhat separately, as both a critic of the Négritude movement, but also a member, in 
Section 3.5. In the last five years there has been a notable resurgence in publications 
discussing his work, as a result of the 50th anniversary. A number of journals chose to 
celebrate with special issues discussing his life works and experiences. “Theory, Culture and 
Society’s” December 2010 issue was titled “Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth 50 Years On” 
and included a variety of articles both supporting, utilising and condemning Fanon’s work; 
endeavouring to “asses how this study reads 50 years on” (Bell, 2010, p.7). As a supporter 
of the colonial struggle and the emancipatory value of violence (which is discussed in 
Section 3.5), as well as a direct dissenter of the worth of French rule in Algeria, his work has 
at times been near silenced in Western circles. That is, until this recent celebration in which 
his work has received mainstream approval and academic respect. As suggested, in recent 
history (the past 5 years) Fanon’s work has become the focus of theorists working in 
postcolonial studies, African studies, and political theory, with a number of articles, such as 
Achille Mbembe’s 2012 publication “Metamorphic Thought: The Works of Frantz Fanon”, 
suggesting that the writings of this great activist remain relevant to political and 
psychological debate today. Similarly, Hart and Negri (2009) chose to adopt a Fanonian 
model for their discussion of the Commonwealth, further signifying the embodiment of his 
views in contemporary academic parlance. As a result of this recent interest in Fanon’s 
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work, it was decided that it would be remiss to exclude him from this thesis, and that a 
discussion of his work through a Kantian lens would offer interesting insights to the 
potential foundational similarities between Kantian ideas and revolutionary discourse, and 
further the current academic debate in this area.  
The role of all the theorists covered in this chapter as philosophers, poets, literary figures 
and in certain cases political figureheads, makes them particularly interesting for the 
purposes of this research. There is scope to analyse, not only whether they posit a belief in 
the right of individuals to be self-law giving in an internal sense (within the private domain), 
but also whether (in the case of the political figureheads Senghor and Césaire), they argue 
for a state duty to implement a political condition under which this right can be met for all 
autonomous agents (a condition similar to that of the Kantian notion of public right). 
Furthermore, the opportunity exists to analyse their actual political influence, and to 
question whether they were successful in implementing the favourable political conditions 
they made claims to support. Thus, there are three elements to the analysis of the thinkers 
covered in this chapter: questioning whether the theorists advocate for, or enter into, 
debates surrounding the value of internal self-law giving as a right and duty of humanity, 
questioning whether through their writing, both political and cultural, they support a 
political condition in which these rights can be realised, and finally analysing whether, in 
the case of political figures, the thinkers implemented a political system under which the 
individual rights of the citizenry, to self-mastery and choice, were recognised and 
supported.   
The majority of works published under the Négritude banner (both cultural and political) 
were associated with the newspaper “L’Étudiant Noir”; political journal “Présence 
Africaine”, “the journal founded in 1947 by the Senegalese intellectual Alioune Diop” 
(Macey, 2010, p.39); and the anthology, edited by Léopold Sédar Senghor, “Anthologie de 
la Nouvelle Poésie Nègre et Malgache de Langue Francaise” (Anthology of New Black 
Poetry In the French Language) (1948). The first publication of “L’Étudiant Noir”, in 1935, 
was the work of Damas, Senghor, and Césaire, achieved whilst they were studying together 
in Paris. It is widely referred to in the literature as the origin of the movement. The first 
published use of the actual word Négritude was in the third issue of the paper, in an article 
written by Césaire. It was declared at the time that it represented a personal understanding 
of an individual’s Blackness, a notion of consciously coming to terms with one’s colour, and 
an expression of pride in said colour. The direct English translation of Négritude is 
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Blackness, and it is often associated with a racialized response to being a member of a 
human community. That being said, it is important at this stage to clarify the usage of the 
terms Black and Blackness as they will be used throughout this chapter. The terms are 
referred to as a form of self-defined identity couched in racial terms, as they are presented 
by the authors, and they are treated as such throughout this thesis. For this reason, I have 
selected to capitalise their usage to recognise them as terms of self-identification. 
Throughout the different essays, poems and speeches the central theme that becomes 
apparent on reading the various literature is a sense of pride in what is presented by the 
authors as a shared identity, enforced by a (as they portray it) Blackness, or for Senghor, a 
sense of shared African-ness. Not only what it means to be a member of a Black community, 
but also the social, political, cultural and individual repercussions of being a member of a 
community that has been consistently devalued, degraded and silenced over a long period 
of time: their views, and forms of expression criticised, or worse, ignored. Négritude, as it 
was first formulated in Paris, was a response to these acts of silencing and condemnation.  
As previously suggested, a number of texts and conferences were viewed as the primary 
cultural and political outputs of the movement. The “Anthologie de la Nouvelle Poésie 
Nègre et Malgache de Langue Francaise” resulted from two conferences held in Paris (1956) 
and Rome (1959), which famously brought together for the first time Black artists, poets 
and literary figureheads to show each other, and the world, that Black culture was valuable 
and should be recognised as such: not because it was exotic, but because these individuals 
had valuable contributions to make to the cultural outputs of humanity. The 1956 
conference was convened by Aliounne Diop, and was the first of a number of cultural 
projects he established to raise awareness of the value and quality of the arts, literature 
and culture, emanating from this group. Diop was also the editor in chief of “Présence 
Africaine”, the role and value of which will be discussed in detail in Section 3.4. Damas, 
Senghor and Césaire also published individual monographs, poetry collections and works of 
fiction focused on the topic of the freedom of the colonised. Senghor’s five volume 
masterpiece, “Liberté” (Liberty), discussed the topics of socialism (1983), dialogue between 
cultures (1993), The Universal Civilisation and Négritude (1977), and Humanism and 
Négritude (1964). This chapter will analyse translations and extracts from Volumes 1 and 3 
“Négritude and Humanism” and “Négritude and the Universal Civilisation”, through a 
Kantian lens. It will also focus on the poetic, and non-fiction works, of Césaire, Diop, Damas 
and a number of further articles and speeches from Senghor. 
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Aimé Césaire’s “Discours sur le colonialisme” (Discourse on Colonialism) (1955) was viewed 
as a seminal text of the movement. It was described by Robin Kelley as being “full of flares, 
full of anger, full of humour. It is not a solution or a strategy or a manual or a little red book 
with pithy quotes. It is a dancing flame in a bonfire” (Kelley, 2000, p.10). The text focuses 
throughout on an assumed pride in realising one’s Blackness, whilst also expressing a sense 
of animosity towards Europe: an element of the literature that has become synonymous 
with the movement, in particular work emanating from the Caribbean. Throughout the text, 
Césaire draws similarities between the treatment of the colonies by Europe and the 
violence and despair caused by the Nazi party in the 1930s and 40s. In contrast to 
Senghor’s work, the text is sceptical of future collaborations with Europe. “Discourse on 
Colonialism” is one of the key texts being analysed in this chapter, and the question is 
raised as to whether it shares similar philosophical underpinnings with the Kantian 
concepts of internal and external self-law giving.  
Similarly to the anti-colonial undertones associated with Césaire’s work, Damas’s poetry 
deals with the pain and fear associated with the colonial experience. His first published 
collection, “Pigments” (1937), in particular, focused on the treatment of colonised people 
by their oppressors and the damaging effect this has had on their existence. The poems 
often placed specific focus on issues of domination and oppression, and the efforts of the 
colonisers to define an identity for the colonised that failed to take into account their 
individual autonomy and purpose. In contrast to the critical element of his work, it was also 
viewed as a central part of the recovery of African self-esteem. For that reason, analysing 
these poems is critical to understanding the emancipatory value of this movement. By 
drawing comparisons with the analytical framework of this thesis, it is possible to 
understand on what grounds emancipatory claims are being made. A number of the poems 
from the “Pigments” anthology, as well as some of Césaire’s work, are analysed in Section 
3.2 which focuses on the cultural side of the movement: both the poetry, prose and plays 
of some of the authors, as well as the role that cultural elements were seen as playing 
amongst Négritude scholars are discussed in this section, and analysed in relation to the 
themes of self-mastery, equality and choice. 
As previously discussed, the movement predominantly consisted of educated members of 
the African elite and, as with many of these movements; it was broadly questioned by 
critics how representative these views were of the general populace. This critique (amongst 
others) will be discussed, in depth in Section 3.5. However, it is raised here as fundamental 
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to understanding the movement itself. In relation to both the cultural and political sides of 
the movement, the majority of work was published in French rather than the vast number 
of local African languages spoken conversationally by the majority of people. In choosing to 
publish in the language of the colonisers, this not only reduced the number of theorists 
involved in the movement but also the accessibility of the work to individuals unable to 
speak the formal language of the colonial experience. Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o made similar 
criticisms of poets and literary figures choosing to publish in English, suggesting that this 
choice further established the colonisers power as “the domination of a people’s language 
by the languages of the colonising nations was crucial to the domination of the mental 
universe of the colonised” (Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, 1986, p.16). It was his opinion (one that is 
considered in Chapter 5), that selection of a none local language played a fundamental role 
in the systematic domination of a class of people, as being less worthy than their French, 
English or Portuguese speaking counterparts. On this argument Négritude, whilst intended 
to be an emancipatory cultural and political project, was only achieving this role for the 
educated classes and not for those individuals worst affected by the systematic domination.  
In contrast to the views of Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, Abiola Irele claimed that it was the role of 
the educated elites to represent the views of those that, he deemed, unable to represent 
themselves. Thus according to his interpretation: “Négritude has a popular precedent in 
Africa; it can be seen as an articulation by an educated elite of sentiments that were felt 
and confusedly expressed by humbler folk” (Irele, 1965, p.32). Whilst on the surface this 
view can be read as the elites representing the views of the people, it can also be seen as a 
patronising view of the general populace that fails to take into account their autonomy to 
represent themselves. This concern remains at the centre of the analysis, not only in this 
chapter but in relation to all the thinkers analysed in this thesis. For that reason (as 
mentioned in Chapter 1), when analysing their arguments in relation to the value of 
practices of self-law giving, it will be assumed that the authors represent their views alone, 
and no assumptions will be made regarding the extent to which the citizenry is represented. 
This will be the assumption throughout the next three chapters, although it is particularly 
relevant here as the thinkers regularly insinuated that their views were representative of 
“the people”.  
iii. The Movement Itself 
Having introduced the authors’ historical backgrounds, the focus of this section now turns 
to a more detailed discussion of Négritude itself. Négritude, as a political, artistic and 
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cultural movement, originated amongst the diaspora communities in Paris in the late 
1930’s, amongst the West-African and Caribbean elite. It maintained its reactionary spirit, 
as an ideological damnation of the political and moral domination of the Western colonial 
enterprise until the start of the 1960’s. At this time the anti-colonial movement changed 
direction, placing greater focus on a political rather than a philosophical and cultural form 
of Pan-African response, or reaction, to colonialism. Unlike other anti-colonial movements, 
the response of Négritude to Europe was ideologically divided; many of the African 
theorists (unlike their counterparts in the Caribbean) working on the theory of Négritude, 
were less inclined to fully disassociate with the colonisers, and advocated instead for a 
peaceful retreat of colonial powers. They, in fact, supported the maintenance of 
relationships with the ex-powers and welcomed their support in the foundation of the new 
governments. This was particularly true for Senghor who, on becoming the first president 
of independent Senegal, maintained a strong political and academic relationship with 
France. He argued for a system of development supported by, and in collaboration with, 
Europe: “We must build our own development plan, based on European, socialist 
contributions and also on the best of Negro African civilisation” (Senghor, 1962, p. 60). He 
also suggested that having successfully re-built both individual states, and a federal state of 
Africa (his model and justifications for which are discussed in Section 3.4), they should 
remain “freely associated with France in a Confederation” (Senghor, 1962, p.15). In 
contrast, Caribbean authors such as Fanon and Césaire, were less supportive of a 
collaborative model. In fact, they condemned Europe as, “morally, spiritually indefensible” 
(Césaire, 2000, p.32). David Macey, in his account of the movement, recognised this divide 
as existing “between the négritude of Léopold Sédar Senghor- the movements major 
African spokesman- and his vision of an eternal Africa, and that of the Caribbean writers 
associated with it, who are much more influenced by both Marxism and surrealism” 
(Macey 2010, p.39). He suggested that not only was there a noticeable divide in the 
responses to Europe between the two groups, but also in the ideologies they were 
influenced by. It is on these grounds that the division between the two approaches begins 
to be seen. The ideological differences between the authors, and the idea of what 
Négritude, or a response to the colonial situation more generally, meant to them, as 
individuals, is discussed throughout the chapter, as each theorist is discussed not only as a 
part of a movement but also as an individual. 
As previously discussed, Négritude consisted of artists, poets and political figureheads and 
was very much a two sided movement: the first being poetic and literary, the second 
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political and philosophical. It was understood to be an explicitly cultural-political project, in 
which both sides of the movement were valued both as valid expressions of thoughts and 
emotions, but also as reactions to the oppressive and degrading treatment of the 
colonisers: under which both political and artistic expression of Black people had been 
devalued or silenced. Césaire, when discussing the movement in terms of the political and 
social groundings was adamant that both himself and Senghor, “refused to see the Black 
question as simply a social question” (Césaire, 2000, p. 94). Rather, viewing it as 
encompassing culture, emotion, feeling, political fervour as well as a more individualised, 
emotional response. However, as suggested, beyond this basic understanding of a cultural-
political project, what Négritude meant for each individual thinker differed, and it is to 
discussion of these differences that this sub-section now turns.  
Senghor believed that the strength of the movement was in guiding Black people to 
recognise the value of their Blackness, and to use this to contribute to the future of not just 
Africa, but the world more generally. In defining this mission, he suggested that it was the 
role of Africans not only to shape their own future but rather to create a model suitable not 
only to fit “Africa and the twentieth century, but first of all to fit man” (Senghor, 1962, 
p.17). To reiterate, he claimed that it was the role of the Black man to “bring, like a leaven, 
his message to the world to help build a universal civilisation” (Senghor, 1962, p.85). On 
addressing these ideas it is possible to suggest that, for Senghor, the role of Négritude, as 
an expressly cultural-political movement, was intrinsically linked with his international 
political aims, to shape the wider global community. As is discussed in Section 3.4, he 
believed that it was Africa’s time to contribute to what he referred to as the Universal 
Civilisation. However, he believed, that to be able to achieve this, colonised groups not only 
needed to be granted their freedom by external forces, but also to come to terms with 
their own worth. It was this that he claimed was the role of Négritude: not only to define 
what it meant to be Black, but also to establish a sense of self-belief amongst Black 
individuals to enable them to share their knowledge and experience internationally. As 
commentator Barrend van Dyk Van Niekerk observed, for Senghor: Négritude is “the 
explanation and interpretation by the black man of his own position in the universe” 
(Barrend van Dyk Van Niekerk, 1970, p.100). It was viewed as an act of self-discovery that 
enabled individuals to position themselves in the world. In discussing Senghor’s approach 
as being one akin to an act of self-definition, parallels can be dawn between the 
philosophical underpinnings of the debates surrounding Senghorian Négritude, as a force 
for emancipation, and those proposed by this thesis as potentially a priori foundations. It is 
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clear from Senghor’s imagery, “bring like a leaven”, that the movement is an act of self-
definition, and self-mastery. It is a personal act to bring, rather than to be given, one’s 
freedom, and this was at the heart of Senghor’s understanding of the movement he had 
helped to create. Similarly, at the heart of a Kantian framework is the value of choice and 
purposiveness. It is understood to be the right of all individuals to live, guided by the laws 
they establish for themselves, and a condition of “right” to be one under which “the 
external freedom of any person can coexist with that of all others according to universal 
law of freedom” (Pogge, 2012, p.78). Therefore, it is possible to draw parallels between 
Senghor’s argument for the creation of a Universal Civilisation defined by the autonomous 
rights of the people to define themselves, and the condition of public right under which this 
condition is guaranteed in common. 
Césaire’s “Discourse on Colonialism” is a colourful discussion of the relationship between 
the colonised and the colonisers. It is not however only a discussion of the past, but also of 
the future and the requirements placed on both the colonised, and the colonisers, to move 
forward. According to Tsenay Serequeberhan’s interpretation of Césaire, he viewed 
Négritude as being inspirational to colonised people. He viewed it as a “coming to 
consciousness”, a method of “positively appropriating the term négre and overcoming the 
negativity imposed on it” (Serequeberhan, 2000, p.23). In advocating for political change, 
Césaire argued that the concept of “négre” had in the past often been associated (by the 
colonisers) with a sense of backwardness and a requirement to be socialised. However, at 
the point of writing, in the mid-1950’s, he argued that it was not the colonised but the 
coloniser that was in fact holding back progress:  
“it is the indigenous peoples of Africa and Asia who are demanding schools, 
and colonialist Europe which refuses them; that it is the African who is 
asking for ports and roads, and colonialist Europe which is niggardly on this 
score; that it is the colonised man who wants to move forward, and the 
coloniser who holds things back” (Césaire, 2000, p.46).   
Césaire made the following argument: colonised peoples were not in fact backwards, 
rather they were attempting to expedite progress, but they were limited in achieving this 
by those who maintained power over them. That being said, it was a matter of not only 
overcoming this limitation but also, as Serequeberhan observed, changing the 
understanding of both the colonised people themselves, and the outside world, of what it 
meant to be black. Césaire, and Senghor like him, felt that the Négritude movement had 
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the power to achieve that, to reaffirm self-belief and self-awareness amongst the 
oppressed Black people and to foster a process, of what could be called, enlightenment. 
Similarly to the Kantian understanding of the term, the thinkers argued that all Black 
individuals had the capacity to realise their self-value, but that this had been silenced 
within them. Thus, like the Kantian reliance on reason to achieve enlightenment, Césaire 
and Senghor relied on Négritude to reassert their sense of self-mastery and autonomy.  
Césaire described Négritude as being both an individual feeling, and a public political act. In 
an interview with René Depestre, he discusses both elements. He suggested in the 
interview that the construction of Négritude, as relating to a feeling, was linked to its 
reference to an individual’s Blackness. Césaire argued that, an individual “either felt black 
or did not feel black” (Césaire, 2000, p.94) and, from an individualist perspective, that 
dictated what Négritude meant to them. To clarify, whether they felt they had an affinity 
with, or a need to be a part of, the movement. However, politically he saw the movement 
as both emancipatory and partisan: “Négritude was, after all, part of the left. I never 
thought for a moment that our emancipation could come from the right- that’s 
impossible…We both felt, Senghor and I, that our liberation placed us on the left” (Césaire, 
2000, p.94). As an aside, it is worth noting that the relationship with the left is one that is 
shared not only between Senghor and Césaire but also with the theorists analysed in 
Chapter 4, who utilise a socialist approach to politics. This is further justification for their 
grouping together in Part 1 of this thesis. Throughout this chapter, the observation of 
Négritude as combining both internal and external factors, as being both political and 
cultural, is discussed in depth. However, it is raised at this stage to highlight the 
multifaceted nature of the movement, and the depth of its meaning beyond the 
boundaries of the definition of Blackness. The division between the individual 
understanding of a feeling and a “coming to consciousness”, contrasting with the external 
political bringing of self-belief to the world, is philosophically similar to the distinction 
between internal and external self-law giving. The inclusion of both an internal and an 
external element to the theory suggests that the philosophical underpinnings of the 
Négritude movement may share similarities with those of the Kantian framework discussed 
in this thesis. Uncovering these similarities is a key element of the remainder of this 
chapter, but at this stage it is merely raised to reiterate Césaire’s insistence on the value of 
Négritude as being multi-faceted.  
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In a discussion of the multiple layers of the movement, and its role as a form of expression, 
Duncan Bell makes the following observation of the situation of colonialism to which the 
movement was responding: “colonialism forces the people it dominates to ask themselves 
repeatedly ‘in reality, who am I’” (Bell, 2010, p.7). Négritude, it is suggested, offers one 
response. It was a response by a group of individuals who claimed that who they were was 
largely dictated by their experiences as Black people, in a world that failed to respect them 
because of that fact. The response was intended to support the history and culture of Black 
people as valuable not only to themselves, but to the world as a whole. Whilst at the same 
time it was directed towards enhancing the self-belief of individuals and making political 
claims. It was in that sense an “abstract coming to consciousness” (Césaire, 2000, p.91). 
Césaire made the claim in “Discourse on Colonialism” that, “Negro heritage was worthy of 
respect and that this heritage was not relegated to the past. That its values were values 
that could still make an important contribution to the world” (Césaire, 2000, p.92). Thus, a 
fundamental element to the movement was, according to Césaire, the celebration and 
support of history and culture (an element discussed in greater depth in Section 3.2). As 
Stephen Howe commented, Négritude was, for the people involved in it as an active 
political movement, a “claim that people of African descent, wherever they live, have and 
should rediscover common socio-cultural traditions derived from their shared origins” 
(Howe, 1999, p.25). This commonality was, according to Césaire, grounded on a feeling for 
people who “felt black” and then became a cultural-political project shared by those 
individuals, intended to enable them to share their heritage and value with the world, in 
both a cultural and political sense.  
Similarly to the claim made by Césaire that Négritude is to be understood as a feeling of 
what it means to be Black, Barrend van Dyk van Niekerk make the following observation: 
“Négritude, as a cultural concept is indefinable” (Barrend van Dyk van Niekerk, 1970, p.98), 
in the sense that what it actually means to individuals differs greatly, and therefore it is 
impossible to properly define each individuals experience of what it feels like to come into 
consciousness as a Black person. Whilst there is a general agreement regarding its 
reference to the value and strength of individual Blackness, interpretations differ in analysis 
of what these values and strengths are, as well as in what it means to be Black. There are a 
number of areas in which the theorists demonstrate similarities in the views they present, 
not least, the assumption that it is a reactionary movement. As Irele observed in his 
discussion of the movements reactionary focus: “its literature and ideology afford an 
insight into the intimate process of the black reaction to the West (Irele, 1965, p.348). In 
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making this claim Irele’s article implies that the Négritude movement could not, and would 
not, have existed if it were not for the oppressive conditions imposed on colonised 
countries by the colonisers. This is not to suggest that the movement is of Western origins, 
but rather that its purpose was grounded on a need to react to colonialism, rather than an 
unprompted coming to consciousness. Having established the various meanings and aims 
of the movement, through the views of Senghor, Césaire and a range of secondary sources, 
the remainder of this section focuses on both the movements differing relationships with 
Europe, and briefly refers to a critique that will be fully expanded on in Section 3.5. 
The critique is as follows. As with many approaches that appeal to a narrative of “return”, 
there is an unsubstantiated assumption amongst the primary sources that is highlighted by 
discussants such as Howe; an assumption that all Africans shared a sense of Blackness 
emanating from their shared history. It was this commonality which was, according to 
Senghor and Césaire, their Négritude. To clarify, each of these authors understood 
Négritude as having a core value to people of Black descent: as speaking to them in some 
way. For this reason, Négritude was criticised by figures such as Frantz Fanon (discussion of 
said criticism is located in Section 3.5) for limiting the potential of individuals to express 
choice in the shaping of their lives, as it presented an image of what it meant to be Black 
and expected people of all different backgrounds and experience to recognise something in 
that image. As a result of this, a number of splinter movements such as Creolite and 
Antillanite formed, which instead chose to focus on particularisms to their specific cultural 
experience, rather than shared universal Blackness. Antillanite, for example, focused on 
what it was that was special and valuable about the Caribbean experience. 
Thus, as a revolutionary tool Négritude was both celebrated for its emancipatory fervour by 
Senghor and Césaire, and condemned by Frantz Fanon for enslaving Black people within 
the shackles of an already defined image, (a discussion which is the focus of Section 3.5). 
Unlike Fanon, the notion of a symbiosis between a people was viewed by supporters of the 
movement as a celebration. Although many supporters of Négritude identified that there 
was a failure to recognise the important differences that existed between the many groups 
of people, across countries and continents, who supposedly shared this underlying identity, 
they felt that the movement still possessed value. It was described by one commentator as: 
“a blanket celebration of black culture regardless of the fact that many 
differences existed among peoples of different nations and continents. It 
was a whole movement devoted to the demonstration of an African 
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identity. Against the European’s sense of superiority and scepticism, there 
had to be self-assertion, equal and opposite” (July, 1987, pg. 216). 
What is of particular interest from this quote is the circumstance in which both arguments, 
for and against Négritude, centred on the fact that individuals and groups had suffered at 
the hands of oppressors. Their response to oppression, whilst realised through opposing 
methodologies, do, however, share a philosophical foundation: that individuals had a right 
to live in a political condition free from oppression, guided by their own choice and 
expression. For Senghor and Césaire, this was achieved by recognising and celebrating both 
the feeling of Négritude, on an individual level, and the political movement on a public level; 
whilst for critics of the movement (such as Fanon) reference to a shared Blackness actually 
stunted freedom. Fanon felt (as is discussed in Section 3.5), that true freedom could only 
be achieved outside of a shared understanding of Blackness because he viewed that as 
being both an individual and personal experience. The similar foundations shared between 
both sides of the debate, as well as with the framework set out in Chapter 1, are apparent 
once it is accepted that approaches to realising foundational principles can differ 
dramatically. This is an important analytical point for this thesis, as it suggests that even in 
the case of contradictory perspectives, the pinnacle of debate remains fixed around shared 
foundations. This is a common theme that occurs throughout the following three chapters, 
and is thus discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6 (Concluding Remarks).  
Discussion in this section now concludes by considering the relationship of the Négritude 
movement to the European colonisers, and the differences between the position of African 
authors and those of the authors emanating from a Caribbean heritage.  
iiii. Relationship with the Colonisers 
The next few paragraphs consider the differences that exist between the African and the 
Caribbean arms of the movement, in reference to their desired relationship with the 
colonial powers. The reference to the revolutionary movement of the Caribbean can be 
claimed to juxtapose the African position on collaboration with the French ex-colonisers. 
Both Senghor and Diop, suggested that it would be wrong of the African community to 
distance themselves entirely from the colonial powers, instead supporting a system of 
partnership: an African, French commonwealth. In “Nationhood and the African Road to 
Socialism”, Senghor was clear about his interpretation of the Western role in Africa’s 
position at the time: “Let us stop denouncing colonialism and Europe and attributing all our 
ills to them. Besides not being entirely fair, this is a negative approach, which reveals our 
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inferiority complex” (Senghor, 1962, p.104). Thus for him, the purpose of the Négritude 
movement was not to accuse Europe of mistreatment, nor to draw attention to the ills of 
the continent. Rather, he foresaw a system of collaboration and co-operation. However, as 
is discussed in Section 3.4, he believed that a system built on co-operation first required 
the colonised people to re-affirm and re-assert their self-belief, to enable them to approach 
Europe as equals. This was the role he envisioned Négritude as playing in the delivery of 
emancipation, as “true independence is that of the spirit” (Senghor, 1964, p.8) and thus 
cannot be given to a people, only claimed. The concept of independence as being a feature 
of the spirit emphasises the individual’s role in achieving autonomy (as the carrier of the 
spirit). Such an argument shares similar philosophical groundings to those of the Kantian 
framework, in that both arguments place the individual at the centre of the understanding 
of autonomy, and advocate for a political system under which the individual is able to 
realise their own autonomy.   
In contrast to Senghor, the rhetoric Césaire employed was less welcoming of the support 
and guidance of the ex-colonisers. Juxtaposing Senghor’s collaborative approach, he 
compared the practices of the colonisers to those employed by the Nazi party, and was 
reluctant not only to collaborate with them in the future, but also to heed Senghor’s 
caution when it came to blaming Europe for the ills of the colonised people. He, in 
“Discourse on Colonialism” critiqued Europe, suggesting that “what is serious is that Europe 
is morally, spiritually indefensible” (Césaire, 2000, p.32). He went on to claim that, only 
when the horrors of oppression and imperialism were directed back towards European 
shores, were Europeans prepared to respond and condemn such treatment. In contrast, 
when similar atrocities were carried out in the colonies, he argued, Europeans were 
prepared to turn a blind eye (Césaire, 2000, pp. 34-38). For him, a movement such as 
Négritude enabled the colonised to realise that these double standards were unfair and 
unjust. He argued that this was the problem at the core of “pseudo-humanism: that for too 
long it has diminished the rights of man, that its concept of those rights has been-and still 
is- narrow and fragmentary, incomplete and biased and, all things considered, sordidly 
racist” (Césaire 2000, p.37). It is apparent when reading these arguments that Césaire was 
in favour of an alternate humanist model. One in which, the rights of all individuals were 
recognised equally. For this, he believed it was necessary to condemn Europe’s current 
model. He criticised European humanism on its failure to properly recognise equality. He 
argued that, it supported the equality and value of what it viewed as the “right” people and 
not, as he believed was fundamental, “all” people. The value of equality to the Négritude 
121 
 
movement is further debated as the chapter develops. However, at this stage it is raised to 
introduce a key theme that was central to the movement, between which it is also possible 
to draw similarities with one of the themes set out in Chapter 1: equality of individuals. 
Similarly to the Kantian approach, that “each person has the right to independence from 
each of the others. None is born either a master or a servant” (Ripstein, 2009, p.17), 
Césaire emphasises the importance of a humanism that does not favour certain groups 
within a hierarchy, but rather treats all humans as equal. 
In concluding the introduction to the movement, it is important to reiterate the definitions 
as they have been presented through a focus on the works of Senghor and Césaire and a 
number of secondary sources. At the centre of the definition there is a difficult interplay 
that exists between the highly racialized notion of a theory built on a feeling of Blackness, 
as it is presented by both theorists, and their understanding of the role of Négritude 
internationally; Césaire’s discussion of humanism, and Senghor’s insistence on the role of 
Africans in developing a fairer and more just Universal Civilisation (discussed in Section 3.4). 
These definitions are at the heart of what Négritude is, and the division can be seen 
between its role as an internally focused movement (a personal feeling of Blackness, self-
belief and a re-assertion of the individual value of “négre”) (Serequeberhan, 2000, p.23) 
and an externally focused movement, to re-establish the value of Black culture and politics 
to share with the world. As suggested, it was intended to have both an internal focus, 
speaking to Black people and ingraining self-belief; and an external focus, exclaiming to the 
world that oppression must come to an end, and that the time of colonisation was over. 
Different theorists placed greater or lesser emphasis on different elements of this 
description, but overall this can be viewed as the summary of the combined aims of the 
Négritude movement. 
According to commentator Abiola Irele, Négritude “has developed far beyond the concept 
of the ‘African personality’, which has remained more or less a catch-word, or a simple 
ideological slogan; whereas Négritude has tended more towards a philosophy” (Irele, 1965, 
p.321), or overarching theory of what Blackness meant for the group of individuals writing 
and working together in France, with the aims of representing and serving the colonised 
world, and reinstating their self-belief and autonomy. The Négritude movement also placed 
specific emphasis on the value of both a cultural and political movement in establishing and 
delivering the aims listed above. This is a key emphasis in the rest of this chapter, as it 
emphasises the argument made in Chapter 2; culturally specific approaches and techniques 
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can be drawn on by way of understanding and achieving similar foundations. For example, 
the journal “Présence Africaine” (discussed in Section 3.4) was viewed as a vehicle for the 
views of the authors and their acts of self-belief. The role of the journal was in fact to share 
these, otherwise often silenced, perspectives. As Hassan observed, “Présence Africaine is at 
the centre of a dialogue between Africa and Europe” (Hassan, 1999, p.169) and was the 
vehicle through which many of these ideas were shared. To reiterate, it was at the centre 
of active cross-cultural dialogue premised on the equal value of each participant.  
Before progressing to a discussion of the cultural element of the movement, where the 
focus will split between Senghor and Césaire (previously discussed), but also Diop and 
Damas whose ideas are yet to be fully investigated, it is important to discuss in passing the 
involvement in the movement of Western existentialist Jean Paul Sartre. Sartre was a 
central figure in developing the existential foundations of Négritude, working closely with a 
number of the key figures. Many of the authors, especially those emanating from a 
Caribbean heritage such as Césaire and Fanon, share his existentialist ontology, and he 
penned a number of forwards and introductions. These include, but are not limited to, a 
number of Fanon’s works, and the most famous of the Négritude anthologies; “Anthologie 
de la Nouvelle Poésie Nègre et Malgache de Langue Francaise”, in which he wrote an article 
describing what he believed Négritude meant to the people he had met. It was titled 
“Orphée Noir” (Black Orpheus). In “Black Orpheus” Sartre draws many parallels between 
the oppression experienced by the European proletariat at the hands of the bourgeoisie, 
and the oppression experienced by the colonised at the hands of the colonisers. Sartre 
suggested that Négritude was “a shimmer of being and of needing to be; it makes you and 
you make it: both oath and passion” (Sartre, 1964, p.48). However, Sartre’s relationship 
with the movement was somewhat controversial. Not least because of his heritage as a 
privileged, European, white man, but also as his relationship with key thinkers (in particular 
Fanon) became strained. It was decided that due to the boundaries set for the selection of 
texts and authors by this thesis, that his inclusion as a primary source was inappropriate as 
it is fundamental for the aims of this thesis that discussion centres around the views of the 
individuals involved in the movement and their experiences of colonialism and oppression 
rather than those of a European commentator. Parts of his work are, however, included in 
secondary discussions. 
Having answered the question of why Négritude was selected for analysis in this thesis, 
introduced the key authors and texts, discussed the theory itself and the relationship with 
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the West, the chapter now progresses to a discussion of the explicitly cultural element of 
the political-cultural movement, as well as a discussion of the relationship between culture 
and politics as expressed by the authors. 
3.2- The Artistic and Cultural Turn: 
The poetry and prose produced as a part of the Négritude movement were the outputs of 
predominantly diaspora communities, working and publishing through the Paris based 
journal Présence Africaine, and they often symbolise the symbiosis between the political 
and cultural elements of the movement. Both Césaire and Damas have produced a plethora 
of work drawing on intense imagery and rhetoric to detail their displeasure with the 
colonial situation, calling on the colonised people to realise their strength and respond. 
Their work is in every sense a cultural response to a political concern, and many of the 
ideas Césaire fictionalises correspond with the views presented in his political texts. This 
section includes analysis of Damas’s poetry from his most famous collection “Pigments” 
(1937), as well as a selection of Césaire’s fictional work. The most famous of which “Une 
Tempête” (A Tempest) (1969), retells Shakespeare’s famous play from the perspective of 
the “natives” (Césaire, 1969), and acts as a critique of the domination of the colonial 
movement. Due to the nature of this project, and its political focus, reference to the 
cultural outputs of the movement are made in relation to their political imagery, and 
underlying themes. A detailed analysis of the form and structure of the pieces is not 
included. That being said, this section utilises the primary and secondary literature to 
assess common themes within a small selection of the vast collection of works produced, 
questioning their philosophical foundations and attempting to draw similarities with the 
Kantian framework set out in Chapter 1. The second half of this section analyses the role of 
culture as a political tool according to the authors of the movement. It assesses the 
relationship between the two elements, because of the fact that it was declared by the 
authors to be explicitly both a cultural and a political project. Senghor in particular, 
emphasised the value and role of culture in the co-production of politics and political 
spaces. Parallels are thus drawn in this section between his views and those of the authors 
discussed in Chapter 2. As well as with the claims of this thesis more generally, that the 
existence of underlying foundational principles does not inhibit the practice of culturally 
relevant methods for realising them. 
A number of discussants have collated the poetic and literary works of the movement, and 
emphasised their role as a response to oppression and imperialism. Robin Kelley, for 
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example, in his analysis of Césaire, stressed the value of poetry in enhancing the 
revolutionary fervour of the movement. He argued that, “while it might appear that the 
poet and politician operated in separate spheres, Césaire’s life and work demonstrate that 
poetry can be the motor of political imagination, a potent weapon in any movement that 
claims freedom as its primary goal” (Kelley, 1992, p. vii). This citation evidences the 
relationship between culture and politics as it is presented by both the Négritude theorists, 
commentators and supporters. Kelley actually went further in his analysis than to simply 
support a symbiosis between the cultural and political sides of the argument, suggesting 
that in the case of Césaire it was his poetry that provided the greatest tool: “the weapon of 
poetry may be Césaire’s greatest gift to a modern world still searching for freedom” (Kelley, 
1992, p.vii). It is for this reason that discussion of both elements of the movement is 
included in this chapter. With the aim of considering the rhetoric at the heart of the poetry, 
and to ask whether it suggests the existence of notions of willkϋr and self-law giving as 
foundational principles on which these arguments are built. However, as previously 
mentioned a detailed literary analysis of the poetry lies outside of the analytical boundaries 
of this thesis. For a more in depth discussion of these elements of the poetic side of the 
movement see the works of James Arnold (1990) and Jerome Rothenberg and Pierre Joris 
(1995), who have anthologised the poetry, drawing out the common themes for analysis. 
As mentioned in the previous section, it was widely accepted that the movement 
originated in its turbulent relationship with the West. This is true of both the political, and 
cultural, projects. By way of discussion, reference is made to a number of the movements 
most prominent discussants. Irele claimed that, “its literature and its ideology afford an 
insight into the intimate process of the black reaction to the West” (Irele, 1965, p.348), 
whilst Barrend van Dyk van Niekerk argued that Négritude “originated as a reaction” 
(Barrend van Dyk van Niekerk, 1970, p.31). At its core, the poetry, novels and plays 
associated with the concept of Négritude drew on linguistic techniques to vocalise the 
desire of the authors to overcome the conditions of domination, dictated by colonialism, 
and to inspire the people of Africa to realise their freedom. It is not possible, based on the 
analysis of the poetry and prose, to make assumptions regarding an alternative political 
system that these authors would have favoured. However, it is possible to locate in the 
poems themselves, and amongst the secondary discussants, a critique of the state of 
domination imposed by the colonisers that is similarly founded to the Kantian concept of 
domination. 
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By way of substantiating this claim, this section firstly considers the poetry of Léon Damas, 
followed by discussion of Césaire’s poetry. Damas produced a broad collection of poetry 
and fiction around the general themes associated with Négritude, and the condemnation of 
colonial treatment of Black people. Probably his most famous collection, “Pigments”, 
contains within it his most widely quoted poem. Written for his friend, and editor of 
“Présénce Africaine”, Alioune Diop, “Whitewashed” denoted the anger Damas felt in being 
presented to the world through a lens over which he had limited control. One of the 
fundamental themes at the heart of the “Pigments” collection was a condemnation of the 
treatment of the évolué by the European powers as successfully overcoming their Black 
heritage, and the suggestion that this was in some way a success of the Europeanised 
education they underwent. 
Damas argued consistently throughout this collection, against this form of domination, 
criticising it as oppressing his freedom to self-define, and as trivialising and condemning his 
roots in favour of his Europeanised form. The poem “Whitewashed” focuses particular 
attention on this concern. The following line from the poem emphasises his discomfort 
with the term and its connotations: “Can it be that they dare, call me whitewashed” 
(Damas, 2011, p.51). Like a number of his fellow évolué Damas responded to the French 
accusation of his education being a sign of his “civilising” and “whiteness” by adamantly 
declaring his Blackness. Similarly in the poem “For Sure” he discusses “everything that 
pisses me off”, making reference to “colonisation, civilisation, assimilation, and the rest” 
(Damas, 2011, p.45). He claims that the factors that anger him are those that impose an 
identity on him that is neither personal to him, nor that he is comfortable with. Parallels 
exist, here, between the concept of domination, as it is understood in the Kantian sense, 
and the views expressed by Damas in these two poems. Kantian domination understands 
wrongdoing not as the choice for someone to do something bad to you, but instead, “it is 
that somebody does something to you” (Ripstein, 2009, p.42). In reference to Damas’s 
claims, it is not necessarily that treating him as a civilised intellectual is itself bad. Rather, 
imposing an identity on him at all, subsequently defining his purpose and diminishing his 
autonomous choice, is where the problems lie. In this sense, it is clear that underpinning 
both positions (Damasian and Kantian) is a foundational belief in the right of individuals to 
have purposeful choice in the formation of their own identities. To reiterate, it is clear 
throughout Damas’s poetry that he violently opposes any forms of oppression, and 
similarities can be drawn between this position and a belief in a right of all individuals to an 
autonomous existence, in which the choice to direct one’s own life is guaranteed. Each of 
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these poems makes reference to both an internal and external factor, as delineated in the 
previous section. Implying not only Damas’s discomfort with the treatment he received 
from the colonisers, but also his desire to define his own identity moving forward.  
Similarly to Damas, Césaire’s poetry was inspired by images of oppression and control. He 
combined an approach that is both “nostalgic and combative” (Jules-Rosette, 1992, p.23). 
In “Afrique” he opened with images of violence and mistreatment, silencing and oppression: 
“they muzzled your voice, which was speaking in the silence of shadows” (Césaire, 1983, p. 
347). Through the imagery of the poem it was suggested the act of silencing itself was at 
the centre of the issue. Curtailing the voice, or freedom, of an individual is presented as an 
act of violence. This is similar to the Kantian argument, discussed above, that curtailing 
individual purposiveness is unjust. The conclusion to the poem is filled with messages of 
hope and potential salvation, somewhat paralleling his technique in his political text 
“Discourse on Colonialism” (discussed in Section 3.1), of being both critical of the past and 
inspirational in his advice for the future. The poem concludes: “hidden things will again 
climb the slope of dormant musics” (Césaire, 1992, p.23); implying that there is hope for 
the future, and we can surmise, that Négritude is fundamental to the process of delivering 
it.  
“A Tempest” reworks the story of The Tempest to focus on the lives and experiences of the 
“natives”. Throughout the play Césaire focuses on the stories of Ariel and Caliban who are 
critical of the role in which they are cast, expected to obey their colonial masters: “I obeyed 
you-but, well why not come out with it?- I did so most unwillingly” (Césaire, 1985, p.9). The 
play, like his other works, focuses on the horrors of the colonial movement, condemning 
the unequal treatment of the colonised people and the creation of a hierarchy between 
“masters and slaves” (Ripstein, 2009, p.42). Hence, it is possible to see within Césaire’s 
poetry and fiction, and his political works, an emphasis on the fundamental importance of 
equality amongst individuals and overcoming dominance. That being said, it can be 
suggested that these views, similar to those underlying the framework of this thesis, 
underpin much of his political thinking and, subsequently, his views of personhood.  
In a controversial discussion of the purpose of the Négritude poetry, Sartre in “Black 
Orpheus” (1948) emphasised its role as an external force, enabling Europe to “gain access 
to the world of jet” (Sartre, 1964, p.16). He implied that the use of poetry and rhyme 
enabled individuals first to “come into consciousness”, and then to share with, or make it 
comprehensible to, the West. He claimed that, through “a poetic experience…the black 
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man, in his present condition, must first become conscious of himself” (Sartre, 1964, p.16). 
Once again, there is a clear divide between the internal and external roles of the 
movement. Additionally, Sartre refers to, what he views as, the emancipation of engaging 
with poetic and cultural forms of expression. However, Sartre was critiqued, predominantly 
by Frantz Fanon, for his assumption that the poems of a few were representational of the 
views of all Black individuals. Not only this, but also for the assumption that all Black people 
required artistic and poetic forms of expression, rather than rigorous analytical thought, to 
share their views; a theme that is also condemned in Chapter 5 in discussion of 
ethnophilosophy. To reiterate, according to Sartre, the role of the poetic and literary 
movements that feature in this section were to enable the poets and authors to undergo a 
process of self-realisation, through the therapeutic nature of writing; to then share this 
process of self-realisation, and utilise it to support others undergoing similar processes. In 
making these claims, he is also making assumptions regarding the ability of individuals to 
rely on formal forms of expression to share their views; suggesting, rather, that they should 
use non-formal approaches. He claimed that “black poetry is evangelic, it announces good 
news: Blackness has been rediscovered” (Sartre, 1964, p.20), and presented it to humanity 
for celebration. As suggested in the previous section, his views are being treated as those 
of a commentator rather than as primary source material representing the movement, as 
“Black Orpheus” sometimes is. 
Discussant Tsenay Serequeberhan, like Kelley, emphasises the role of poetry in the political 
expression of Négritude. He observed that: “It is aimed at regaining concretely a black 
‘existential spatiality’. For it is the negation of this lived space- the historical existence- that 
constitutes the experience of enslavement” (Serequeberhan, 2000, p.18). Similarly to Irele, 
he suggested that the artistic strand of the movement was fundamental in criticising the 
existence of a political condition in which a community was controlled by an external force, 
and unable to exist (referring to Ripstein’s wording) spatially individuated. According to 
Ripstein’s model, and the ideas being adapted by this thesis, the realisation of autonomy is 
grounded, for Kant, on the concept that individuals can freely pursue their own 
purposiveness on the understanding that no two individuals can co-exist in the same space. 
Thus for Kantians, control over an individual’s space is a form of domination. Similarly, 
Serequeberhan argued, the role of Négritude was in overcoming the metaphorically 
evocative condition of enslavement to which he referred. Whilst critique of such a 
condition is widely associated with a number of approaches, including Marxism, and a wide 
range of liberal positions, the underling philosophical foundations can be viewed as similar 
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to the Kantian argument of spatiality: that domination and enslavement constitute the limit 
of another’s space and purpose and are thus wrong, regardless of the consequences of this 
limiting.   
Having briefly covered the role of the artistic movement and its grounding, this section now 
focusses on a discussion of the role of culture in the formal political setting. This is followed 
by discussion of the relationship between the two elements according to the Négritude 
movement, which, as previously mentioned, were defined by the authors as an expressly 
political-cultural project. As a result of this understanding, it is necessary to unpick in 
further detail what that entails, and why the relationship between the two was deemed as 
fundamental. Senghor in particular, focused much of his political discourse on the value of 
understanding cultures influence on political spaces and decisions. This was a recurrent 
theme throughout “Nationhood and the African Road to Socialism”. He argued that it was a 
failing of “African politicians (that) have a tendency to neglect culture, to make it an 
appendage to politics” (Senghor, 1962, p.67), and in contrast his project would expressly 
value and recognise the influence of cultural membership on individuals lives. He argued 
that in reality, the “two areas (politics and culture), are certainly closely connected, 
reacting each on the other” (Senghor, 1962, p.67). He supported this form of interaction 
because, “if one stops to reflect, culture is at once the basis and the ultimate aim of 
politics… culture is the very texture of society” (Senghor, 1962, p.67). Such an approach is 
ingrained into the model of this thesis, which recognises the relevance of culture in 
realising and valuing foundational principles (as discussed in Chapter 2). Senghor 
maintained this emphasis on the role and value of culture throughout his work: “contrary 
to the notion of numerous African politicians, culture is not an appendage of politics that 
one can lop off without damage. It is not even a simple political means: culture is the 
precondition and goal of any policy worthy of the name” (Senghor, 1962, p.103). For him, 
culture was at the centre of establishing politics, it was the medium through which debates 
occurred and were deliberated. Simultaneously, he argued that it was the role of politics to 
enable the full development of culture, viewing them as symbiotic. The strength of the 
relationship between the political and the cultural was, for Senghor, and his 
contemporaries, fundamental to the understanding of Négritude as a movement. This was 
not to suggest that he did not advocate for a form of politics that recognised the universal. 
Rather, it was to suggest that, he, like this thesis, recognised the value of a cultural 
approach to understanding fundamental questions, such as those relating to autonomy and 
personhood.  
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As discussed in Chapter 2, the concept of culture is somewhat fluid, which inspires the 
question, of what Senghor believed was involved in a political condition centred on respect 
for culture. Whilst he does not specifically limit the notion of culture to his idea of a shared 
Négritude, it is implied, on reading his works, that for him a Black culture, or as Césaire 
refers to it a “feeling”, exists that is shared by all Black people. This feeling, then, influences 
the political. However, the notion of a shared Black culture, as mentioned in Section 3.1, 
raises a number of concerns regarding its effect on individual autonomy. July described 
Senghor’s approach to culture as, a “blanket celebration of black culture” (July, 1987, 
p.216), in contrast to a recognition of the importance of individualism and specificity. 
Although it is important to reiterate that, as defined in Section 3.1iii, there was more to 
Négritude than simply a shared feeling of Blackness. It must also be emphasised that this 
was a somewhat divisive approach, with a noticeable divide between theorists that both 
support and condemn the project of homogenisation for political reasons. As referenced in 
Section 3.1, Fanon, as well as contemporary scholars, such as Hountondji and Wiredu 
(studied in Chapter 5), highlight the flaws in an approach that ignored individual difference 
in favour of an all-encompassing Black culture. Nigel Gibson, in an analysis of Fanon’s work, 
discussed “the objective Négritudist’s search for a Black soul (suggesting that it) could end 
in an empty celebration of the exotic. By appealing to people of colour solely on the basis 
of race, Négritude ignores the specificity and distinguishing character of people’s 
experience” (Gibson, 2003, pp.81-82). Thus, Gibson’s concern, similar to that of other 
critics, is that Négritude, rather than enhancing individual freedoms, actually curtailed 
them. 
In contrast, Alioune Diop implied that cultural groups or definitions should be able to be 
fluid, and responsive to temporal and geographical change. Thus, in the case of defining 
one’s Blackness he would argue that it can mean different things for different people, 
therefore overcoming Gibson’s critique. For example, evidence for this arises in the simple 
fact that what Négritude meant for one author was vastly different to what it meant for 
another: the contrast between Senghor and Césaire would be a case in point. Diop 
suggested that: 
“Cultures do not live in isolation, cut off from their roots, their support 
system and the source of their own vitality, that is to say cut off from their 
institutions and plans for civilisation. Each living civilisation can assume its 
own history, make use of its own maturity, and give expression to its own 
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modernity, based upon its own experiences, the inspiration of its own 
environment, the talents specific to its own genius” (Diop, 1992, p. xv). 
As previously suggested, for him, culture was something that changed and flourished in 
response to new and developing inspirations, and in that sense it was possible to view it as 
responsive to change and difference. To clarify, Diop supports the truism that a culture 
does not exist in “isolation” but rather adapts and changes based on “history, maturity, 
experiences and environment”, arguing that this is fundamental to the understanding of 
politics. On this understanding, Négritude was able to overcome the concern that it curtails 
individual freedom. Instead it could be interpreted as a collaborative project of individuals. 
In considering the debate between the two perspectives a pattern emerges in which, as 
mentioned in the previous section, authors that are both for and against the Négritude 
movement base their claims on the value of individual or group culture, as well as the 
positive effects on the global civilisation of providing the opportunities for them to be 
expressed. In arguing for this, they make their claims based on whether the realisation of 
Négritude either enhances or reduces individual freedom. Thus, leading to the hypothesis 
that, these arguments share a similar normative underpinning on which they are premised. 
Whilst it is true that the philosophical base is realised differently, leading to different 
conclusions, it is possible to argue that underlying both arguments are claims for the value 
of autonomy and personhood. Throughout the following two chapters a pattern emerges in 
which opposing claims responding to the colonial and post-colonial movements share a 
philosophical foundation: further similarities occur not only between the arguments 
themselves but also with the Kantian framework set out in Chapter 1, thus providing 
support for the hypothesis of this thesis, that shared foundational principles exist a priori. 
Having discussed the relationship between culture and politics, as it is expressed by the 
Négritude movement, as well as the cultural outputs, the chapter now proceeds with a 
more detailed analysis of the concepts of Blackness and Otherness and the perceived 
relationship with the concepts of independence and autonomy (understood in a Kantian 
sense).  
3.3- Blackness, Otherness and Independence: 
The purpose of this section is to consider the ways in which the Négritude movement 
responded to the concepts of Otherness and Blackness. The term Other is often associated 
with the colonial movement. It was used as a method of referring to non-Western cultures 
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that were in some way alien to the understanding of the colonial administrators. However, 
at the centre of a number of the reactionary responses to colonialism lay a desire to 
positively reclaim the concepts of Otherness and Blackness. The aim being to express their 
position that, “we’re black and have a history, a history that contains certain cultural 
elements of great value; and that Negroes were not, as you put it, born yesterday…Negro 
heritage was worthy of respect…its values were values that could still make an important 
contribution to the world” (Césaire, 2000, pp. 91-92). This section (Section 3.3) asks how 
the theorists achieved this. How they questioned coloniser policies? What methodologies 
they utilised to re-establish the concepts of Blackness and Otherness in a positive light? It 
then focuses on the relationship between the re-appropriation of these terms and the goal 
of establishing independence. It concludes by questioning what independence and 
autonomy would look like according to these authors. 
As previously indicated the two forms of Négritude, emanating from Africa and the 
Caribbean, differed considerably. In particular, differences existed in their understanding, 
and valuing, of violence and revolution. Whilst the African approach (associated with 
Senghor and Diop) spoke predominantly of the glorious kingdoms of the past, and 
establishing Africa’s place in the global community; the approach associated with Césaire, 
and to some extent Fanon, focused predominantly on recognising and responding to the 
horrors of colonialism. Their approaches often avoided the critique of exoticism often 
directed at Senghor, as less claims were made by the Caribbean authors regarding a 
glorious and unestablished pre-colonial condition. Whilst focus was placed on the lessons 
that could be taken from the past, their approach was predominantly grounded in a coming 
to consciousness, or even a coming to terms, with their current condition. This section 
analyses these approaches in relation to individual identity.  
Lewis Gordon, a contemporary discussant of the movement, described it as “a literary 
theoretical response to anti-black racism which posited a unique black soul that was a 
source and function of a unique black reality of intrinsically black values” (Gordon, 1995, 
p.31). The concept of “uniqueness” refers to what it is that is special and important about 
Blackness and established, according to Gordon and other commentators, the foundation 
of the movement.  By focusing on what was special or different about being African or 
Black, the theorists were able to present an alternate response to Otherness than that 
posited by Western anthropologists. The assumption of a unique identity, that should be 
both re-discovered and shared as a response to the belittling approach of the West to 
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understanding the culture of colonised people, implies an underlying philosophical 
grounding to the Négritude movement. This underlying philosophy is based on the right of 
individuals to undergo a process of self-discovery, in which they come to understand and 
associate with a sense of individual and group culture, through which it is then possible to 
establish their purposiveness. Each of these claims is based on the assumption (first 
discussed in Chapter 2) that all human cultures should initially, before their merits have 
been deliberated, be approached from a neutral standpoint; making no assumptions 
regarding their merit. The purpose of the Négritude movement, on this level, was to share 
the value of what the thinkers perceived as Black culture, with both one another and the 
world more generally on the understanding that it had value.  
Valentin Mudimbe argued, as previously suggested, that “Présence Africaine” provided an 
outlet through which the Négritude movement could make these claims. He argued that, 
“what Diop’s project represents is a questioning, not of the French culture per se but of the 
imperial ambition of the Western Civilisation… It wishes to bring in the very centre of the 
French power and culture what was being negated in colonies, that is, the dignity of 
otherness” (Mudimbe, 1992, p.xvii). Such an approach, whilst not couched in Kantian terms, 
shares a philosophical foundation that recognises and respects the rights and duties of 
mankind to treat one another in such a way that respects individual choice and the value of 
persons, and is able to defend against the domination of one group at the hands of another. 
To further reiterate this point, Marc Rombaut, in his article “The Politics of Othering” 
discussed the role of Négritude on the generation following Diop, Senghor and Césaire. He 
implied that in time “the new generations had to break with the myth of négritude in order 
to invent themselves and to endow themselves with a specific identity and legitimacy” 
(Rombaut, 1992, p.414). Similarly, Senghor admitted that the role of Négritude was not 
indefinite, but that it had a finite relevance to the struggle. This “breaking with the myth”, 
as Rombaut presents it, was a secondary stage built on the success of Senghor, Diop and 
Césaire in rousing the next generation to realise themselves and to find their independence. 
According to Rombaut, what Négritude meant to his predecessors was the ability to 
overcome being “insulted (and) enslaved”. It was a way of readdressing themselves: “he 
accepts the word ‘Negro’ which is hurled at him as stone, and he asserts himself, in pride, 
as a black in the face of the white- we understood them well beyond their significance, by 
reinterpreting them as closely as possible to our own problematics” (Rombaut, 1992, 
p.410). Again, the strength of the argument is based on the value of reclaiming a word that 
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had in the past been used as an insult, as a method of reasserting, not only a positive 
identity, but the ability to define one’s own identity. Identity formation, is thus at the core 
of this element of Négritude, and obvious parallels can be drawn with the Kantian concepts 
of self-mastery and equality; in particular, respecting individuals as having the capacity to 
overcome their “un-civilised” desires, and having the ability to be guided by reason when 
embarking on the process of identity formation. It enabled them to fight against a 
condition they found themselves in, in which they were “deprived of ways of thinking 
correctly about the modern world, based on sufficient information and exchanges, we let 
strangers construct our future and impose on us ideas that we have not created from 
personal experience of history and action in the world” (Diop, cited in Jules-Rosette, 1992, 
p.26). This damnation, by Diop, of strangers imposing a world view and dictating a group’s 
future, as well as an insistence of the value of personal history and experience, suggests 
that the foundations underpinning Diop’s worldview, whilst presented through different 
ideologically and culturally specific terminologies, have similar foundations to the Kantian 
arguments of choice and domination. 
The first half of this section has focused on methods employed by the theorists to re-
establish the identities of Black or Other; their aim being not only to prescribe them with 
positive definitions, but also to utilise them as a method for realising individual value, 
identity, and subsequently freedom. This discussion raises a further question: what does 
that freedom look like according to the Négritude theorists? According to Senghor: 
“True independence is that of the spirit. A people is not really independent 
when, after its accession to nominal independence, its leaders import, 
without modification, institutions- political, economic, social, cultural... I do 
not deny that every institution, every moral or technical value is related to 
man….Nevertheless, it must be adapted to the realities of the native soil, 
by retaining the spirit rather than the form” (Senghor, 1962, p.16). 
Independence, or autonomy, is not something that can be given to an individual, group, 
nation or continent, instead it needs to be realised or taken by the individual themselves. In 
Kantian terms: freedom comes from realising one’s “enlightenment” and living by the laws 
you define for yourself. The state, or in the example Senghor referred to, the ex-colonial 
power, can provide the conditions for enlightenment, but, the realisation must be driven by 
the individual. Thus, at its foundation this element of the Négritude movement was a claim 
about overcoming domination, and realising the conditions for personal choice and self-
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mastery in defining the identity and direction of personal existence. However, what 
distinguishes it from a Kantian model was that it was presented in terms of colour and race, 
which as previously suggested was one of the inconsistencies within the movement. Once 
again, it is possible to interpret in this movement a distinction between the universally 
relevant philosophical foundations and the ideologically and culturally specific aims and 
applications. The claim was made on the basis that all individuals had an equal right to be 
freely formulate their own identity, and the colonial condition had obstructed this right. 
The foundations of the arguments made by Senghor, Diop and even Césaire, were not 
racially motivated. Rather, they implied that the role of Négritude was to enable the victims 
of colonisation to realise their own freedom, and their value to the Universal Civilisation; to 
enable them to enter into dialogue with the West and to contribute to the future of the 
global community. Nonetheless, this was achieved through an enhanced value of racial 
imagery, and thus a clear distinction is present between the racialized methods, and the 
universal foundations of the movement. 
The concept of the Universal Civilisation and the journal “Présence Africaine” are the focus 
of the following section (Section 3.4). 
3.4- The Universal Civilisation and Présence Africaine: 
The concept of the “Civilisation de l’Universal” is predominantly associated with the work 
of Senghor and Diop. As previously discussed, both theorists along with Jacques 
Rabemananjara, promoted their journal “Présence Africaine” as an appropriate vehicle for 
establishing the conditions to facilitate effective dialogue between cultures: specifically 
between the colonised and the coloniser. It was assumed by all three, that for dialogue to 
be effective it must exist between individuals embarking on fair and just cross-cultural 
interactions, grounded in a notion of equality. It was important therefore for Africans (and 
other colonial communities), to establish their culture as being of equal value to that of the 
ex-colonial powers; so as to facilitate just dialogue and future interactions. It was the initial 
manifesto of “Présence Africaine” to showcase Négritude or Black culture as being of 
interest, or value, not simply as a result of its exoticism, but because of its intrinsic value. 
Barrend van Dyk van Niekerk argued in 1970 that in relation to the arts community this 
attempt had been successful and that, “black artists and their art are now accepted on 
equal terms by the world, not because they are black but because they are good” (Barrend 
van Dyk van Niekerk, 1970, p.72). Thus, that the movement had at least been successful in 
creating the conditions under which artists, could interact justly as equals. The purpose was 
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to emphasise the value of Black culture as having worth not only for Africans, but also in 
establishing and developing the Universal Civilisation. This section focuses on discussion of 
the concept of the Universal Civilisation, as presented by the theorists; and on “Présence 
Africaine’s” role in contributing to the establishment of Négritude as possessing innate 
value to a global civilisation. It also questions whether the philosophical grounding 
underlying support for the Universal Civilisation, as it was presented by Senghor, Diop and 
Rabermananjara, shared similar underpinnings to those expressed by the Kantian literature 
set out in Chapter 1: summarised by the terms self-law giving and willkϋr. 
It was Senghor’s philosophy that the achievement of African emancipation, as a result of a 
re-established sense of pride in both individual and collective Négritude, was not the 
ultimate end of the movement: “unlike so many of his political counterparts elsewhere in 
Africa, the politics of Senghor does not constitute an end in itself but is geared to the more 
encompassing aim of cultural liberalisation” (Barrend van Dyk van Niekerk, 1970, p.29). 
Alternatively, he viewed this as a fundamental first step in the creation of a new Universal 
Civilisation that would benefit, not only colonised people, but also Western cultures on 
which the notion of universality was, he argued, founded. It was his opinion that accepting 
Western culture as the foundation of a Universal Civilisation was a mistake. The concept of 
civilisation, as it is presented by Senghor, is somewhat vague. However, based on the 
assertions made regarding its potential universality, it can be assumed that Senghor viewed 
it as a shared human condition under which different conceptions competed. It is possible 
to draw similarities with the concept of a “clash of civilisations” as presented by Samuel 
Huntingdon (Huntingdon, 1993). In contrast to Huntingdon, Senghor’s argument was not 
that different religious, or cultural, groups should compete until one was deemed superior, 
but rather that the hierarchical condition should be reversed and a Human, or Universal, 
Civilisation should be created based on the best elements of all cultures. He viewed 
Négritude as setting the parameters for just-cross-cultural dialogue between civilisations. 
Seeing it as enabling individuals to firstly recognise their own worth, and then draw on this 
to enable them to interact with other cultural groups as equals. His arguments for this will 
become clear in the following discussion. 
In his 1962 monograph “Nationhood and the African Road to Socialism”, Senghor argued 
that, “Europeans claimed to be the only ones who have envisaged culture in its universal 
dimensions” but that this was, in fact, not the case. Rather, “we had little difficulty in 
demonstrating that each exotic civilisation had also thought in terms of universality, that 
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the only merit of Europe in this regard had been to diffuse her civilisation throughout the 
world, thanks to her conquests” (Senghor, 1962, pp.90-91). Senghor argued that it was 
power, rather than the non-existence of a valuable alternative, that had dictated the 
parameters of the Universal Civilisation as it existed at that time. The alternative he 
proposed was a universal political condition that enabled the existence of a shared 
Universal Civilisation. A Civilisation that blended the best that European and African 
cultures, to name his two examples, had to offer. It was his argument that a universal 
system that was able to take into account the strengths of both European and Western 
culture, as well as traditional African values, would be of great benefit to the human 
community. 
To further analyse the concept of cross-cultural blending, it is necessary to refer in greater 
detail to Senghor’s vision in the 1960’s when the majority of his publications focused on 
this topic. It is Senghor’s commitment to a system grounded partly on traditional African 
values that has led to the argument that he, in certain elements of his discourse, relies on a 
narrative of “return”. He, like Jacques Howlett, suggested that the inclusion of non-
Western voices would not only create a fairer and more equal global political condition, but 
it would also be of noticeable benefit to cultural development. Howlett recommended, a 
“universalist humanism, enriched and authenticated by the values of the excluded peoples, 
different in fact from the abstract universalism as thought of by the West” (Howlett, 1969, 
p. 42). Senghor presents his position in poetic and embellished language, intended to 
represent his beliefs of how African culture and knowledge is formed, in contrast to the 
analytical and formal approach of the West:  
“Negro-African speech does not mould the object, without touching it, in 
rigid categories and concepts; it brushes things up to restore their original 
colour, with their texture, sound and perfume; it perforates them with its 
luminous rays to reach the essential sur-reality in its innate 
humidity…European reasoning is analytical, discursive by utilisation; Negro-
African reasoning is intuitive by participation” (Senghor, 1962, p.97). 
He implies throughout his publications that the African’s relationship with nature is 
somewhat different to that of the European’s. That the actions of both groups are dictated 
by reason, a property he sees as universal, but that their approaches to reason are 
different: “Negro-African reason is traditionally dialectical, transcending the principles of 
identity, non-contradiction, and the excluded middle” (Senghor, 1962, p.98), whereas he 
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sees European reason as being “analytical and discursive”. Therefore, he argues that a 
blend of the two positions would favour humanity. However, throughout his discussion the 
focus remains of why such an approach would be of value and it is unclear how this would 
be achieved in reality. It can be assumed that his emphasis on the maintenance of strong 
relationships with France, and a collaborative political system, would be at the heart of this 
approach, but, again, it is unclear how this would work in reality. The emphasis on the 
universal notion of reason is of particular interest to this thesis. Similarly to the arguments 
presented in Chapter 2, Senghor suggested (as shown in the above citations), that the 
concept of reason is universal, but the approaches to reasoning differ between the two 
cultures. On that basis similarities can be drawn between the Kantian suggestion that 
reason is the foundation, not only of political discourse, but also of autonomy, and 
Senghor’s reliance on similar assertions, as well as with the underlying assumption set out 
in Chapter 2 that universal foundational principles can be accessed and achieved via 
culturally specific means. 
To investigate this argument further, discussion turns now to Senghor’s claim that “we 
must assure a cultural base for the future nation, by defining the essential characteristics of 
traditional Negro African civilisation which, blending with European and French 
contributions, will undergo a renaissance” (Senghor, 1962, p.33). In making this claim he 
was suggesting not only that the Universal Civilisation would benefit from the blending of 
cultures, but also that his own country of Senegal would find advantage in drawing not only 
on their own heritage, but also on the French practices that had been established in the 
colonial period. In this sense, it is obvious that for Senghor, human existence and culture 
were based on an adaptive process in which the best elements of different human 
experiences were blended for the benefit of all. At least as a national approach, this 
argument relied on maintaining the elements of French infrastructure and culture that 
Senghor deemed to be valuable in the time period following independence. It was 
important for his political model that elements that were of value were not simply 
jettisoned because of their links to the colonial past. In making these recommendations 
Senghor, and Howlett, unlike their more revolutionary counterparts discussed in Section 
3.5, were not recommending an overthrowing (either violent or non-violent) of Western 
values. Rather, they were advocating for a condition under which cultures were able to 
develop simultaneously, and for the benefit of one another, via a system of cross-cultural 
discourse and collaboration. As has been suggested in the previous paragraphs, it was 
Senghor’s claim that different cultures could learn from one another, but the specifics of 
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how this process would take place are unclear. What follows is a discussion of how the 
theorists believed that this could be achieved. 
In discussing the prospect of cross-cultural dialogue capable of creating  the basis of a 
Universal Civilisation, Diop referred to the necessity of such dialogue taking place between 
“complete and living civilisations” (Diop, 1992, p.xv). To clarify, it was important to Diop 
that the process involved contemporary cultures and this process, whilst potentially 
inspired by traditional values, was not based on an unjustified glorification of the past. 
Hassan observed that, “Diop promotes the idea of a universal synthesis in which Africans 
join Europeans in the production of modern human civilisation” (Hassan, 1999, p.207). He 
goes on to quote Diop as claiming that, “this culture, of a truly universal vocation, only 
takes shape through the free intervention of particular cultures” (Diop, translated in 
Hassan, 1999, p.204). To clarify, Diop, like Senghor, proposed the fundamentality of this 
condition based on his assumption that “we all need the West. We also need it to master 
and discipline an all too powerful appetite on its part for domination- so that we may live 
harmoniously and in peace with the other human civilisations” (Diop, 1992, p. xvi). To 
summarise, they were clear throughout their publications that it would not benefit Africa, 
or what Diop referred to as Black civilisation, to ostracise themselves from the West. 
Instead, they advocated for a system of both political and cultural collaboration in which 
non-Western cultures, firstly had the opportunity establish and develop as equals, and 
secondly then enter into discourse based on that foundation. It was argued that achieving 
this was a two stage plan. Firstly, Africans needed to realise their own worth so that when 
they entered into discourse with other groups they were able to do so viewing themselves 
as equals. Diop and Senghor suggested that the Négritude movement was a solution to this 
first problem. Secondly, Western governments needed to overcome their imperialist 
assumptions regarding the value of their cultural and political attitudes, and to enter into 
dialogue with other cultures grounded on an assumption of equal value and worth. The 
importance of equality in cross-cultural dialogue is a value that is shared not only by the 
Négritude theorists, but also by contemporary scholars discussed in Chapters 2 and 5, as 
well as the Kantian model central to this thesis. The emergence of this focus across 
different academic traditions is further indication of the shared value placed on the 
importance of equality between both individuals and cultural groups; one of the themes 
expressed by this thesis as representing internal and external self-law giving as potential 
foundations of cross-cultural discourse and debate. The concept of equality, in each of 
these cases, relies on the assumptions that all humans have equal worth and rights over 
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the choices affecting their lives, thus interactions with them should be premised on 
respecting these principles. 
The assumption of a hierarchy of cultures by European thinkers and political leaders was, 
for Diop and Senghor, a hindrance to the successful development of a Universal Civilisation. 
However, they were also concerned with certain post-independence leaders who 
supported the complete reversal of colonial political structures and developments. They 
argued that such a process would only serve to harm the continent. In fact, Senghor 
claimed that, “we should impoverish ourselves and probably despair of reducing our 
millenary backwardness as compared with Europe, if, on the pretext of anti-colonialist 
struggle, we refused Europe’s contributions” (Senghor, 1962, p.16). For them, the value of 
cross-cultural collaboration was threefold. Firstly, Western advances in science and 
technology would serve to benefit the people of Africa, especially as they were entering 
into a process of state building in the post-independence era. Secondly, there were certain 
elements of European culture that were of benefit to humans universally, as there were 
elements from other cultures that could be similarly beneficial to humanity in general. 
Thirdly, Africa had the potential to make valuable contributions to the Universal Civilisation, 
to both the benefit of Africans and non-Africans alike. Commentator Richard Bjornson 
summarises this argument, claiming that, “according to Senghor, for example, Africans 
could contribute to the disalienation of the West by sharing with it the humanising 
perspectives of their own culture, and they themselves could overcome alienation by 
recognising their rootedness in this culture” (Bjornson, 1992, p.147). Thus, in proposing a 
universal approach to understanding culture, it can be surmised from these arguments that 
both Diop and Senghor understood there to be universally relevant questions for mankind. 
Answering these problems, they argued, required a collaborative human solution, and 
achieving this should be premised on fair and just cross-cultural interactions and 
collaborations: a system they referred to as a Universal Civilisation.  
The concept of a Universal Civilisation was not (similarly to the philosophy of Négritude 
more generally), simply a philosophical and cultural project. It was also, especially in the 
case of Senghor, an explicitly political project. In the 1955 edition of “Présence Africaine” a 
claim was made regarding the value of achieving political freedom. Unlike much of the 
Négritude literature the argument was not based on the importance of individuals realising 
their freedom, but rather on the need for the instruments of the state to be free and 
capable of serving the people. In his editorial Niam N’goura stated that “there can be no 
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cultural production or initiative without self-assurance and lucidity, without that 
remembrance of our personality which free political institutions alone can guarantee” 
(N’goura, translated in Hassan, 1999, p.214). Thus, for N’goura, the value of the movement 
was not only in talking to individuals, but also in establishing political conditions under 
which individuals could flourish. The term “personality” is in no way uncontroversial and 
what it means to different groups, individuals or ideologies differs greatly. However, in this 
instance the point raised by N’goura does not require the pinning down of a definition. 
Rather, it highlights the importance for him of free individuals working within free 
institutions, if cultural production is to be achieved and protected. Thus, as with the 
movement more generally, N’goura recognised the ingrained relationship between the 
cultural and the political and the need to consider each element simultaneously, especially 
in relation to issues of freedom. 
Manthia Diawara suggests that the value of freedom and emancipation was not just 
expressed and experienced by scholars and politicians, but also Africans more generally 
recognised the value of Négritude as supporting freedom movements not just for Black 
people, but for all oppressed peoples: implying that the movement had universal potential. 
Diawara expresses her feeling “that Négritude was bigger even than Africa, that we were 
part of an international movement which held the promise of universal emancipation that 
our destiny coincided with the universal freedom of workers and colonised people 
worldwide” (Diawara, 1998, pp. 6-7). For her, the movement was one example of a wider 
concern: the value of freedom and emancipation to all individuals who had experienced 
oppression, regardless of geo-political location or local experience. According to this 
interpretation, a dislike of oppression, and support for freedom of choice was a universally 
shared foundation of humanity. 
The purpose of this section has been to highlight the role the Négritude movement played 
“in the awakening of Black consciousness throughout the world” (Bjornson, 1992, p. 147), 
and questioning the role this played in advancing the Universal Civilisation. It has also been 
the intention of this section to indicate the emphasis theorists have placed on rooting 
these ideas in the concepts of autonomy and freedom. In summarising this discussion it is 
also important to highlight a potential paradox in Senghor’s work. Whilst he supports the 
concept of a Universal Civilisation, and establishing politics combining both the past and 
present; he also supports a “return” narrative, glorifying pre-colonial Africa, and, in this 
sense it is possible to see a paradox. In recognising this dilemma, this thesis argues that 
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whilst inconsistencies do indeed exist in his work, these are in the practice rather than in 
the foundations. In fact, both of his positions are grounded on arguments for the necessity 
of establishing positions that foster self-mastery. Either in the sense of recognising and 
celebrating traditions that are important to the people, or, in creating the conditions under 
which individuals can better develop. 
This section concludes with a summary of “Présence Africaine’s” role in delivering these 
goals, as well as the role of the journal in responding to the changing nature of 
emancipatory movements away from Négritude and towards other Pan-African models. 
The final element of the argument is a criticism of the notion of a Universal Civilisation, this 
leads into Section 3.5 which focuses on criticism of the Négritude movement more 
generally. 
According to Valentin- Yves Mudimbe in his introduction to the “The Surreptitious Speech” 
(a text dedicated to celebrating forty years of “Présence Africaine”), the role of the journal 
as the editor’s viewed it, was to “incarnate the voice of a silenced Africa” (Mudimbe, 1992, 
p. xviii). In realising that goal, it “was both a source of cultural innovation and a vehicle of 
social and political mobility” (Jules-Rosette, 1992, p. 14). The aim was to overcome a 
situation in which “the Black man existed only to be an object of jeers and gibes; he existed 
only in humiliation and obliteration”. To achieve this, “the existence of the Black man had 
to be reinvented; he had to be thrown resolutely, and without complexes into the common 
path of the human species” (Rabemananjara, 1992, p.376). For Rabemananjara, one of the 
original editors of the journal, “that was and still remains the objective of “Présence 
Africaine”: to be present in the world in the same way as others” (Rabemananjara, 1992, 
p.376). Thus the journal, like the Négritude movement more generally, maintained a core 
focus to overthrow the shackles of oppression, and reassert what it meant to be Black, 
both in, and to, the world. As can be seen in the above statements, many of the authors 
focused on acts of freedom: the freedom to achieve “political mobility”, as Jules-Rosette 
states, or to provide a space in which the silenced could speak, as Mudimbe proffers. Each 
of these aims and goals, whilst they differ, are philosophically underpinned by the value of 
realising individual freedom, be that the freedom to express individual views, the freedom 
to play an active role in politics or the freedom from certain violent acts of domination 
under which a racial group is targeted or bullied.  
As a journal that far outlived the Négritude movement as a vehicle for realising freedom 
from oppression, the methods “Présence Africaine” supported changed over time. As it 
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became apparent that Europe was still failing to treat Africa as an equal, and as having 
something to offer to a Universal Civilisation, and “as liberal humanism came under 
increasing attack, Diop and a diminishing group of other intellectuals associated with the 
journal still tried to persuade black intellectuals and African nationalists that European 
culture was the basis of an imperfect universal civilisation” (Hassan, 1999, p.203). However, 
in time it became apparent that support for humanism was diminishing the journal’s 
popularity amongst their readership, and Diop was forced to give up the strong humanistic 
feel of the journal in favour of critiquing Eurocentric ideas and supporting Pan-African 
movements that avoided, rather than supported, interactions with Europe or universal 
notions of culture. This need for a change of approach resulted from increasingly vocal 
critics claiming that, “to expect the colonised to open his mind to the world and be a 
humanist and internationalist would seem to be a ludicrous thoughtlessness (when) he is 
still regaining possession of himself, still examining himself with astonishment, passionately 
demanding the return of his language” (Memmi, 2003, p. 179). The development of a 
different Pan-African approach is considered in Chapter 4: The African socialism movement. 
3.5- Frantz Fanon and a Critique of the Négritude Movement: 
Section 3.5 focuses on the critics of the Négritude movement, and questions whether the 
criticisms they make are rooted in similar philosophical foundations to those of the 
movement they criticise. The purpose being to analyse whether similar philosophical 
foundations form the basis of arguments from across the political, cultural and ideological 
spectrum. This section begins with a general critique of the Négritude movement as 
presented by contemporary discussants, and concludes with a focused discussion of the 
writings of Frantz Fanon. 
i. General Critique 
This section relies heavily on the views and interpretations of both contemporary critics, 
and those writing in the period directly following the movements prevalence. As 
contemporary discussants Barrend van Dyk van Niekerk, Benetta Jules-Rosette, and 
Manthia Diawara were clear in their critique of Négritude, that they felt that the movement 
had value within its own time period but that this value was not sustainable. Both Jules-
Rosette and Frantz Fanon made the argument that what it meant to discover ones 
Négritude or Blackness, or in fact to be African, was never fully uncovered by the Négritude 
scholars, and nor could it have been. Fanon in particular, felt that the notion of a fixed, 
shared identity was in fact damaging to the cause. As discussed in the following sub-section, 
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he is adamant throughout his work that his identity is not something that is universally 
shared, or a fixed consciousness waiting for him to awake to its presence, but rather: “I am 
not a potentiality of something, I am wholly what I am. I do not have to look for the 
universal” (Fanon, 1968, p.134). His assertion of the notion of individuality was a response 
to the assumption (discussed throughout this chapter) that existed across the work of the 
authors of the movement of a shared understanding of what it meant to be Black, which 
critics argued, they failed to fully establish. Whilst “Africa provides a historical source for 
the significance of the writers’ present challenges…what is intended by the term ‘Africa’ is 
neither uniform nor obvious” (Jules-Rosette, 1992, p.20). An assumption of a shared 
African identity lies at the centre of the Négritude movement but it is also at the heart of 
its critique. Africa is a continent consisting of many distinct cultures, religions, races, 
identities, individuals and nations. Critics, such as Jules-Rosette, condemn the assumption 
that each of these groups shares the same understanding of what it means to be African, 
and in doing so premise their argument on the values of autonomy and purposiveness to 
individuals. 
In further support of the argument that Négritude failed in its attempt to be representative 
of the people it claimed to characterise, Gibson suggested that, instead, the Négritude 
movement was nothing more than a “response by a section of the Black évolués in French 
society to their sense of alienation” (Gibson, 2003, p.62). Alienation from both the French 
citizenry amongst whom they were living at the time, and from their own people. He 
argued that the poetry, in particular, was a response to a feeling of homelessness and a 
desire to get back in touch with their African roots, with the hope of discovering and 
developing their individual “African identity”. It was not, according to Gibson, a 
representation of the views of the people they claimed to represent and understand. 
Fanon made similar claims regarding the notion of a shared Black identity, arguing that 
“there will never be such a thing as black culture” (Fanon, 1965, p.189). Similarly, Barrend 
van Dyk van Niekerk discusses Senghor’s claims to understand and be a part of an exotic 
African past: 
“Whatever he might proclaim in his poetry, an African man of letter will 
hardly seriously maintain that he himself is imbued with this awareness of 
an all-encompassing unity of man and thing, life and death etc. Senghor 
has played up this theme- especially in regard to the continued existence 
and living reality of his ancestors- throughout his poetry, but has still to 
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convince me that it represents more than just a literary prose” (Barrend 
van Dyk van Niekerk, 1970, p.102). 
Fanon made a similar claim about Senghor’s position as a member of the educated elite: 
“we must understand that African unity can only be achieved through the upward thrust of 
the people, and under the leadership of the people, that is to say, in defiance of the 
interests of the bourgeoisie” (Fanon, 1965, p.133). As the quotes suggests, it has been 
argued by a range of critics that the movement failed to gain traction, in both making 
claims for a shared identity and representing the views of people outside of their own 
group. In this sense, critics argue, the movement failed. The unestablished shared identity 
and the controversial response to such an argument has been viewed by contemporary 
discussants as a primary explanation of the brevity of the movements influence.  
The second element to this thesis asks whether the authors studied advocated for political 
conditions in which the rights of individuals to be self-law giving are guaranteed. Similarly 
to discussions of individual, internal freedom, the assumption is not that these ideas will be 
couched in Kantian terminology, but rather, to assess whether similar demands are being 
made. It was suggested in Section 3.4 that theorists advocated for a philosophical claim for 
the necessity of free institutions able to recognise and guarantee the freedom of 
individuals. However, like a number of other theorists considered in this thesis, Senghor 
was not only a poet and scholar but also an active political figure. Therefore it is important 
to question his political success in guaranteeing freedom to the people of Senegal. Barrend 
van Dyk van Niekerk discusses Senghor the politician, in contrast to Senghor the poet and 
philosopher: 
“The great apostle of the black man’s rights, the defender of the socialist 
faith in Africa, the ardent protagonist of humanistic ideals, the great seeker 
for unity, has not entirely been able to free the independent observer from 
the nagging doubt that he could have done more to let true democracy and 
true freedom take root in his own country” (Barrend van Dyk van Niekerk, 
1970, p.68). 
Based on Barrend van Dyk van Niekerk’s observations, and through consideration of the 
political situation in Senegal under his rule (a detailed analysis of which is outside of the 
analytical boundaries of this thesis), it can be argued that whilst Senghor advocated for the 
right and value of autonomy and choice from a philosophical perspective, he was 
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unsuccessful in delivering this when it came to actively constructing a political state. 
Therefore, as Diawara observes, Senghorian Négritude can be criticised “for marginalising 
the majority of our populations, and for not basing its theories on economic, cultural, and 
social realities in Africa. Négritude was too philosophical and had too little material basis” 
(Diawara, 1992, p.384). This critique is established on two levels. Firstly, similarly to the 
authors discussed in the previous paragraph, Diawara concentrates on the failure of 
Senghor and his contemporaries to represent the views of the people, focusing instead on 
his own feelings of oppression and isolation. Secondly, he suggests that the philosophical 
focus of the movement led to its failure politically, as it was not properly grounded in 
reality. Gibson makes a similar claim: “Négritude was useful in shaking everything up, but 
finally its reliance on unconscious rather than conscious action, and the importance it 
placed on the irrational, meant that it was unable to articulate a positive conception of 
change” (Gibson, 2003, pp.80-81). Thus, it can be argued that as a philosophical movement 
Négritude was successful in raising questions and debates, but as a political reality the lack 
of empirical grounding resulted in its limited existence as a movement. 
The validity of the critiques regarding the concept of a universal Black identity, the people 
the movement represents and the excessively cultural and philosophical, rather than 
political focus raises a number of questions regarding the movement’s placement in this 
thesis. If the claims made by the movement can be disregarded via a number of successful 
critiques the question is asked as to whether the analysis of this chapter can be maintained. 
However, the purpose of this thesis is to analyse the views of individual theorists from a 
range of different ideological and cultural perspectives, and to question whether their 
views share a philosophical foundation, established on premises similar to those of internal 
self-law giving and external willkϋr, it is not to defend the political models they established. 
As is discussed in greater detail in the following chapter (Chapter 4), theorists’ 
philosophical ideas and their political decisions are being treated separately in this thesis. 
Whilst the critiques discussed in this section do indeed raise fundamental questions about 
the success of Négritude, both in achieving its aims and as being representative, they do 
not question the philosophical groundings of the arguments being made. A number of the 
criticisms discussed both in the previous paragraphs, and in the following discussion of 
Fanon, in fact share similar foundational beliefs, focusing on the movement’s failure to 
guarantee political freedoms and to respect the identity of individuals. 
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Before concluding the section with a discussion of Fanon it is opportune to refer to Irele’s 
observation of Senghor: “I don’t want to give the impression that Senghor’s négritude was 
an ideology of aggression; in fact, one of the main objections levelled against it by its 
radical critics is that it was, in fact, a form of collaboration and accommodation with 
colonialism” (Irele, 1992, p.208). Irele’s point provides a link between the two halves of this 
section, as one of Fanon’s critiques of the Négritude movement is grounded on its lack of 
violent revolutionary spirit. For Fanon, and those like him, it was this lack of revolutionary 
fervour created by Senghor and Diop that was its true downfall. For them, it was not 
enough to philosophise on the topic of oppression. Instead, what was required as a 
response to the violence committed by the colonial movement was further violence. Fanon 
supported a response to colonialism grounded in the restorative nature of a certain type of 
violence: a form he referred to as cleansing violence. It was only through a systematic 
violent response that he believed emancipation could be achieved. For him, freedom could 
not be given, but rather it had to be taken violently. It was not acceptable for France to 
retreat from Senegal and for Senghor to collaborate with them. Under these parameters 
Senegal was not free. Rather, what was needed was a violent uprising against the 
oppressors. The value of which is explained in the remainder of this chapter, along with 
Fanon’s more general critique (previously referenced) of theories such as Négritude and 
Pan-Africanism, that rely on a shared image of what it means to be Black or African. 
ii. Frantz Fanon 
This sub-section first focuses on the views of Frantz Fanon on violence, and secondly on his 
critique of the concept of a Black personality. According to Fanon and his commentators, 
the colonisers “goal was not only to void the colonial subject of any substance, but also to 
foreclose the future” (Mbembe, 2012, p.22); the purpose being to diminish their individual 
choice. For Fanon, this level of interference constituted violence. By considering violence as 
a form of interference, realistic parallels can be drawn between Fanon’s views and those of 
the Kantian concept of dominance as it was presented in Chapter 1: “that somebody does 
something to you” (Ripstein, 2009, p.42). For Kantian’s, the consequences of interference 
do not dictate whether it violates an individual’s rights. It is the fact that the act of 
interference was committed at all that is the criteria for viewing it as domination. Fanon 
made similar claims. He made the uncontroversial claim that both colonial violence and 
notions of imposed identity, such as those supported by Césaire and Senghor, interfered 
with individual freedom. To clarify, his argument was not that Senghor and Césaire’s view 
of what it meant to be Black or African was necessarily bad or wrong, but rather that 
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imposing a predefined understanding of either concept on individuals violated their rights 
to define their own identity as individuals living in Africa. Whilst a less severe crime than 
that of colonial violence, Fanon suggested that both were rooted in the same problematic 
assumption that the African people should be helped towards, or given, their freedom. For 
him, such an approach did not constitute real freedom. What sets his views apart from the 
majority of authors who would share this observation, was his belief in violence as the 
methodology for overcoming oppression. This argument is considered in detail in the 
following paragraphs, after first discussing his problems with the notion of establishing a 
fixed identity into which individuals were supposed to “fit”. 
His first critique that this sub-section will consider is founded on his understating of the 
meaning of Négritude itself. The term, as mentioned in Section 3.1, can be understood in 
English as Blackness. The implication, on reading Senghor, Damas, Diop, Césaire, and even 
Sartre, is that this Black consciousness is an abstract property that exists a priori to 
individuals: a feature that people will come to realise through the emancipatory politics of 
the Négritude movement. For Fanon, this imposed view of what it meant to be Black was 
indeed problematic, and in fact an act of domination or violence. It is on this point that a 
further example of both the Négritude scholars and their critics making claims grounded in 
similar philosophical foundations can be observed; both Fanon and the Négritude theorists 
discuss a Black personality in terms of Africans realising their autonomy. 
For Fanon, his being Black is not a fixed identity which he must come to understand and 
inhabit, rather it is an “identity, always in process, that constitutes itself in confronting 
domination” (Serequeberhan, 2000, p.19); it is an individual rather than a shared construct. 
What it means to be Black for one individual will differ to what it means for another. He is 
particularly critical of Jean-Paul Sartre’s interpretation of his understanding of Black culture 
in “Black Orpheus”: 
“The black consciousness is held out as an absolute destiny, as filled with 
itself, a stage preceding any invasion, any abolition of the ego by desire. 
Jean-Paul Sartre, in this work, has destroyed black zeal...Still in terms of 
consciousness, black consciousness is imminent in its own eyes. I am not a 
potentiality of something; I am wholly what I am. I do not have to look for 
the universal. No probability has any place inside me. My Negro 
consciousness does not hold itself out as a lack. It is. It is its own follower” 
(Fanon, 1968, pp134-135). 
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As is clear in the preceding quote, the individual is central to Fanon’s philosophy. He did 
not believe in the existence of an a priori, universal understanding of what it meant to be 
Black, which he, as an individual, must live up to. Rather, he felt that what was important to 
him was not to be “typically Negro” (Fanon, 1968, p.132), but instead to be typically him. It 
is on these arguments that similarities can be observed with the Kantian notion of 
autonomy. For both Kant and Fanon, autonomy over the self is fundamental. In Kantian 
terms, a Fanonian critique of Négritude would be that the imposition of a Black 
consciousness is a form of domination. It is not that there were necessarily bad intentions 
attached, but rather the act of domination itself that Fanon saw as problematic. In this 
sense, there are notable similarities between his views, and the proposed foundational 
principles discussed in Chapter 1. 
His views on identities defined by race and colour, it can be argued, resulted from much of 
the treatment he received when travelling and studying outside of Martinique. Especially 
during his time studying in Lyon, where Fanon was subject to mistreatment grounded 
purely on the colour of his skin. The role of his personal experience becomes clearer when 
considering that, in contrast to his views on racial identity, in a number of his publications 
he is comfortable with drawing identity distinctions based on both psychoanalytical 
classifiers and notions of class: “bourgeoisie” (Fanon, 1965, p.133). He made a number of 
arguments based on his distrust for the bourgeoisie, failing to recognise that in drawing 
these distinctions, grounded in ideas of class, he too was making arguments based on 
imposed identity. To elucidate, in the quote previously discussed in Sub-Section 3.5i, he 
accused the Négritude movement of being a bourgeois movement. Suggesting that what 
was needed to respond to colonialism was instead a system that was, “under the 
leadership of the people, that is to say, in defiance of the interests of the bourgeoisie” 
(Fanon, 1965, p.133). This distinction highlights a contradiction within his position, 
between not pre-forming racial identities on the one hand, and subsequently choosing to 
do so on the basis of class on the other. In relation to the project of this thesis, this 
contradiction has a number of consequences. As will become clear in the following 
narrative, analysis of Fanon’s views allows for parallels to be drawn between the 
philosophical groundings he establishes for both, his support of “cleansing violence”, and 
his displeasure with pre-formed racial identities, and the Kantian arguments focusing on 
equality, autonomy and self-mastery. However, based on the above observations regarding 
his views on class and psychoanalytical identifiers it is not possible to argue that these 
views necessarily underpin all of his beliefs; although many of his discussions of class are 
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grounded on a belief in the self-mastery of the people overcoming the oppression of the 
bourgeoisie so it is still possible to draw comparisons. Due to the focus of this thesis on the 
post-colonial period, and the cultural and political responses to oppression occurring within 
it, Fanon’s psychoanalytic work has been omitted from this thesis. What can be argued, 
regarding the philosophical underpinnings of his views, is that his views on colonialism and 
violence share similar foundations to those of willkϋr and self-law giving: a critique of 
oppression, support for notions of self-mastery, and the fundamental importance of 
equality. Each of these is discussed in further detail in the remainder of this section.    
The concept of violence is fundamental to understanding Fanon’s position and it is to this 
discussion that this section now turns. There was, for Fanon, a distinction to be made 
between the violence of the coloniser, and the form of violent response of the colonised 
that he advocated for. He viewed the violence of the colonised as having positive attributes 
which could enable the people to form community bonds, and find strength in one another 
to respond to colonialism. This, unlike the views of Senghor and Diop, was the only way 
Fanon believed freedom could be attained. He suggested that: 
“For the colonised people this violence, because it constitutes their only 
work, invests their characters with positive and creative qualities. The 
practice of violence binds them together as a whole, since each individual 
forms a violent link in the great chain, a part of the great organism of 
violence which has surged upwards in reaction to the settlers violence in 
the beginning” (Fanon, 1965, p.73). 
The importance of equality amongst the people is clear from the above quote, as is Fanon’s 
reliance on violence in achieving this. However, it is the role he sees for violence as 
constituting work, and the self-discovery and belief attached to this, that is particularly 
interesting to this thesis. It suggests that Fanon believed that creating the conditions for 
individuals to “positively and creatively” direct their actions was at the foundation of 
autonomy. Discourse and debate in such an area thus focuses around notions similar to 
those attributed to the Kantian theme of self-mastery. This is not to suggest that only a 
Kantian approach focuses on the value of individuals positively directing their own 
existence, but rather that this is a foundational concept that is present in a number of 
thought systems (Fanon’s being one), and thus it can be suggested that it may indeed be 
relevant universally. A similar argument is being made for the value of equality as it is also 
established by Fanon. 
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According to Achille Mbemebe Fanon presented three goals that he believed could be 
achieved through the uptake of colonial violence. The somewhat lengthy quote is included 
here as Mbembe’s observations are valuable to understanding Fanon’s views on violence 
qua autonomy rather than violence qua violence: 
“First it served as a call to a people caught in the grip of history and placed 
in an untenable situation to exercise freedom, to take charge, to name 
themselves, to spring to life…They were forced to make a choice, to risk 
their lives, to expose themselves… (second) Fanon’s theory only makes 
sense within the context of a more general theory, that of the rise of 
humanity. The colonised has to propel himself, by his own force, to a lever 
above the one to which he has been consigned as a result of racism or 
subjugation… in this way he restores the possibility for him personally and 
for humanity as a whole, starting with his executioners, of new and open 
dialogue between two equal human subjects where, previously, there had 
been opposition between a man (the colonialist) and his object (the 
colonised)” (Mbembe, 2012, p.24). 
The two goals mentioned in the above quote are then concluded with a third: dialogue 
between equals. As previously mentioned, the theme of cultures of individuals interacting 
as equals is common across the chapters of this thesis. As already mentioned in Section 3.4, 
it was a theme commonly associated with the journal “Présence Africaine”, as well as 
contemporary scholars Kwame Gyekye and Kwasi Wiredu discussed in Chapters 2 and 5. 
However, there is a notable difference in Fanon’s interpretation of how equality should be 
achieved. He argued, as suggested in the earlier quote referencing the “great chain of 
violence”, that equality could be realised through the uptake of a cleansing form of 
violence, a method in which the colonised were able to “propel himself, by his own force”. 
In fact, “by choosing violence rather than being subjected to it, the colonised subject is able 
to restore the self…he redefines himself and learns to value his life and the shape of his 
presence in relation to his body, his speech, to the Other and to the world” (Mbembe, 2012, 
p.21). The violence he supported was different to that of the colonisers which in contrast, 
he claimed, reduced equality. He argued in “The Wretched of the Earth” (1965) that, “we 
have said that the natives violence unifies the people. By its very structure, colonialism is 
separatist and regionalist” (Fanon, 1965, p. 73). Thus, it is clear on reading Fanon that he 
argued for a distinction between the two forms of violence. Firstly, the oppressive violence 
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of the colonisers which de-humanised the colonised, creating a hierarchical system under 
which the colonisers were seen as people, and the colonised were seen as objects.  
Secondly, the cleansing violence of the colonised, which enabled them to redefine 
themselves not as objects, but as persons, with rights to autonomy, self-definition and 
choice. The notion of “choosing violence”, discussed by Mbemebe, is also fundamental to 
distinguishing between the two positions. It is the distinction between actively choosing 
and demonstrating purposiveness, and the act of having violence imposed upon you. This 
thesis is not suggesting that the concept of violence, as it is usually understood, is 
necessarily philosophically grounded in notions of autonomy and self-law giving, as 
understood by Kantians. However, the claim is being made that the concept of “cleansing 
violence”, as it is discussed by Fanon, was indeed grounded on these principles. This is not 
to suggest that the act of violence, in and of itself, does not destroy the autonomy and self-
law giving capacities of its victims, nor is it to support the acts that Fanon advocated for. 
Similarly, the argument is not being made to suggest that Fanon’s approach recognised the 
value of individual humans universally, it is accepted that this is an argument for revolution 
and violence as a method of establishing the autonomy of only one group of people. Rather, 
the aim of this discussion has been to locate the centrality of the concepts of self-law giving, 
self-mastery, equality and freedom of choice within the debates and discourse of Fanon’s 
model of cleansing violence. The claims being made recognise the limiting factors of 
Fanon’s model to only a certain group of people, and that the similarities with the Kantian 
model are made based on Fanon’s claims for that group of people. The argument is not 
that Fanon was a universalist, but rather that even under a very different ideological model, 
similarities can be drawn with the philosophical foundations of what both Kantians, and 
Fanon believed was owed to individuals: autonomy and choice. Without violence, Fanon 
believed, the colonised would be unable to be truly free: “It is precisely at the moment he 
realises his humanity that he begins to sharpen the weapons with which he will secure its 
victory” (Fanon, 1965, p.35). Like Kant, he believed in the philosophical foundational 
argument that freedom originates in the self, and cannot be gifted by an external force. It 
was his position that violence was the only method through which colonised people could 
achieve their freedom. This reliance on a violent revolution was the basis on which his 
criticism of Négritude was built. He felt that the Négritude of Senghor, in particular, failed 
to truly understand the psychological need to break the bonds of servitude.   
From the previous discussion Fanon’s emphasis on autonomy for colonial people and his 
view that “cleansing violence” is the best method for appropriating this has been 
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demonstrated. However, Vikki Bell argued in her 2010 editorial of the “Theory, Culture and 
Society” special issue that these views also translated into a political system based on 
similar groundings: “For his part, Fanon argued that the government to come should be 
one that is the direct expression of the masses and that no leader, however valuable he 
may be can substitute himself for the popular will” (Bell, 2010, p. 9). According to Bell, 
Fanon believed in a system that placed the views and autonomy of the citizenry at its 
centre. Whilst it is clear that the approach he advocated for achieving this is very different 
to the condition of public right promoted by Kant, there is an apparent similarity in the 
underlying premise justifying his notion of government: government is justified when it 
protects the freedom of individuals. Thus, as with the other scholars considered 
throughout this chapter, it is clear that the ideas Fanon promoted were not couched in 
Kantian terms. However, what has become clear throughout this chapter is the existence of 
an underlying philosophical grounding, which is shared by theorists of disparate views, that 
looks similar to the Kantian concepts presented in Chapter 1. 
3.6- Conclusion: 
In concluding this chapter the aim is to summarise the fundamental arguments of the 
Négritude movement, and to reiterate the areas in which it is possible to locate similarities 
between the views of this collection of African theorists and the values of self-law giving 
and willkϋr as they are presented in Chapter 1. At its core Négritude was a movement 
dedicated to disputing the conditions imposed on the colonised people by European 
colonial powers and to reaffirm the value and strength of Blackness as a response. It was a 
response to the cultural marginalisation imposed by the West, and a desire to readdress 
the balance of non-Western contributions to a universal cultural and political civilisation. 
This became particularly clear in Section 3.4, in which the role of the journal “Présence 
Africaine” was the central focus. Benetta Jules-Rosette observed that the journal “was born 
out of protest against the colonisation and assimilation produced by ‘Latin culture’. Diop 
frames the goals of “Présence Africaine” as, a liberating search for African identity and 
values in art and culture” (Jules-Rosette, 1992, pp.17-18). In doing so he made it clear from 
the first issue in 1947 that the journal, and similarly the significance of Négritude, was 
grounded in a desire to present to the world a culture that was of equal value and worth to 
that of European culture. The secondary focus was on establishing the conditions for cross-
cultural discourse which would, they believed, better serve a Universal Civilisation. It was, 
according to Bernard Mouralis, “a discourse on Africa and a discourse by Africans” 
(Mouralis, 1992, p.5), aimed at reasserting themselves against oppression. At the centre of 
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each of these definitions is a belief in an underlying equality that existed, and still exists, 
between Europe and Africa, or the coloniser and the colonised. At the heart of the 
Négritude movement, therefore, was a belief in a human condition in which each culture, 
and each individual, is valuable. Simultaneously, this notion of equal value of individuals 
also stood at the centre of the arguments of Négritude’s greatest critic, Frantz Fanon 
(although as previously discussed this notion of equality was internal to the colonial 
movement and his views on the colonisers were less in line with humanist values). 
Throughout this chapter it has become apparent that both supporters and critics of the 
Négritude movement enter into debates, though in linguistically different ways, that rely 
on the assumption of the universality of notions of equality, self-mastery and freedom of 
choice as fundamental principles at the heart of what is owed to individual persons. To 
conclude, the Négritude movement was an explicitly cultural-political project that 
responded to the colonial situation, and called for an alternative that was grounded in a 
belief in the equality of humanity and the autonomy of African and Caribbean peoples. It 
was criticised for its lack of revolutionary fervour, as well as its imposing of a Black 
personality or consciousness on a diverse group of individuals, but it was at least successful 
“in shaking everything up” (Gibson, 2003, p.80). 
As the concept of liberal humanism lost its popularity in Africa so did Négritude: being 
associated with a central aim of contributing to a Universal Civilisation. The result was a 
rise in different Pan-African movements, which advocated for a closed and revolutionary 
Africa; although still broadly grounded in a theory of shared African identity. The successes 
and failures of one of these movements (African socialism) are the focus of the following 
chapter (Chapter 4). As with this chapter, the central focus will be on asking whether the 
philosophical underpinnings of the arguments for, and debates surrounding, African 
socialism share similarities with the Kantian framework which is central to this thesis. 
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Chapter 4- African Socialism: 
“Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing 
to lose but their chains. They have a world to win” (Marx & Engels, 1992, p.39). 
 
As with Chapters 3 and 5, this chapter firstly outlines the theory being considered: African 
socialism in the time period just following independence. It then, introduces the theorists 
chosen to represent this position, and justifies the choice to select these particular figures: 
the three philosopher statesmen Kwame Nkrumah, Julius K Nyerere, and Samora Machel. 
Finally, the chapter debates the question of this thesis in relation to these thinkers: is it 
possible to locate the existence of appeals to shared foundational principles regarding what 
it means to be a person in the speeches and writings of Nkrumah, Machel and Nyerere. Do 
they suggest that it is a right of all autonomous agents to be self-law giving, and a duty of 
states to create the necessary conditions under which this will be possible? Due to 
Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Machel’s positions as political figureheads this chapter also queries 
the realities of the political conditions they established, and asks whether their rhetoric and 
their realities coincided. To clarify, a crucial element of analysis to the overall thesis is to 
consider both the theorists’ discussions of the internal value of being self-law giving, and 
their belief in the external notion of willkϋr, understood as choice and freedom from 
domination. However, in situations in which the theorists were also political figureheads 
(the case in this chapter), a further question is raised: whether the political conditions they 
established constitutionally respected the rights of individuals to be self-law giving and 
provided the necessary conditions to achieve this. The question will also be raised, as with 
the study of Négritude, as to whether the motivations given for choosing socialism as the 
relevant model for each of their countries (Ghana, Tanzania, and Mozambique), was 
grounded in this same philosophical understanding of what persons are owed, and a belief 
that an African form of socialism was the best method for delivering this.  
 
This chapter is divided into the following four sections: The first (Section 4.1) is an 
introduction covering the issues of why African socialism is being included in this thesis, the 
choices behind the inclusion and exclusion of certain theorists, an introduction to the three 
theorists selected, and finally a brief discussion of the existence of explicitly, rather than 
implicitly, Kantian ideas underpinning many of the claims being made (although this will 
then be dealt with in greater detail in a later section). Section 4.2 is a brief discussion of 
Nyerere and Nkrumah’s prevalent role in the Pan-African movement, the justifications 
156 
 
given for its value and importance, and whether any of these debates centred on 
foundational beliefs in the rights of individuals to exercise choice in dictating the direction 
of their lives, and the failure to successfully implement it. Section 4.3 is a detailed account 
of the existence of explicitly Kantian language in the writings and speeches of the three 
politicians. Included within this are sub-sections looking specifically at content dealing with 
the concepts of self-mastery, external freedom of choice and autonomy, equality and the 
political goals of avoiding dominance and oppression; understood in the Kantian sense set 
out in Chapter 1. Also included in this section is discussion of the implied philosophical 
groundings of Nyerere and Machel’s villagisation projects, as well as a more in depth 
discussion of the question of whether the theorists are utilising socialism to deliver 
foundational principles or whether the choice to follow a socialist path was alternatively 
grounded. Section 4.4 considers the failings of the three models of African socialism. This 
section is predominantly based on the political states of Nkrumah and Nyerere. Due to 
Machel’s untimely death it is harder to analyse what the outcomes in Mozambique would 
have been were he to continue as president, although predictions can be made as a 
personality cult had already started to form around the President and he had begun to 
implement the necessary conditions for a one-party state. This section also considers the 
failings of the three theorists to create the political conditions necessary to respect the 
individual autonomy of the citizenry. The conclusion (Section 4.5) ties each of these themes 
together and summarises the overall arguments of this chapter.  
4.1- Introduction: Why African Socialism? 
Similarly to the theorists studied in the previous chapter (Chapter 3) those covered here 
have a mixed background between political theory and active political statesmanship. Each 
was involved in the struggle for independence, before taking active political office in the 
post-colonial period, with some publishing philosophical doctrines as part of their 
leadership.  Similarly, again to the theorists discussed in the Négritude chapter, each 
individual was involved to a greater or lesser extent in the Pan-African movement 
described in the introduction to Chapter 3 (and covered in slightly greater depth in Section 
4.2), and believed that a system of either unification or federalisation, grounded on the 
claim of a shared African identity, would be beneficial to the future of the continent. Each 
of these themes is analysed and unpicked within the body of this chapter and the 
consequences discussed. As mentioned in the Introduction, a further similarity that exists 
between this and the previous chapter is Nkrumah and Nyerere’s relationship with 
traditional ideas. This is not to suggest that they advocated for the exoticisation or 
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romanticisation of the past, in fact Julius K. Nyerere, one of the theorists included in the 
following analysis, explicitly denounced said practice: “we are not trying to go backwards 
into the traditional past; we are trying to retain the traditional values of human equality 
and dignity while taking advantage of modern knowledge” (Nyerere, 1968, p.7). Kwame 
Nkrumah also warned against the risk of making “a fetish of the communal African society” 
(Nkrumah, 1966, p.202). However, they both also recognised that “in our own past there is 
very much which is useful for our future” (Nyerere, 1967, p.316), and as a result advocated 
for a position that does not look to the past simply for the sake of glorifying it, but rather as 
a method for guiding the future.  
 
As way of introduction to the subject of African socialism the primary concern to be 
problematized and responded to is why the choice was made to include the post-colonial 
model of African socialism and not the alternative model popular in Africa at the time: 
capitalism. Following on from this, the selection of the theorists (Nkrumah, Nyerere, and 
Machel) as iconic figures of this ideology is discussed.  
 
In the period following independence in Africa, beginning with Libya in 1951 and ending 
with Zimbabwe (formally Rhodesia) in 1980, the political path the countries chose was 
often both divisive and controversial. Political decisions were often directed or dictated by 
a combination of both internal and, often persuasive, external forces. Be that as a response 
to the ex-coloniser, or a need to develop trade and aid relationships with an influential 
power (normally falling into one of two power blocs: East or West). Influential post-
independence leaders who chose to take a Western influenced capitalist path included 
Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea. Whilst leaders who 
implemented a socialist model included, Nkrumah, Nyerere, Machel, as well as Leopold 
Sedar Senghor and Benjamin Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria. There were a number of reasons 
offered by both sides as to their choices. Nyerere claimed an affinity with the Chinese 
model of socialism, whilst “Nkrumah of Ghana asserted that capitalism was ‘too 
complicated a system for a newly independent nation’” (Nkrumah, cited in Napier, 2010, 
p.369). Alternatively, Machel argued for a system of socialism, uninfluenced by Russia or 
China, but particular to Mozambique. Neither ideological choice was without its problems; 
both types of states struggled for different reasons in the post-independence era. 
Discussions of why, as well as which of the two alternatives (although each state chose to 
adapt both models greatly in their methods of rule so the notion of capitalist and socialist 
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ideologies are used loosely here) was selected, though interesting, are outside of the 
academic parameters of this thesis’s project. The important question for this discussion is 
why the overarching umbrella of African socialism was selected as a topic of interest. 
 
As referenced in the Introduction, isolating the groups of theorists to be analysed for the 
project, and grouping them appropriately, was a fundamental part of the research process. 
African socialism was selected for a number of reasons. The theorists adopting this model 
were strongly involved either in the Pan-African movement (Nyerere and Nkrumah) or in 
the struggle of other African states to realise their freedom in the post-independence era; 
Machel played a pivotal role in the fight against Apartheid in South Africa up until the time 
of his death. What makes this element of their political thought particularly interesting to 
the project of this thesis is the reliance and emphasis on African values, both within their 
own political states, and as a foundation for the arguments they made for a collaborative 
African project. For example, Machel was forceful in his assertions that the aim was not to 
adopt another continents socialist ideology, but rather, to develop an African system of 
socialism for Africans. As mentioned in the first paragraph of this section, this is not to 
imply they underwent a process of fetishizing the past, but rather that “the use of historical 
analysis in order to reach some goals as he (Nyerere) retained vital for an African society 
immersed into an order that was both new, larger, and more complex than the traditional 
one” (Masolo, 1981, p.12). Unlike Senghor and Césaire’s Négritude, there was a far greater 
emphasis placed on creating a forward looking theory, grounded in traditional values, 
rather than the re-establishment of traditional values within a political system, which is an 
interesting point of contrast.  
 
As an aside, it is made clear throughout this thesis, touched on briefly in the Introduction 
and drawn out in greater depth in the final chapter (Concluding Remarks), that there is a 
noticeable progression in the schools of thought selected for analysis. Whilst both Chapter 
3 and the current chapter (which make up Part 1) analyse arguments that can both loosely 
be described as utilising traditional African ideas, there is a progression in the way 
traditional views are considered and used by the different theorists. African Négritude, at 
least in its infancy, was very much focused on the notion of a glorified pre-colonial 
condition shared by Africa as a whole (as was discussed in Chapter 3), whereas the 
statesmen studied in this chapter place a greater focus on adapting the past to create new 
political systems that are relevant to particularly African problems. As Dismas Masolo 
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observes, “the common characteristic in African versions of socialism is what has been 
described as reconstructed traditionalism or the tendency to claim that modern socialist 
planning is no more than a redefinition of the communaucratic basis of traditional African 
social organisation” (Masolo, 1981, p.21). This is particularly relevant to understanding 
Nyerere’s Tanzania. Many of his policies, especially his villagisation project, focused on re-
establishing certain traditional African values of community and kinship at the core of the 
policies. At their centre the influences were presented as being very much African 
(although as suggested in the Introduction, the concept of Africanness is somewhat vague 
and confused between different groups). This stands in contrast to Part 2 of this thesis, in 
which the philosophers studied actively critique reliance on traditional values as 
foundations to political and philosophical policies, and advocate instead for a more future 
focused system that is willing to take the best parts of all African experience, including 
recognising the value of ideas and structures imposed by the colonisers.  
 
At this stage it is sensible to return to the choice to include African socialism in the study, 
rather than the alternative capitalist post-independence model. As implied in the previous 
two paragraphs, certain elements of African socialism, similarly to Négritude, had roots in 
traditional African ideals and it can be viewed as being more heavily routed in philosophy. 
This makes it an interesting, suitably different, philosophy to Western Enlightenment 
Kantian political thought. Thus the argument follows, if a similar philosophical grounding 
can be viewed to exist between these two, quite different, philosophies then this creates a 
stronger basis for implying the a priori existence of notions of self-law giving as 
foundational philosophical principles of humanity, at the centre of discourse and debate 
across, and between, different cultural groups. Additionally, the belief systems in Part 1 of 
this thesis are different to those in Part 2, with philosophers considered in Part 2, in fact, 
very critical of Négritude and African socialism. Once again, if similarities can be drawn 
both between the philosophies being analysed here, and with the Kantian ideas central to 
the argument of this thesis, then further argument can be made for the a priori nature of 
the principles existence. 
 
Having established the choice to consider African socialism as an important philosophical 
movement in the post-colonial period, it is important to recap the choice to select these 
particular theorists as representational of the movement. As mentioned previously, 
Nkrumah, Machel and Nyerere were selected based on their outward looking approach in 
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relation to the wider continent of Africa. When founding their ideologies they were looking 
beyond their own borders. They believed that freedom was a right, not only of their 
country folk, but of African’s, and humanity more widely. For that reason it is both 
interesting and insightful to consider the foundational principles that ground this belief in 
freedom, and to consider the similarities and differences that exist both in principles, and 
approaches to deliver them, between the ideas of the African scholars and the Kantian 
framework proposed by this thesis. To highlight this point, one that will be developed in 
greater detail in Section 4.3, parallels can be drawn between a Kantian perspective and 
Kwame Nkrumah’s claims in his 1973 monograph, “The Revolutionary Path”: 
 
“We know that the traditional African society was founded on principles of 
egalitarianism. In its actual workings, however, it had various shortcomings. 
Its humanist impulse, nevertheless, is something that continues to urge us 
towards our all-African socialist reconstruction. We postulate each man to 
be an end in himself, not merely a means; and we accept the necessity of 
guaranteeing each man equal opportunities for his development…Any 
meaningful humanism must begin from egalitarianism and must lead to 
objectively chosen policies for safeguarding and sustaining egalitarianism” 
(Nkrumah, 1973, p.441). 
Throughout “The Revolutionary Path”, Nkrumah explicitly states that his interpretation of 
traditional African society is of a society that was rooted in a sense of humanism, that 
supported a view of man as having a right “to be an end in himself, not merely a means”. 
He suggested in the above passage, that the notion that traditional African societies were 
egalitarian was uncontroversial. However, as with descriptions of what it means to be 
African (discussed in the Introduction), this is not the case. By failing to recognise the 
subjectivity of this claim, a situation is created in which his argument is lacking in evidence 
to support his assertion that traditional African societies were, indeed, egalitarian. 
However, that being said, the lack of evidence offered for the existence of traditional 
values does not take away from his argument that future political conditions should respect 
an egalitarian model, nor does it prevent comparisons from being drawn with similar 
Kantian ideals. What it does highlight is a concern present in much of his political theory: 
that he failed to justify many of his arguments. 
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A further concern present within the above passage, but also in Nkrumah’s work more 
widely, is his insistence on the usage of masculine pronouns throughout his arguments. For 
example, reference to an individual as an “end in himself”, or the necessity of 
“guaranteeing each man equal opportunities” within a political system. Failure to recognise 
women as individuals, whether intentionally or unintentionally, is an incredibly problematic 
element to his argument. However, in his writings he is not explicit about his choice to 
exclude females. It is thus possible to suggest that the ingrained misogyny is with the, no 
less difficult, choice of wording, rather than a belief that females are less deserving of 
egalitarian treatment. That being said, it is thus possible to argue that his position, whilst 
poorly defined, is intended to be universally applicable. Therefore, it is still possible to draw 
comparisons with the Kantian model established in Chapter 1 of this thesis. Nonetheless, it 
remains important to take into account, and not overlook, the underlying sexism in his 
writings.  
The above passage also indicates Nkrumah’s claim that egalitarianism should remain at the 
heart of African politics, and particularly in the model of socialism that he advocated for. 
Claims such as these highlight the overt similarities that exist between these theorists and 
Kantian ideals. This will be further discussed in Section 4.3. It is apparent throughout the 
progression of this chapter that these claims are more explicitly, rather than implicitly, 
framed in similar philosophical foundations to those of a Kantian approach than those 
being made by the Négritude theorists: which also explains why the chapters are presented 
differently. Before moving on to a brief discussion of the Pan-African movement, it is 
important to conclude this introductory section with a brief factual introduction to the 
theorists Julius K. Nyerere, Kwame Nkrumah, and Samora Machel. 
Julius K. Nyerere was the first president of independent Tanganyika from the day of 
Independence on the 8th December 1961, through the unification of Zanzibar and 
Tanganyika to create Tanzania, until his retirement in 1985. He is often referred to as “The 
Father of the Nation” or Mwalimu (which translates from Swahili to mean teacher), which 
was both his original profession and a sign of respect of the high esteem he was (and still is) 
held in by the people of Tanzania. It is important to note that both of these colloquialisms 
present an idea of leadership, implying a hierarchy within the state under which Nyerere 
was leading the people, rather than a political condition under which individuals were able 
to live via their own purposiveness. As becomes clear throughout the discourse of the 
chapter, and specifically in the concluding section, there is a noticeable contradiction 
162 
 
between the policies Nyerere claims to support (many of which share foundations with the 
Kantian approach), and his position in society and methods utilised for implementing them. 
That being said, he enjoyed great popularity in Tanzania, and whilst many of his political 
choices were deemed unsuccessful and controversial, he remains an icon of Tanzanian 
history. 
Throughout his speeches and writings, there existed a central theme expressing his belief in 
the fundamental need to value and respect individuals. Many of his more explicitly Kantian 
views will be considered in Section 4.3, but by way of introduction, reference is made to a 
speech entitled “Individual Human Rights”, in which Nyerere argued adamantly  for the 
centrality of individual rights to his political practise. He declared, “when we say we want 
to establish the rights of individuals in our countries, irrespective of race, we mean it” 
(Nyerere, 1967, p.70). Similarly one of the central creeds of his political party TANU, as set 
out in the Arusha Declaration (in which the villagisation project, Ujamaa, which was 
essential to Nyerere’s political aims, was laid out: discussed in Section 4.3), declared that it 
was the central and fundamental role of government “to safeguard the inherent dignity of 
the individual in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (Nyerere, 
1968, p.232). Thus, as is made clear throughout this chapter, and as a common 
denominator amongst all three of the theorists, the rhetoric, if not the reality of Nyerere’s 
position, was very much based in respect for the individual as directing their own path. 
Although, it is important to recognise that usage of such language is a popular political 
technique, and is not necessarily representative of the thinker’s actions. Unlike a strictly 
Kantian approach, however, Nyerere relied on a communalistic method for delivering 
individual freedom. He argued that freedom was best achieved through involvement in a 
community that worked and lived together and enjoyed a process of deliberative decision 
making. Masolo emphasises this point. He suggests that for Nyerere “although man is 
fundamentally free, his freedom is realisable through and dependent upon his collective 
identity; (and) that this collective conditioning is the basis of his knowledge, autonomy and 
well-being” (Masolo, 1995, pp.120-121). On reading Nyerere on this topic, it becomes clear 
that he believed a strong community also provided the conditions for avoiding and 
overcoming exploitation, an issue considered in greater detail in Sub-Section 4.3.iii. 
Nyerere claimed that, “in our traditional African society we were individuals within a 
community. We took care of the community, and the community took care of us. We 
neither needed nor wished to exploit our fellow men” (Nyerere, 1962, p.5). Similarly with 
the discussion of Nkrumah earlier in this section, Nyerere is unclear regarding what a 
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traditional African society involved, and in that sense it can be suggested that he fails to 
abide by his own rules of avoiding exoticism. However, it can be assumed from his 
discourse that he believed traditional societies, and as such future societies, should be 
grounded in a strong sense of community, rather than individualism. As suggested in 
Chapters 1 and 2, the existence of reference to similar core principles, such as the 
importance of recognising the individual freedom of citizens, does not imply support for 
the same political methods for achieving them. Similarly, suggesting that these principles 
are foundations shared across cultural perspectives does not require them to be realised 
through the same political methods. Thus, Masolo’s observation that Nyerere intended to 
achieve individual freedom through the community does not necessarily imply that he 
supports the sanctity of individual freedom less than, for example, a Kantian who suggests 
the individual takes priority over the community. This concept of individual freedom as 
being achieved via the community is discussed again in Chapter 5 with reference to the 
views of Kwame Gyekye and Kwasi Wiredu, and is a theme that emerges throughout the 
analysis of the different chapters. It is thus further discussed in the Concluding Remarks to 
this thesis. To conclude the summary of Nyerere’s life and views: following twenty-four 
years in power Julius K. Nyerere retired the presidency in 1985, dying in London in 1999 
and remaining a national hero in Tanzania. 
Kwame Nkrumah was the first president of Independent Ghana (previously the Gold Coast 
under British rule), taking the presidency on March 5th 1957, and establishing a Marxist 
inspired socialist state. He played a particularly prevalent role in the Pan-African movement 
(which is discussed in Section 4.2), and advocated for a programme of federalisation which 
he believed would strengthen Africa’s global position. However, Nkrumah’s determination 
to create a political block rather than a purely economic and cultural block was unpopular 
amongst his fellow African leaders:  
 
“Political union is an idea of which Dr. Nkrumah has become the leading 
and, indeed, virtually the only prominent exponent in Africa…To all the 
disturbing problems in Africa-poverty, neo-colonialism, balkanisation, 
disunity, cultural and language differences-Dr. Nkrumah offers one recipe: 
`strong political unity' and `the African race united under one federal 
government' ” (Legum, 1965, p.57). 
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As his determination to create a federal state developed, so did his unpopularity amongst 
his contemporaries. In the early stages of the movement Manning Marable (1987) 
suggested Nkrumah was viewed positively and his views taken into account. However, as 
he became more adamant in his support for federalisation, concern grew that his support 
for Pan-Africanism lay firmly in a desire to lead the continent, and his popularity dwindled. 
Similarly, by the start of the 1960’s, his popularity amongst his own party in Ghana (the CPP) 
was being called into question. He ruled in an ever more authoritarian manner, until an 
eventual coup in 1966 leading to his exile to Guinea. As his style of rule became less 
participatory he began to employ foreign advisors. He was thus able to ignore party 
members and to pick and choose the advice he felt would be most beneficial to his rule, 
dismissing those who contradicted his views. Marable observes that:  
“The Ghanaian state was no longer simply an authoritarian statist regime, 
dominated by a deformed, populist-social democratic style party. By 
severing all meaningful ties with its traditional class constituencies, 
eliminating virtually all elements of democratic discourse and destroying its 
original leaders, the state had become ‘Bonapartist’ (Marable, 1987, p.137). 
Simultaneously to his project of one man rule as the 1960’s continued his numbers of 
publications presenting his political thoughts dramatically increased, and in some cases he 
re-wrote history to put himself at the centre of Ghana’s successful liberation: devaluing the 
role of prominent party members such as Komla Gbedemah. The 1963 version of “Africa 
Must Unite” suggests that he, and he alone, was responsible for the movement. Whereas 
an earlier version recognises the value and strength of other party members, and the 
pivotal role they played in continuing the parties work in the period Nkrumah spent in 
prison. Between 1950 and 1951 Nkrumah was imprisoned on political charges and 
Gbedemah took control of the day to day running of the party. This was until Nkrumah’s 
release was agreed to enable him to take leadership of the CPP after its success in free 
elections.  
In the early years of his rule, Nkrumah advocated for a system of collaboration with the 
British, similarly to Senghor’s approach to France, as a method of moving past the colonial 
history. This was instead of an armed struggle, for which there was support amongst the 
people. This led to Ghana’s membership of the Commonwealth. However, whilst in exile he 
re-wrote a number of his key works in which he both recognised his failings as a leader, and 
moved towards a Fanonian position regarding the value and usage of violence. Marable, 
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and Paulin Hountondji refer to this change in Nkrumah’s approach: “in his early works 
Nkrumah advocated what he called positive action, meaning all methods of resistance that 
are legal and non-violent…The latest works, however, assert that the only effective method 
of resistance is armed struggle” (Hountondji, 1983, p.135). Hountondji is supported in this 
reading by Marable, who asserts that with the benefit of hindsight, “Nkrumah condemned 
as ‘sham independence’ the achievement of political self-rule, as in Ghana in 1957, and 
advocated ‘genuine independence, the product of mass political movement or an armed 
liberation struggle’” (Marable, 1987, p.148). His views moved more in line with those of 
Fanon as he began to claim that freedom cannot be given, it can only be taken. Thus, true 
freedom is achieved through independent, violent revolt against a countries oppressor.  
Whilst Nkrumah became a dictatorial political figure, the philosophical underpinnings of his 
system of thought were in fact rooted in an egalitarian approach, and it is in this area that 
the similarities with the Kantian framework become apparent; although, as emphasised in 
a later section of the chapter, not with the political realities he established. On his reading 
of Nkrumah’s monograph, “Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for De-Colonisation” 
(1970), Hountondji described Nkrumah’s philosophy as one that, “professes an egalitarian 
and humanistic ethic strongly marked by the influence of Kant. Politically, it adopts the 
central demand of nationalist ideology by reaffirming the right of self-determination for all 
people on the one hand and calls for the construction of socialism in a liberated Africa on 
the other” (Hountondji, 1983, p.153). Whilst discussion of explicitly Kantian language in the 
theorists thought is reserved for Section 4.3, as with Nyerere, this element to Nkrumah’s 
theorising has been included here to indicate the existence of secondary sources 
recognising the existence of similar fundamental principles in the writings of African 
statesmen. It is also used to highlight once again the different approaches advocated for 
achieving them; in Nkrumah’s case, a socialist political state subsumed into a Pan-African 
federation. Following the coup in 1966, Kwama Nkrumah lived in exile in Guinea authoring 
further political texts until his death in 1972. 
Samora Machel was, and still is, recognised as a “man who helped change the face of 
Southern Africa” (Christie, 1989, p. viii), not only in his own nation of Mozambique, but also 
as a central voice in the anti-Apartheid struggle in South Africa. Unlike Nyerere and 
Nkrumah, Machel was an active revolutionary in the Mozambique independence struggle, 
making him a popular figure amongst the people he fought alongside, and leading to his 
ascension to the role of the first president of independent Mozambique in 1975. On 
166 
 
becoming president Machel set the country on a socialist path, intending to deliver tangible 
results:  
“In 1980, Mozambique was regarded throughout Africa as the embodiment 
of ‘real’ socialism on the continent, as the model for African socialists. The 
attempt to transform economic and social relations and culture along 
socialist lines was by far the more far-reaching and serious of the many 
varieties of ‘socialism’ in Africa” (O’Meara, 1991, p. 82). 
Based on the intrinsic role he played in developing such an influential model, it was 
deemed fundamental to include the views of Samora Machel in this thesis in a discussion of 
African forms of socialism in the post-independence period. However, it is also important 
to understand that, like Nyerere and Nkrumah, Machel’s leadership changed as it 
progressed towards the abrupt end of his presidency and his death in a suspicious plane 
crash on the 19th October 1986. Discussion of said crash is outside of the analytical 
parameters of this thesis but an interesting dialogue considering it exists in letters between 
Winnie Mandela and Graça Machel. In the infancy of Machel’s presidency, he, like his 
counterparts, made claims regarding the value and importance of respecting individuals’ 
right to engage in the creation of their own life paths. In his speech at Mozambique’s 
independence ceremony he set out the following aims for the future: “a people’s 
democratic state, in which all patriotic strata under the leadership of peasants and workers 
engage themselves in the struggle to destroy the vestiges of colonialism and imperialist 
dependence, to eliminate the system of exploitation of man by man” (Machel, 1989, p. 91). 
Similarly with discussion of Nkrumah, the usage of male specific pronouns is a problematic 
element to his discourse. However, in regards to the analysis of this thesis, it will be treated 
through the same lens as discussed in regards to Nkrumah. It is clear from Machel’s usage 
of language that his views are broadly Leninist, based on an approach utilising a dominant 
state. Whilst it can be argued that such an approach does not traditionally share ideological 
roots with a Kantian model, this is not the purpose of this thesis. Rather, the purpose is to 
demonstrate the underlying philosophical similarities underpinning the choices to select a 
Lenninist approach to, for example, realising self-mastery, and to ask whether that 
underlying foundation is similar. Thus, the fact that Machel’s arguments are often couched 
in Marxist language is not reason to suggest that the underlying foundational principles of 
the arguments or the debates being responded to are not focused around the themes 
central to the hypothesis of this thesis. For example, the condemnation of exploitation, as 
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well as the apparent commitment to the creation of a political condition rooted in the 
engagement of the people, enables parallels to be drawn with the themes set out in 
Chapter 1 as representing the Kantian concept of willkϋr: freedom of choice and freedom 
from domination. Throughout this chapter a number of Machel’s earlier speeches are 
discussed. Throughout this discussion it becomes clear that he believed that it was a 
responsibility of the government to ensure that the ability of individuals to be self-law 
giving was recognised; simultaneously, that the justification for the existence of 
government existed on similar grounds. 
However as is a common theme amongst the three theorists, as his rule continued, a 
personality cult began to form around Machel and he altered the constitution to establish, 
and maintain, greater power in the hands of the executive (himself). The focus of his rule 
became more hierarchical and less egalitarian. In a famous speech made in 1979 (“The 
Hospital Speech”), Machel set out two directives that highlighted the change in his style of 
rule. O’Meara explains this change in governing from the egalitarian people focused model 
in Machel’s earlier years of rule, towards the more authoritarian, hierarchical style, in his 
1991 evaluation of Machel’s rule: 
“First of all the term comrade was no longer to be used amongst 
Mozambicans except between party members in party meetings. This was a 
severe, and at the time shocking, attack on a strong culture of 
egalitarianism. He directed, secondly, that the role of managers was to 
manage…and the role of workers was to work and to obey the managers. 
This undermined the fragile but important embryonic structures of 
collective decision-making” (O’Meara, 1991, p.94).  
The notable differences between the political rhetoric of the statesmen and the realities 
they were able to deliver will be dealt with in greater depth in Section 4.4. However, the 
point is raised at this stage to support the suggestion that failure to realise fundamental 
ideals does not suggest that belief in them did not exist in the aims and policies as initially 
set out. There is a point of contention throughout this chapter between the levels of 
success in delivering on the political conditions that were claimed as valuable by Machel, 
Nkrumah, and Nyerere. However, each form of rule originated in similar principles to those 
at the core of this thesis, the expression of which implies the potentially a priori nature of 
these principles as being present prior to politics. It was only once politics, and the reality 
of creating conditions to respect these said principles was involved, that they became less 
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prevalent. However, this does not suggest that they were not still fundamental, but rather 
that adherence to a model that is able to guarantee them is politically challenging. Each of 
these issues is discussed in greater depth as the chapter progresses. The following section 
briefly considers the role of the statesmen in the Pan-African movement and questions the 
roots of said movement. 
 4.2- The Pan-African Presidents: 
The Pan-African movement, as mentioned in Chapter 3, originated as a philosophical 
programme in the 1920’s in the writings of African-American writer W.E.B. DuBois. 
However, as an African political undertaking it gained real momentum through the 
determination and steerage of Nkrumah and Nyerere in the 1950’s and 1960’s, as well as 
Senghor and African American Marcus Garvey. The purpose behind unification was, for 
Nkrumah, based on the improved opportunities it had the potential to create for Africans 
interacting with the rest of the world. He claimed that, “a union of African states will 
project more effectively the African personality. It will command respect from a world that 
has regard only for size and influence” (Nkrumah, 1961, p. xii). The concept of an “African 
personality”, like similar language discussed by the theorists studied in this thesis, is 
unclear in its definition, and often utilised to cover a multitude of ideas. However, in this 
case, Nkrumah, whilst unclear regarding what this includes, takes the concept to refer to all 
factors he views as specific to, and special about, what it means to live, work and exist 
within the African continent. He takes this to be a shared concept, specific not to one 
country, area or cultural group but to the continent as a whole which can form the 
foundations of Pan-Africanism. The hope behind Pan-Africanism was that it would provide 
the conditions for Africa to reassert itself in global politics. He supported an African system 
of government founded on traditional African thought systems, run and dictated by 
Africans (rather than external colonial rulers), for the benefit of Africa. He suggested that it 
was clear that the solution to African problems needed to come from Africa, because 
“divided we are weak; unified, Africa could become one of the greatest forces for good in 
the world” (Nkrumah, 1961, p.xi).  
Nyerere made similar claims regarding the purpose of unity. A divided continent was, for 
him, one of the greatest risks facing a newly independent Africa. He strongly believed that 
squabbling within the continent would weaken the relative position of every nation as well 
as the continent in its entirety. In his speech “Africa must not fight Africa”, Nyerere 
defended his belief that “the weakness of Africa is a constant invitation and a constant 
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encouragement to the exploiters of Africa to suck Africa with impunity. Only a strong Africa 
can stop this. But there can be no strong Africa and no salvation for Africa except in unity” 
(Nyerere, 1968, p.219). It was his belief that this issue was rooted in Africa’s  constant 
economic race to the bottom as a method for encouraging investment, as well as the 
continents choice to politically imitate and court the West or East to encourage aid. 
Nyerere, similarly to Nkrumah, supported a system of unification, although unlike Nkrumah 
he supported a project of collaboration rather than federalisation, as the only solution to 
these problems. However the question remained, on what grounds Africa could overcome 
political, economic and cultural differences, and unify. At the root of Nyerere and 
Nkrumah’s solution was what they referred to as a “sentiment of ‘African-ness’, a feeling of 
mutual involvement, which pervades all the cultural and political life. There is, in other 
words, an emotional unity which finds expression in, among other things, concepts such as 
‘African personality’” (Nyerere, 1967, p.188). It was on the controversial grounds of a 
shared meaning of what it meant to be African, that it was claimed unification could be 
possible. Unlike the concept of Négritude described in Chapter 3, however, the “African-
ness” referred to here by Nyerere placed less emphasis on a glorified past and greater 
emphasis on community and mutual involvement, which it was believed were grounds on 
which political differences between states could potentially be overcome. However, 
similarly to the views expressed in Chapter 3, Nyerere and Nkrumah were arguing that a 
single African underlying philosophy did exist. It is on this fundamental point that many of 
the theorists studied in Part 2 of this thesis take hubris. Paulin Hountondji summarises this 
concern as problematic in its “basic assumption that Africa needs a collective philosophy” 
(Hountondji, 1983, p.149). This issue will be discussed further in Chapter 5.  
Nyerere’s argument was not grounded in a denial of difference; he did in fact recognise 
that Africa was a continent made up of diverse political and cultural situations. However, it 
was his argument that these, rather than being seen as barriers to unification, should in 
fact be included in a Pan-African model:  
“It is no use waiting for differences of approach, or of political belief, to 
disappear before we think of working for unity in Africa. They will not 
disappear. If we are ever to unite, the differences must be accommodated 
within our growing unity, and our growing unity must be shaped in a 
manner which allows for the existing differences” (Nyerere, 1973, p.13). 
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On consideration of these claims a further question is raised: If Nyerere recognised the 
differences that existed between the various political conditions of the African continent, 
on what grounds did he believe collaboration could be based? Although he did not directly 
make this claim, it is possible to assert that, in appealing to the possibility of a Pan-African 
state, he was making an assumption based on shared human principles existing a priori to 
political conditions, which would allow divergent political ideologies to find common 
grounds for collaboration. This thesis is not intending to imply that in this instance these 
claims are rooted in the same Kantian language that has been referenced elsewhere, but 
rather that it is possible to interpret in this statement, a recognition of a shared foundation 
from which unification could be established. Whether this is only a shared African 
foundation, or indeed a shared human foundation is unclear, but nonetheless it is possible 
to interpret Nyerere’s enthusiasm for a collaborative African project as recognising a 
shared foundation on which the said project can be built: one that exists prior to politics 
and culture (a priori). Further examination of the philosophical underpinning of similar 
ideas will be discussed in Section 4.3. However, the point is raised here to highlight the 
possible existence of support for cross-cultural dialogue grounded in foundational 
principles, with a desired political goal that is not just relevant at a local and national level 
but also at a pan-national level. The implication being that for dialogue to be effective it 
requires some form of grounding. The question is also raised as to whether he was correct 
in his belief that African unity was the correct model for the future of the continent, but 
the purpose of this thesis is not to evaluate this system, but rather to analyse its 
philosophical underpinnings, and thus this question will be left to one side. 
 
As a political movement, Pan-Africanism in the post-independence era faced a number of 
problems. One such problem was the question of leadership in a federalised system. It 
became apparent that as the Pan-African movement moved towards a political ideal in the 
1960’s there was a noticeable rise in personality politics in which, as already suggested, 
Nkrumah in particular advocated for a federalised continent in which he was able to play a 
dominant role. Many of those advocating for a system of collaboration, as with the 
majority of power politics, saw their own model as superior, and themselves at the centre. 
As the West African Pilot observed in the early 1960’s: “in Africa a struggle for leadership 
has already developed. Until recently it was a tournament between Nasser and Nkrumah 
but Africa today contains many stars and meteorites, all of them seeking positions of 
eminence” (The West African Pilot, cited in, Legum, 1965, p.55). As the movement 
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increased in popularity, questions were also raised as to what a Pan-African state should 
look like. Nkrumah argued for a “United States of Africa”, whilst Nyerere supported 
regionalised blocks, and numerous other leaders such as Ahmed Sékou Touré and Gamal 
Abdel Nasser of Egypt had yet further ideas. Not only did this lead to problems of 
leadership, but also of vision, and eventually the Pan-African movement of that time period 
began to break down. It does still exist in other forms today, but this is outside of the 
parameters for this section which will instead focus exclusively on the post-independence 
movement and the visions of Julius K Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah. 
 
In the 1960’s and early 1970’s Nyerere worked with his counterparts in Kenya and Uganda 
to form an East African federation. However, as their political differences took hold the 
relationship became problematic and the system of unification broke down. In particular, 
the schism between Kenyatta’s capitalist model and Nyerere’s socialism grew deeper and 
harder to overcome. Between 1975 and 1985 “Julius broke off the East African Community 
and made it impossible even to send a letter between Kenya and Tanzania, and so it lasted 
for nearly 10 years” (Bailey, 1998, p. vi). At a similar time period, Tanzania went to war with 
Uganda and the dream of a federation of East Africa was lost (at least in the time period in 
which Nyerere remained in power). Thus, it becomes apparent that the political and 
ideological differences, as well as the power struggles, were at the core of the failings of 
the post-independence Pan-African dream, as the leaders involved failed to create the 
correct political conditions for realising it. 
 
The Pan-African movement was thus unsuccessful in establishing a unified post-
independence political solution, due to, amongst other factors, fractions within the 
continent. Discussion of unification and collaboration on different levels do still exist, with 
figures such as Muammar Gadaffi attached to the movement in the last 10 years.  However, 
as previously mentioned, this lies outside the remit of this thesis. What makes post-
independence Pan-African thought interesting to this thesis is the question of how the 
statesmen believed that collaboration could have been grounded, how they argued cross-
cultural dialogue could have been achieved, and whether it was implied that a common 
factor needed to exist between the states, groups, or individuals for collaboration to be 
possible. 
As has become clear throughout the discussion of the views of Nyerere and Nkrumah, both 
believed in an underlying foundation on which collaboration could be built. For them it was 
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a sense of African-ness, which Colin Legum translates as being racial: “undoubtedly the 
dominant theme in Pan-Africanism: the race-consciousness born of colour” (Legum, 1965, 
p.17). However, this is a controversial reading of the views of Nyerere and Nkrumah, when 
taking into account the fact that in many of their speeches the statesmen argued that 
support for unification was not being drawn along race based lines. The suggestion of a 
racial foundation for political collaboration clearly does not relate to the principles set out 
in Chapter 1 of this thesis. However, what it does suggest, as referenced in relation to 
Nyerere’s arguments about collaboration across ideologies, is that there is recognition 
amongst theorists that certain foundational principles do exist, that enable cross-cultural 
discourse to take place. Whether that is simply race based, or whether there is emphasis 
on other factors such as autonomy and personhood, are the questions at the centre of the 
remainder of this chapter. To clarify, similarly to discussion of the Négritude movement, it 
can be argued that there is an observable reliance on an underlying foundation on which 
political and cultural dialogue can be built. Thus, it can be suggested that this is an 
approach that has been prevalent throughout the African political theory of the 1940’s to 
the 1980’s. The argument follows, if this is the case then it is logical to postulate the 
recognition of similar foundations for humanity more generally, and as the chapter 
develops it becomes clearer in what elements of the three theorists thoughts these exist. 
The following section focuses on the question of whether the Kantian themes set out in 
Chapter 1 are present in the outputs of Machel, Nkrumah and Nyerere. The argument is 
thus being made that a pattern emerges in which the underlying philosophical groundings 
of the arguments of the three statesmen share a common foundation with not only one 
another, but also the Kantian framework.  
4.3- Kantian Undertones: 
This section raises, and answers, the question of whether there exists explicitly Kantian 
language in the writings and speeches of the three politicians. As suggested in Section 4.1, 
a number of commentators, such as Paulin Hountondji, have suggested that there was a 
Kantian undercurrent in the thinking of Kwame Nkrumah. This section asks not only if this is 
a realistic interpretation, but also whether similar ideas are present in the works of Machel 
and Nyerere. This section is divided into the following sub-sections: self-mastery; external 
freedom of choice, autonomy and equality; and domination and oppression. Each being 
under stood in the Kantian sense set out in Chapter 1. The final sub-section is a discussion 
of the implied philosophical groundings of Nyerere and Machel’s villagisation projects, as 
well as a more in depth discussion of the question of whether the theorists are utilising 
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socialism to deliver foundational principles, or whether other justifications were given for 
the choice to follow a socialist path. Throughout the speeches and monographs of the 
three thinkers it is possible to recognise common themes of dignity, freedom from 
exploitation and oppression, choice, respect, liberation and the value of self-rule. Each of 
these concepts are drawn out and discussed in relation to the Kantian framework set out in 
Chapter 1 throughout this section.  
i. Self-Mastery 
 
The concepts of self-mastery, freedom of choice and autonomy, whilst not always 
presented in linguistically identical forms, are common themes amongst revolutionary and 
oppressed peoples. It is often suggested that the reasoning for this is based in the tendency 
of oppressive regimes to restrict these rights to groups they fail to recognise as appropriate 
recipients. For that reason, it is unsurprising that each of the theorists studied in this 
chapter (each living through and affected by colonialism) made reference to them in one 
form or another in their speeches and texts. They do so, not only in reference to the 
individual rights of the people, but also in presenting their parties political goals. As 
previously suggested, this is not to argue that they were successful in delivering these 
political conditions, or that their time in power didn’t corrupt their aims (both of which will 
be discussed in Section 4.4), but it is rather to imply that the philosophical underpinnings of 
their arguments express these ideas. 
 
Samora Machel, in particular, couched much of his political rhetoric in terms of the value 
and necessity of recognising, utilising and supporting “people’s power”. He made a number 
of claims indicating this, particularly in his earlier speeches. For example, in laying out the 
political strategy for post-independence he clearly stated that “in the People’s Republic of 
Mozambique we want respect for the people, respect for the freedom of the citizen, 
respect for people’s lives and property” (Machel, 1981, p.187). He also used this idea to set 
his government apart from its predecessors, claiming that; “our power is different in form 
and content from anything that has previously existed in our country. Our power belongs 
to the people and is exercised by its genuine representatives to serve the interests of the 
people” (Machel, 1974, p.13) and that “people’s power in its essence is about people first 
seizing and then determining their own destiny in an organised way” (Munslow, 1985, p. 
xxxvi). In discussing Machel’s presidency, Barry Munslow also suggested that respect for 
the people was at the centre of his politics. He argued that Machel based his system on 
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“the power of human agency” (Munslow, 1985, p. xxii) and endeavoured to build this into 
his political system. The focus on a collaborative, people centric approach coincides with 
Machel’s time as a revolutionary, fighting alongside a range of different individuals and 
coming to understand the strengths and passions of the people. His focus on the necessary 
involvement of the people in establishing a just political system can be viewed through a 
Kantian lens in relation to the model of public right Kant sets out in “The Metaphysics of 
Morals”. Kant states that the legislative authority of a just state “can belong only to the 
united will of the people” (Kant, 1996, p.91). This claim shares a similar underpinning to the 
view of government set out by Machel as belonging to the people, the power of which can 
only be exercised at the will of the people. In drawing these parallels between the 
recommended political models of both Machel’s system, and a Kantian system, it is 
possible to recognise shared philosophical foundations relying on the significance and 
necessity of respecting the values of self-mastery and purposiveness of a states citizenry 
when establishing systems of government.  
Similarly, David Ottaway, when describing the habits of the political party Frelimo, claimed 
that they “allowed a great deal of local autonomy and decentralisation in the Northern 
regions” (Ottaway, 1988, p.214). The apparent value placed on understanding and 
representing the people, and creating a system of rule that was able to recognise and 
support their autonomy, as well as advocating for the protection of their freedom of 
person and property, was grounded on an inherently liberal understanding of humanity 
and politics. For example, many of Machel’s speeches implied an underlying trust for the 
peoples’ ability to govern themselves. This implied a faith in the citizenry as being capable 
of a role in governing their lives, as well as the lives of the rest of the state and their fellow 
citizens. Whilst Kant argued that the right to be self-law giving individuals, and the need for 
the state to recognise this, was based on reason; Machel seemed to imply that the right 
was not restricted by individual capabilities, but rather a right of all individuals. However, 
similarly to Kant, he made the argument that legitimate state power should, and does, 
come from the people, and that it is the role of the state not to serve its own ends but to 
serve “the interests of the people”. As will become clear as the chapter progresses, there is 
a contradiction between the statements Machel made in support of the strength and value 
of the people, and the need to treat them as ends in themselves with their own purpose. 
Post 1977 Frelimo’s model for the state focused less on the self-determination of the 
people and more on justifying excessive state power. One particular example is the 
contradiction between the justification for the villagisation project, and the actual 
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treatment of the citizens involved. Thus, as is a common theme across the three statesmen, 
the models they support and the models they deliver do not always correspond: this 
disconnect is the focus of Section 4.4. 
To summarise, when considering the arguments Machel made for the role and justification 
of government and state power (although not necessarily the political reality), it is possible 
to interpret a basic philosophical argument which shares similarities with the Kantian 
argument for a condition of public right set out in Chapter 1. However, as his presidency 
progressed, the reality of the political situation he ruled over adhered to this philosophy 
less and less as the views of the people became less central to the political decision making 
process. Thus, this thesis makes the claim that the philosophy behind Machel’s model 
shares similarities with the Kantian framework, but the political reality was less successful 
in delivering this philosophy: this is a common factor across all three political leaders.  
In his early struggles against the colonial movement, as well as in the founding of his 
political party (the CPP), Nkrumah relied on the slogan “self-government now”. He 
published this idea along with future party member Komla Gbedemah in the first edition of 
their paper the “Accra Evening News” in September 1948. The uncompromisingly anti-
colonialist newspaper carried the slogan: “We prefer self-government with danger to 
servitude in tranquillity…we have the right to govern ourselves” (Gbedemah and Nkrumah, 
1948, cited in Marable, 1987, p.99). It was a strong message that they carried through from 
their activism days to their role in the political infrastructure. In fact, the party was founded 
on the same message: “The specific policy goals of the CPP, ratified at the Party’s second 
annual conference in August 1951, seemed clear. On national matters, the CPP called for 
‘self-government now’, the removal of ‘all forms of oppression’ and ‘the establishment of a 
democratic socialist society” (Marable, 1987, p. 113). The concept of “self-government 
now”, it can be assumed, referred to two factors. The first, and most pressing in that time 
period, was the removal of a colonial government and the establishment of an African 
system of rule or “self-government” implemented by Africans, for Africans. However, a 
second reading of Nkrumah’s claim for the value of “self-government now” can be 
established in Kantian terms. As discussed in Section 4.1, Hountondji claims that there 
exists in Nkrumah’s writing and speeches a Kantian influence (“he professes an egalitarian 
and humanistic ethic strongly marked by the influence of Kant” (Hountondji, 1983, p.153)), 
and thus the term “self-government” takes on a secondary meaning. In reference to the 
above quote from the 1951 party conference, this reading is particularly interesting. The 
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conference notes referred to the removal of not only colonial rule, but “all forms of 
oppression”. Additionally the Accra Evening News article (also quoted above) referred to a 
preference for the dangers of self-government over a tranquil servitude. Thus, it is possible 
to argue that for Nkrumah, at least in this time period, the concern was not with the 
outcomes of oppression (he accepted it was possible to experience a tranquil existence 
whilst living under an oppressive regime), but with the act of oppression itself. In a similar 
way, Kantians argue that the problem with domination is not based on the consequences 
of the act (be they good, bad, or indifferent), but with the undergoing of the act itself. Thus, 
in comparing the two positions a similarity emerges in the underlying philosophy at the 
heart of the justification for why “self-government now” was important. It was important 
for Nkrumah, and similarly for Kantians, because it is the only system that does not lead to 
oppression. This is not to suggest that the consequences would be either better or worse 
than under an oppressive state, but rather to suggest that this is not an important 
consideration in making the claim. The only important consideration, in both the discussed 
cases, was that self-rule is a philosophically grounded right, regardless of its subsequent 
consequences.  
To conclude this section, and before moving on to a discussion of the statesmen’s views of 
the value of freedom of choice, it is important to reflect on the value Machel, in particular, 
placed on not only the abstract right of self-law giving or self-rule, but also the active 
political commitments he made to realise these. At the start of his rule he was adamant 
about the importance of democracy in delivering these aims: “Our decisions must always 
be democratic in both content and form. Democratic in content means that they must 
reflect the real interests of the broad masses. Democratic in form means that the broad 
masses must take part in reaching a decision, feeling that it is theirs and not something 
imposed from above” (Machel, 1974, p.15). On reading this, parallels can be drawn with 
the Kantian concept of willkür (as it is presented in Chapter 1), which emphasised the 
expectation on the political system to guarantee the necessary conditions to enable 
individuals to be self-law giving in common with all others. This quote from Machel 
suggested, not only that he supported such a situation, but also that he intended to create 
the political conditions in which he was able to deliver on these goals for the people of 
Mozambique. As mentioned elsewhere, he was not successful in achieving this reality. 
However, this does not diminish the argument that his speeches demonstrate the presence 
of belief in common human grounding on which these political choices could have been 
justified. 
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ii. External Freedom of Choice, Autonomy, and Equality 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Kant justified his thoughts on the problematic nature of 
domination by extolling his support for the rights of individuals as autonomous agents. He 
argued in “An Answer to the Question: what is Enlightenment?” that enlightenment is a 
state all individuals should strive for, but not necessarily all will achieve. It is a state, 
according to Kant, in which individuals are able to overcome their base drives and instead 
be guided by reason; to have freedom of choice over the direction of their lives. It is not 
only a matter of making choices, but rather it concerns making the “right” choices, whilst 
freely following your own path unhindered by others. According to Leander Schneider, 
Julius Nyerere made a similar claim about the importance of choosing rightly: 
“Nyerere seems to suggest that being able to recognise, as well as "freely" 
taking, the right course of action… was an important part of what qualified 
people as genuinely ‘developed’. Insofar as true development then implied 
such a state of higher consciousness, freely choosing a course of action in 
development was desirable since freely choosing ‘authenticated’ such a 
state of consciousness” (Schneider, 2004, p.360). 
Thus, it can be argued that what Schneider interprets in Nyerere is a belief not only in the 
right of individuals to express their free choice in directing the laws by which they live, but 
also the duty to make the right free choice. Thus, similarly to a Kantian model, the concept 
of free choice, be it in methods of development or forms of self-government, is not 
necessarily a blanket right, but rather a right dependent on making the correct choices: a 
right defined by a duty to realise it appropriately. For Kant, that is choices directed by 
reason. Whilst for Nyerere, this extract suggests, it is based on individuals making the 
correct choices to enable development. It is, however, unclear from this reading what the 
concept of “correct development” would look like, and what its philosophical foundations 
were.  
Masolo, in reference to Nyerere’s view of man, also emphasised the value placed on 
freedom by him: “A few characteristics summarise Nyerere’s view of man. Man is a 
fundamentally free being; he can realise his freedom from external conditionings and 
domination only if he is self-reliant, and this depends on his work which is in turn only 
effective if realised collectively or in society” (Masolo, 1981, pp.28-290). Thus, according to 
Masolo, Nyerere believed that freedom is not a solitary goal, but rather, that autonomy is 
achieved through working for, and with, the community. Thus for him, membership of a 
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socialist society is a fundamental element in achieving freedom. Therefore, as implied in 
Section 4.1, autonomy existed as, for Nyerere, a fundamental right. Thus, similarly to a 
Kantian approach, there is concentrated emphasis on achieving it, but the methods used 
for realising this autonomy were different. This can be viewed as an example of the 
phenomena presented in Chapter 2, in which the philosophical grounding of a foundational 
principle may be the same (the importance of respecting human freedom and autonomy), 
but the methods for achieving them are culturally or individually specific to either a 
theorist or a group. For Nyerere, an African form of socialism presented the most 
appropriate political methodology for protecting the rights of man to be “fundamentally 
free beings” able to overcome domination and be truly self-reliant: as true self-reliance was 
grounded on active participation within a community. However, freedom still remained a 
property and experience of the individual. 
Throughout his speeches and writings, Nyerere not only focused on freedom but also on a 
second Kantian foundation: equality. Similarly to the previous point concerning the role of 
socialism in delivering freedom, Nyerere also claimed that the ideology of socialism played 
an essential role in achieving equality amongst the people.  According to a speech he made 
in 1967 “the essence of socialism is the practical acceptance of human equality. That is to 
say, every man’s equal right to a decent life before any individual has a surplus above his 
needs; his equal right to participate in Government; and his equal responsibility to work 
and contribute to the society” (Nyerere, 1967, pp. 324-325). Thus, for Nyerere (at least in 
the public speeches he made, although as is discussed in Section 4.4, he was less successful 
in delivering it as a political reality), similarly to the Kantian view, all autonomous 
individuals had a right to be treated as such: to have freedom of choice; to involve 
themselves in governing; to be recognised as a member of society; and to have each of 
these fundamental principles, equally. The central focus on equality was also apparent in a 
number of the TANU declarations. In discussing the party line, Nyerere claimed that “for in 
our constitution we say TANU believes a) that all human beings are equal; b) that every 
individual has a right to dignity and respect” (Nyerere, 1967, p.261). Furthermore, it was 
stated in the Arusha Declaration, which, as previously mentioned, set out the political aims 
and beliefs of the TANU party: participation in decision making is a vital part of realising 
equality, and that this equality is a fundamental right of humanity, “and must be realised as 
such. Unless every person plays an effective role in their own government, rather than 
being the recipient of decisions made by others, there can be no equality in human dignity 
and status. Nor is there likely to be very much progress in economic equality” (Nyerere, 
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1998, p.269). It is also possible to interpret, in the final sentence of this quote, a pattern 
emerging with previously quoted elements of Nyerere’s speeches: the centrality of 
development and economic improvement in Nyerere’s goals. In the first paragraph of this 
section, Schneider’s quote highlighted Nyerere’s focus on “correct development” as a 
necessary result of the socialist movement and, here again, is a focus on achieving 
economic development through participation. Both of these discussions focus on the 
achievement of freedom and equality through development, be that economic or 
otherwise, and thus similarly to his treatment of socialism, development can be interpreted 
as a means for achieving further goals (freedom and equality) rather than as an end in itself.  
Samora Machel indicated a similar emphasis in his speeches and political rhetoric on the 
role of equality, collective decision making and governance. He claimed that, “political 
democracy is based on a collective discussion, on a collective solution of our problems. 
Each and every one of us is expected to express his views” (Machel, 1974, p.16). Thus for 
him (again, at least in the ideal politics he presented rather than the reality he achieved), 
governing was not a top down system in which rules were imposed on the citizenry. Rather, 
it was a system in which people had a right, as well as a duty, to play an active role in 
governance. He did not suggest that people “could” express their views, but in fact that 
they were “expected” to. Thus, in these comments it is possible to interpret an underlying 
belief in the value and importance of self-law giving, to not only the individual, but also to 
the political condition: as a right and a duty.  
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, Kwame Nkrumah has been associated in 
the secondary literature with explicitly Kantian views and language. His discussion of the 
importance of treating humans as ends in themselves is a clear example of this: “We 
postulate each man to be an end in himself, not merely a means; and we accept the 
necessity of guaranteeing each man equal opportunities for his development” (Nkrumah, 
1966, p.204). Similarly to Nyerere, Nkrumah focused on the rights of development and 
equality in achieving a system in which people could be respected as ends in themselves, 
rather than means to a further end. However, what is of particular interest is the explicitly 
Kantian philosophical basis he posits for his political ideology. Once again, at least in his 
presentation of his ideal theory, he presents socialism as the best political model for 
recognising the rights of individuals to be treated as ends in themselves, which he, similarly 
to Kant, implied was the fundamental underpinning and purpose of the political condition. 
Thus, at least in the view Nkrumah presented outwardly, it is possible to interpret ideas of 
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both the value and importance of internal self-law giving, and the need to create an 
external political condition that respects individuals’ free choice and willkϋr. Such a 
condition, that may not look like a Kantian political system of public right (as it would 
instead be a socialist state), does still demonstrate similar philosophical foundations and 
aims. In this sense, as suggested in the earlier discussion of Nyerere, it is possible to imply 
that the model for realising the foundations grounding political choices may differ in 
different cultural, political and temporal settings, but similarities can still be drawn 
between the foundations of the ideas themselves, and the debates and issues that are at 
the centre of state building: freedom of choice.  
iii. Domination and Oppression 
Two of the key themes set out in Chapter 1 as representing a Kantian model of willkϋr and 
self-law giving is a vehement discrediting of systems of oppression and domination. As 
suggested throughout this thesis, questioning the presence of these ideas in the work of 
anti-colonial and post-colonial theorists and statesmen is particularly important as the 
colonial model placed a strong emphasis on oppressing freedom and dominating choice. 
Thus, if there was not an underlying theme across the post-colonial authors work critiquing 
models of domination, it would suggest that these are in fact not underlying philosophical 
principles common across humanity, existing prior to culture and politics (a priori). 
However, as is apparent in this sub-section, it is possible to see explicit criticism of both 
domination and oppression in the writings of both Nyerere and Machel, as well as in 
Nkrumah’s argument for “self-government now” (Nkrumah, cited in Marable, 1987, p. 113), 
previously discussed in Sub-Section 4.3i and thus excluded from discussion here.  
 
Condemning exploitation is a theme common across a number of Machel’s speeches, and 
he in fact argued that it was the first issue that must be overcome before a truly 
independent state could be established. For him, establishing a new political order meant 
establishing a system based on the power and will of the people, as such, a system could 
not be established under exploitative conditions in which the people were not free to 
express their thoughts on the system of government. He claimed that when an individual 
decided to be a part of the anti-colonial struggle, “what is at stake is the establishment of a 
people’s power that asserts our independence and identity, and destroys exploitation. This 
entails destroying the power of those who foster exploitation” (Machel, 1974, p.2). Thus, 
for Machel, similarly to the Kantian model expressed in Chapter 1, it was not simply a 
matter of overcoming exploitation and implementing a different system of government, 
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but it was also important that the new government was grounded on the correct 
foundations. To elucidate, a system which involved, for example, a benevolent dictator 
who provided the citizenry with all that they required to live a happy and fulfilled life, 
would not be justifiable for either Machel or Kant, even if the consequences were 
favourable. Regardless of the consequences the system itself would fail as it would not be a 
political model founded on the respect for the choice of the people, and thus it would be 
an act of domination. In this sense, we can draw similarities between Machel’s view on 
good government and the problems of oppression and domination set out in Chapter 1. 
Further evidence exists for the argument that a Machelian and a Kantian position share 
similar philosophical groundings in two more of Machel’s speeches. The first discusses the 
choice to take up arms and participate in a violent revolution, the justification for doing so, 
and the new system they hoped to replace it with: “When we took up arms to overthrow 
the old order, we felt the need to create a strong, healthy and prosperous new society in 
which men, free from exploitation, would co-operate for the progress of all” (Machel, 1974, 
p.60). The second explains Mozambique’s post-independence party’s (Frelimo), choice to 
embark on a socialist path dictated by them, and not influenced by either the Russians or 
the Chinese: “Nobody will change the geographical standpoint of the Mozambican people. 
Nobody will overthrow the independence of Mozambique. We have chosen socialism and 
we shall build socialism. Nobody will come from outside to build it for us” (Machel, 1980, 
p.90). The argument Machel raised was not that an external system imposed on the people 
of Mozambique would be bad necessarily, but rather that its being imposed at all was the 
issue of contestation. He preferred instead, even if it failed at first, a system created by the 
people of Mozambique for the people of Mozambique, and as previously suggested, this 
assertion inspired other socialist models in Africa. Again, it is possible to interpret in this 
assertion similarities with a Kantian critique of domination: the claim that external forces 
imposing themselves on individuals (regardless of whether the intended outcome is 
positive or negative) will never be a rightful condition.  
Nyerere made similar claims regarding the problematic nature of issues of oppression. He 
couched these arguments in terms of the role of government and individuals in political 
authority. He stated publically that, “leaders too often forget that the purpose of 
government and party and of all the laws and regulations… is to serve people. And when 
we say ‘serve the people’ we do not just mean ‘the masses’ as an abstraction; we mean the 
people in large groups, and small groups, and as individuals” (Nyerere, 1998, p. 272). His 
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claim, similar to the Kantian approach presented in Chapter 1, was that government cannot 
be justified on grounds other than those related to the people. The sole role of government, 
as Nyerere declared it, was to serve the people and deliver the conditions the people 
wanted, and needed, for a better life. Similarly, Kant argued in “The Metaphysics of 
Morals”, that the only justification of government was on the grounds that it provided the 
space for autonomous agents to live, according to the laws they reasoned for themselves, 
in common with others. On neither argument can government be justified for a purpose 
separate to delivering conditions in which individuals’ rights can be realised. As with many 
of these arguments, the type of government recommended by Nyerere was different to the 
Kantian model, but the debates regarding what good government looked like, in both 
situations, was founded on similar principles. This is further evidence for the argument 
which is a recurring theme throughout this thesis, that the a priori principles regarding 
what is owed to humans are similar, but the methods for realising these are culturally, 
politically and ideologically sensitive, and alter between individuals, ideologies, cultures 
and political models.  
A further argument made by Nyerere was that the political structure needed changing to 
“abolish this division of people between masters and servants, and to make every person a 
master- not a master who oppresses others, but one who serves himself” (Nyerere, 1966, 
p.139). Not only does this indicate his dislike for political structures in which dominance 
and oppression are inherent, it also highlights the value he placed on the necessity for 
individuals to live in a condition in which they were able to achieve self-mastery. This is a 
similar claim to the one discussed in Sub-Section 4.3ii in which his emphasis on 
development and creating the conditions for the right kind of free choice were discussed. 
For Nyerere, similar to Kantians, being the master of one’s self and one’s own decision 
making was a fundamental right that he suggested underpinned the political structures he 
created. 
Respect for the value of self-mastery extended beyond his speeches into the written 
documents for the policies he implemented, in particular the Ujamaa villagisation project 
which, as will become clear in the following sub-section (Sub-Section 4.3iiii), was justified, 
by Nyerere, as creating the conditions for villagers to have complete control over the 
villages in which they lived. His initial aim, on founding the project, was to allow them to 
run the villages on a policy of self-rule, with very little central government control. 
However, the programme was unsuccessful in delivering these conditions, and the model 
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became a system of compulsory re-location. That being said, the point is raised here to 
indicate Nyerere’s respect for the value of self-mastery, both on an internal level and in the 
drafting of political policies. Thus, it is possible to suggest that both elements of the Kantian 
model presented in Chapter 1 (internal self-law giving and external willkϋr) can be 
interpreted as grounding Nyerere’s thought. His speeches and texts indicate a belief in the 
value of self-mastery for individuals and his political policies demonstrate his commitment 
to creating the political conditions in which choice, autonomy and self-mastery can be 
achieved for the Tanzanian citizens. The following sub-section considers, in greater detail, 
in what ways the policy of Ujamaa Vijinni can be said to be grounded in the principle of 
creating the conditions for individuals and communities to become self-mastering, and the 
failings in the policies implementation.  
iiii. Ujamaa Vijijini 
This sub-section predominantly focuses on the villagisation programme implemented by 
the Tanu government of Tanzania under the leadership of Julius K Nyerere. The argument 
being made is that on analysing the origins of this policy, similarities can be drawn between 
the Kantian framework set out in Chapter 1, and the philosophical groundings of the 
Ujamma Vijijini project as presented by Nyerere. Following a discussion of the aims and 
groundings of the project, the sub-section turns to the critiques of the implementation of 
the project and an analysis of its failings. To conclude the debate surrounding villagisation, 
a second and less famous, project will be considered, that of Machel’s Frelimo government 
in Mozambique. Both villagisation projects failed to achieve their aims of providing citizens 
with the space to direct their own lives. Critique of the models exists in the conclusion to 
this section, but the initial aim is to consider the philosophical underpinnings for the 
projects as they were presented by the theorists. In reality they became a system directed 
by the state, and in some cases systems of forced production utilising the citizenry as a 
means to achieving the states’ economic gains. However, when the policies were first 
devised the opposite was presented and the focus was on treating individuals as ends in 
themselves, and it is to this discussion that the chapter first turns. 
 
Ujamaa, or family hood, was the embodiment of the political reality of Nyerere’s 
philosophical socialist goals. It was a policy that was set forth in the Arusha Declaration of 
the 29th January 1967 which formally announced that Tanzania’s economic and political 
goals to follow a socialist path. The policy involved the (what became forced) relocation of 
Tanzania’s rural population into socialist communities or Ujamaa villages, in which they 
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could work together to provide for the needs of the community, whilst also defining the 
rules by which the village, and its people, lived and worked. The model relied on villagers 
being responsible for all decision making in the villages, as well as food production both for 
the village and to sell (although as the state became more heavily involved production 
became directed toward state aims). It was their decision how much of this was achieved 
through communal farming and how much remained in private hands. Schneider observed 
that the role of the Arusha Declaration was to “set out the broad parameters of this new 
approach. It famously elevated ‘ujamaa’, which translates literally as family hood and is 
generally rendered as denoting Nyerere’s particular version of ‘African socialism’, to be the 
guiding principle behind Tanzania’s new approach to development” (Schneider, 2004, 
p.348). 
As already discussed, the programme embodied Nyerere’s belief that the goal of 
government was to deliver development to the people, but his views on what that 
development would look like are expanded on by his detailed breakdown of how the 
Ujamaa programme should work. For him, the central point at the heart of the programme, 
at least as he originally envisioned it, was that it was a programme directed by, and 
delivered by, the people. He saw no role for external experts in setting up the villages, or 
developing the necessary farming techniques. In fact, he claimed that the fundamental goal 
was that “the people will have begun to develop themselves as dignified and confident 
human beings, in a way which is impossible if they simply take orders from someone else” 
(Nyerere, 1973, p.60). For that reason, he claimed that the involvement of experts was 
impossible as it would undermine the fundamental principle, which was to allow individuals 
to master their own development. He further claimed that “the fact that the orders of an 
"expert" may have led to greater output of a crop if they were fully carried out, does not 
affect this issue. By debating this matter and then deciding for themselves, the people will 
be doing real development of themselves” (Nyerere, 1973, p.60). Similarities can be drawn 
here with the discussion in Sub-Section 4.3iii on the irrelevance of outcomes. Unlike a 
consequentialist account, Nyerere at least initially, argued for a system of development 
that respected the rights of the community to direct their own lives, regardless of the 
effect this had on the villages’ productivity and economic output. For example, expert 
advice and training on farming methods could have improved the standard of living and the 
agricultural output of the village. However, Nyerere argued that domination in this form 
would negatively affect the human development, which he saw as the fundamental goal of 
the project and the government. Therefore, consequences were superfluous in deciding 
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the policy. He argued that this deontological view was based on his understanding of what 
was important when considering development. Nyerere was explicit and detailed in his 
account of the justification behind, and structuring of, the villagisation programme. 
Therefore, it is of value to quote this somewhat lengthy passage in full: 
“People can only develop themselves…Ujamaa villages are intended to be 
socialist organisations created by the people, and governed by those who 
live and work in them. They cannot be created from the outside, nor 
governed from outside. No one can be forced into an ujamaa village, and 
no official- at any level- can go and tell the members of an ujamaa village 
what they should do together, and what they should continue to do as 
individual farmers. No official of the Government or Party can go to an 
ujamaa village and tell the members what they must grow. No non-
member of the village can go and tell the members to use a tractor, or not 
to use a tractor. For if these things happen- that is, if an outsider gives such 
instructions and enforces them- then it will no longer be an ujamaa village! 
An ujamaa village is a voluntary association of people who decide of their 
own free will to live together and work together for their common good” 
(Nyerere, 1973, p.67). 
To summarise, development for Nyerere was a human project rather than an economic one. 
For him, this meant enabling individuals and communities to develop themselves, and to 
realise a situation in which they were the masters of their own future. When discussing the 
previous statement, Schneider made similar observations about the president’s view of 
development. He proposes that “several of Nyerere's pronouncements suggest that 
people’s initiative, active control over their own affairs, and voluntary participation were 
also essential parts of what ‘development of people, not things’ meant” (Schneider, 2004, 
p.354). The human focus of the project was partially grounded on the idea that the villages 
were based on an African cultural project: focusing on small, traditional communities, living 
and working together collaboratively, rather than on individual, economic development. 
The villages were an exclusively African cultural project. 
As previously mentioned, regardless of the promises, and determination in the language in 
which the idea was presented to the people, the practical implementation of the Ujamaa 
Vijijini project failed to deliver the conditions promised by the Arusha Declaration. This is 
not to suggest that Nyerere’s belief in the need to provide certain conditions for his people 
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was falsified, but rather, that the method he employed to recognise these basic human 
principles was unsuccessful. As the project developed it became clear that many of the 
rural population were uncomfortable with being uprooted from their family homes and 
moved into artificially created villages. In one interview Nyerere even admitted to “decent 
modern houses that had been bulldozed flat because they were not sited in the ujamaa 
village” (Bailey, 1998, p. v). It became clear in these cases that the realisation of the 
ideology was taking precedence over the delivery of a stable system inspired by the people 
and implemented for the people. Commentators spoke of situations in which “the 
President…condoned, and apparently even prompted, the use of certain "mildly" coercive 
measures (usually in the form of restricting famine relief (only) to residents of ujamaa 
villages)” (Scheider, 2004, p.369). Furthermore, “different degrees of persuasion and 
coercion (were used) by administrative and political officials… (for example) material 
rewards in the form of expanded services or direct support from the government” (Boesen, 
Moody and Madsen, 1977, p.15) were given to those villagers producing the crops required 
by the state. These policies led to a situation in which the policy altered completely from a 
“voluntary movement to a highly coercive system” (Seftel & Smyth, 1998, p.131), in which 
the villagers were treated by the state as means to a further end: productivity. The high 
levels of coercion led, according to Schneider, to: 
“The historical end-result of the policy of ujamaa vijijini (which) was the 
compulsory settlement of the majority of Tanzania's rural population into 
approximately seven thousand villages, which began in 1968, was greatly 
accelerated in 1973, and declared largely completed by late 1975. The 
basic modus operandi of villagisation was coercive and top-down, and it is 
generally agreed that it did not improve the majority of rural Tanzanians' 
lot, as had been hoped (Schneider, 2004, pp.345-346).  
Thus, whilst at its foundations the policy was intended to create the political conditions 
under which individuals and communities would be able to take control of their own lives, 
what it became was a system supported by coercion, directed by the blind following of 
ideology, and the failure to prioritise fundamental human interests and abandon the 
policies failing to guarantee them.  
Mozambique also attempted a programme of villagisation which made the Frelimo party 
unpopular with some strands of the peasant population. Their approach involved “forcing 
rural families to live in collective villages…It saw the emergence of forced labour emerging 
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under the rubric of voluntary labour” (O’Meara, 1991, p.91), again viewing the villagers as a 
means to achieving further, state wide, economic goals. On defending this policy, Machel 
argued that what had been created was a system based on equality that would put an end 
to exploitation of the people by the bourgeoisie class. He claimed that what had been 
created were “agricultural co-operatives in which the fruits of collective labour are shared 
out in proportion to the amount of work put in; individual fields, but farmed on the 
principle of mutual help and non-exploitation of another’s labour” (Machel, 1974, p.58). 
Furthermore, that “the communal villages are founded in the form of socialist property 
(and) the co-operative administers the communal village” (Machel, 1979, p.128). However, 
in his analysis of the policy Dan O’Meara came to a different conclusion:  
“When coupled with the drain on resources to the state farms, the forced 
villagisation of most areas, the lack of availability of the most basic supplies 
in the rural areas, and the widespread coercion of peasants into ‘voluntary 
seasonal labour’ on the state farms, it had the effect by 1981 of deeply 
alienating wide sectors of FRELIMO’s original class base (the labouring 
class)” (O’Meara, 1991, p.92). 
To summarise this sub-section, both Nyerere and Machel presented their policies on the 
basis of improving development for the people, creating conditions in which exploitation 
would be eradicated and opportunities would be created for individuals and communities 
to play an active role in government, thus realising their ability to develop into self-
mastering individuals. In that sense, it is possible to draw out (as has been done above) the 
similarities with a Kantian approach. However, when these policies proved to be unpopular 
with large numbers of rural civilians, rather than ending them and continuing the policy of 
government by the people, a system of coercion was implemented by both governments to 
enable these policies to be realised. Therefore, the parallels with the Kantian approach are 
limited in regard to actual governing practice, as the justification for government as defined 
by the people was ignored by both Machel and Nyerere as their villagisation projects 
proved to be unsuccessful. 
Furthermore, it is possible to claim that as theorists considering individual freedoms, 
Machel and Nyerere recognise fundamental principles similar to those presented by the 
Kantian theory of internal self-law giving. Beyond that it is also possible to suggest that in 
designing their political policies they intended to create conditions under which these basic 
human principles could be realised: conditions similar to those espoused by the Kantian 
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theory of willkϋr. However, as previously demonstrated, as statesmen they were 
unsuccessful in implementing these policies and creating the necessary political conditions 
to enable the community to live under a political situation in which the people had a 
certain level of governing control. Thus, on a Kantian argument, their governments could 
not have been justified as they were grounded in a concern for ideology, rather than 
focusing on the rights and needs of the people. Thus, it is possible to see in the work of 
these two theorists, and as will become clear in the final section (Section 4.4) Nkrumah as 
well, a disconnect between the claims they made, and the political realities over which they 
governed. The claims they made regarding the purpose of government and the rights of the 
people, share, as has been analysed throughout the previous three sub-sections, many 
similarities with Kantian claims for the importance of reasoned persons living in conditions 
that enable them to be equal, self-law giving and free individuals. However, as their 
political states developed it became clear that they were going to fail to recognise these 
principles, and by the end of each of their rules, each state had become systematically 
centralised: placing less emphasis on the power of the people, and greater emphasis on the 
implementation of oppressive, centralised policies. The failings of each of these states are 
briefly discussed in the following section. 
4.4- The Failings of the African Socialist Projects of Nyerere, Nkrumah, and 
Machel: 
On analysing the secondary literature a number of key concerns come to the fore regarding 
the three political states of Mozambique, Ghana and Tanzania, and their immediate post-
colonial leadership. Various criticisms exist of all three leaders. However, the focus of this 
section will be on the patterns that exist between critiques of all three. Objections 
commonly laid at all three leaders are as follows: implementation of a system leading to 
the centralisation of power, thus leading to the advancement of personality cults around 
the leaders; corruption amongst high ranking party members; the adoption of (and 
continued commitment to) the wrong ideology for delivering a stable, people driven, 
political condition. Many of these concerns have been covered in the previous section 
dealing with the Ujamaa Vijijini projects, but they are further extended here for the 
purposes of clarity. Predominantly, objections to the practices of the statesmen deal with 
their external political projects, rather than their philosophical beliefs or internal claims 
regarding individual treatment of citizens. Thus, it is the argument of this thesis, that these 
critiques are relevant to failings of the external political model, and do not undermine the 
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analysis throughout the rest of this chapter which has drawn similarities between the 
philosophical groundings of the work of Nyerere, Nkrumah and Machel in relation to what 
all humans are owed, and the Kantian position of this project. In regards to this 
methodological choice, this thesis suggests that a precedent exists in political theory, in 
particular Western political theory, to distinguish between the theoretical models of 
statesmen and the political realities over which they ruled, and to critique or support each 
separately. To name just two examples of this phenomenon: Marcus Aurelius and Benjamin 
Franklin. In both cases their political theories are often treated separately to their more 
troubling realities. On this justification it is argued that the choice to treat the two roles of 
Nyerere, Machel and Nkrumah, as well as Senghor in the previous chapter, (as both 
theorists and statesmen) separately can be justified on both theoretical and precedential 
grounds.  
As discussed in the previous section, Nyerere focused in a number of his speeches and 
publications on the value of ideas similar to the Kantian concept of self-mastery, portraying 
it as a necessary strand of human development that should be respected by governments. 
However, in the post-independence era his party presented mixed messages to the people: 
“on the one hand they were urged to embrace mass democracy, common ownership of 
land, and the sharing of wealth. On the other, the party and the government were 
becoming ever more centralised and authoritarian, while the nation’s wealth was still 
enjoyed by only a small number” (Smyth & Seftel, 1998, p. 79). Centralisation of 
governmental practices was also associated with increased powers for the executive, a 
theme, along with corruption of party officials, which was common across all three 
theorists. 
Nkrumah’s party (the CPP), was most widely associated with corruption. It was suggested 
early on in his rule that the officials around him were more interested in personal, material 
wealth than in the protection and development of the people. Marable (referencing 
Makonnen) concluded that “the rhetoric of the CPP was socialist. But watching the 
evolution of the regime from 1957 to 1966…virtually none of the CPP leadership was really 
interested in defending the material interests of workers and peasants” (Marable, 1987, 
p.93) and, in fact, the ideology was being used, not to deliver favourable political 
conditions to the people, but rather to enhance the material wealth of high ranking party 
officials. Discussion of the failings of each of the leaders and their regimes is included to 
highlight the distinction between theory and practice. In the case of Nkrumah, his failure to 
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utilise his socialist model to deliver the correct political conditions under which the citizens 
could realise a condition of equality and self-law giving. 
Issues of corruption and authoritarianism were prevalent throughout the regimes. In fact, 
as they became more established in their presidential roles, each statesman implemented 
policies that prevented their power from being challenged. This included making it illegal 
for opposition parties to stand in elections (in the case of Nkrumah), and eventually all 
three became one party states.  
Simultaneously, personality cults began to form around the leaders, a fact which Marable 
argued both reinforced, and was reinforced by, “corruption and bureaucratization” 
(Marable, 1987, p.126). It has been observed that the formation of cults centred on viewing 
the figures as saviours from the colonial movement. This enabled them to have freer rein in 
establishing political policies. Nkrumah, in particular, was guilty of viewing himself in this 
way. As mentioned in Section 4.1, before falling victim to an eventual coup he had 
embarked on a process of re-writing history to exaggerate the role he played in freeing 
Ghana from British colonial rule. The sense of cultism surrounding Nkrumah became ever 
stronger as dissenters were removed from the party and greater focus was placed on him 
as the saviour of the nation. In 1961, party member and long-time confidant of Nkrumah, 
Adamafio, published a pamphlet extolling his virtues. He described Nkrumah’s name: “a 
breath of hope and (it) means freedom, brotherhood and racial equality… Kwame Nkrumah 
is our father, teacher, our brother, our friend, indeed our lives…is greater even than the air 
we breathe, for he made us as surely as he made Ghana” (Marable, 1987, p. 134). At the 
same time, as the party elite were extolling his virtues, Marable observed, the party was 
losing popularity with its class bases (the working class): resulting from the ever growing 
wage gap between the people and the party members. There was an increase in strikes and 
the values of socialism were no longer recognisable as the government was becoming ever 
more authoritarian. It became apparent as Nkrumah’s government went on, that the focus 
on the role, and value, of the people diminished. He was unable to create a political 
condition in which the views and autonomy of the people were either central, or 
fundamental, and as such many of the claims he made in his early days in government were 
reversed. Thus, as suggested in the introduction to this section, similarly to other 
philosopher statesmen who were active at this time, such as Ahmed Sekou Toure, it is 
possible to interpret in his speeches and publications both a philosophical underpinning 
that respects and advocates for the autonomy and value of individuals, or an idea similar to 
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the value of internal self-law giving, and that the debates into which he enters regarding 
these issues centre around these foundations, even when the language itself is not Kantian, 
the ideas are central to the debates. However, he failed to translate this to his external 
political practice and in this sense failed to create a condition that enabled the people to 
realise the rights he had previously claimed were common to all individuals.  
O’Meara argued that, prior to his death, Samora Machel’s government was moving 
towards a similar situation, in which a cult of adoration was forming around the leader; a 
situation which was negatively affecting the political direction of the country. He 
references a time in the early eighties (1983), in which Frelimo, whilst moving towards 
becoming a centralised, Machel focused, party remained active and responsive to the 
people. In this sense, he argued, it was still possible to interpret, at this time, a belief in the 
necessity to create a political condition that responds to and respects the autonomy of the 
body politic:  
“FRELIMO was a highly contradictory political movement. On the one hand, 
it was extremely centralised and commandist, moving slowly towards a 
personality cult around Samora Machel. On the other hand, it was at that 
stage still highly responsive to all kinds of mass pressures, and indeed 
organised wide-ranging consultative processes at all levels of society” 
(O’Meara, 1991, p.97). 
However, in an interview he conducted after Machel’s death, John Saul was told by a 
Frelimo party veteran, that for the country, the choice to focus so strongly on Machel as 
the dominant image the party presented to the public was a mistake: “we were wrong, all 
of us at the top, in fostering a cult of personality around Samora” (quoted in Saul, 1991, 
p.107). The party member insinuated that a more citizen centric message would have 
better served the people of Mozambique. As a result “Frelimo never succeeded in creating 
the political and economic system it aimed for” (Ottaway, 1988, p.213). 
Similarly, many of Nyerere’s policies, in particular the villagisation programme, were 
reversed following his retirement in 1985: Tanzania is no longer described by its leadership 
as a socialist state. However, he remains (even posthumously), a vastly popular figurehead. 
Likewise, many of Nkrumah’s political choices were changed following the coup that 
removed him from the presidency in 1966, and he himself, reversed many of his opinions in 
several of the works he wrote in exile. Thus, it was argued by commentators speaking 
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about all three of the statesmen, that the cults that formed around them, and the 
corruption that this inspired, resulted in one of the fundamental reasons that they were 
unable to deliver successful socialist policies, able to protect and enhance the lives of their 
citizens, whilst also respecting the autonomy they claimed to uphold. 
4.5- Conclusion: 
In concluding, this final section reiterates the essential points drawn out by this chapter, 
making final remarks regarding the contrasts and comparisons between the three 
statesmen and a Kantian model, and finally, summarising the overall conclusions drawn by 
Part 1 of this thesis.  
This chapter has drawn out a number of key similarities between the philosophical 
groundings and justifications for the implementation of an African socialist model (as 
understood by Machel, Nkrumah and Nyerere), and a Kantian approach to the rights and 
duties owed to individuals, as well as the justifications for creating a state or system of 
government. As was suggested in Section 4.3, each theorist believed that governments 
should not be founded on a system of oppression, but rather, on the views and voice of the 
people. However, when translated into a political condition, none of the three were able to 
create a system that achieved this. Furthermore, each theorist claimed that socialism was 
the correct model to deliver human development and self-rule in their countries, although 
none of them were successful in implementing a robust socialist state. Therefore, as 
suggested in Section 4.4, it is the argument of this chapter that Machel, Nyerere and 
Nkrumah represent in their writings and speeches a belief in an underlying shared 
foundational principle of humanity to be self-mastering, self-law giving individuals. It is also 
the argument of this chapter, that in the early years of their rule they presented publicly an 
intention to create the political conditions in which these shared human principles could be 
realised: thus drawing similarities with a Kantian model of willkür (as presented in Chapter 
1). However, it is also the observation of this chapter that, as their presidencies developed, 
they were unsuccessful in delivering these conditions, and in fact created political 
situations that violated the philosophical principles they had originally claimed to uphold.  
Many of these failures occurred, as suggested in Section 4.4, as the models of government 
became more open to corruption and oppression and lost many of their socialist traits. It is 
thus impossible to make claims regarding the success of African socialism in delivering the 
conditions by which the principles of self-law giving, autonomy and freedom of choice can 
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be realised, as many of the socialist elements of each government were lacking by the end 
of each regime.  
A theme that is noticeable across not only this chapter, but also Chapters 2 and 5, is the 
value placed on using culturally specific methods to recognise foundational principles. For 
example in this chapter, Nyerere’s claims for realising individual autonomy through the 
community have been discussed. These ideas were also expressed in the analysis of 
Chapter 2, and are further debated in Chapter 5 in relation to the views of Kwame Gyekye. 
Extending from this point, support existed in the views of all three statesmen for systems of 
cross-cultural interactions and dialogue (both amongst the Pan-African community and 
with the Eastern and Western blocs). Support for such dialogue implies a belief on the part 
of the statesmen in a human foundation on which said interactions could be based, and 
built, which is a notable similarity with the claims made by this thesis. 
Finally, Part 1 of this thesis has summarised and analysed the views of two groups of 
philosopher statesmen. A noticeable progression exists from the beliefs of those authors 
discussing Négritude, who argued for a return to a glorified past; to those building models 
of African socialism around tradition, but choosing not to develop a sense of exoticism in 
relation to the past. However, in both cases there is a focus on traditional values in policy 
formation; for example, Nyerere’s insistence on the communal, African basis for the 
Ujamaa project.  Across both of these chapters, which have covered the work of political 
statesmen and activists who have suffered a turbulent relationship with the West, the 
presence of ideas associated with the Kantian Western Enlightenment tradition have been 
observed. Across the cases the language used has differed, and the methods appropriated 
for realising basic human foundations varied. However, in each case it has been possible to 
locate similar philosophical foundations for political and philosophical arguments and 
structures to those presented in Chapter 1 as representing a Kantian perspective. In areas 
where these foundations have been recognised, it has often been the case that these ideas 
are central to debates and discussions of how political conditions should be created. To 
clarify, this thesis is not claiming that each theorist was able to implement a political model 
under which individual’s right to their own purposiveness was successfully guaranteed. 
Rather, that the question of how it could be, or whether it should be, was a focus across 
theorists. The argument is simply that these ideas underpin debates, not that respect for 
them has been successfully implemented. What follows in Part 2 of this thesis is a further 
chapter questioning the existence of these ideas in the debates of contemporary 
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philosophers. It is the argument of this thesis that regardless of the differences between 
the two groups of theorists, and the fundamental qualms one set has with the work of the 
other, it will still be possible to locate in both, shared philosophical underpinnings 
grounding their understanding of personhood.  
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Chapter 5- Post-Colonial Philosophers:  
“Africa actually enriches Europe: but Africa is made to believe that it needs Europe to 
rescue it from poverty” (Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, 1986, p.28). 
As with Chapters 3 and 4, the central aim of this chapter is to introduce the theorists 
selected for study, outline their views in relation to the topic of this thesis, and finally, to 
debate whether, in the writings of these key thinkers, appeals are made to similar 
foundational principles regarding what it means to be a person. This question is analysed in 
relation to similarities that may exist between the theorists themselves, and also within the 
Kantian framework central to the overall hypothesis of this thesis. However, the 
methodological distinction between this chapter and the previous two is that the authors 
selected for study are not members of a distinct philosophical, ideological or political group. 
Rather, they are professional contemporary scholars debating questions of interest to 
philosophy today. 
This chapter is divided into five sections. As with the previous two chapters, the first 
section (Section 5.1) introduces the authors, explains their selection for analysis, touches 
upon the choice to separate this chapter from the previous two, and briefly elucidates the 
decision to include post-colonial philosophers as a group for analysis in this thesis. The 
second section (Section 5.2), is a discussion of the contemporary scholars views on both a 
narrative of “return” approach to considering and understanding the political condition in 
Africa (in the case of Senghor), and traditional groundings more generally, in the case of 
thinkers such as Nyerere, Nkrumah and Machel. The section discusses the critiques they 
make of each of these positions: “return” narratives and traditionalism more generally. This 
section also briefly considers the concept of ethnophilosophy as it is defined by authors 
such as Paulin Hountondji, and the critiques presented against it by both Hountondji and 
other contemporary scholars discussed in this Chapter. Section 5.3 further develops the 
debate in Chapter 2 regarding specific African philosophers’ views on culture, and the 
methods for comprehending it when considering human questions of potentially universal 
interest or foundation. The section also questions whether the philosophers arguments 
refer to foundational principles of humanity, and in doing so, whether they advocate for a 
culturally relativist approach to delivering them. Section 5.4, similarly to the previous 
chapter, questions the existence of explicitly, or implicitly, Kantian ideas in the writings of 
these academics. This is not to imply that they are themselves Kantian, although it can be 
argued in the case of Kwame Anthony Appiah that his form of Cosmopolitanism is rooted in 
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similar ideals; but rather to analyse whether philosophers from diverse backgrounds 
ground their understanding of issues of personhood and autonomy in similar ways, and 
whether debates occurring from different ideological perspectives focus around these 
central principles. As suggested in the Introduction, the inclusion of authors from non-
Kantian backgrounds actually provides greater evidence for the argument of this thesis 
than a specific focus on the work of academics that are openly sympathetic to Kantian 
views. The final section (Section 5.3) concludes the chapter and reiterates common themes 
that occur throughout the analysis.  
5.1- Introduction to the Post-Colonial Philosophers: 
This section first explains the choice to include a secondary part to this thesis (Part 2), and 
then the decision for it to be based around the analysis of contemporary philosophers 
working today. Finally, it introduces the philosophers selected for analysis.  
As suggested in the Introduction, the theorists studied in this chapter are being presented 
as separate to those discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, in line with the selection process 
outlined in the earlier chapter. Whilst the individuals considered in the previous two 
chapters were either philosopher statesmen, literary figures or activists reacting to 
colonialism, or affirming their leadership in the early post-colonial period, the theorists 
analysed in this chapter are professional philosophers and academics writing 
predominantly between the 1980s and the present day. As discussed in the Introduction, 
an important element to selecting the texts for study was ensuring a divergent range of 
views from within African political theory: to enable stronger claims to be made regarding 
similarities of foundational principles coming from culturally, and academically, disparate 
positions.  As was the focus of previous chapters, the statesmen and activists discussed in 
Part 1, implied that there were lessons to be learnt and value to be gained, from focusing 
on the structures and values of pre-colonial Africa as a model for inspiring the post-colonial 
condition. This was not to suggest a complete disregard of progress but was sometimes 
grounded in a glorification of the past. In contrast, the academics investigated in this 
chapter focus predominantly on the rights and duties of African academics, such as 
themselves, to discover and develop an African form of philosophy and politics, which will 
then, they argue, enable them to respond to human questions from an African perspective: 
adding valuable insight to the global field of philosophy. Additionally, a number of them, 
such as Paulin Hountondji, are also explicitly critical of a backward looking approach to the 
establishment of an African philosophical or political condition, thus providing interesting 
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points of contention with some of the theorists considered in the previous two chapters. 
Although, it is important to highlight that this is in no way a universally accepted response, 
nor does it reflect a condemnation for the study of traditional ideas.  Many contemporary 
philosophers (such as Kwame Gyekye), in fact, advocate for a greater emphasis to be 
placed on studying the philosophical thought of traditional groups. However, in contrast to 
philosopher statesmen such as Senghor, this philosophical focus on the study of traditional 
ideas is not intended as a political exercise. Rather, as a method of gaining greater 
understanding of these groups and discovering what lessons can be learnt from their past 
experiences: Gyekye focuses in his work on the Akan people of Ghana. The intention of 
Gyekye and his contemporaries working in this area is primarily to enhance understanding 
of tradition. This is not necessarily to directly implement those traditions within political 
endeavours, but rather it is a historical project intended to garner deeper understanding. 
This is what separates their approach from some of those studied in the previous two 
chapters.  
There is a strong emphasis amongst the contemporary philosophers considered in this 
chapter on questioning the opposing roles of cultural difference and universalism in 
dictating our understanding of, and interaction with, philosophical ideas; a topic which is 
debated in greater depth in Section 5.3. As referenced in Chapter 2, Gyekye and Wiredu 
focus considerable attention on interrogating the difference between practices that are 
specific to a culture (such as dress, music and culinary styles) and those that they view as 
being relevant to humanity in general (such as issues of human well-being and agreed facts 
of science). For them, respect for the former provides the conditions for the continued 
existence of the cultural group and are thus outside the remit of external debate. Whereas 
the latter, they argue, are concerns of humanity in general and should thus be treated as 
such; they argue that a practice that is harmful to human well-being cannot be protected 
on cultural grounds. This chapter extends the analysis of Chapter 2 and questions on what 
philosophical grounds these ideas are based. It then asks whether an understanding of 
culturally relative concepts limits acceptance of the existence of universally relevant 
foundations. In the case of Gyekye and Wiredu, they argue for a symbiosis of the two 
positions in which both culture and universal human concerns are respected. Their jointly 
edited collection, “Person and Community” (1992), is one of the key texts analysed in 
relation to this element of the chapter’s research. The purpose of this chapter is to further 
extend the discussion of the effect culture has on universal foundational principles. Section 
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5.3 considers the views of not only Gyekye and Wiredu, but also Kwame Anthony Appiah 
and Dismas Masolo.  
Additionally, there is common focus amongst African philosophers of investigating the 
question of identity. Many of the theorists, Appiah and Masolo, to name just two, respond 
to questions of identity posed by earlier thinkers (Leopold Sedar Senghor, Aimé Césaire, 
and Kwame Nkrumah), and question the notion of pre-defined identities of being African 
associated with these thinkers. Appiah’s seminal publication, “In My Father’s House” (1992), 
is a pivotal text in this discussion of identity and is widely cited in other texts. As such, it is 
heavily referenced in this chapter. Masolo’s article, “African Philosophy and the 
Postcolonial: Some Misleading Abstractions About Identity” (1997), also offers interesting 
insights into the question of identity and the foundation of human personhood. This text is 
also a central element of discussions in Section 5.4 in the analysis of the relationship 
between imposed identities and dominance. This chapter asks whether the focus on 
identity, and the assumption of its value for individuals by these theorists, shares similar 
philosophical groundings to the Kantian framework at the centre of this thesis: whether 
they ground their insistence on the importance of the individual defining and 
understanding their identity on the philosophical understanding of humans as having a 
right to be self-law giving agents, able to rely on their individual purposiveness to direct the 
choices of their existence, and the formation of their identity as they understand it.  
Professional African philosophers are an ever growing, but small and recently founded, 
community, and many of the debates and discussions occur amongst a well cited group; 
with many of the publications speaking to one another. For this reason much of the 
discussion in this chapter surrounds debates taking place between these philosophers: for 
example, a number of the articles in “Person and Community” (1992) debate back and 
forth around a central topic, and are further referenced in other texts. Thus, selection of 
the theorists for analysis was fundamental. In doing so, it was essential to cover a range of 
perspectives, whilst also maintaining a focus on topics specifically relevant to this thesis. In 
particular, a number of influential African scholars concentrate on broadening 
understanding of the folk philosophies of traditional groups, such as the Akan, Yoruba or 
Ewe people. Whilst these discussions are related to topics of personhood, and would make 
for an interesting future project for analysis; it was decided that they did not fit the remit 
of this thesis. Thus, a number of enlightening and engaging works by Gyekye, Wiredu and 
Immanuel Chukwudi Eze have been set aside. That being so, the decision was made to 
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exclude a number of important African figures and texts from this study; whilst an 
interesting insight to the philosophy of the region, if they are not relevant to discussions of 
personhood, autonomy, self-mastery, dominance and self-law giving, or if they present 
their interpretation of the views of another group (such as the Yoruba) rather than their 
own perspective, they have been excluded from this project. The secondary element of the 
study (whether states people were able to implement the political conditions they claimed 
to support) is a less prominent focus in this chapter than in the previous two. This is due to 
the nature of the individuals being studied: professional philosophers rather than political 
states people. This is not to imply that any discussion of ideal political states in their texts 
was excluded, but rather that analysis of their abilities to implement them cannot be 
carried out in the same way as in previous chapters.  
That being said, the following group of philosophers, from a wide range of ideological 
backgrounds, and discussing issues of culture, personhood, self-mastery, autonomy and 
political theory more generally, have been selected as being of relevance to the analysis of 
this thesis. This is not to suggest that this list is exhaustive, as due to the limiting 
parameters of this study (as set out in the Introduction) a number had to be excluded, and 
will thus be included in further study. This chapter in particular, focuses on a less well 
defined group, coming from a range of backgrounds rather than one in particular. As 
previously mentioned, this is advantageous for questioning if theorists from different 
backgrounds imply in their publications a belief in certain a priori foundations, but it is also 
more challenging when selecting texts and authors to be analysed. However, a selection of 
texts from the following authors is included in this chapter: Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Gyekye, 
Kwame Anthony Appiah, Paulin Hountondji, Dismas Masolo, Immanuel Chukwudi Eze, 
Valentin-Yves Mudimbe, Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o and Noah Dzobo. These are the authors 
selected as primary sources. However, there are further academics included as secondary 
discussants, as well as analysis of the debate that takes place between the philosophers 
mentioned above. 
Having detailed the selection process for the primary sources, briefly introduced the topics 
which are central to the debate of this chapter, as well as introduced the theorists and a 
number of the primary texts, this chapter proceeds to the first point of analysis: a critique 
of narratives of “return”, emphasis on traditional models and ethnophilosophy.  
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5.2- A Critique of Narratives of “Return”, Traditional Values and 
Ethnophilosophy: 
This section is divided into two halves. Both halves consider a number of critiques posed by 
contemporary philosophers regarding previous streams of thought, either emanating from 
Africa, or colonial discussions of traditional African views and values. The first half discusses 
their criticisms of narratives of “return”, asking whether these criticisms are grounded on 
principles of concern for foundational principles similar to those delineated in Chapter 1, or 
whether the debates between the two streams of thought (contemporary critiques and the 
narratives of “return” literature) focus on the same foundational principles. To clarify, 
whether, similarly to discussions taking place in Chapter 3 between the Négritude 
movement and its critics, the arguments being made by both groups are premised on the 
value of respecting the same foundational principles, but the point of contention surrounds 
how these principles should be recognised. The second half of this section analyses similar 
questions in relation to the school of thought of ethnophilosophy. Ethnophilosophy 
originated in South East Africa with the publication of Belgian missionary Placide Tempel’s 
“La Philosophie Bantoue” (Bantu Philosophy), published in French in 1945 with an English 
translation following in 1959. It refers to a belief, held by a number of missionaries in the 
time period, that the rigorous analytical requirements placed on Western philosophy were 
not appropriate standards by which to judge African thought systems. Rather, it was the 
role of visiting missionaries to translate and interpret these thought systems and to apply 
philosophical standards. Tempel’s supported the position that African groups did have a 
philosophy but that it was confined to oral traditions and lacking a rigorous methodology. 
This somewhat patronising approach to studying other cultures has been widely 
condemned by contemporary African scholars and their critiques will be the main focus of 
the second half of this section. 
There is a fundamental distinction between the analytical approaches of contemporary 
philosophers to studying and learning from the past, and that of a historical “return” 
narrative associated with Senghor and Césaire: one concentrates on studying and 
understanding the past, whilst the other glorifies and mythologises it with the hope of 
emanating it in future political conditions. Masolo delineates this distinction in his 
discussion of the role the colonial period played in shaping the conditions of the post-
colonial: “The postcolonial defines itself in the shadow of the colonial, from which it is 
inseparable. Remember, however, that saying that the postcolonial condition is 
determined by its preceding opposite is not the same as saying that the precedent 
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condition was good” (Masolo, 1997, p.285). It is his argument that the fact that the present 
is influenced by the past does not suggest that the past was either right or good, nor that 
lessons taken from the past shouldn’t be changed or adapted for future usage. This is often 
recognised in discussions such as these that focus on the colonial period, in which the 
colonisers are condemned for their mistreatment of the colonised. However, contemporary 
African philosophers argue that a number of their predecessors have been mistaken in 
their treatment of the pre-colonial period. It is suggested by a number of theorists, in 
particular Hountondji, that simply because the pre-colonial condition formed the 
foundations of African communities, and could be described as organically African, (unlike 
the colonial forms of government which had alien origins) is not, they argue, reason to 
support overthrowing valuable colonial input in favour of a return to supposed African 
roots. Rather, they support a system of progression in politics that utilises input from a 
range of sources. Eze further emphasises this point: “political practices in Africa today are a 
more flexible and often highly eclectic or syncretic melange of the African and the Western, 
the old and the new, the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial, and so forth” (Eze, 1997, 
p.314). On investigation of both of these arguments it is clear that both Eze and Masolo 
place less emphasis on a need to eradicate colonial influence, as was suggested by theorists 
such as Césaire, Fanon and later Nkrumah. Nor do they focus on glorifying the pre-colonial 
condition as the solution to Africa’s contemporary problems (like Senghor), but rather they 
concentrate on combining the lessons from a number of different time periods to develop 
a synthesised system to best suit contemporary Africa. Such an approach raises the 
question: on what grounds this approach is justified. Such a question is of particular 
interest to this thesis as it enables comparisons to be drawn between, not only the 
foundations of the arguments being made for a synthesising approach and one of the more 
traditional models discussed in the previous two chapters, but also between these 
approaches and the Kantian framework set out in Chapter 1. The argument being, if each 
contrasting approach is grounded on the value of self-law giving to individuals, then further 
evidence exists to support the argument that it is an a priori value prior to political or 
cultural difference. This enquiry underpins the following discussion and justifies its 
placement in this thesis.  
Wiredu suggests that a “return” approach is methodologically flawed. He constructs this 
argument on the basis of a comparison with a desire to return to our childhood as a 
method of better developing our adulthood: 
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“There are problems of principle with this mode of self-definition. It is 
obviously not true in general that what we ought to be is what we used to 
be. We were children to start with, but that hardly supports nostalgia for 
infantilism. The concept of self-improvement implies that we ought to 
become something other than what we are currently or were in the past. 
Thus, unless we make the strange assumption that culture is not open to 
improvement, the premise under discussion must be acknowledged to be 
faulty” (Wiredu, 1992, p.60). 
His argument, therefore, is grounded on an understanding that human identity, both in the 
individual and cultural sense, is fluid and changeable. This also implies that it can be 
enhanced by the experience of new and different things. This assumption implies that 
human identity is not fixed, but rather something that develops and changes over time. He 
also makes reference to the concept of self-improvement; implying that development in 
this sense relies on a philosophical approach that is not grounded on a narrative of “return”. 
In drawing similarities between the foundations of Wiredu’s understanding of identity (as 
being fluid and changeable, or developing over time), and a Kantian model, it can be 
suggested that his argument shares similar foundations to those in “An Answer to the 
Question: what is Enlightenment” (1784). These similarities can be recognised with Kant’s 
argument that reaching enlightenment was a process of development and change. The 
concept of an ever changing identity driven towards the achievement of autonomy or 
freedom (understood to be different on a Kantian and Wireduian model, but nonetheless, 
still an overarching process), suggests a shared understanding of the changing process 
through which individual autonomy can be realised. Wiredu argues that what individuals 
ought to be is not necessarily what they currently are, nor what they were in the past, but 
rather it is something that develops and grows. Whilst the arguments for this may differ 
(Wiredu places less emphasis on living guided by reason) they are nonetheless similar in 
assuming that individuals develop and grow over time. Thus, a static approach to 
understanding identity fails to recognise the complexities of personhood, as individuals 
react to changes in experience.  
Gyekye criticises Wiredu, suggesting that he fails, in his analysis, to recognise the value of 
understanding, and learning from, traditions. As previously suggested, this is not to argue 
that Gyekye supports a “return” approach to identity formation, but rather that he feels 
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that there are lessons that can be learnt from academic study of traditions. He responds to 
Wiredu as such: 
“Wiredu, for instance, has said that ‘…traditional conceptions of things just 
cannot provide an adequate basis for contemporary philosophy.’ This kind 
of judgement, even if it may contain some truth, is, in my view, too 
sweeping and premature. For the ‘traditional conceptions’ of things have 
not been given adequate philosophical formulation, articulation, and 
analysis by modern African philosophers, and therefore we do not know to 
what extent they can and cannot be accommodated by the ethos of 
contemporary culture, and to what extent and how they should be 
modified” (Gyekye, 1987, p.41). 
The purpose of his essay is not to defend traditional folk philosophies, nor to suggest that 
study of them will prove valuable to understanding best political and philosophical practice 
for future projects. Rather, he argues that traditional conceptions should be viewed as 
material for contemporary philosophical analysis. Following on from this analysis a decision 
can be made as to the utility of the ideas for enhancing future development. This is 
because the primary focus for contemporary African philosophy, according to Gyekye, 
should be “to provide conceptual responses to the problems confronting the contemporary 
African situation” (Gyekye, 1987, p.40). This position is in many ways a middle ground 
between the extremes of a “return” approach popular in the 1940’s, and the approach 
supported by Wiredu that focuses on change and development. The primary focus is on 
developing models of philosophical thought that are of benefit to contemporary 
communities, but to achieve this he advocates for a system that refers to traditional ideas 
that may be useful in guiding and developing the situation. Despite their differences in 
approach discussed here, an area on which they agree is that questions of contemporary 
philosophy in Africa should be the domain of contemporary African scholars, and not the 
remit of post-colonial European scholarship. On making this claim they do not argue that 
there are not universal questions of philosophy (as discussed in Chapter 2 both authors 
support the argument that there are). Rather, that it is important for African philosophers 
to develop a response to these questions grounded on their knowledge and experience and 
not simply to adopt unreservedly, models originating from experiences and cultures that 
are alien to their particular circumstances. 
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Alternatively, Mudimbe argued in the 1980’s, that the African situation at the time was 
almost entirely a product of Western influences and that the continents political and 
philosophical approaches were shaped either by adopting Western ideas, or by reacting 
against them:  
“Modern African thought seems somehow to be basically a product of the 
West… When prominent leaders such as Senghor or Nyerere propose to 
synthesise liberalism and socialism, idealism and materialism, they know 
that they are transplanting Western intellectual Manicheism. The 
conceptual framework of African thinking has been both a mirror and a 
consequence of the experience of European hegemony” (Mudimbe, 1988, 
p.185).  
Underlying this critique is the suggestion that schematics of thought, identity or 
personhood, should not be influenced by external agents. In contrast to a system of African 
thought or political ideology dictated either by the influence of the West or by a desire to 
oppose European ideas; instead, models of thought should be defined by African 
governments, state officials or academics, with the African people themselves as the sole 
concern when dictating policies. When considering the philosophical grounding for such an 
argument, it is possible to imply certain similarities with the Kantian argument for the value 
of self-law giving. Mudimbe’s criticism is based on what he interprets as the choice of 
Nyerere and Senghor to imitate certain Western ideas as an alternative to implementing an 
African system responsive to African needs. This critique is somewhat controversial 
however, as both authors contended that this was not what they were doing (that they 
were in fact implementing an organically African system). However, for the purposes of this 
analysis Mudimbe’s critique will be accepted on face value; the purpose here is not to 
defend or support it, but rather to question whether the philosophical groundings 
underpinning the claim compare favourably with the framework of analysis set out in 
Chapter 1. It is the argument of this thesis that the claims he makes, whilst not presented 
in Kantian language, are based on his argument favouring a system of thought or 
government that is not adopted from elsewhere, but that is alternatively constructed by 
Africans, for Africans: a system similar to the creation of a model of public right, supportive 
of individual self-law giving. By making the observations cited above, he enters into a 
debate about the value to individuals or groups of creating their own systems of thought 
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and political models, and in that sense the principles at the centre of these debates are 
those discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis: choice, self-mastery and domination. 
Having discussed the shared underlying values grounding contemporary critiques of 
narratives of “return”, this section now turns to a discussion of the contemporary critique 
of the system of thought of ethnophilosophy.  
Ethnophilosophy is a term that originated as a critique aimed at those authors who engage 
in descriptive, rather than analytical, philosophical work. By this it is meant to be a pre-
reflective form of research that views African belief systems as static and unchanging. To 
illustrate, ethnophilosophy looks at individuals as groups of people and claims that the 
group as a whole has a shared philosophy. For example, they present the views of 
individuals that have been studied or interacted with as being the views of the group as a 
whole: the Maasai people, the Igbo people. It was a school of thought originating with 
Placide Tempel’s and his attempt to philosophise the traditional thought system of the 
linguistic family of the Bantu. He implied in his work that it was the role of European 
anthropologists and missionaries to study what he referred to as “native peoples” and to 
come to understand their methods for understanding life. To achieve this he asked not only 
whether they had a system of philosophy that enabled them to better understand certain 
questions, but also what this system included. Until this point, it had been the argument of 
the colonisers that indigenous peoples were not endowed with the ability to understand 
philosophical questions, such as the meaning of life or the existence of God. However, 
Tempel’s suggested in “Bantu philosophy” (1945) that the elders in traditional African 
groups were, in fact, responding to similar questions to those of traditional philosophical 
enquiry, but that they were doing so orally and in a way that required translation by 
Western anthropologists. These practices, as well as the practices of Tempel’s followers, 
implied that traditional African groups all shared the same understanding of certain 
philosophical questions, and that the questions they were responding to were African 
rather than human. The studies of Tempel’s and his contemporaries thus failed to take into 
account the role of the individual philosopher amongst the group they were studying, 
instead assuming that this was the view of the collective: the Bantu, the Akan, the Yoruba, 
or even Africa as a whole. In discussing Tempel’s work, Mudimbe makes a similar 
observation, suggesting that throughout his work he fails to fairly discriminate between the 
individual, the small community, the larger group or even the continent as a whole: 
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“In effect, throughout his book Tempels indistinctly uses the terms African, 
Bantu, primitives, natives, and savages, clearly indicating that although he 
is presenting the ‘philosophy’ of a small community in the Belgian Congo, 
his conclusions could be valid for all non-Western societies. At least twice 
he expresses this ambition” (Mudimbe, 1988, p.139). 
Reverend Placide Tempel’s “Bantu Philosophy” was originally published in the African 
journal, “Présence Africaine”. Like similar studies, Tempel’s is criticised for viewing Bantu 
thought processes as pre logical, separate from rationality, and requiring interpretation by 
the Western academic to make sense to the world. He was often praised for demonstrating 
to the world that African’s did have something that looked like philosophy, but his critics 
have argued that his study was both patronising and lacking in understanding of the 
multiplicity of views that existed amongst the Bantu linguistic family. In short, the aim of his 
work had value, but the methodology failed to respect the philosophies he studied as 
holding equal value and analytical rigour to Western philosophy. Ethnophilosophy is often 
associated with an assumption of African philosophy as being a lesser form of philosophy to 
that of European scholarship and has thus been widely critiqued by a number of 
contemporary theorists. The critique is considered in the following discussion and the 
question raised as to what principles underpin the debate. The role of this chapter is not to 
analyse Tempel’s work specifically, and thus it is not cited directly in this chapter. Rather, 
the purpose is to discuss the movement that formed amongst contemporary scholars 
critiquing his, and his followers, proclamations of the existence of a secondary form of 
philosophy that was to be viewed as utilising less scholarly rigour than that of the European 
model, and the philosophical underpinnings of this movement. 
The first usage of the term ethnophilosophy is associated with Paulin Hountondji, who 
made use of it in 1970 to “characterise the work of people like Placide Tempels, Alexis 
Kagame, Leopold Sedar Senghor, Marcel Griaule and Germain Dieterlen” (Hallen 1995, 
p.382). Hountondji believed that these theorists were guilty of supporting a double-
standard in which philosophy emanating from Africa was required to meet a lower 
standard than that emanating from the West. It was not required to meet the necessary 
standards of reflectivity, rationality and scientific rigour that were normally expected of 
Western philosophy. In defence of these authors Hallen suggested that “in their own 
intellectual circles they believed they were doing something revolutionary, something 
genuinely radical and progressive, by daring to link the word philosophy directly to African 
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systems of thought” (Hallen, 1995, p.384). However, it is widely accepted in contemporary 
circles that the value of the ethnophilosophical approach was outweighed by the 
assumptions it made regarding the existence of group philosophies rather than individual 
scholars, and the failure to recognise individual and cultural differences amongst large 
groups. A vast literature exists discussing these ideas. However, due to the scholarly aims 
of this thesis the focus of the remainder of this section is comparing the philosophical 
underpinnings of the contemporary philosophical critiques of ethnophilosophy.  
Masolo cites the concept of a cohesive, jointly possessed, African personality as being at 
the heart of what he views to be at fault with an ethnophilosophical approach. It is the 
failure to recognise the vast cultural and individual differences that exist amongst African 
individuals and groups that he views as being of particular issue:  
“The cohesion of African societies has given false impressions of a 
subjectless unity, suggesting to Western scholarship the unanimity and 
sameness of all Africans…I wish to argue that this generalisation of an 
African identity, like most universals, is not real because it does not reflect 
the social experiences of single subjects; that is not only misleading, but 
also part of the politics of re-presenting” (Masolo, 1997, p.291).  
This citation offers an interesting insight into two interlinked arguments this thesis is 
making in relation to the approaches of post-colonial academics. Firstly, it is critical of the 
establishment of concepts such as “African personality” which, as has been discussed in 
Part 1 of this thesis, were common between the 1940’s and 1970’s as a method of re-
establishing what is viewed by certain groups to be an African response to concerns of 
oppression and domination imposed by the colonisation movement. This leads to the 
second observation, whilst there is a distinguishable difference between the approaches of 
contemporary African academics and those philosopher statesmen and activists from the 
middle of the last century, the work of whom they criticise, there is a shared philosophical 
underpinning dictating the purpose of all the aforementioned individuals work. This is a 
theme that is apparent across the chapters of this thesis. Both, those individuals supporting 
the concept of an “African personality”, and those critiquing it, do so for a number of 
reasons. On investigation, one which is common across theorists is the right of Africans not 
to suffer domination from external forces, such as colonial and post-colonial forces. 
Domination, here, is understood in the Kantian sense presented in Chapter 1, as 
wrongdoing based on the premise “not that somebody does something that causes 
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something bad to happen to you; it is that somebody does something to you” (Ripstein, 
2009, p.42) at all. For example, in the above quote Masolo refers to the right of individuals 
not to be “re-presented” in a way that does not respect the choices of the individual or 
community. By re-presenting them in such a way, the rights of individuals or communities 
to dictate their own identity are curtailed. This is not to suggest that the unified identity is 
necessarily bad or offensive, but rather that the act of imposing an external view of 
another’s identity fails to recognise them as a self-mastering individual with their own 
choice and purposiveness. This is, in and of itself, an act of domination. In contrast, 
theorists such as Senghor and Césaire (cited in Chapter 3) argued that the rhetorical tool of 
a shared African identity provided a platform on which future generations could build a 
response to oppression and that rather than being viewed as a tool of domination, it should 
instead be viewed as a response to oppression able to provide a condition under which 
individuals could develop as persons. Thus, it can be argued that the debate between the 
two groups (those supporting and those condemning reliance on unifying identities to 
strengthen personhood) does not question the foundations of personhood, but rather, the 
methods that are suitable for creating the correct conditions to develop it. Regarding the 
value of the metaphysical foundations of choice, purposiveness, oppression and self-
mastery themselves, this thesis suggests that the two sets of theorists find agreement, and 
that this agreement relies on an understanding of self-mastery as being a foundational 
principle of personhood.  
When establishing a critique of ethnophilosophy, a further focus that is shared by most 
contemporary scholars is on the assumption that African’s are not responding to 
philosophical questions in the sense that Western philosophy does. Rather, they are 
responding to African specific questions with lower expectations placed on the quality of 
output. It is not assumed by ethnophilosophy that reason is a universal trait, nor that 
African’s possess it. Thus, reason is not viewed as fundamental to philosophical enquiry 
emanating from Africa; whereas it is viewed as being central to traditional European 
philosophical investigation. Appiah discusses the views of both Hountondji and Wiredu on 
this matter and concludes by agreeing with their analysis that, “uncritical ethnophilosophy 
fails, in the end, as I have argued, to face the truly urgent questions that would be faced by 
a critical tradition” (Appiah, 1992, p.103). He suggests that this conclusion results from the 
lack of focus on rigorous and critical philosophical enquiry.  Appiah’s central argument 
focuses on the question of what makes a particular philosophy or theory African: 
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“As a believer in the universality of reason, Wiredu holds the relevance of 
his being African to his philosophy to be both, in one sense, more global 
and, in another, more local; more local in that…he speaks as a Ghanaian 
from an African culture, more global in that he asks what it is that the 
particularity of his Ghanaian experience can offer to the philosophical 
community outside Africa. For Wiredu there are no African truths, only 
truths-some of them about Africa… His (Hountondji’s) prescription is that 
we should think of African philosophy as being African not (as the 
ethnophilosophers claim) because it is about African concepts or problems, 
but because (and here he agrees with Wiredu) it is that part of the 
universal discourse of philosophy that is carried out by Africans” (Appiah, 
1992, p.106). 
This brief discussion of the critiques of ethnophilosophy made by contemporary scholars 
demonstrates that, for them, it is fundamental for the philosophical community outside of 
Africa to understand that, similarly to the rest of the world, the work they are doing is in 
pursuing answers to universally relevant questions. It is their opinion that these questions 
relate to everyday human existence and have been the topic of debate amongst 
philosophers from time immemorial. To name just a few examples of these questions: 
What is human nature? Why do we need politics? What does it mean to be an individual? 
What is freedom? Is there a deity? In their view, what separates them from Western 
philosophers or Asian philosophers is their experience growing up in, and contributing to, a 
range of different African cultures, and the ways in which these experiences have shaped 
their approach to study and thought. They argue that what they are able to offer to the 
global philosophical community is an African approach to responding to these universal 
questions. On establishing these claims an assumption is made, similar to that at the core 
of this thesis: that there are shared universal questions that are relevant to humanity in 
general and not dictated by cultural experience, and that these questions and debates are 
underpinned by certain a priori principles. This thesis has argued that these underpinning 
principles are those set out in the Kantian framework discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
The thinkers discussed in this chapter, like this thesis, suggest that responses to said 
questions are culturally dependant, but that the questions themselves are nonetheless 
universally relevant. This has been seen, in particular, in this section in discussion of the 
foundational underpinnings of arguments both for and against narratives of “return”, as 
well as the debate surrounding the existence of a homogenous “African personality”. It has 
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been shown that both those advocating for, and against, these positions do so on the 
understanding of a basic notion of self-law giving in the sense of condemning domination 
and supporting the values of self-mastery in identity formation. Therefore, this section has 
argued that it is possible to draw parallels not only between the foundations of the 
contradictory positions, but also between those positions and the Kantian framework being 
utilised for the analysis of this thesis.   
Having discussed the concerns of a selection of contemporary African philosophers with 
ethnophilosophy, excessive focus on traditional values and narratives of “return”, and the 
philosophical ideas underpinning these concerns, the following section (Section 5.3) 
focuses on a discussion of the concept of culture in relation to universal principles.  
5.3- Universal Principles and the Role of Culture: 
The role of this section within the thesis is to expand on the discussion of the views of 
Kwame Gyekye and Kwasi Wiredu that were included in Chapter 2 regarding the role of 
culture in understanding, and responding to, the hypothesised concept of a priori 
foundational principles. There are a number of similarities between this section, and both 
the debate that took place in Chapter 2 and issues of specifically African concepts of 
philosophy discussed in the previous section (Section 5.2). The purpose of this section 
however, is not to repeat this previous analysis, but rather to develop and expand on the 
arguments that have been made elsewhere.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the debate that takes place between universalism and relativism 
is both complex and extensive. Polycarp Ikuenobe argues that this deliberation has 
extended, in recent history, into a specifically African debate on either side of which, he 
argues, exist Universalists and Particularists:  
“The former camp, represented by the works of Bondunrin, Wiredu, 
Appiah, and Hountondji, among others, argues that the concept of 
‘philosophy’, in terms of the methodology and subject matter of the 
discipline, should be the same in both Western and African senses. The 
latter camp, as seen in the works of Ayoade, Gyekye, Sodipo, and 
Onwuanibe, among others, argues that different cultures have different 
ways of explaining reality; hence Africans must have a philosophy that is 
essentially different from other philosophies” (Ikuenobe, 1997, p.189).  
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Ikuenobe thus summarises the debate that was raised in the previous section and suggests 
that, even amongst contemporary scholars, the question of what it means to be a 
philosopher in Africa is widely contested. That being said, neither side of this debate 
suggests that reality itself is not experienced universally, nor that there are not certain 
fundamentally shared elements of humanity that enable individuals from different cultural 
groups to recognise one another as being of the same species. However, what is contested 
is the approach to understanding these facts of existence. Ikuenobe concludes that: 
“There are both universalist and particularist elements in African 
philosophy. In other words, although there are culturally determined 
philosophical ways of constructing meaning, these ways are not 
incommensurable. As such, we can use the ‘known’ universal (?) 
philosophical concepts and methods of one ‘culture’ to analyse and make 
understandable the philosophical beliefs and worldviews of another 
culture” (Ikuenobe, 1997, p.190). 
Thus, for Ikuenobe, similarly to the argument of this thesis, the existence of a wide range of 
cultural groups and experiences does not prevent cross-cultural collaboration and 
discourse, in fact the wide range of perspectives and experiences provides a basis for 
growth: as cultures can learn from one another’s philosophical methods and experiences. 
To be able to achieve this level of discourse, it can be argued, relies on the existence of 
certain human traits or foundations that enable cultures to recognise themselves in other 
groups, and thus to see the value in learning from one another. Kant argues in “Toward 
Perpetual Peace” that even in times of war it is necessary to maintain “some degree of 
trust in the enemy’s manner of thinking” (Kant, 2006, p.70) and to respect them as persons. 
Thus, it is implied by both Kant and Ikuenobe, that even in times of complete and 
fundamental disagreement between groups, it is still possible to recognise one another as 
persons and to garner understanding of a different set of philosophical beliefs. Thus, it is 
suggested that a universal trait of shared personhood must be the basis for this recognition. 
For Kant, this is the right of reasoned individuals to live only by the laws they will for 
themselves and to do “that which they themselves find necessary to undertake” (Kant, 
2006, p.21) in advancement of ends directed by their own purposiveness; limited only 
when the advancement of those ends conflicts with the rights of others to achieve the 
same. Parallels can be drawn between the Kantian position (that universal laws exist 
governing all persons, but within this framework individual’s possess complete autonomy 
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up to the point that they encroach on another’s autonomy), and Ikuenobe’s position that 
there are certain universal concepts relevant across cultures but that these are 
supplemented by individually and culturally specific concepts and methods.  
The distinction between Particularist and Universalist approaches to understanding 
existence raises a further interesting question: What are the consequences of these 
approaches? Josiah Cobbah argues, similarly to Senghor’s concept of a Universal Civilisation 
discussed in Chapter 3, that accepting the existence of different culturally specific 
approaches to human existence can, in fact, be of value not only to the group that may 
have been silenced in the past, but also to humanity in general. The concept of learning 
from other cultures is one that has been discussed throughout this thesis, in particular in 
relation to African cultures. The argument that is being put forward by these theorists is 
not that previously silenced groups may necessarily be approaching questions of 
philosophical interest in a different or original way, but rather that the different cultural 
experiences they have may, in certain cases, lead to different and valuable insights to 
universally relevant issues. Cobbah raises this point in discussion of the issue of human 
dignity, and what it means for different cultural groups. He suggests that “it should be 
helpful for Westerners to look to other cultures in order to re-establish the fact that our 
rights as individuals and as a society should eventually relate to our dignity as human 
beings” (Cobbah, 1987, p.319). He  goes on in his article to relate this to the question of 
universal human nature, suggesting that when comparing cultural groups it is important to 
understand that “homeomorphism is not the same as equivalence and strive to discover 
peculiar functional equivalence in different cultures” (Cobbah, 1987, p.329). This is not to 
imply that certain facts of humanity are not universally relevant. In fact, he admits in his 
1987 article that “there may indeed be a universal human nature” (Cobbah, 1987, p.328). 
However, he does not believe that this is an argument for homogenising cultural or human 
difference. In particular, he focuses on discussion of human rights. As suggested in the 
above quote, he argues that such an approach could actually be detrimental to human 
dignity. He implies that what it means to have dignity may differ between groups and the 
rights we have should reflect this. He advocates for a model similar to that of Will 
Kymlicka’s discussed in Chapter 2 that takes cultural difference into account when defining 
certain rights. Thus, Cobbah suggests that whilst what it means to different groups or 
individuals may alter, the concept of dignity itself is a human concern. Thus, similarly to 
arguments previously raised by a number of the theorists considered in both this chapter 
and Chapter 3, it can be implied from reading Cobbah’s article that he advocates for the 
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value of protecting culturally different approaches that are utilised for the achievement of 
the same philosophical end point; an argument that is not only supported by this thesis but 
that is also a common thread in the analysis of thinkers from across cultural and ideological 
backgrounds. It is not clear from reading his article what dignity means according to 
Cobbah, but it is nonetheless implied that it is of value to humans in general. Resulting 
from the acceptance of certain universal concerns by a large number of the thinkers 
analysed in this thesis, it can be assumed that such an assumption is held by a number of 
thinkers.  
Further to the discussion in Chapter 2, reference is made here to Gyekye’s work on the 
topic. He is very clear in his argument that there are certain universal ideas that define 
human understanding in general and that it is not the cultural uniqueness of a philosophy 
that defines its value. He uses the example of comparison between the belief systems of 
multiple traditional African cultures to provide evidence for this argument: 
“A painstaking comparative study of African cultures leaves one in no 
doubt that despite the undoubted cultural diversity arising from Africa’s 
ethnic pluralism, threads of underlying affinity do run through the beliefs, 
customs, value systems and socio-political institutions and practices of the 
various African societies” (Gyekye, 1987, p.192). 
In making this claim he refers to community as being central to the understanding of the 
individual and in the creation of political structures. Beyond this, a number of his more 
general articles can be critiqued for not offering a detailed account of the similarities; 
although much of his work focuses on a more specific account of each ethnic group, and 
therefore, this information can be gleaned from these studies. However, as previously 
stated, this element of Gyekye’s work is not considered in detail within this chapter. That 
being said, his argument, as quoted above, is of interest to the overall debate of this thesis. 
It emphasises Gyekye’s support for approaching philosophical study on the basis that 
certain shared belief systems and values remain relevant regardless of other cultural 
differences and affiliations. He not only argues that this is the case when comparing 
traditional African groups, but also implies that certain similarities would exist if, say, 
comparison was carried out between the views of the Akan people and the views of a 
geographically diverse group such as the English:  
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“If my remarks regarding the possibility of doctrinal affinities in world 
philosophies are reasonable, then we cannot maintain that the 
philosophical system of one people must necessarily be different in all 
respects from another people… on some philosophical questions the 
answers of the Akan thinkers may well be similar to those of thinkers of the 
West or the East, but on others they may be different” (Gyekye, 1987, 
p.21). 
It can be argued that Gyekye recognises the existence of certain foundational principles as 
being a priori. Further evidence for interpreting his views in such a way exists in referencing 
the following quote taken from Gyekye and Wiredu’s collection of essays “Person and 
Community” (1987): 
“African philosophical systems will not be unique. The important thing is to 
see how the ideas of being, causation, the nature of a person, destiny, evil, 
morality, the nature of human society and social relationships, etc., are 
comprehended and analysed by African thinkers on the basis of African 
cultural and intellectual experience. African perspectives on these ideas 
may be similar to those of others; nevertheless, they are worth examining 
within the African conceptual crucible” (Gyekye, 1987, p.211). 
On analysing this quote, it is clear that he does not suggest that the existence of certain 
shared concepts should lead to the silencing of one culture by another; rather he argues 
that the different (culturally specific), analytical approaches will be positive for human 
understanding as this will enhance the shared pool of human knowledge.  He is supported 
in this approach, as previously mentioned, by a number of other thinkers. Masolo, for 
example, utilises logic to explain difference in this sense. He suggests that, “The fact that P 
is the negation of –P is not a sufficiently good reason for inferring that all claims involving P 
can be resolved in one way at all times by everybody” (Masolo, 1997, p.294). Appiah makes 
a similar claim grounded on a transcendental argument:  
“Now, no doubt, not all cultures have exactly these concepts, but all of 
them will probably have concepts that bear a family resemblance to 
them…No one could have social norms without concepts at least 
something like good, evil, right, and wrong, and a society without norms 
could hardly exist- not simply because the concept of a society is 
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connected with the idea of shared norms but because without common 
norms it is difficult to conceive of any collective action…There is, then, in 
every culture a folk philosophy, and implicit in that folk philosophy are all 
(or many) of the concepts that academic philosophers have made central 
to their study in the West” (Appiah, 1992, p. 87). 
To elucidate, he argues similarly to Kant, that because societies are built on social norms 
and understandings that enable individuals to interact in some meaningful sense, and 
debate on such topics as right and wrong and good and evil, that these concepts must be 
understood across cultural boundaries. Furthermore, that each cultural group must have 
some form of philosophy that enables them to understand what these terms mean in their 
specific situation. For a Kantian this constitutes the ability to reason about fundamental 
questions and to then define the relevant laws by which one lives because “reason 
commands how men are to act even though no example of this could be found, and it takes 
no account of the advantages we can thereby gain, which only experience could teach us” 
(Kant, 1996, p.9). Thus for Kantians moral laws and norms “command for everyone” (Kant, 
1996, p.9) and are established a priori and accessed via reason. They would therefore be 
unaffected by cultural difference and all autonomous agents would reason the same 
universal laws. Parallels can be drawn here between the Kantian position and Appiah’s 
argument for the existence of shared norms, as both suggest that there are certain human 
issues that are universally relevant principles which are relevant to all and thus form the 
basis of collective decision making or state craft. This is not to suggest that these concepts 
will look the same, or be treated the same in each different setting, but rather that a priori 
principles underpin the founding of these social norms which allow for them to be referred 
to similarly, and for members of different groups to be able to recognise collectively shared 
social norms.  
The purpose of this debate so far has been to suggest that a commonly shared theme 
amongst the theorists considered is to support, to a greater or lesser extent, the existence 
of certain universals which transcend cultural dimensions. It is then the purpose of the next 
section (Section 5.4) to analyse whether the shared universals the theorists refer to 
resemble the themes defined in Chapter 1 as representing the Kantian foundational 
principles of internal self-law giving and external willkür.  
Having discussed a selection of African philosophers’ beliefs in the distinction between 
Particularist and Universalist accounts for grounding and understanding philosophy, and 
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the repeated theme of utilising a local approach to human issues, the secondary focus of 
this section is on the role they see culture as playing in this experience. According to 
Gyekye, the cultural community in which individuals exist dictates certain elements of their 
life. For example, community provides, for Gyekye, the conditions for individuals to make 
their own choices and define their own paths:  
“The cultural community constitutes the context or medium, in which the 
individual person works out and chooses his goals and life plans, and, 
through these activities, ultimately becomes what he wants to be- the sort 
of status he wants to acquire- the cultural community must be held as prior 
to the individual” (Gyekye, 1992, p.106). 
Thus for him, as suggested in Chapter 2, community plays a fundamental role in defining 
individual identity and also in creating the necessary conditions for autonomous choice and 
purposiveness. In raising the individual, the community defines the conditions by which 
freedom is possible. This, similarly with discussion of the views of Nyerere and Machel in 
Chapter 4, is not to suggest that individual freedom is not fundamental to the existence of 
the individual, but rather that they rely on a different method of achieving this freedom. He 
discusses these ideas in debate with Ifeanyi Menkiti, in which the two theorists discuss the 
role of community in African political thought systems. Gyekye defines his view as being a 
form of “restricted communitarianism”, in which he views the community as important but 
also recognises the value of the individual at the centre of his theorising. In contrast, he 
argues that Menkiti’s views (and additionally, he claims, those of previous African leaders 
such as Nkrumah and Nyerere), are examples of radical or excessive communitarianism. It 
is his opinion that his model represents a balance between extreme individualism and 
extreme communitarianism, recognising both the importance and the necessity of both the 
community and the individual. He thus argues for a:  
“Moderated or restricted version of communitarianism that... It is not clear 
which of the two versions, if any, is espoused in African cultural traditions. 
But the position I have taken generally appears to run counter to that of 
the African political leaders whose writings in the period following the 
attainment of political independence unmistakably suggest a radical or 
extreme type of communitarianism traced by them to African cultural 
traditions” (Gyekye, 1992, p.121).  
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When analysing the similarities in philosophical foundation that exist between the works of 
Gyekye and those of the Kantian framework of foundational principles, it is necessary to 
recognise his focus on the role, rather than the position, of the community. To clarify, for 
Gyekye, unlike extreme versions of communitarianism, the community does not exist as an 
end in itself. Rather, its function is defined as improving the well-being of the individuals. 
Within that setting “a communal being (is) an autonomous, self-determining, self-assertive 
being with a capacity for evaluation and choice” (Gyekye, 1992, p. 113). Thus, not only is 
the role of the community defined by the individual, in a similar way to the Kantian concept 
of public right, there are also similarities between what the two models view as ideal forms 
of individual attainment. Thaddeus Metz argues that this equates, not only in the case of 
Gyekye, but also Wiredu, to a particular focus for their forms of African philosophy. He 
argues that they conceive the role of African morality as being a “function of improving 
people’s quality of life” (Metz, 2007, p.330). It can be implied on analysing the previous 
citation of Gyekye’s views that what constitutes quality of life for him is similarly focused to 
the underlying Kantian principles, and that this is potential evidence for their a priori 
existence. He makes reference to the values of autonomy, self-assertion and choice as 
being central to the development of the individual. These values will be discussed in 
greater detail in relation to the views of contemporary African philosophers in the 
following section (Section 5.4).  
Similarly to Gyekye’s suggestion that the community creates the conditions on which 
individuals can develop their autonomy and choice, Noah Dzobo implies that community is, 
in fact, fundamental to the process of realising the individual right to be self-governing: 
“We as self-governing people need a framework of ideas, guiding principles and clear 
values that will help us define and determine our collective will as well as individual destiny, 
and retrieve and maintain our self-respect as a people” (Dzobo, 1992, p.224). Thus, for 
Dzobo, the community provides the guidelines by which concepts of individual autonomy 
can be understood and realised. Such a model can be compared favourably with a Kantian 
system of public right: “a system of laws for a people, that is, a multitude of human beings, 
or for a multitude of peoples, which, because they affect one another, need a rightful 
condition under a will uniting them, a constitution, so that they may enjoy what is laid 
down as right” (Kant, 1996, p.89). Such a system, like Dzobo’s, relies on the state, or 
community, to put in place a framework of guidelines, established by the people, that 
protects the autonomy of the individual to act dictated by their own purposiveness. Thus, 
within Dzobo’s model, similarly to Kantian thought, we can view the community as a tool 
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for creating the conditions for individuals to realise their foundational rights to be self-law 
giving persons. It has become clear throughout the analysis of this thesis that a common 
theme exists across the studied theorists. They utilise different methodologies, ideologies 
and approaches to realise similar foundational principles; in Dzobo’s case, like the Kantian 
system of public right, this was the community. In particular there is a shared focus on the 
ability of individuals to be self-governing, and their right to be autonomous. However, as 
expected, there is vast variation in the methods utilised for realising these principles, 
especially when this translates (as in the previous chapters) into the creation of suitable 
political conditions. 
As an extension to the discussion of the role of communal practices to understanding 
identity formation Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o discusses, in his final English language publication 
“Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of African Literature” (1986), the role of language in 
understanding individual and communal identities. It is his argument that language was a 
pivotal element of British colonial rule in Kenya; a system under which school children were 
punished for usage of local languages and rewarded for fluency in English regardless of 
other academic skills: “English became more than a language: it was the language, and all 
others had to bow before it in deference” (Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, 1986, p.11). He argued that, 
in silencing local languages the colonisers were not only silencing a form of communication, 
but also a culture (Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, 1986, p.13), and that in achieving this form of 
silencing they were also controlling individual’s tools of self-definition (Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, 
1986, p.16). As language and culture, simultaneously, according to Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, are 
necessary tools for individuals to achieve self-definition. In response to this condition, he 
argues that it is the responsibility of contemporary scholars to publish their thoughts in 
local languages, and to potentially have them translated for wider audiences, but 
nonetheless to share their views with the people to whom they relate. He argues that this 
would not only be of value to those regions and communities, but also foster better 
understanding of the links between different cultural groups: 
“Writers in African languages should reconnect themselves to the 
revolutionary traditions of an organised peasantry and working class in 
Africa to defeat imperialism and create a higher system of democracy and 
socialism in alliance with all other peoples of the world. Unity in that 
struggle would ensure unity in our multi-lingual diversity. It would also 
reveal the real links that bind the people of Africa to the peoples of Asia, 
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South America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand, Canada and the U.S.A.” 
(Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, 1986, p.30). 
This socialist idea suggests not only Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o’s belief in the value of local 
languages, but also his understanding of shared identities that exist across cultures: in this 
case a united socialist peasantry who, he suggests, will see similarities in their experiences 
of oppression and domination. Thus, similarly to the other theorists discussed in this 
section, Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o argues both for the necessity and value of cultural attributes to 
achieving self-definition within the identity formation process, as well as the existence of 
shared attributes existing across cultural groups. Whilst he makes reference specifically to 
socialist ideals, he does not suggest that these are the limits of shared expression. The 
focus on the value and importance of self-definition suggests that these factors, also, are 
central to his understanding of universally shared philosophical underpinnings to 
personhood. 
Having discussed the role of culture and community on the understanding of personhood 
of a selection of contemporary African philosophers, as well as the philosophical principles 
underlying their views, the penultimate section of this chapter (Section 5.4) deliberates the 
potential existence of either implicitly or explicitly Kantian language in the work of these 
theorists. 
5.4- Kantianism and Contemporary African Philosophy: 
Analysis in this section is divided into two sub-sections. The first questions similarities 
between the African thinkers and the Kantian model in relation to rights and duties of 
internal concerns of self-law giving. The second sub-section focuses on the philosophers’ 
suggestions for the role of the state in delivering these conditions, the type of political 
condition they would view as ideal, and the necessary limits they argue need to be placed 
on individuals to ensure their equal right to realise their willkür. To clarify, whether the 
political condition they recommend to enable this is similar to the Kantian condition of 
public right. In contrast to the analysis in Part 1 of this thesis (and due to their roles as 
professional philosophers rather than statesmen), the analysis in this section does not 
extend to consider their ability to deliver said conditions. Rather, it will be based purely on 
the philosophical justifications they proffer and the methods they advise for delivering on 
them.  
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i. Rights and Duties of the Individual to be Autonomous  
As a Cosmopolitan, many of Kwame Anthony Appiah’s justifications share similarities with a 
Kantian model. Whilst he has published a wide selection of articles and books on the topics 
of ethics, morality and cosmopolitan ideals, the focus of the analysis in this section is on his 
widely cited seminal text on African philosophy, “In My Father’s House” (1992): 
predominantly on his discussion of identity in relation to autonomy. 
His method for embarking on this discussion is as a response to previously held concepts of 
pre-formed African identity. Similarly to the authors in the previous section, he accepts that 
individual understanding of what it means to be African is often somewhat dictated by the 
surroundings and conditions in which the individual exists. However, he argues in line with 
Chinua Achebe, that those said conditions can, and should, be altered by the individual if 
they contradict with their autonomy: 
“Being African already has a ‘certain context and certain meaning’. But, as 
Achebe suggests, that meaning is not always one we can be happy with, 
and that identity is one we must continue to reshape. And in thinking 
about how we are to reshape it, we would do well to remember that the 
African identity is, for its bearers, only one among many” (Appiah, 1992, 
p.177).  
To emphasise this point he refers to the example of the Igbo people in Nigeria and the 
Shona people in Zimbabwe. He claims that “the Igbo identity is real because Nigerians 
believe in it, the Shona identity because Zimbabweans have given it meaning” (Appiah, 
1992, p.178), and thus context or culture are not fixed identities that exist a priori to the 
individual. In fact, the opposite is true; group identities such as these are defined and 
formed by individuals for their individual purposes and advancement. Resulting from his 
support for such an approach he has a somewhat fluid perception of identity, viewing it as 
something that is both changeable and fluid in response to individuals. On analysis of such 
an approach it is possible, not only to imply that his method places the individual rather 
than the shared identity at its centre, but also to draw comparisons with Brian Barry’s 
approach discussed in Chapter 2. Barry argued for an understanding of culture that was 
fluid and responsive to temporal and situational change. Appiah makes similar claims, with 
a greater focus on the individual. It is his argument that shared norms and identities are 
valuable (in the sense that they inspire community and interaction), but that they are 
secondary to the individual and thus should not be seen as limiting an individual’s freedom. 
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For him, therefore, the concept of individual choice is central. He refers, in this example, to 
specifically African identity which he views as being one amongst many. He asserts that, 
“race and history and metaphysics do not enforce an identity… we can choose, within 
broad limits set by ecological, political, and economic realities what it will mean to be 
African in the coming years” (Appiah, 1992, p.176).  
To clarify, his purpose is not to imply that shared identities, such as African, Nigerian or 
Ghanaian do not exist, but rather, to assert that such identities are properties of an 
individual and should be utilised to ensure that individuals are able to realise certain 
fundamental rights; or as Mudimbe suggests, “as a means for establishing themselves as 
‘subjects’ of their own destiny, taking responsibility for the ‘invention’ of their past as well 
as of the conditions for modernising their societies” (Mudimbe, 1988, p.167). Therefore, it 
can be argued that each of these authors focuses in their philosophies on the rights of 
individuals to have purposiveness over their lives qua individuals. As will become apparent 
in the final sub-section, this for Appiah at least, translates into a re-establishment of what a 
Pan-African identity or community would look like. However, before considering the views 
of other thinkers on the internal rights and duties of individuals, it is of value to summarise 
Appiah’s view of the multiplicity of identities an individual can utilise for their own ends by 
quoting his example of an Akan proverb:  
“’The crocodile does not die under the water so that we can call the 
monkey to celebrate its funeral’. Each of us, the proverb can be used to say, 
belongs to a group with its own customs. To accept that Africa can be in 
these ways a usable identity is not to forget that all of us belong to 
multifarious communities with their local customs” (Appiah, 1992, p.180). 
Thus, identity is not only a fluid concept, nor is it for Appiah a singular entity. Instead, each 
individual embodies many different identities dictated by their individuality.  
William Abraham makes similar claims regarding the individual’s capacity to assimilate 
different cultural values as a method of emancipation. He argues that: 
“The anticipated result of the acculturation will be the re-invigoration of 
sub-Saharan African cultures, enriched by the colonial, the Islamic, and the 
Christian experience in a manner and to an extent which are beneficial to 
the peoples of the areas. The goal is the evolution of cultures within which 
transformation from disrupted, diseased, untechnical and largely illiterate 
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post-colonial societies into harmonious, literate, technical, industrial, 
prosperous and thoroughly emancipated ones can be assured” (Abraham, 
1992, p.29). 
For him, the underlying foundation of such a process is the need for individuals to achieve 
emancipation. Thus, whilst his methods for achieving this condition may not share 
commonalities with the Kantian framework central to this thesis, the underlying 
philosophical justifications (the emancipation of individuals in Africa) are indeed similar. 
Abraham’s recommendations are such that they can be compared with the Kantian 
concept of enlightenment. For Kant, enlightenment was both a process, and a choice on 
the parts of individuals to take up this process, and in this sense it can be viewed as both a 
right and a duty. On becoming enlightened individuals became, on this argument, 
“gradually more capable of freedom of action” (Kant, 2006, p.23) or what could be viewed 
as “emancipation”. Thus it is possible to draw out similarities between the philosophical 
underpinnings of both arguments, each which understand freedom or emancipation to be 
enhanced and achieved via development or enlightenment, and both which view this as a 
right of persons to achieve. Abraham’s recommendations for achieving the condition are 
discussed in the following sub-section (Sub-Section 5.4ii). 
Discussion of identity, what it means to be African or where this identity originates, is, as 
has become apparent throughout this chapter, a question that is at the centre of 
contemporary African philosophy. However, to understand the philosophical foundations 
of this enquiry it is necessary to ask, why? It is in asking this question that similarities 
appear with the philosophy of such an approach and the foundations of Kantian political 
thought. Kwasi Wiredu claims that enquiries into the role and foundation of identity 
emanate from the oppressive treatment of Africans in the colonial period. He suggests that 
such a prevalent focus on identity is reactionary. He raises and answers the following 
question: “But why is there a problem of identity in the first place? Individuals, let alone 
nations and whole continents, do not start wondering whether they are what they ought to 
be if everything seems to be going well. It is when things go wrong that critical self-analysis 
tends to begin” (Wiredu, 1992, p.59). He interprets the response of anti-colonial 
nationalism to be as follows: “because we became what we are now, not of our own free 
will, but rather through a colonial imposition” (Wiredu, 1992, p.60).Thus, the identity crisis 
he refers to is viewed as being a response to a situation in which individuals purposiveness 
in defining their own identity was restricted. He argues that the solution to concerns over 
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identity is the proper usage of reason. To elucidate this point, he refers to the example of 
an individual who views themselves as having multiple personalities, one of which 
originates from an external source: 
“No African Christian can lay much of a claim to authentic African identity if 
he adheres to an unexamined jumble of Euro-Christian and African 
cosmological conceptions. On the other hand, if, on due reflection, a 
modern African concludes that Euro-Christian cosmology or conceptual 
framework, more generally, is preferable, this need not compromise his 
African authenticity” (Wiredu, 1992, p.65).  
Thus, for Wiredu, it is only via reason (an attribute he believes to be universally attainable), 
that individuals come to understand and delineate their views on identity. To recapitulate 
this point, it is only when an individual undergoes a rational decision making process 
regarding their direction of life that their choices are free from oppression. In this sense, it 
is possible to draw similarities with a Kantian focus on the centrality of reason in 
understanding and realising individual freedom and Wiredu’s assumptions. To clarify, the 
Kantian framework being utilised by this thesis, like Wiredu in the above citation, 
postulates reason to be the common factor shared by all humans which dictates their rights 
and duties to be self-law giving autonomous beings.  
Having referred to internal arguments made by a number of philosophers, both for the 
value of individual autonomy in identity formation, and the role of reason in achieving this; 
the final sub-section of this chapter analyses the recommended external conditions for 
establishing the internal philosophical principles discussed so far.  
ii. Guaranteeing Willkür within a Condition of Public Right 
The purpose of this sub-section is to examine the suggested political conditions of a 
number of the theorists discussed in the previous sub-section. The purpose being to 
analyse whether the political states they recommend are in line with guaranteeing the 
foundational principles they suggest are intrinsic to personhood. Abraham argues that 
emancipation is a fundamental right of individuals. Further to this, he argues that 
democratic process provides the conditions for guaranteeing this right: 
“The pursuit of democratic aims and practices all the way down to regional 
and local assemblies holds the best promise for arousing the faith of 
people in their destiny, for galvanising their energies, and for fostering the 
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degrees of self-realisation and self-creation needed by each individual for 
rewarding participation in cultural life” (Abraham, 1992, p.35). 
To summarise, not only is it apparent from the above quote that Abraham supports a 
system of democratic process as a possible solution to ensuring individual freedom, the 
quote also offers further support for the claim of this thesis that he supports internal 
notions of individual self-law giving and self-realisation. Whilst his approach to realising 
these conditions differs somewhat from a Kantian condition of public right, preferring 
instead a direct participatory approach to politics, this does not lessen the implication that 
his arguments are grounded on similar philosophical foundations: the rights of individuals 
to be self-mastering. That being said, this is further evidence for the pattern emerging 
throughout the analysis; theorists and statesmen recognise the value of self-law giving as a 
foundational principle of humanity, in addition they support the uptake of political 
conditions that they argue will enable individuals to realise this principle. However, the 
political models they recommend for achieving this differ (as do the success rates of the 
models), between cultural, ideological and individual perspectives.  
Gyekye argues for similar foundations, but as previously suggested, he does this on the 
assumption of the value of a different property at the centre of the political condition he 
supports. He argues that one of the conditions for establishing and maintaining society and 
community should be a commitment to continued re-evaluation. This, he believes, will 
provide the space for individuals to maintain their autonomy within a communal setting:  
The possibility of re-evaluation means, surely, that the person cannot be 
absorbed by the communal or cultural apparatus…it means, also, that the 
communal structure cannot foreclose the meaningfulness and reality of the 
quality of self-assertiveness which the person can demonstrate in his 
actions. The development of human, communal culture results from the 
exercise by persons of this capacity for self-assertion; it is this capacity 
which makes possible the intelligibility of autonomous individual choice of 
goals and life plans” (Gyekye, 1992, p.112). 
To summarise, as previously suggested, it is the notion of human autonomy and “self-
assertiveness” that, for Gyekye, exists a priori. The concept of culture is both established by, 
and secondary to, individual self-assertion. Thus, he asserts that a political condition is 
needed that recognises this ordering and allows for the constant re-evaluation of the value 
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of certain cultural practices in relation to the individual. Therefore, it can be asserted that 
cultural practices that were detrimental to individuals purposiveness “or individual choice 
of goals and life plans” would be condemned by Gyekye. Thus it can be argued, similarly to 
the analysis of Abraham, that there is an underlying assumption grounding Gyekye’s 
philosophy in the value of individuals being self-mastering, self-law giving agents. 
Additionally, that he supports the establishment of political and societal conditions that are 
able to respect these principles. This is not to suggest that said political or societal 
condition would resemble a Kantian model of public right, but rather, that the justifications 
for the condition would be similar to those utilised to justify a Kantian model.  
5.5- Conclusion: 
Throughout the ever growing canon of contemporary African political theory and African 
philosophy there exists further examples of a similar phenomenon to that which has 
become a common theme of this chapter: shared philosophical assumptions regarding the 
value of autonomy to personhood being associated with different recommendations for 
political and societal models intended to realise these foundations. Due to the analytical 
boundaries of this thesis, it has focused on only a small selection; however, there is a 
common thread of support across the canon for the value of such concepts (at least within 
the debates) as self-assertion, self-mastery, freedom, autonomy, choice and self-
government. The roots of this support, it has been argued, arise as a result of the 
oppressive tendencies of the colonial movement. To clarify, it has been argued that such 
philosophies would not exist if it were not for the atrocities committed by the colonial 
movement. However, throughout this chapter it has been suggested that whilst colonialism 
was an influential factor, it was in fact secondary: that many of these philosophies, whilst 
influenced by oppression, were grounded on foundational principles that are prior to 
experience, that in fact, exist a priori. Thus it may have been a consequence of the colonial 
movement to draw further attention to the desire of individuals to realise these principles 
once they had been prevented from doing so, but nevertheless, the foundations 
themselves do not result from colonialism.  
The principles of equality and self-mastery in particular, are common across the canon. For 
example, Wiredu and Gyekye focus on the importance of equality when different cultures 
enter into dialogue; whilst Abraham and Appiah emphasise the importance of self-
assertion and self-mastery in relation to identity formation and the fundamental value of 
the individual in relation to culture. To summarise, the chapter has discussed the 
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philosophical writings of a number of key thinkers, and has argued throughout that in their 
work appeals are made to similar foundational principles regarding what it means to be a 
person. Similarities have been drawn both between the theorists themselves and with the 
Kantian framework central to the overall hypothesis of this thesis: that it is a right of all 
autonomous agents to be self-law giving and the duty of the state to create the necessary 
conditions to enable this. At no point has it been suggested that these ideas were couched 
in specifically Kantian terms, but rather that underlying similarities exist in the foundational 
principles on which they ground their arguments.  
The final chapter (Concluding Remarks) draws out similarities that have become apparent 
across all three chapters, and makes a number of suggestions for the implications of the 
thesis’s findings. 
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Concluding Remarks: 
This project originally grew out of a concern regarding the universality of Human Rights and 
the way in which they were inter-culturally formed and implemented. This was then 
narrowed down to consider issues of cross-cultural interactions, leading to an interest in 
the question of what it was that all human beings had in common, and whether there were 
universal rights and duties that were not man-made, but rather, that existed a priori. It was 
the opinion of this author, in line with the work of Immanuel Kant and contemporary 
Kantians, that individuals may share, regardless of cultural or ideological affinities, both a 
right and a duty to be self-law giving, and that this, could be viewed as a foundational 
condition when entering into just cross-cultural dialogue. It was through problematizing 
this assumption that this thesis sought to test whether, underpinning the understanding of 
what it means to be a person or individual, is an assumption in the value of self-law giving 
(as both an internal and external condition), and that this assumption constitutes 
foundational principles grounding what it means to be a person. To test this hypothesis, 
this thesis then questioned the existence of these ideas in a selection of debates 
responding to issues of oppression and colonialism within the canon of African political 
theory.  
The choice to test this particular question originated in an analysis of the academic 
literature surrounding issues of personhood, universalism and culture. The analysis 
culminated in the assessment that this body of literature had failed to fully address the 
question of foundational principles, and on what basis just cross-cultural interactions could, 
and do, occur. Through the use of a Kantian framework, this thesis has thus explored on 
what grounds individuals from different cultural, ideological or political groups recognise 
one another as persons and what, if anything, they are owed as a result of their shared 
personhood. The purpose of this was to indicate the potential existence of universally 
relevant, shared, a priori principles that underpinned the human understanding of 
personhood and autonomy, and to suggest that these principles form the foundations of, 
and should be respected when participating in, just cross-cultural dialogue. The concern 
being, in line with Dallmayr’s justification for comparative political theory, to strive for “a 
more genuine universalism” (Dallmayr, 2010, p.15), grounded on the understanding of the 
existence of shared philosophical underpinnings and what these may be. A universalism 
that does not homogenise difference, but rather that is respectful of it as a function of self-
law giving individuals. 
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The resulting study involved a comparative analysis of the philosophical foundations and 
presuppositions of a range of African political theory, enquiring whether the philosophy on 
which the various arguments were built shared a common foundation, focusing on the 
rights and duties of individuals. Through a focus on a Kantian model, as the lens through 
which to address this concern, this thesis has been able to explore the concepts of internal 
and external self-law giving (willkϋr), and to question their value and importance to 
individuals and groups external to the Western Enlightenment tradition. Through carrying 
out a detailed textual analysis, focusing on a range of African political theory, this thesis is 
able to claim that within these sources the values of internal and external self-law giving 
can be located. The results do not imply a belief amongst the authors studied of the value 
of a Kantian model for establishing political, moral and philosophical beliefs and codes, nor 
do they represent support for a Kantian model of republican government. Rather, the 
implication is only that the authors studied in Chapters 3 to 5 of this thesis suggest in their 
writing, and through the debates they enter into, that the concepts of choice, equality and 
self-mastery (as defined in Chapter 1 as themes representational of internal and external 
notions of self-law giving) are central tenants of personhood. That these tenants form the 
focus of debates that exist between cultural groups: debates surrounding issues of 
individual or cultural identity formation, or in acts of activism and protest. As such, they 
may represent foundations which are advocated for as being of value to all individuals 
universally. 
Having demonstrated that these concepts underpin African arguments, it is the claim of 
this thesis that these principles thus underpin discussions of the rights and duties of 
personhood, both across and between cultures. As such, it is argued that the narrow case 
study of African political theory establishes the evidence to potentially view them as 
universal foundations existing a priori, and to establish a justification for carrying out 
further research considering the foundational underpinnings of other cultural groups in 
relation to questions of identity, personhood and self-law giving. In making these 
concluding remarks, the aim is to summarise the analysis of each chapter, and to indicate 
textual support that has been highlighted throughout the analysis as supporting this 
argument. Having summarised these arguments, the conclusion then considers a number 
of objections that could be made relating to the analysis and assumptions of this thesis, 
and any critiques and paradoxes arising from the study. This is then followed by an attempt 
to respond to, and overcome, these concerns and to defend this thesis’s position 
methodologically, ideologically and normatively. Finally, this thesis will end with a brief 
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consideration of possible future research, and the areas into which this project could next 
develop.  
6.1- Summary:  
Each of the analytical chapters (Chapters 3 to 5) has taken as its theme a selected school of 
thought, or collection of thinkers, which have been grouped together based on similarities 
in their views, or the individual’s claimed membership to a particular ideology or system of 
thought; the method for allocating thinkers to certain groups, and for selecting the thinkers 
more generally, is discussed both in the Introduction in reference to the overall 
methodology for selection, and at the start of each individual chapter in relation to 
selecting (and omitting) thinkers as representational of that particular set of views. The 
purpose of this brief summary is to further draw out and reiterate the areas in which the 
analysis of each chapter provided support for the research question of the overall project.  
Chapter 3 focused on an in depth analysis of the authors and publications of the Négritude 
movement, originating in the work of an educated African and Caribbean elite living and 
working in Paris in the 1930s and 1940s. The movement was recognised to be explicitly 
both cultural and political, and was thus selected as being of interest to this thesis with its 
focus on both issues of cultural particularity and universalism, and understanding the role 
of philosophical foundations in different political conditions. The majority of the work 
published by the movement was a response to issues of oppression and domination under 
colonialism. The analysis found that none of the authors supported in their work 
specifically Kantian ideals, nor did they advocate for a Kantian model of politics. However, 
throughout the research it became clear that a number of the arguments they made, and 
debates they presented, centred on similar ideas. In particular, their advocacy for individual 
choice and purposiveness and the value of treating individuals from different cultural or 
geographical backgrounds as equally valid. This manifested itself in a number of ways, a 
selection of which are considered in the following paragraphs. 
A particular theme that was found to be central to the movement was a dislike for 
assimilation politics and the goals of the colonisers to homogenise cultural and linguistic 
differences. It was observed by Jules-Rosette, that the movement itself “was born out of 
protest against the colonisation and assimilation produced by ‘Latin’ culture’” (Jules-
Rosette, 1992, p.17). In particular there was a focus amongst the thinkers on the value of 
Black identity and its strength as both a revolutionary tool, and to understanding what 
Senghor referred to as the “Civilisation de l’Universal”. Both of these factors enabled 
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similarities to be drawn with the themes at the centre of this thesis. Firstly, in the sense 
that individual identity and purposiveness were clearly valued by the movement, especially 
in opposition to the models espoused by the colonisers; and secondly, the suggested 
existence of a Universal Civilisation implies, as evidenced in the chapter, an understanding 
of humanity couched in terms of universals.  
In concluding Chapter 3, focus turned to the work of Frantz Fanon whose views were in 
places critical of what he viewed as the assimilative nature of Négritude itself. It was his 
argument that advocacy for a shared Black identity, combined with a political approach 
that worked with the ex-colonisers, failed to provide the newly independent states with 
real freedom. Whilst this led to his criticism of Négritude, Chapter 3 argued that the claims 
he was making were grounded on similar philosophical foundations to those of the 
movement itself: the right to express ones individual identity without coercion from 
external parties, and to maintain a sense of purposiveness in doing so. Thus, throughout 
the chapter it was argued, not that any of the thinkers analysed were themselves Kantian, 
but that the political and cultural arguments they were making, implicitly centred around, 
or were grounded in, discussion of issues of self-mastery, choice and equality. That being 
said, the chapter concluded in support of the hypothesis, that many of the arguments 
expressed by the Négritude thinkers focused on ideas similar to those of internal and 
external self-law giving. Thus, the chapter provided support for the overall claim of this 
thesis: that these principles are foundational to discussions of individuals, identity and 
personhood, and that these foundations underwrite key presuppositions in these African 
thinkers. 
Chapter 4 extended this analysis to consider the foundations of a second area of historical 
political discourse emanating from Africa. It concentrated on the topic of African socialism 
in the post-independence era from 1950 to 1980. Three theorists were selected for analysis, 
each of whom was associated not only with socialist political ideals but also with responses 
to colonialism within the wider continent: Julius K. Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah with the 
Pan-African movement and Samora Machel with independence and anti-oppression 
movements across Southern Africa. As discussed within the chapter, unlike the 
philosopher-statesmen of the Négritude movement, discussants of Kwame Nkrumah did 
recognise in his publications a Kantian influence. Hountondji observed that, particularly 
within “Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for De-Colonisation” (1970) Nkrumah 
“professes an egalitarian and humanistic ethic strongly marked by the influence of Kant” 
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(Hountondji, 1983, p.153). That being said, this chapter focused not only on the 
philosophical thought of the theorists, but also on their ability to deliver on these ideals. 
Throughout the chapter (particularly in Section 4.3), the existence of explicitly Kantian 
ideals was questioned in the cases of not just Nkrumah, but all three thinkers. This was not 
to imply that these thinkers were each explicitly Kantian in their views and ideals. Rather, it 
was to suggest that their positions shared with both one another, and the Kantian 
framework set out in Chapter 1, similar philosophical foundations. It was concluded that 
the ability to locate these principles thus supported the argument that these foundations 
may exist a priori. 
Much of their work focused on the re-building of their state, the political conditions they 
intended to create, and on what grounds they justified their decisions. Analysis of a 
combination of the thinkers’ articles, monographs and speeches, alongside the work of 
secondary discussants, thus provided the necessary material for this thesis to draw 
similarities between the philosophical underpinnings of their arguments and the concepts 
of both internal self-law giving, and willkϋr within a political condition. The chapter focused 
on the three areas of self-mastery, equality of individuals and freedom of choice versus 
domination. By dividing the section in such a way it was possible to draw specific 
similarities rather than relying on more general comments, thus providing in-depth analysis 
of the philosophical foundations of the thinkers views; an approach that was less 
appropriate in the previous chapter due to the less explicitly expressed views in the 
material being studied. It became apparent throughout the chapter that a number of 
themes were emerging across the thinkers. For example, each statesman placed a strong 
emphasis on “people’s power that asserts our independence and identity” (Machel, 1974, 
p.2), and the right of the people to “govern ourselves” (Gbedemah and Nkrumah, cited in 
Marable, 1987, p.99). 
This concept of self-government even manifested in two villagisation projects (in Tanzania 
and Mozambique), which were initially founded on the premise of implementing policies of 
self-government. As was discussed at length in the chapter, both of these projects failed to 
abide by these ideals and eventually became models for forced villagisation of rural 
communities. However, this thesis considered the expressed views of the thinkers at the 
outset of the project as well as the critiques as they began to fail. This enabled the thesis to 
consider the justifications initially given for the villagisation model, and the philosophical 
ideas underpinning these justifications, as well as the reasons for failure. In doing so, it 
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became clear that the philosophical premises on which these models were built, 
“organisations created by the people and governed by those who live and work in them” 
(Nyerere, 193, p. 67), “the co-operative administers the communal village” (Machel, 1979, 
p.128), were similar to those expressed by the themes of individual choice and self-mastery: 
focusing on the purposiveness of the individuals and the communities, and not necessarily 
on the needs and wants of the states. Whilst these projects may not have been realised in 
reality, it does allow the chapter to make claims regarding the centrality of notions of self-
mastery and purposiveness to these systems of thought, and in doing so to imply the 
potential universality of these principles as common to all persons. Throughout the analysis 
it became clear that a disconnect existed between the philosophical norms posited by the 
politicians, and the political realities they were able to achieve. Whilst this calls in to 
question the “follow through” of their speeches and publications, it is less problematic for 
the aims of this thesis. As has been discussed throughout, the purpose of this thesis has 
been to demonstrate that questions of self-law giving, as both internal and external 
concepts, are foundational principles to discussions of personhood and autonomy and thus 
can be viewed as fundamental rights when entering in to political organisations. It has not 
been the aim of this thesis to defend either political figures, or their models, as appropriate 
for achieving this, but rather to suggest that their views are premised on, or underpinned 
philosophically by, an understanding of self-law giving as a core facet of individuals. 
Throughout Chapter 4 it was possible to make these claims and to thus argue that analysis 
of Nyerere, Machel and Nkrumah supports the hypothesis of this thesis. 
The final analytical chapter (Chapter 5) focused on the publications of contemporary 
professional philosophers. This stood in contrast to the previous two chapters which 
concentrated on the work of philosopher statesmen and activists. Thus, the inclusion of the 
three chapters provided diverse cases for study. In particular, many of the contemporary 
scholars included in the final chapter were highly critical of the approaches of their 
predecessors and condemned their choice of focus. Thus, by selecting theorists that 
approached issues of identity, personhood and oppression from divergent stances, this 
thesis was able to make more substantiated claims regarding the universal nature of the 
underlying principles; if theorists from a range of backgrounds, arguing for contrasting 
perspectives, made reference to the same underlying principles then this increases the 
argument for supporting an understanding of these foundations as being universal. The 
works of the theorists included all dated from the 1980’s to the present and were 
published in edited books, monographs or articles. Unlike the previous two chapters, this 
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chapter avoided less formal texts such as speeches and letters, focusing instead on purely 
academic publications. 
As suggested, the role of the fifth chapter was to enhance the evidence base for this thesis 
by considering the views of professional philosophers from a range of ideological 
backgrounds, including scholars such as Kwame Anthony Appiah whose Cosmopolitanism is 
openly entrenched within Kantian theory, and those such as Kwasi Wiredu and Ngũgĩ Wa 
Thiong’o who approach philosophical enquiry from a different ontological and ideological 
starting point. Through detailed analysis of a range of publications the chapter was able to 
show, not that contemporary African philosophy is largely Kantian, but rather that in 
discussions of personhood, identity, culture and individuality; the principles of choice, self-
mastery, domination and equality make up much of the dialogue, and that this dialogue 
was often premised on a notion of personhood that strongly reflected, Kantian like, a priori 
presuppositions. Section 5.3 opened with analysis of Polycarp Ikuenobe’s discussion of the 
relationship between culture and universalism in African political thought, and his view, 
similar to that of this thesis, that “there are both universalist and particularist elements in 
African philosophy. In other words, although there are culturally determined philosophical 
ways of constructing meaning, these ways are not incommensurable” (Ikuenobe, 1997, 
p.190). Thus, unlike the Incommensurability Thesis, which was questioned in Chapter 2, 
Ikuenobe suggests that a balance can be achieved between a culturally specific, and a 
universalist approach.  
This assumption is one of the fundamental conclusions also drawn by this thesis: that the 
existence of universal principles regarding personhood and autonomy does not necessarily 
imply that the methods for achieving these principles are not guided by cultural, ideological 
or political influences. This was not only suggested in Chapter 5, but throughout this thesis. 
For example, this thesis has argued, and provided evidence for, the suggested usage of a 
Black identity by the Négritude movement for re-establishing what it meant to be a person 
for a community condemned and belittled by colonialism. In Section 3.6, Frantz Fanon’s 
views, that real freedom and autonomy can only be achieved through the restorative 
nature of “cleansing violence” were discussed: “by choosing violence rather than being 
subjected to it, the colonised subject is able to restore the self…he redefines himself and 
learns to value his life and the shape of his presence in relation to his body, his speech, to 
the Other and to the world” (Mbembe, 2012, p.21).  Similarly, it was suggested, in Chapter 
4, that forms of African socialism, or support for Marxist values, were drawn upon to 
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achieve a sense of individual self-law giving and autonomy and a political condition able to 
recognise this. As Nyerere stated when justifying his choice to favour and adopt a socialist 
model: “socialism is good because it is an organisation of society by all the people of the 
society, and for their common benefit” (Nyerere, 1968, p.46). In the case of Nyerere’s 
political views Masolo commented that what was fundamental to understanding man was 
freedom, but to achieve this freedom a communitarian model of work and community was 
required: “Man is a fundamentally free being; he can realise his freedom from external 
conditionings and domination only if he is self-reliant, and this depends on his work which 
is in turn only effective if realised collectively or in society” (Masolo, 1981, pp.28-290). 
Whilst in Chapter 5 Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o’s views on the roles of language and communication 
in understanding, defining, and oppressing autonomous identity, were discussed. It is his 
argument that language is at the heart of understanding individual identity, and thus was at 
the heart of procedures for colonial control. Whilst his focus on language differs greatly 
from that of Fanon on violence; or Nyerere on collective work, the foundation around 
which these debates hang are nonetheless similar: that persons have a right to 
autonomous personhood, to a sense of purposiveness in directing their lives, and that they 
have this equally. In short, individuals, have a right to be self-law giving on an individual 
level, and to live in a political condition under which this is possible. It is in providing 
evidence for these claims, whilst recognising that cultural and ideological differences do 
not imply that foundational principles cannot exist, that this thesis has been able to 
contribute to the literature of both comparative political theory and cultural studies, and 
advance the knowledge in these areas.  
6.2- Objections and Responses: 
As with all projects, a number of tensions can be found within the work and it is at this 
stage that these will be addressed. A number of common concerns occur with projects such 
as this one that take for their inspiration a system of thought strongly entrenched in a 
Western tradition and then utilise this as a lens for analysing traditions external to the 
individual experience of the author: in particular, the argument that this constitutes an act 
of violence or ethnocentric oppression. This thesis was born out of a concern for the value 
and relevance of the categories of internal self-law giving and willkϋr, expressed through 
themes of self-mastery, equality and freedom of choice or purposiveness. That being said, 
it is possible to critique the project as being somewhat paradoxical, in that  it takes as its 
source material publications (sometimes translated) from a different cultural, political and 
experiential background and formulates arguments based on interpretive textual analysis. 
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Furthermore, this thesis has explicitly selected for analysis sources that, in certain cases, 
are explicitly aligned with non-Kantian traditions. For example, Samora Machel (discussed 
in Chapter 4) has been widely recognised as grounding his political thought in Marxist 
Leninist values. Thus, the question is raised as to whether the process of comparative 
analysis being undertaken by this project is, in fact, a process of stretching the ideas 
contained within the texts to fit the required outputs. The following discussion undertakes 
the procedure of responding to both of these concerns: firstly the anxieties surrounding 
the concerns of ethnocentrism, and secondly the critique of stretching.  
The worry of ethnocentrism is one that is often levied at projects that analyse the thought 
systems of cultures the author is not a member of. In particular, an issue that has been 
historically problematic in the analysis of African political thought is the assumption that 
the ideas presented by individuals are representative of an entire cultural or linguistic 
group, rather than simply the views of the individual sharing them. This is a concern with 
schools of thought such as Négritude, where the authors themselves make claims to be 
representative of larger groups. By way of overcoming this issue it has been made clear 
throughout this thesis that the views discussed are being treated as representing the 
authors’ views alone, and not the people living within the political, cultural or linguistic 
groups discussed. Furthermore, this thesis has avoided using source material specifically 
produced to represent the views of others. As discussed both in the Introduction, and again 
in Chapter 5, a conscious decision was made to exclude texts focusing on the interpretation 
of traditional oral philosophies by third parties. Thus, the work of missionaries such as The 
Reverend Placide Tempels, as well as contemporary African scholars such as Gyekye and 
Wiredu’s discussion of Akan thought, have been excluded from the textual analysis. 
Tempel’s “Bantu Philosophy” was briefly discussed in Chapter 5. However, this was 
intended to provide the setting for the critiques made by contemporary African scholars of 
ethnophilosophical texts and not for the purpose of detailed textual analysis of his claims.  
This element was incorporated within the methodology as it was felt that including these 
texts would build in a layer of bias to the project, as it is unclear which elements of their 
discourse are directly taken from discussion and study of the oral traditions, and which 
elements are influenced by either their own interpretation, or challenges arising from 
translation. 
It must also be made clear that the process of textual analysis relies on certain levels of 
interpretation on the part of the analyst regardless of their grounding in a particular 
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cultural, ideological or geographical experience, and all scholars face these problems when 
assessing the work of other cultures. However, in answer to this concern, this piece of work 
has intended to be as reflective as possible and every effort has been made to overcome 
these issues in the ways detailed below. It is important to recognise that this is an issue, 
and reflecting on these concerns has thus been a fundamental element of the analysis. 
Whilst it is impossible to completely avoid this, it was consciously reflected upon 
throughout the analysis and a number of methods put in place to avoid it. Firstly, a wide 
range of sources, both primary and secondary, were included to verify and triangulate 
certain ideas in different source material. Secondly, the project utilised both formal, and 
informal, texts to substantiate certain assumptions. This included analysis of formal 
scholarly texts as well as the inclusion of letters, speeches and interviews to authenticate 
certain claims. In future projects it would be valuable to research further non-scholarly 
texts to include, for example, analysis of diaries, meeting notes and a larger selection of 
letters and interviews. Additionally, it would be of interest to carry out interviews with the 
scholars studied in Chapter 5 to discuss, in greater detail, their explicit views on the 
philosophical foundations underpinning their work. 
A factor that has been central to the process of reflectivity has been to approach the study 
of texts from other cultures in the spirit of this thesis itself: on the assumption that this is 
an act of cross-cultural dialogue and thus the conditions for achieving this should respect 
the right of these theorists as self-law giving individuals. In reality, this translated into a 
methodology inspired by Kwame Gyekye’s work on ethnocentrism first discussed in 
Chapter 2. The approach views the particularities of the personal culture of the author “as 
one- and only one- form of life among others” (Gyekye, 2004, p.62), and is thus able to 
approach work from other cultures on a similar premise. This is not to suggest that all 
cultures, when studied in detail, will present equally valuable models, but rather that when 
approaching the work of different cultures this should be done, as much as possible, from a 
position that does not favour your own perspective and is interested to take lessons from 
other cultural perspectives. By making this a central premise of this thesis’s research 
process, it was possible to reflect on the most suitable framework for recognising and 
attempting to overcome ethnocentric tendencies. 
In answer to the second concern, the stretching of ideas that have been classically 
associated with one ideological position to be understood through the analytical lens of 
another, the following points are raised. As discussed throughout, the central aim of this 
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research was not to support the existence of either political or ethical Kantian models as 
being universal. Rather, it was to imply that certain fundamental principles present within 
the Kantian framework could also be located in the work of different cultural, political or 
moral perspectives. Hence, it is possible to suggest that these foundational principles may, 
in fact, be a priori, but, at the very least, they can be located in the works analysed by this 
thesis. Therefore, the purpose of this research was not to suggest that views associated 
with, for example, Marxist or Leninist perspectives were in fact Kantian, but rather to 
suggest that both positions may share similar philosophical foundations and 
presuppositions when considering issues of autonomy; the argument extending to suggest 
that these philosophical underpinnings may be common to all human understanding prior 
to political or cultural influence. As Freeden and Vincent suggest in their 2013 discussion of 
comparative political theory, when utilising a comparative approach it is vital to avoid 
“papering over differences in interpretation in the hope of establishing firm commonalities 
in another… (instead we should) encourage and preserve the form of ideo-diversity on our 
planet” (Freeden & Vincent, 2013, p.7). In answer to this concern, this thesis argues not for 
a Kantian understanding of politics, but for culturally diverse understandings underpinned 
by the same philosophical foundations. Thus, this thesis does not aim to silence difference, 
but rather, it advocates for a set of conditions on which cultures can enter into discourse 
fairly and openly. It suggests that one method for achieving this is to locate, and then 
respect, the existence of universal foundations that enable different cultural groups to 
recognise in one another shared traits of personhood. Thus, it is possible to argue that 
rather than being an act of stretching, the research that has been carried out is simply an 
act of comparison: questioning on what grounds certain claims are made, whether 
similarities exist, and thus whether these foundations can be used to establish the basis for 
just and open dialogue between groups.  
Having described the concerns that affect scholarship, focusing on the work of other 
cultures, and by way of concluding this section, discussion now turns to the value of 
undertaking comparative political theory at all. As discussed in the Introduction, 
comparative political theory as a formalised methodology is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, gaining popularity “in the late 1990’s and early 2000s” (Freeden & Vincent, 
2013, p.4). However, scholarly interest in other cultural groups, and the act of comparative 
analysis, has existed throughout human history. There is a long tradition of investigating 
the similarities and differences that exist between groups of people and debating the most 
suitable methods for encouraging discourse between these groups. This thesis contributes 
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to the historical debate in this area by offering one solution to understanding the 
grounding for cross-cultural dialogue. This is not to suggest that this is the only solution, 
but rather, that this piece of work is one further intervention into the debate surrounding 
comparative political scholarship. Based on the argument that, “comparison offers a basis 
of assessment and evaluation, and political theory rightly is a tool for promoting or testing 
ideas through which different outcomes may be attained” (Freeden & Vincent, 2013, p.7), 
it is argued that this thesis finds its utility in offering a favourable solution to the debate 
surrounding the foundations of just cross-cultural dialogue, based on the evidence gleaned 
from the textual analysis.  
6.3- Future Works and New Directions: 
Whilst it has been argued throughout this concluding chapter that this thesis has been 
successful in providing evidence for its claims, and for illustrating the potential universality 
of the principles of self-law giving and willkϋr as being central to the human condition (at 
least as it relates to key African philosophy), it has also raised further questions of interest 
to be explored in future projects. Within the boundaries of this thesis, it has only been 
possible to consider a small selection of African political thought systems, and to consider 
them in depth, in order to question the philosophical foundations on which they were 
premised. That being said, it is not possible at this stage, to claim the actual universality of 
these principles, but rather to state that evidence exists, as presented by this project, that 
these principles can be located in, not only work emanating from the Western 
Enlightenment tradition, but also amongst African scholars, political figures and activists 
from a wide range of political, cultural and ideological backgrounds, who focus in their 
work on Négritude, African socialism and contemporary philosophical discourse. Therefore, 
scope exists to propel this project into a number of new directions, both utilising the same 
methodological model and through a range of different approaches. 
As suggested in the previous section, a natural extension of the project as it stands would 
be to acquire a wider range of informal documents such as letters, diaries and notes to 
offer further verification for the claims being made regarding the theorists covered within 
this analysis. This would not only provide further clarification for understanding a thinker’s 
understanding of the individual, but also in answering the questions surrounding the 
disconnect between individual belief and political practice. To clarify, throughout this thesis 
it has become apparent, and widely discussed, that the position advocated for by theorists, 
in both their publications and their speeches, were often different to those achieved by 
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those individuals that were also political figureheads. This issue was a particular focus of 
both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4; with Senghor, Nyerere, Nkrumah and Machel making claims 
regarding the value of individual self-law giving, and the necessity to recognise this within 
political conditions. However, the reality of the political conditions they presided over then 
failed to recognise the value of individuals and, in fact, in some cases, led to forms of 
domination and oppression as understood in the Kantian sense of limiting purposiveness or 
choice.  However, as discussed in Chapter 4, there is a strong tradition in Western political 
thought to study the ideas of thinkers such as Marcus Aurelius, despite the fact that they 
ruled differently to them. Thus, it is argued in that chapter, that the difference between a 
theorist’s ideas, and their ruling approaches, are not a reason to avoid studying the 
normative claims of philosopher states people.  Nonetheless, further investigation into the 
justifications for the differences between their theories and their rule would make for an 
interesting extension to the project.  
In addition to extending the study in relation to the theorists and movements currently 
studied in this project, claims of universality could be better supported through the 
extension of the study to a wider range of cultural perspectives: initially from within the 
African continent, and in time, considering a range of other thought systems based on both 
historical and contemporary sources. Whilst this approach could continue to contribute to 
the comparative political theory literature, the space also exists to expand the project into 
a qualitative study of remote groups living separately to Western influence. Whilst this 
would be an ambitious extension to the project, it would enable greater claims to be made 
about the a priori nature of these principles.  
Finally, the research of this thesis also establishes two further potential areas for 
investigation. Firstly, it raises questions surrounding identity and citizenship; in particular 
the role of racial, national and even continental identities, in establishing individual 
personhood and overcoming homogenisation and domination. Thus, consideration of this 
relationship will be a further area of interest for future study. Likewise, investigation into 
the practical utility of recognising the value of foundational principles, and the creation of a 
framework for dialogue based on this premise, will be a long-term ambition for future 
areas of work.  
6.4- Closing Remarks: 
At the heart of this project has been a focus on understanding the age old question of 
political theory: is there a universal understanding of what it means to be an individual 
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person; to raise the question of whether foundational principles exist, shared by us all, 
from which meaningful and just cross-cultural dialogue can take place to establish 
international principles of conduct, interactions and law. As a result, this study has 
presented one possible intervention into the debate concerning the homogenising nature 
of universalism, and the often imperialist, justifications underlying it in cases of 
international principle formation and application. In this sense, parallels can be drawn 
between the work of this thesis and a form of moral Cosmopolitanism which views the 
philosophical underpinnings of personhood to be premised on an understanding of 
individuals as having equal and intrinsic moral worth. However, what distinguishes this 
project from Cosmopolitan values, is an understanding of cultures that recognises and 
accepts the existence of difference and boundaries, and rather than viewing the 
differences between groups as irrelevant, this project supports a system premised on 
motivating and providing the foundations for cross-cultural dialogue that is able to 
recognise both a weak sense of universalism (set out in Chapter 1), and the existence of 
cultural difference, within it. 
Throughout this thesis it has been suggested that these principles (of self-mastery, equality 
and freedom of choice or purposiveness) do indeed exist within the selected source 
material, and that it is possible to recommend further research to establish the universal 
relevance of the concepts of willkϋr and self-law giving. Through the establishment of 
themes representing these concepts, this thesis has been able to carry out detailed textual 
analysis which supports the hypothesis that foundational to debates of autonomy, identity 
and personhood are claims for the value of self-mastery, choice, equality and freedom from 
domination. This thesis makes these claims, not by ignoring the significant impact of 
culture on individuals, but rather by suggesting that cultural and political factors are 
instrumental to individuals achieving these foundations. To reiterate, individuals and 
communities may rely on the uptake of vastly different political ideologies and cultural 
approaches, and in the majority of cases studied by this thesis it has become clear that they 
do; but underpinning each of these is a human assumption that all reasoned individuals, 
share both an a priori right and duty to be self-law giving and should be able to achieve this 
within a rightful condition. The existence of these principles places a requirement on the 
human community to think creatively about our political situations and to enter into cross-
cultural dialogue based on just principles: respect for all individuals (and their freely 
associated groups) as having a right and duty to be self-law giving, and to live within a 
political condition that is respectful of this right.  
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This thesis contributes to the ever growing literature surrounding the topic of comparative 
political theory. It supports a model of weak universalism premised on the understanding 
of foundational principles that can be approached and responded to in culturally specific 
ways: whilst also respecting individual autonomy and personhood. In conclusion, this thesis 
has been able to show that an argument can be made for the necessity for open, honest 
and fair cross-cultural dialogue that is justified by, and respectful of, the principles of 
internal and external self-law giving, as existing at the centre of political discourse in both 
the Kantian model and the selection of African political theory examined by this project. It 
has therefore established an evidence base for the claim that the principles of internal self-
law giving and external willkür can be located within the selection of African political 
theorists studied and, may, in fact, exist a priori. On this basis, this thesis recommends that 
these principles should be recognised and respected as foundations of, and applied to, just 
and fair cross-cultural dialogue.   
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